The fall of Saddam Hussein, which took place on April 9, 2003 with the arrival of US tanks in the center of Baghdad, had many effects in the Middle East region. The reason is essentially based on the fact that Iraq, without a solid government in power, has turned into a potential powder keg. The country, historically crossed by strong sectarian tensions and a clear division between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, has become a battleground both between the various internal actors and between regional powers.

The war of 2003 can therefore be considered as a detonator of the various Middle Eastern turbulences and that is why it has helped to change the face not only of Iraq but also of the history of the surrounding countries.

Baghdad in the Iranian orbit

During the era of Saddam Hussein, Iraq lived in an almost paradoxical situation. Although the country had a Shiite majority, the rais and his circle of loyalists in Baghdad belonged to the Sunni minority. A circumstance that has not failed to create tensions during the 24 years of regime. Saddam has often viewed with suspicion the emergence of Shiite political and religious groups, mainly based in the south of the country. This led, among other things, to an increase in the level of confrontation with Iran.

In the same year that the rais took the keys to the Iraqi government, an Islamic revolution in Tehran brought to power the Shiite theocracy led by the Ayatollahs. An eight-year war broke out between the two countries, at the end of which diplomatic relations were never fully restored.

When the US overthrew Saddam, Iraqi Shiites immediately pressed for strong representation in the new authorities. The first elections in 2005 saw the victory of Shiite parties, at the expense of Sunni ones. Iran was thus able to get its hands on Baghdad. An effect certainly not intended and almost certainly not calculated by the US on the eve of the war. Between the pro-Shiite Iraq and the Iranian theocracy, a strong convergence was born. In doing so, the Ayatollahs began to control large parts of Iraq’s new power.

The effects of this sudden change have also occurred at regional level. Tehran has begun planning the so-called “Shiite crescent” strategy. A project aimed at ideally linking its government with the new post-Saddam Iraq, with Syria governed by the Alawite Shiite Bashar Al Assad, then extending its sphere of influence to Beirut. Here, in fact, Iran has begun to exploit the axis more with the Lebanese Shiite movements and, in particular, with the Hezbollah.

This has created the basis for heated discussions throughout the region. Iranian activism has in fact sharpened the tug-of-war between Tehran and its historical antagonists. These include Saudi Arabia and the Gulf petromonarchies. The wars that broke out in the following decade, starting with the one in Yemen, are attributable to the confrontation at a distance between the Shiite theocracy of the Ayatollahs and the Sunni monarchies. It is also important to underline the growing fears for its own security by Israel, another historic rival of Iran in the Middle East.

The rise of Al Qaeda and jihadist terrorism

The radical change at the top of Baghdad has also had consequences within the Iraqi Sunni world. In some fringes, the concern has emerged to become slaves of the Shiite majority. A circumstance that has created, among other things, fertile ground for jihadist propaganda. Already in 2014, several terrorist groups were active in Iraq. Inside, not only Iraqis but also foreign fighters. Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist movement, took the reins and took advantage of the situation to launch its own holy war against US troops.

Emerging in this context was the figure of the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. Bin Laden himself gave him his approval for the birth of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The jihadist insurgency went on for several years, finding support especially in the province of Al Anbar, between Ramadi and Falluja. The situation was particularly serious in 2007, with the country effectively hostage to a sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. Al Zarqawi was killed in 2006, but his successors implemented Al Qaeda’s activities in Iraq.

The group will later become “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) and with the new leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi will be engaged since 2011 in the Syrian civil war, alongside Al Nusra and other Islamist groups opposed to the Assad government. ISIL will become better known by the acronym of Isis and the group will give birth to the Islamic State, capable of conquering the entire north of Iraq and large portions of Syria between 2014 and 2017. Today th

e Islamic State is no more, but the country continues to be crossed by jihadist tensions.

The duel between Washington and Tehran in Iraqi territory

The fight against ISIS has brought the presence of various international forces to Iraq. On the one hand, the US-led coalition, engaged in eastern Syria and northern Iraq against the caliphate. On the other, an alliance between several Shiite paramilitary groups, assisted by Iran. Behind the common intent to defeat the Islamic State, the struggle to contend for its influence in Baghdad has also emerged.

In the heart of Iraqi territory, therefore, Washington’s forces still coexist with forces close to Tehran. An incompatibility that emerged especially in 2020, when a US raid in Baghdad killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimaini, architect of the Shiite crescent project. In response, Iran bombed US bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraq has thus turned into the battleground between the United States and Iran. A tug of war that has contributed to fueling tensions throughout the Middle East and that has dragged within it also the other regional powers.

