Per decenni la Svezia ha incarnato un modello di neutralità attiva, resilienza istituzionale e integrazione economica globale. Oggi quel paradigma è superato. L’ingresso nella NATO nel marzo 2024 non rappresenta solo una scelta militare, ma il riconoscimento di un mutamento strutturale: la sicurezza non è più lineare né separabile per ambiti. Nel 2026, le valutazioni della Säkerhetspolisen e del MUST convergono su un punto: Russia, Cina e Iran operano simultaneamente su più livelli – militare, economico, informativo e criminale. La Svezia non è più periferia stabile, ma frontiera avanzata del confronto euro-atlantico, soprattutto nello spazio baltico.

Il Baltico come spazio di pressione multidimensionale

Il primo vettore di rischio è geografico. Il Mar Baltico è diventato un teatro strategico ad alta densità di vulnerabilità: rotte commerciali, cavi sottomarini, infrastrutture energetiche e digitali. La Russia resta la principale minaccia militare. La guerra in Ucraina e la competizione con l’Occidente hanno trasformato il Baltico in uno spazio di pressione costante ma sotto soglia. Interferenze GPS, manipolazioni AIS, protezione aggressiva della “shadow fleet” e presenza navale crescente indicano una strategia che punta a logorare senza provocare escalation diretta. Gli incidenti ai cavi sottomarini tra 2024 e 2025 – spesso senza attribuzione certa – mostrano una dinamica chiave: il danno materiale è secondario rispetto all’effetto sistemico. Ogni interruzione aumenta i costi di sicurezza, assicurazione e sorveglianza. In questo contesto, la non attribuibilità diventa un’arma.

Proxy criminali e minaccia interna: la nuova frontiera

Il secondo livello è interno ma connesso all’esterno. La Svezia, già segnata da anni di violenza di gang, si trova oggi davanti a una trasformazione qualitativa: la criminalità organizzata come strumento geopolitico. Secondo la Säpo, l’Iran ha utilizzato reti criminali svedesi per colpire interessi israeliani e intimidire oppositori. Il caso della rete Foxtrot e del suo leader Rawa Majid rappresenta un esempio emblematico di questa convergenza. Qui si rompe una distinzione classica: non esiste più una separazione netta tra sicurezza interna e minaccia esterna. Le reti criminali diventano infrastrutture a noleggio, abbassando i costi operativi per attori statali e aumentando la difficoltà di prevenzione e attribuzione.

Cina: la pressione silenziosa su economia e tecnologia

A differenza di Russia e Iran, la Cina agisce su un piano meno visibile ma più strutturale. Pechino utilizza il proprio peso economico per influenzare catene del valore, ricerca e innovazione tecnologica. Nel 2025, la Cina rappresentava di gran lunga il principale partner commerciale della Svezia tra i tre attori considerati. Questo crea una vulnerabilità diversa: non legata alla sicurezza immediata, ma alla dipendenza sistemica. Il MUST evidenzia come il controllo di tecnologie strategiche e supply chain possa tradursi in una leva geopolitica. La minaccia non è un attacco diretto, ma la capacità di condizionare le scelte industriali e politiche nel lungo periodo.

Difesa totale e aumento della spesa: la risposta di Stoccolma

Di fronte a questo scenario, la Svezia ha avviato una trasformazione profonda. Il modello della “difesa totale” – che coinvolge Stato, economia e società – è tornato centrale. Il bilancio della difesa è in forte crescita, con l’obiettivo di superare il 3% del PIL entro il 2028. Non si tratta solo di riarmo tradizionale, ma di una strategia più ampia: protezione delle infrastrutture, sicurezza cyber, resilienza civile. Parallelamente, è prevista la creazione di un nuovo servizio di intelligence civile esterna entro il 2027. Questo indica un passaggio chiave: la Svezia riconosce che la sicurezza moderna richiede integrazione tra intelligence, polizia e difesa.

La convergenza delle minacce: un’unica matrice strategica

Il dato più rilevante non è la presenza di tre attori ostili, ma la loro convergenza funzionale. Russia, Cina e Iran non agiscono necessariamente in coordinamento diretto, ma beneficiano dello stesso effetto: l’erosione della coesione occidentale.

• La Russia esercita pressione militare e ibrida
• L’Iran utilizza proxy e intimidazione transnazionale
• La Cina incide su economia e tecnologia

Il risultato è un ambiente in cui le minacce si sommano, creando una saturazione strategica. La difficoltà di attribuzione, la moltiplicazione dei vettori e la continuità delle pressioni trasformano il rischio in una condizione permanente.

Due scenari: resilienza o saturazione

Nel migliore degli scenari, la Svezia riesce a trasformare questa pressione in un vantaggio strategico. Rafforzando coordinamento, protezione infrastrutturale e contrasto alle reti criminali, può diventare un modello di resilienza nordica. I segnali positivi sarebbero: maggiore capacità di attribuzione, riduzione degli incidenti, contenimento del reclutamento criminale e stabilità sociale. Nel peggiore degli scenari, invece, si entra in una fase di saturazione ibrida. Non un grande evento, ma una sequenza continua di micro-crisi: sabotaggi, cyberattacchi, intimidazioni, disinformazione. Il risultato sarebbe un aumento del costo-Paese, con effetti su economia, investimenti e coesione interna.

La Svezia come laboratorio geopolitico

La Svezia rappresenta oggi un caso di studio cruciale. Non perché sia un’eccezione, ma perché anticipa una tendenza più ampia: la trasformazione della sicurezza in un campo multidimensionale e continuo. Il punto centrale non è stabilire quale minaccia sia prevalente, ma comprendere come esse interagiscono. La distinzione tra guerra e pace, interno ed esterno, civile e militare si sta progressivamente dissolvendo. Per analisti e decisori, la lezione è chiara: la competizione geopolitica contemporanea non si gioca più solo sui territori, ma sulle connessioni, le vulnerabilità e la capacità di resistenza delle società. La Svezia, nel Baltico, è oggi il luogo dove questa trasformazione è più visibile. E forse, anche, il primo banco di prova per capire se l’Europa saprà adattarsi a una sicurezza che non concede più zone grigie.

L'articolo Svezia, minaccia a tre dimensioni: tensioni nel Baltico, guerra ibrida e vulnerabilità interne proviene da InsideOver.

Nel 1997, sotto la guida di Boris El’cin e Jiang Zemin, Mosca e Pechino proclamavano la nascita di un ordine multipolare fondato su dialogo, consultazioni e centralità delle Nazioni Unite. La fine del bipolarismo doveva aprire una stagione di cooperazione equilibrata, lontana dall’egemonia statunitense. A quasi trent’anni di distanza, quella visione appare sbiadita. L’intesa tra Russia e Cina non è più soltanto un esercizio diplomatico, ma una convergenza strategica pragmatica alimentata dalla pressione occidentale e dalla competizione sistemica con Washington.

Putin, Xi e il consolidamento dell’intesa

Con l’ascesa di Vladimir Putin, la Cina diventa per il Cremlino un contrappeso alla presenza euro-atlantica. La cooperazione si intensifica nelle piattaforme multilaterali come i BRICS e l’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai, fino a intrecciarsi con progetti di integrazione economica quali la Belt and Road Initiative. Dopo il 2014, con l’annessione della Crimea e l’espulsione dal G8, Mosca comprende che l’isolamento finanziario può essere mitigato solo rafforzando il legame con Pechino. La crisi del 2008 aveva già avvicinato i due Paesi sul terreno della de-dollarizzazione; le sanzioni occidentali rendono quella traiettoria una necessità.

Dal partenariato paritario all’asimmetria strutturale

Tra il 2014 e il 2022 crescono le esercitazioni militari congiunte, la cooperazione tecnologica e l’interscambio energetico. Ma l’equilibrio si modifica. La domanda cinese di armamenti russi si riduce, mentre aumenta la dipendenza russa da componenti elettroniche, macchinari e tecnologia dual use provenienti dalla Cina.

Dopo il 2022, la quota cinese nelle importazioni russe supera il 50%. Mosca paga sovrapprezzi elevati per beni soggetti a restrizioni occidentali e, nel 2025, emette per la prima volta bond in renminbi, segnalando una crescente esposizione finanziaria verso Pechino. Il rapporto fornitore-cliente si rovescia: la Russia diventa junior partner.

Washington come catalizzatore dell’asse

Gli Stati Uniti restano il principale fattore di coesione tra Mosca e Pechino. La Casa Bianca interpreta l’intesa come una sfida diretta al primato globale. Con il ritorno di Donald Trump nel 2025, la linea americana assume toni più transazionali ma mantiene l’obiettivo di contenere la Cina, considerata minaccia strutturale. Il risultato è un triangolo geopolitico instabile: Washington tenta di isolare Mosca per concentrarsi su Pechino; la Cina sostiene la Russia senza esporsi eccessivamente; il Cremlino sfrutta il legame per dimostrare la resilienza alle sanzioni.

Un matrimonio di convenienza

Per Mosca, la Cina è ossigeno economico e sbocco energetico. Per Pechino, la Russia è un partner revisionista che distrae l’Occidente e garantisce accesso privilegiato a materie prime strategiche. Ma la relazione è segnata da un pragmatismo freddo, non da un’alleanza formale. La crescente asimmetria rischia di erodere la sovranità strategica russa, mentre la Cina deve gestire un alleato nucleare imprevedibile, attivo in scenari sensibili come Asia Centrale e Artico. È un equilibrio funzionale finché la pressione anti-occidentale persiste.

Tre scenari per il 2026 e oltre

Stabilizzazione multipolare.
La competizione USA-Cina resta prevalentemente commerciale; Mosca diversifica parzialmente le esportazioni; Pechino mitiga l’asimmetria. L’asse sino-russo si consolida come alternativa al G7.

Vassallaggio silenzioso.
La dipendenza tecnologica e finanziaria russa diventa strutturale. La Cina utilizza Mosca come scudo strategico e fornitore energetico a basso costo. L’asse regge, ma la Russia perde autonomia in Asia Centrale e nell’Artico.

Attrito aperto.
Una crisi finanziaria russa o divergenze strategiche portano a tensioni manifeste. Pechino riduce il supporto; Mosca cerca aperture verso altre potenze asiatiche. Il risultato sarebbe un vicino nucleare isolato e instabile ai confini cinesi.

Un multipolarismo fragile

Nel 1997 si parlava di equilibrio condiviso; nel 2026 prevale una simbiosi asimmetrica. La convergenza sino-russa non nasce da affinità ideologica, ma da necessità e opportunismo. È un’alleanza che resiste perché conviene, non perché unisce. La domanda non è se Mosca e Pechino resteranno partner, ma a quale prezzo e con quali margini di autonomia reciproca. In un ordine internazionale frammentato, l’asse eurasiatico è insieme fattore di stabilizzazione e potenziale detonatore.

L'articolo Russia e Cina, l’asse che resiste solo perché conviene. Il nuovo equilibrio eurasiatico alla prova proviene da InsideOver.

The fall of Saddam Hussein, which took place on April 9, 2003 with the arrival of US tanks in the center of Baghdad, had many effects in the Middle East region. The reason is essentially based on the fact that Iraq, without a solid government in power, has turned into a potential powder keg. The country, historically crossed by strong sectarian tensions and a clear division between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, has become a battleground both between the various internal actors and between regional powers.

The war of 2003 can therefore be considered as a detonator of the various Middle Eastern turbulences and that is why it has helped to change the face not only of Iraq but also of the history of the surrounding countries.

Baghdad in the Iranian orbit

During the era of Saddam Hussein, Iraq lived in an almost paradoxical situation. Although the country had a Shiite majority, the rais and his circle of loyalists in Baghdad belonged to the Sunni minority. A circumstance that has not failed to create tensions during the 24 years of regime. Saddam has often viewed with suspicion the emergence of Shiite political and religious groups, mainly based in the south of the country. This led, among other things, to an increase in the level of confrontation with Iran.

In the same year that the rais took the keys to the Iraqi government, an Islamic revolution in Tehran brought to power the Shiite theocracy led by the Ayatollahs. An eight-year war broke out between the two countries, at the end of which diplomatic relations were never fully restored.

When the US overthrew Saddam, Iraqi Shiites immediately pressed for strong representation in the new authorities. The first elections in 2005 saw the victory of Shiite parties, at the expense of Sunni ones. Iran was thus able to get its hands on Baghdad. An effect certainly not intended and almost certainly not calculated by the US on the eve of the war. Between the pro-Shiite Iraq and the Iranian theocracy, a strong convergence was born. In doing so, the Ayatollahs began to control large parts of Iraq’s new power.