The unresolved Kurdish question

The 2003 war and the end of Saddam’s power gave the Kurds the opportunity to manage their territories independently. The new Iraqi constitution recognized Kurdistan as an autonomous region with Erbil as its capital. Here is the de facto seat of a state within a state. The Iraqi Kurds have entered into trade agreements and ties independently of Baghdad.

But beyond the internal events in Iraq, the autonomy granted to the Kurds has also reignited the issue in all the other countries in the region where the Kurds constitute an important minority. Starting with Turkey. President Erdogan, after an initial opening to dialogue, has chosen a hard line against all the main Kurdish organizations. In Ankara, the fear is linked to the fact that the Kurds present in Turkey could claim the same autonomy achieved in Iraq.

In Syria, too, the issue has been at the center of discussions several times. The government in Damascus, before 2011, viewed with suspicion the activism of Kurdish groups. When civil war broke out in the country, the Kurds themselves took advantage of the problems of the central government to organize themselves. The Self-Defense Forces founded the Rojava region. Currently, the groups that bring together Kurdish fighters are partly supported by the US and are based in eastern Syria, beyond the Euphrates. This is also contributing to tensions, with Ankara starting to target Kurdish forces in Syrian territory since 2016.

L'articolo Setting the Middle East ablaze: the Iraqi War, 20 years later proviene da InsideOver.

Intensified relations between Turkey and Iran continue to develop as the two nations recently joined together to launch a series of coordinated artillery barrages and air strikes on Kurdish targets in northern Iraq over the last eleven days, according to Arab News. 

The strikes included assaults on areas located near the Iraqi-Turkish border. The border is of strategic importance to both Tehran and Ankara as Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) militants remain active there. Other strategic targets that Iran and Turkey plan to target include Yazidi areas near Sinjar on the Iraqi-Syrian border; and areas on the Iraqi-Iranian border, which is where other Iranian Kurdish opposition groups maintain a presence alongside the PKK.

Iran and Turkey Argue Operation is Valid Self-defense

This scenario presents a dilemma for the different alliances of nations that are emerging in the Middle East. Both Turkey and Iran argue that they are engaged in legitimate self-defense against Kurdish groups starting incursions against them from Iraqi Kurdistan.

Ankara quickly blamed the PKK for a string of recent bombings in northern Syria, which is home to many Kurds.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi no doubt feels intimidated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. The Iraqi Government, Saudi Arabia and the UAE believe that the strikes are an apparent violation of Iraqi sovereignty.

However, the rest of the world, particularly the US, remains silent on the issue and both Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government remain too weak to do anything about Turkish-Iranian strikes.

Soleimani’s Death Weakened Iran’s Influence

Fortunately, Iran’s influence in Iraq has been weakened by the assassination of its former influential general, Qasem Soleimani, and this was recently confirmed by Israeli journalist and veteran war correspondent, Ron Ben-Yishai. He managed to retrieve this information from Israeli security assessments. The Israeli journalist also believes that Soleimani’s successor, Esmail Ghaani, will struggle to gain the status of his predecessor.

There is no doubt that Iran’s influence in Iraq has been weakened because of Soleimani’s assassination, but the recent Turkish-Iranian strikes should worry the US in particular. The 2003 Iraq War’s purpose was to eliminate Saddam Hussein and turn Iraq into a democratic nation with a free market economy. If Baghdad falls to both Tehran and Ankara, those sacrifices made by American troops during the 2000s would have been for nothing.

US President Donald Trump insists that he wants to end America’s involvement in “pointless wars,” but if both Turkey and Iran continue to violate Iraqi sovereignty, it not only places Baghdad in danger, but all of America’s strategically important allies. This includes Saudi Arabia. As Trump continues to focus inward because of the coronavirus, he still leads a country that has a duty to protect vulnerable allies from the influence of powerful leaders like Rouhani and Erdogan.

Trump Must Continue to Help Iraq

Throughout his entire presidency so far, Trump has made tackling Tehran one of his main priorities, but if Turkey and Iran use these strikes as an opportunity to further advance into Iraq, then that will only result in victory for both Erdogan and Rouhani and embarrass the US.

The US President is unlikely to achieve his original goal of bringing all NATO and US troops home. In the short-term, he may have to increase America’s military presence in Iraq. But there are other actions he can take to strengthen Baghdad, too. The Center for American Progress argues he can recruit Sunni Arabs into Iraq’s security forces, strengthen the US’s cooperation with its NATO allies to cut off the Islamic State’s funding and propaganda, and continue to ensure that the PMF’s influence completely diminishes.