The effects of this sudden change have also occurred at regional level. Tehran has begun planning the so-called “Shiite crescent” strategy. A project aimed at ideally linking its government with the new post-Saddam Iraq, with Syria governed by the Alawite Shiite Bashar Al Assad, then extending its sphere of influence to Beirut. Here, in fact, Iran has begun to exploit the axis more with the Lebanese Shiite movements and, in particular, with the Hezbollah.

This has created the basis for heated discussions throughout the region. Iranian activism has in fact sharpened the tug-of-war between Tehran and its historical antagonists. These include Saudi Arabia and the Gulf petromonarchies. The wars that broke out in the following decade, starting with the one in Yemen, are attributable to the confrontation at a distance between the Shiite theocracy of the Ayatollahs and the Sunni monarchies. It is also important to underline the growing fears for its own security by Israel, another historic rival of Iran in the Middle East.

The rise of Al Qaeda and jihadist terrorism

The radical change at the top of Baghdad has also had consequences within the Iraqi Sunni world. In some fringes, the concern has emerged to become slaves of the Shiite majority. A circumstance that has created, among other things, fertile ground for jihadist propaganda. Already in 2014, several terrorist groups were active in Iraq. Inside, not only Iraqis but also foreign fighters. Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist movement, took the reins and took advantage of the situation to launch its own holy war against US troops.

Emerging in this context was the figure of the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. Bin Laden himself gave him his approval for the birth of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The jihadist insurgency went on for several years, finding support especially in the province of Al Anbar, between Ramadi and Falluja. The situation was particularly serious in 2007, with the country effectively hostage to a sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. Al Zarqawi was killed in 2006, but his successors implemented Al Qaeda’s activities in Iraq.

The group will later become “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) and with the new leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi will be engaged since 2011 in the Syrian civil war, alongside Al Nusra and other Islamist groups opposed to the Assad government. ISIL will become better known by the acronym of Isis and the group will give birth to the Islamic State, capable of conquering the entire north of Iraq and large portions of Syria between 2014 and 2017. Today th

e Islamic State is no more, but the country continues to be crossed by jihadist tensions.

The duel between Washington and Tehran in Iraqi territory

The fight against ISIS has brought the presence of various international forces to Iraq. On the one hand, the US-led coalition, engaged in eastern Syria and northern Iraq against the caliphate. On the other, an alliance between several Shiite paramilitary groups, assisted by Iran. Behind the common intent to defeat the Islamic State, the struggle to contend for its influence in Baghdad has also emerged.

In the heart of Iraqi territory, therefore, Washington’s forces still coexist with forces close to Tehran. An incompatibility that emerged especially in 2020, when a US raid in Baghdad killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimaini, architect of the Shiite crescent project. In response, Iran bombed US bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraq has thus turned into the battleground between the United States and Iran. A tug of war that has contributed to fueling tensions throughout the Middle East and that has dragged within it also the other regional powers.

The unresolved Kurdish question

The 2003 war and the end of Saddam’s power gave the Kurds the opportunity to manage their territories independently. The new Iraqi constitution recognized Kurdistan as an autonomous region with Erbil as its capital. Here is the de facto seat of a state within a state. The Iraqi Kurds have entered into trade agreements and ties independently of Baghdad.

But beyond the internal events in Iraq, the autonomy granted to the Kurds has also reignited the issue in all the other countries in the region where the Kurds constitute an important minority. Starting with Turkey. President Erdogan, after an initial opening to dialogue, has chosen a hard line against all the main Kurdish organizations. In Ankara, the fear is linked to the fact that the Kurds present in Turkey could claim the same autonomy achieved in Iraq.

In Syria, too, the issue has been at the center of discussions several times. The government in Damascus, before 2011, viewed with suspicion the activism of Kurdish groups. When civil war broke out in the country, the Kurds themselves took advantage of the problems of the central government to organize themselves. The Self-Defense Forces founded the Rojava region. Currently, the groups that bring together Kurdish fighters are partly supported by the US and are based in eastern Syria, beyond the Euphrates. This is also contributing to tensions, with Ankara starting to target Kurdish forces in Syrian territory since 2016.

L'articolo Setting the Middle East ablaze: the Iraqi War, 20 years later proviene da InsideOver.

How business is seeking rich rewards from surging military spending triggered by the Ukraine war

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has piqued the self-interest of private investors and military firms which calculate that the increased military spending spurred by the conflict will boost growth for defence-focused companies.  

And there’s little wonder why, with world military spending growing for the eighth consecutive year in 2022 to an all-time high of €2,042 billion, according to new data published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

By far the sharpest rise in spending (+13 per cent) was seen in Europe, largely accounted for by Russian and Ukrainian military expenditure. However, military aid to Ukraine and concerns about a heightened threat from Russia strongly influenced many other states’ spending decisions, as did tensions in East Asia.

Serge Weinberg, chairman of €43 billion French pharmaceuticals and healthcare multinational Sanofi,  is one of the most prominent of the private investors tapping into this heightened state of defence awareness in the wake of the Ukraine war. 

He is championing the consolidation of France’s fragmented aerospace and defence supply chain via Weinberg Capital Partners, his investment firm which has raised over €100mn for a new fund backing French defence companies. It expects further fund-raising to double that figure.

Weinberg’s campaign coincides with president Emmanuel Macron calling last year for French defence contractors to emulate a “war economy”. Macron’s administration backs the creation of investment funds to support some 4,000 small and mid-sized companies supplying the likes of defence and aerospace titans Airbus, Dassault Aviation and Thales. 

“The bigger defence companies are concerned about having a solid supply chain. This is becoming even more important given the perspectives of additional military spending that is set to come through with the next multiyear military budget,” Weinberg told the Financial Times in March. 

“There is a need for additional production capacity, ability to build up stocks, and therefore there is a need to strengthen the financial structures [of these groups],” the former chairman of PPR and CEO of Rexel added.  

High-impact expenditure

SIPRI data shows that military expenditure by states in Central and Western Europe totalled $345 billion in 2022. In real terms, spending by these states for the first time surpassed that in 1989, as the cold war was ending, and was 30 per cent higher than in 2013. Several states significantly increased their military spending following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, while others announced plans to raise spending levels over periods of up to a decade.

‘The invasion of Ukraine had an immediate impact on military spending decisions in Central and Western Europe. This included multi-year plans to boost spending from several governments,’ said Dr Diego Lopes da Silva, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘As a result, we can reasonably expect military expenditure in Central and Western Europe to keep rising in the years ahead.’

Some of the sharpest increases were seen in Finland (+36 per cent), Lithuania (+27 per cent), Sweden (+12 per cent) and Poland (+11 per cent).

‘While the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 certainly affected military spending decisions in 2022, concerns about Russian aggression have been building for much longer,’ said Lorenzo Scarazzato, Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘Many former Eastern bloc states have more than doubled their military spending since 2014, the year when Russia annexed Crimea.’

The war in Ukraine has sparked plans for a significant increase in military spending in many other European countries, including France, Germany, Poland and the UK. With governments investing more in drones, sensors, cyber and artificial intelligence, private investors’ antennae are twitching. 

That said, environmental, social and governance (ESG) consideration weigh heavily on some fund managers’ minds. Many are wary of being seen to support weapons manufacturers, opting instead to invest in developing dual-use technologies for both civil and military applications. 

The two top private equity defence deals by value were consummated by Advent International, which bought UK-listed groups Cobham for £4bn in 2019 and Ultra Electronics for £2.8bn in 2022.   

Tanks a lot

The war has also seen the number of military vehicles sold by private dealers in the UK to Ukraine soar since Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion last year.

As Ukraine’s forces have scrambled to arm themselves in the face of Russia’s onslaught started by the full-scale invasion in February 2022, with towns like Bakhmut and Avdiivka now under daily attack in the war, the demand for weapons has never been higher.

British businessman Nick Mead spent decades buying military vehicles from the UK Ministry of Defence for his entertainment company Tanks A Lot, but since February 2022, Ukrainians desperate for tanks and armour have been buying them off him. But Mead’s vehicles are not the only ones on the road to the war.

More than €34 million-worth of military vehicles were shipped from the UK to Ukraine between April and September 2022 alone, according to government data, while in the whole of 2021 only £37,000 worth of vehicles were sold, in 2020 it was £550,000 and nothing in 2019.

The soaring demand for British armoured vehicles has driven prices up, leading some to accuse sellers of profiteering. Mead says: “There’d be some people who’d think we’re profiteering out of war, and I guess we are and that hurts. What I’m trying to do is help Ukraine, and I wish a lot more people would help Ukraine.”

As for whether the surge in demand for matériel will intensify rivalry between suppliers belonging to the ‘Atlantic’ and European blocs, SIPRI’s Scarazzato reveals there are many discussions at the European level to coordinate procurement in favour of companies in the European Defence and Technology Industrial Base (EDTIB).

‘But the issue is notoriously thorny, as countries tend to favour their national industry. Moreover, the urgency and the pressure created by the war in Ukraine are pushing some countries towards off-the-shelves acquisitions often from the US companies or (in the case of Poland) South Korea.

Scarazzato adds a caveat, however. ‘European companies have been wary about ramping up production, wanting to see contracts signed before committing to investments. The reason is they want to make sure their return on investment is guaranteed, and not at the mercy of political wills.’

L'articolo Cashing in conflict: the Ukraine War and its business implications in Uk and Europe proviene da InsideOver.

On April 26, 2023, more than a year after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in February 2022, Chinese president Xi Jinping held his first interaction with Ukrainian president Zelensky by way of an hour long telephonic conversation.

Both sides are reported to have discussed the crisis in Ukraine, with president Zelensky saying that he had a long and meaningful call with Xi. However, for a country of China’s standing that is seeking to play a major role in upholding the institution of global governance, the Xi-Zelensky phone call could be a classic case of too little, too late. Besides, being lost no time in clarifying that the conversation was requested by the Ukrainian side. In contrast, since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, President Xi has had several virtual and in-person meetings with President Putin, most recently in March 2023 when he visited Russia.
Lately, China has been trying to project an image of itself as a global mediator. On February 24, China proposed a 12-point peace plan for resolving the crisis in Ukraine. Ironically, till that time, President Xi had not had a single interaction with its Ukrainian counterpart – a fact that was increasingly creating murmurs even among countries of the global south. However, it is not just China’s inordinate delay in communication with the Ukrainian leadership that is the issue here, but rather Beijing’s questionable neutral position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

One may recall that just a few weeks before Russian troops entered Ukraine, President Putin met President Xi in Beijing on February 4, 2022. It was a time when Russia had already amassed a huge build-up on Ukraine’s borders. Instead of dissuading Russia from impinging on Ukraine’s sovereignty, President Xi went ahead and pledged a no-limits cooperation with Moscow. If China wanted to don the mantle of peace broker, that was the time to effectively do so. Instead, Beijing proceeded to provide a blanket reassurance to Russia, thereby further emboldening it to act against Ukraine.

Since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Beijing has maintained that it is a responsible power and a neutral party. Yet, over the course of the last year, China has stepped up its political, diplomatic,
economic and strategic support to Russia – all but stopping short of providing direct military assistance to the latter. China has been blocking UN resolutions criticizing Russia for its actions in Ukraine and has also extended Moscow an economic lifeline amidst wide-ranging economic sanctions. During President Xi’s recent visit to Moscow (March 20-22, 2023), both sides further renewed their pledges of strategic and economic cooperation.

China and Russia also have robust defence relations and have conducted several joint military exercises, even after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In February 2023, reports were rife about China’s plans to provide lethal miliary support to Russia in Ukraine. While this has been vehemently dismissed by Beijing and has, so far, not been confirmed, it is suspected that China is looking for ways to increase assistance to Moscow without tarnishing its own image. Some of the ways adopted by Beijing to avoid sanctions and reputational cost include supplying dual use equipment to Russia, operating through the cover of private companies, or even routing supplies through a third country. Over the last year, Chinese companies have provided assault rifles and body armour to Russia apart from navigating equipment, satellite imagery, vehicle and jet fighter parts, electronic jamming technology, and electronic parts for anti-aircraft missile radars. Such actions, for someone, could do not qualify Beijing as a credible mediator.

Again, for all of Beijing’s diplomatic language about sovereignty and territorial integrity, the startling remarks made by Lu Shaye, China’s Ambassador to France, questioning the sovereignty of former soviet states, gives a peek into Beijing’s actual worldview. Responding to a question on whether Crimea belong to Ukraine, Ambassador Lu had stated that ex-Soviet countries don’t have an effective status in international law because there was no international agreement to materialize their status as sovereign countries. This essentially disputes Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea and other Russian occupied areas. This is also not a very comforting statement from the emissary of a country professing to establish an alternative ‘global security’ order based on respect for sovereignty.

Though the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was prompt to distance itself from Lu’s comments, it is hard to believe that the statements of a hand-picked ‘wolf warrior’ like Lu Shaye, do not somewhere reflect the inner thinking of the Chinese Communist Party. More concerning is the fact that Lu is echoing what Moscow itself has been saying on Ukraine. As pointed out by Lithuanian Foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, this is the Russian propaganda on Ukraine, and now its being sent out by another country, which is in our eyes an ally of Moscow. Once again, this does not position Beijing very well as an impartial mediator in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Some like Czech president Petr Pavel have even assessed that it may actually be in China’s interest to prolong the status quo in Ukraine since it would allow Beijing to continue ‘pushing Russia to a number of concessions’ while also keeping the West occupied.
Apart from Beijing’s interest in resolving the Ukraine crisis, the other question that arises is its actual ability to do so. On April 27, the Russian Foreign Ministry commenting on the Xi-Zelensky call said that it had ‘noted’ Beijing’s willingness to put in place a negotiation process and welcomed any attempt to end the Ukrainian conflict ‘on its own terms.’ However, less than a day later on April 28, Russia resumed missile attacks on civilian targets in Ukraine, resulting in more than twenty casualties, including three minors. This is a clear message from Kremlin that it is not in a mood to be reined in by Beijing or anybody.

The only situation in which Russia may allow China to broker a peace on its behalf would be if it finds itself in an irrecoverable position of weakness, and needs to either buy time to fortify itself or to find a way out of Ukraine without losing face. China’s interest in mediating the Ukraine crisis throws up two scenarios: one is where China merely wants to gain some moral ground by posturing as a ‘mediator’ without changing anything on ground between Russia and Ukraine. The second and more concerning one is if China is posturing as a ‘neutral’ party trying to broke a ‘peace deal,’ but is actually acting as a proxy on behalf of Russia. This would change the nature of the conflict by providing Moscow tactical and strategic military advantages over Ukraine.

Following his call with President Xi, President Zelensky had remarked that it would act as a ‘powerful impetus’ to their bilateral relationship. Notably, he did not make any comment on how ‘meaningful’ or otherwise the talks might have been for resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict, per se. It is clear that Kiev has no illusions about the optics involved in China projecting itself as a mediator in the Ukraine crisis.

L'articolo The Xi-Zelensky Phone Call: a Case of ‘Too Little, Too Late’? proviene da InsideOver.

For all its bluster, Chinese foreign policy may be at a geopolitical crossroads on the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since last February, China has tried everything to keep itself engaged, albeit unilaterally and uninvited by any member of the international community, with negotiations to end the war. But it has nothing much to show at the end other than the realization that the global isolation is hurting it. Borrowing China’s consistent argument – it is one that Russia believes – that the United States-led West provoked Vladimir Putin until he crossed the Ukrainian border, the problem for China is the narrative remained with the West, not Beijing.

It is the West that did nothing to prevent the war. It promptly imposed sanctions against Russia which the West subsequently turned a blind eye to – the example of how Russian oil takes a global detour to reach the United States is a glaring example. It continued to arm Ukraine, though with defensive and not offensive weapons – meaning thereby the intention was to prolong the war rather than end it. It used Ukraine as a photo-op for the heads of state of European nations. Even the wife of the US president went there. President Joe Biden just couldn’t stop watching the parade of guests and went there himself. Even today, the West and Ukraine are on a daily routine of chats to decide how they will strategise for the ongoing war.

The trading partners of the US and Europe are supporting them, vocally or silently. There has been not much of dissent seeking the US to rein in its ranking policy of allowing the war to go on indefinitely. China is the lone exception. It is not invited at any Western table. It finds itself having to pursue an entirely independent policy on the war. That is the root of the angst in Beijing. They want to belong to a group to show they have ideas to end the war – or at least pretend to have ideas. But nobody is interested. So they tag along, alone. And how? By treating Ukraine as a proxy war against the United States in particular, select portions of the West in general. Far away from Ukraine and with only rhetorical support to Russia, nothing explains China’s policy other than that it wants the war to set the stage for another Cold War.

Despite its anti-American propaganda, China has not really done much to help Russia. It publicly supported Russia over the invasion, calling for a negotiated end to the conflict. President Xi Jinping met with Putin but not Volodymyr Zelenskyy, but that has not stopped China from sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the initial months. Aware of the western sanctions against Russia, China ensured that it did not cross the line despite committing itself to its ‘no-limits friendship’ with Russia.

Look at the scenario. The China-US ties are worse than before, thanks to the ill-advised shooting down of a Chinese balloon(s) by the Americans. The Americans raised a bogey that China proposes to supply arms to the Russians, well knowing that Russia has the world’s second largest army in the world, followed by China. China bristled when US Secretary of State Antony Blinken made an issue out of the China-arms-to-Russia theory and issued a warning of serious consequences if ‘lethal’ weapons are supplied to Russia. The brouhaha ended up in a chilled round of diplomacy and exchange of words, but nothing else.

Beijing ramped up its anti-American propaganda thereafter, while the Chinese foreign ministry issued a memorandum to western journalists about American hegemonic intentions. China rounded up its campaign by announcing a deeper relationship with Russia, calling the alliance “as stable as Mount Tai”—to use a Chinese idiom.

So far, it has calibrated its foreign policy vis-à-vis Ukraine to how the world perceives it. A media report analysed thus: “China has walked a fine line: It suspended business when threats to Chinese interests necessitated it, parroting Russian talking points when they aligned with China’s criticism of the U.S., and continuing trade when the environment was conducive. In doing so, China has used the opportunity to further its foreign policy interests at an incredibly uncertain time in the international environment.”

This policy has given it the freedom to do what it really wants: Give no opportunity to the West to criticize Chinese actions, continue to support Russian actions without violating western economic sanctions, and all the while keep chastising the US. Such a policy has only one objective: Treat itself as a strategic rival of the United States and project the image as a policy at every opportunity the Ukraine war creates.

There is no public knowledge so far of China having provided any ‘lethal’ military support to Russia. But there is a logic to the proposition: China would not want to let go of an opportunity to test its current military arsenal even if by proxy by allowing Russia to use it against Ukraine. It may want to observe from close quarters how Russia strategises the war effort, to even theoretically equip Chinese military commanders with data to study how a war is fought—having fought its last war in 1979, nearly all of the Chinese military has never experienced conflict in the last 40-odd years.

L'articolo More Lessons Learnt than Taught for China on War Anniversary proviene da InsideOver.

After one year of war in Ukraine, Nato is stronger and more united. Inside Over dialogues with General (ret.) David Petraeus about the dynamics shaped by the conflict at the global level, the role of the Alliance in the world competition between powers and the possible ends of the war. Petraeus, born in 1952, has served 37 years in the U.S. Army and has served in many leading roles. From 2007 to 2008 he was the commanding general of Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), from 2008 to 2010 he has served as commander of the U.S. Central Command (Centcom), between 2010 and 2011 he has been the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and commander, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A). From to 2011 and 2012 he has been the 4th Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Cia). Now  Partner at KKR and Chairman of the KKR Global Institute,

How has the Ukraine War changed the strategic context in Europe? 

“I think it is accurate to observe that while Vladimir Putin set out to “Make Russia Great Again,” what he really has done is make NATO great again: prompting two historically neutral (and very capable) countries to seek NATO membership; fostering a level of unity in NATO that has not been seen since the end of the Cold War; resulting in increased defense budgets in Europe and the U.S., with Germany, notably, now committed to achieve the NATO goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense, after having not event gotten to 1.5% previously; leading to augmentation of forces in the Baltic States and eastern Europe; and, finally, dramatically reducing Russia’s military capability, with Russian forces having sustained enormous casualties and staggering losses of weapons systems and vehicles, as well as dramatically depleting its stocks of munitions.  In sum, Russia is very substantially diminished and NATO substantially strengthened”.

Can we state that the West is more united one year after the beginning of the war? 

“Yes, absolutely, despite occasional hesitation over provision of certain weapons to Ukraine (as in the decision over the provision of western tanks to Ukraine, which is now agreed, of course).  As I noted earlier, NATO and other western countries have not been this united since the end of the Cold War”.

What was the role of Western weapons and Intelligence support in strengthening the Ukraine resistance? 

“Absolutely vital.  Ukraine has done a truly extraordinary job of mobilizing the entire country to fight what Ukrainians see as their War of Independence; they have done vastly better than Russia in recruiting, training, equipping, organizing, and employing additional forces and capabilities.  But that would not have been possible without the massive assistance from the U.S. and other western countries.  The U.S. alone has now provided over $27 billion in arms, ammunition, and materiel to the Ukrainian military since the invasion last February, with another $2B reportedly about to be added.  And the weapons systems provided continue to be more and more capable.  And, reportedly, sharing of intelligence has been very helpful, as well, though I don’t want to speculate further on that”.

Which mistakes were committed by the Russian Army? 

 A staggering number of mistakes, – everything from the terribly deficient initial campaign design, overestimation of Russian capabilities, complete underestimation of the capabilities (and incredible determination) of the Ukrainian forces and people, lack of appreciation of western support for Ukraine, poor command and control and communications, failure to achieve combined arms effects (armor, infantry, artillery, engineers, close air support, air defense, and electronic warfare all working together), wholly inadequate logistics, terrible indiscipline by Russian forces, lack of a professional noncommissioned officer corps, poor senior leadership (which is why multiple leaders have been fired), and, clearly, a failure to take advantage of all the time Russian forces had in Belarus and Russia to actually train and prepare the forces for the invasion. 

Is the perspective of an Ukraine victory a feasible one for the end of the War? 

“Yes, though the answer to that question obviously depends on how one defines “victory” and it also depends on a number of factors, most significantly continued strong western security and economic assistance for Ukraine and further tightening of the sanctions and export controls on Russia.  At the end of the day, I believe the war will end with a negotiated resolution when Russia realizes that it is unsustainable on the battlefield (where Russia has already lost more than 8 times the soldiers the USSR lost in nearly 10 years in Afghanistan) and also on the home front, given the ever-tightening sanctions and export controls.  And we need to do all that we can to hasten that day – and also to be ready with a Marshall-like plan to help rebuild Ukraine and also with an ironclad security guarantee for Ukraine, as well (whether that is NATO membership, which would be ideal, or a U.S.-led coalition commitment, if NATO membership is not achievable”.

President Biden stated in his Inauguration Speech that America was coming back as a global, reliable leader. Has the Ukraine War proven that he was right or America’s leadership is still in doubt? 

“I think that America’s leadership of the NATO and western effort to support Ukraine and to impose sanctions and export controls on Russia has shown that the U.S. is “back,” to use President Biden’s term (and that is particularly important in the wake of the withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, which allowed potential adversaries to contend that the U.S. was an unreliable partner and a great power in decline).  And in offering that assessment, please recall, Andrea, that I am not a member of any political party in the U.S. and do not even register to vote, much less vote.  I stopped voting when I was promoted to two-star general and have sought to stay non-political ever since”.

At the global level, the US is dealing with Russia’s expansionism in Europe and China’s ambitions in the Far East. What will be the most important issue for Washington in the coming years? 

“I think there is no question, that the most important relationship in the world is that between the U.S. – together with our allies and partners – and China.  Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s National Security Advisor, has described the relationship with China as one of “severe competition.”  And we all – all like-minded nations – must work together to ensure that competition doesn’t turn into conflict.  One might hope that patient, pragmatic, firm engagement could help reduce the sense of competition and increase areas of cooperation, eventually producing a relationship that is as mutually beneficial as is possible.  But we have to be clear eyed and coldly realistic, even as we seek to deal with differences and, again, ensure that they do not result in true conflict.  And we also all have to work together to ensure that the elements of deterrence (capabilities and willingness to employ them) are rock solid”.

L'articolo “Putin has made NATO great again”: a dialogue with David Petraeus proviene da InsideOver.

Reportage / War 24.02.2023

Father Oleh, a brave priest on the frontline

Siversk (Ukraine) . “See that factory in front of us? It is occupied by the Russians. They have seen us now and might shoot us. Let’s hope they don’t,’ calmly explains Father Oleh Ladnyuk, the Salesian priest who lived in…

Fausto Biloslavo

Siversk (Ukraine) . “See that factory in front of us? It is occupied by the Russians. They have seen us now and might shoot us. Let’s hope they don’t,’ calmly explains Father Oleh Ladnyuk, the Salesian priest who lived in Italy for eight years and took his vows in Turin. In the Donbass inferno,  he is known as “The Brave Priest”,  defying the Russian’s  gunfire to bring medicines, food and aid to the civilians left on the firing line.  Our minivan, a Red Cross on the windscreen, is packed with humanitarian aid. We speed as fast as we can down the icy linear road, cutting straight across the open fields.  The simple low houses have been mercilessly ravaged by the artillery. The shrapnel did not even spare the white statue of the Virgin Mary. 

The road is dotted with the  carcasses of white, red and green cars, reduced to pieces by bombs, and we are forced to slow down to drive around a huge crater. The village with the unpronounceable name is dead. There appears to be not a living soul, except for a handful of zombies, holed up in cellars which have been turned into makeshift bunkers. Intermittent artillery fire acts as the backdrop to a ghostly landscape. Bogdan, middle-aged and with shaky legs, struggles up the steep steps from a hole in the ground where he is hiding in the company of his dog. ‘I’ve been living here since June when the fighting intensified,’ he says, pointing a couple of kilometres away to the suburbs of Russian-occupied Lysychansk. A battery supplies the dim light and a small heater gives off a little warmth with the outside temperatures reaching minus 15 degrees at night. Asked what his expectations are after a year of war, Bodgan, barely holding back the tears, whispers “I hope to survive”.

The few who remain do not want to give up what is left of their homes and have neither the strength nor the money to start over anywhere else. Others are called ‘zhdun’, those waiting for the Russians . Ljuba, who runs up to Father Oleh to hug him, is a tiny “babucka”. “Look at my house,” she says, “It was hit by a  bomb three days ago.” The roof has caved in and inside there is only rubble. Father Oleh hands her some medicines, a box with food, basic necessities and small icons of John Paul II that the military chaplain was given by a supporter in Italy to be brought over and distributed on the front line. “The war is causing so many casualties among the Ukrainians,” Oleh explains, “but even more on the Russian side. They are being dispatched to assault in waves all along the Donbass front line starting in Bakhmut.” The cannons in the background have been replaced by the burst of machine-guns and explosions of a battle that is frightfully close. “They often call me from hospitals to console the wounded with a prayer,” says the Salesian Father. “It is terrible to see our boys with arms and legs missing. Families ask me to look for their loved ones who have been taken away from the battlefield on stretchers. Sometimes they are alive and I contact them by mobile phone. Unfortunately other times I find they are dead. ” 

Retracing back down the icy track under Russian fire it leads to Siversk, a ghost town with neither water nor electricity. A moustachioed gentleman, who won’t give up, shows us a piece of shrapnel the size of half the palm of his hand. “It got stuck in the front door when the rocket exploded there in the snow.” The façade of the Soviet-style popular building  he lives in has been stripped by bombs. The four remaining civilians live in modern catacombs carved out of the basement.  “My name is Alexander,” a young boy introduces himself in English, helping to unload the last aid boxes, with the image of Don Bosco, brought by Father Oleh to an emergency collection centre. Silversk is the city at war of children, there are at least 70 hiding in DIY bunkers. The artillery fire intensifies and as we are leaving a grenade explodes with a sombre metallic screech some thirty metres away, in the middle of the houses, which act as a shield absorbing the shrapnel. Luck or perhaps, as Father Oleh says, “It is the Salesian cross always hanging around our necks that protects us”.

L'articolo Father Oleh, a brave priest on the frontline proviene da InsideOver.

The initial launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Kremlin on February 24 was intended to be a short-lived affair, with the swift capture of Kyiv as the end goal. However, one year later, those plans failed, as Ukrainian forces successfully repelled Russian troops through a combination of determination and support from Western nations.

The conflict has had far-reaching impacts, reshaping our understanding of various fields, including military operations and strategy, diplomacy, intelligence, national security, energy security, economic statecraft, and much more. As the conflict marks its first anniversary, it is imperative to reflect on the key lessons learned from this ongoing war.

First and foremost – the Putin regime cannot be trusted

The past six months of Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, along with the country’s repeated invasions of neighbouring states and its recent hybrid warfare against the West, have demonstrated that agreements with the Putin regime are unreliable and can be detrimental. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine despite having committed to upholding the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity under the Budapest Memorandum. More recently, despite years of negotiations in the Normandy format and the Minsk agreements, the Kremlin has seized a fifth of Ukraine’s territory. These actions make it clear that any agreements made with the Russian government should be approached with caution.

The Russian government has consistently demonstrated its disregard for international law, liberal institutions, and various international agreements, both with its partners and rivals. Through its involvement in crimes against humanity in Ukraine, its violation of the principle of freedom of navigation, its weaponisation of food, and its use of energy blackmail, the Putin regime poses significant threats to the future of the Ukrainian nation and the global rules-based order.

The approach of appeasement, dialogue, and compromise with an aggressor has proven to be ineffective in the past. To achieve peace in the region, it is necessary for the West to adopt a stance of strength and assertiveness, as this is the only language that the Putin regime responds to.

Victory in conflict hinges on people, not solely equipment

In 2021, Russia allocated approximately $65 billion towards defence spending, surpassing Ukraine’s allocation by a factor of ten. Despite the significant investment in equipment, the outcome of the conflict has not met Russia’s expectations. The contrast in military performance highlights the impact of leadership and training on battlefield success.

With a shared military heritage dating back to Imperial Russia, the divergent results of the conflict offer valuable insights. Ukraine has been a participant in the US National Guard’s State Partnership Program since 1993, undergoing training based on the US model. This approach emphasises empowering junior officers and non-commissioned officers with mission-type orders, clear explanations of the commander’s intent, and the ability to make real-time decisions based on situational developments. Through realistic exercises, Ukraine has cultivated a culture that fosters individual initiative and encourages rigorous evaluation. These practices have contributed to high morale and effective performance in combat.

In comparison, the Russian armed forces heavily rely on conscripts and lack a professional non-commissioned officer corps, which deters initiative and discouragement of feedback. Decision-making remains highly centralised, with independence limited to senior officers. The approach to warfare employed by Russia is characterised by an absence of adaptability and low morale in the face of adverse conditions on the battlefield.

Ukraine is a key lesson in the pitfalls of linear thinking

The initial assumption regarding a Russian attack on Ukraine was that it would result in a military victory for Moscow. However, following the defeat of Russia in the Battle of Kyiv, it took some time for experts to recognise that the initial failures were not just temporary and that Russia was actually losing the war.

Another persistent prediction was that the conflict would result in a stalemate, similar to the First World War, with both Ukrainian and Russian forces entrenched in their positions, unable to make significant progress. This prediction has been proven incorrect by several Ukrainian counteroffensives. It is unwise to assume that the success of these counteroffensives will persist in the future, and it’s possible that the war may bring about unexpected developments rather than continuing patterns.

The war has proven that cyberspace is a legitimate conflict domain

The recent events in Ukraine, including Russia’s invasion, have resulted in a newfound role for the private sector in cyber conflict, as private firms are actively participating in direct cyber operations. Of course, Ukraine has a competent team of cybersecurity defenders who have successfully prevented attacks, but the efforts of these defenders have been augmented by private sector companies that have collaborated with the Ukrainian government to improve the country’s overall cybersecurity posture.

Leading technology companies, such as Microsoft and Cisco, have published reports on their defensive efforts and European cybersecurity firms, such as ESET, have also been involved.

It is imperative that the United States, NATO, and democratic nations in the Indo-Pacific region establish effective collaboration with relevant elements of the private sector to ensure seamless operation of cyberspace in the event of armed conflict. The National Cyber Security Centre in the United Kingdom and the US Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative are commendable initiatives; however, they currently lack the capability to address the challenges posed by large-scale combat scenarios. This is an important lesson; it has taught the world that it is essential to implement appropriate planning and operational mechanisms that cater to this challenge.

Learning the lessons learned

The invasion of Ukraine has provided a unique opportunity to evaluate the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces and the impact of various military technologies and strategies on modern warfare. The purpose of this report is to shed light on the key lessons learned from the conflict, but it should be noted that this is an ongoing conflict, and we’ll be learning just what lessons can be learned for years to come. This time next year, there will undoubtedly be a greater understanding of what can be known from the conflict.

L'articolo Ukraine – One year later proviene da InsideOver.

As the war in Ukraine nears its one-year anniversary with little signs of abating, military analysts are drawing up the balance on how one year of large-scale conventional fighting in Europe has impacted thinking on modern warfare, hoping to draw lessons from the biggest land war in Europe since World War II. Though reports on the death of the tank have been greatly exaggerated, the war has highlighted the vulnerability of more than one weapons system as a multitude of new technologies and armament have made their combat debut.

The war in Ukraine has experienced several major phases: from the initial Russian advances in early 2022, to Ukrainian counter offensives with the aim of taking back lost territory in the summer of 2022, and then to an artillery duel spread across a largely static front since late 2022. During each of these stages, the ability to target enemy troop concentrations, ammunition depots and other high value targets far behind enemy lines has become crucial in gaining the upper hand. 

Artillery and multiple rocket launchers have played a prominent role in Ukraine ever since the outbreak of the War in Donbas in 2014. Especially the latter systems have proven capable of destroying enemy fortifications and breaking up enemy advances using only a few volleys of rockets. Yet precisely this capability is conspicuously lacking, or at least deficient, in the inventories of most NATO member states. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many European countries have over the past year sought to (re)introduce these types of weapons systems into the inventories of their militaries.

It was Russia that entered the war with a significant advantage in artillery firepower. Initially outgunned and outranged along most of the frontline, this situation began to change with the delivery of some 300 Western-made towed howitzers and self-propelled guns and some 40 HIMARS and MLRS rocket systems. These gradually allowed Ukraine to gain a decisive upper hand to the extent that it can be argued that Russian forces have not been able to close the gap since. This disparity has not merely been achieved through the delivery of the gun systems alone, as these systems came alongside an extensive arsenal of precision-guided munitions, scatterable mines and weapons-locating radars. Even if the first are generally considered too expensive for widespread deployment, they have allowed Ukraine to accurately engage high value targets that arguably justify their high production costs. The deployment of artillery-fired mines has seen Russian offensives being stopped dead in their tracks as newly laid minefields form an impassable hindrance in fields that had been cleared just a day ago. Weapons-locating radars for their part have allowed Ukrainian forces to engage in increasingly effective counter-battery fire, in which a radar detects incoming artillery shells and immediately calculates their point of origin. The artillery guns firing these shells can then be targeted and destroyed before they are able to relocate.

The War in Ukraine has also highlighted the need for far larger stockpiles of ammunition than had previously been anticipated for a land war of this intensity. Furthermore an extensive logistics and repair network is required that is capable of repairing sophisticated weaponry that can be prone to frequent breakdowns under the stress of intensive use. 

As in every conflict, it is only a matter of time before your opponent starts implementing solutions to deal with a certain threat. The large-scale use of loitering munitions, which are essentially unmanned drones packed with an explosive warhead that fly themselves into an enemy target, was especially looked at with much anticipation. However, the deployment of U.S.-made Switchblade loitering munitions on the side of Ukraine left much to be desired, and it would ultimately be Russia that first managed to effectively introduce this new mode of warfighting to the battlefield. Video footage of combat operations so far confirms it has used its Lancet loitering munitions to strike close to a hundred Ukrainian targets, amongst which dozens of Western-delivered artillery systems. Ukraine has attempted to mitigate their threat by installing mesh wiring above the location of howitzers, which are especially vulnerable to enemy drones for their inability to quickly redeploy after having fired. Evidently, the seemingly endless cycle of lethal innovation is playing out in real time on Ukraine’s bomb-scarred East.

Attracting more notice than the loitering munitions has been Ukraine’s (and to a more limited degree Russia’s) fleet of small drones used for target acquisition and, increasingly, bombing enemy tanks and positions. Small, agile and extremely difficult to spot, these small contraptions have in many ways exceeded the performance expected of larger drones, albeit operating at far shorter ranges. Especially in this phase, marked by mostly stationary frontlines, the constant harassment by these small systems can make life in trenches at the front a living hell. A myriad of different types are now deployed with integrated armament, ranging from heavy octocopters carrying multiple mortars to tiny models with a single anti-tank weapon, operated from first-person view using special goggles. And their popularity is justified: attrition amongst (particularly Russian) personnel and fighting vehicles from these new tools of war has been anything but insignificant.

Despite appearing stagnant, the conflict is in fact evolving faster than Western militaries are capable of tracking and analysing, let alone incorporating the lessons from. Although legacy armament can and will have a significant impact on the course of the conflict, truly effective tools that match all this war’s needs and particulars will only emerge as it plays out. Or as the legendary Will Rogers observed all the way back in 1929:

“You can’t say that civilization don’t advance, for in every war they kill you a new way.”

L'articolo How rapid innovation in modern warfare has shaped one year of war proviene da InsideOver.