US intervention in Iraq may be unpopular, but until the nation is safe from ISIS, Turkey and Iran, Washington must maintain its relationship with Baghdad and monitor Turkish-Iranian military developments carefully.

L'articolo How Should the West respond to Turkish-Iranian Strikes in Iraq? proviene da InsideOver.

US troops guarding al Omar oilfield near Deir Ezzour, Syria’s largest oil installation in the northeastern province came under attack for the first time since President Donald J Trump announced that the United States was “keeping Syria’s oil” following his administration’s controversial decision to pull out most US troops from Syria in October; a decision that was viewed by many as a green light for the Turkish military offensive against Syrian Kurds in the northeastern parts of the country despite wide international outrage and condemnation.

No faction or force has claimed responsibility for Thursday’s four-pronged attack which targeted and destroyed some oil-plundering tanker trucks and at least one US military vehicle at the oilfield, and no official announcement of casualties among American soldiers or their proxy oil transporters has been confirmed. The significance of the attack lies in the fact that it took place soon after Syrian President Bashar al Assad had made it clear that there will be a popular resistance to the presence of US or any uninvited foreign troops in Syria, and his reiteration that “every single inch of Syrian territories shall be liberated”. Trump’s October 6 withdrawal move from Syria has shocked US Kurdish allies who felt abandoned and left in the open to face the advancing Turkish army and its overwhelming military power and drew wide international outcry as well as severe bipartisan criticisms within the USA itself.

Soon, Trump – already under mounting pressure stemming from impeachment procedures and corruption charges and suspicious communications with Russia and the Ukraine – attempted to make amends with his critics by declaring the Syrian oil feat and pressurizing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to curtail his military offensive against Syrian Kurds, with a “carrot and stick” approach. The latest attack on US oil-guardians in Syria is bound to put Trump under more pressure, given the unabated political campaign both against his characteristics as well as his problematic foreign policies. Trump’s image was severely tarnished last week after leaked footage showed leaders of Britain, France and Canada mocking him at a dinner hosted by the Queen on the margin of NATO summit in London. Trump was so outraged as the video went viral on social media that he cancelled a planned press conference and left London unceremoniously, it was reported.

How secure for Trump is Syria’s “secured’ oil”?

Thursday’s attack on US troops at al Omar oilfield and tankers smuggling Syrian oil into Iraq and Turkey followed an air raid earlier last week by Syrian and possibly Russian jets which destroyed a convoy of oil tanker trucks in the northeastern parts of Syria, put into question Trump’s claims that he had “secured” Syria’s oil. “We’ve secured the oil and, therefore, a small number of US troops will remain in the area where they have the oil,” Trump said during an Oct. 23 press conference. “And we’re going to be protecting it, and we’ll be deciding what we’re going to do with it in the future.”

Once again, Trump falters on his promises to the Americans and their allies in the region. US troops at the oilfield that came targeted from four directions are reported to have used all available firepower at their disposal to foil the attack but to no avail. Many Syrian and regional observers believe that Thursday’s daring attack was a clear message to Trump, his allies and proxy oil plunderers, and most likely just “the tip of the iceberg” of what lies ahead for US troops in Syria. The trap of “oil for blood” equation many American have warned against falling into in Syria, seems to have become a painful reality for the snookered Trump administration, with problems creeping in from every nook and cranny; Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Kurdish allies, Turkey and NATO to name a few.

A mini oil war looms in the Syrian offing

Syria’s oil production has plummeted by approximately 90% as a result of the nine-year conflict aggravated by a stringent chain of US-led sanctions against the country. Before the conflict that broke out in March 2011, the country used to produce 385.000 barrels of oil per day. The figure went as low as 14.000 BPD at the worst stage in the war. Although the oil and gas sector has made a humble recovery in recent months following the recovery by the Syrian army and its allies of vast sways of land that had been for years out of government control, much is needed for this vital factor to become fully functional.

The Syrian government has resorted to some drastic austerity measures in recent years and has been importing much of its oil and gas from Iran, Iraq and Algeria to make up for its plundered wealth. The war-torn nation and its badly damaged economy badly need oil and gas resources to maintain the minimum required economic as well as social stability and growth, and can’t afford to leave this essential wealth at the mercy of the Americans or any other foreign power forever. By hook or by crook, through diplomatic means and deals, or armed resistance to make good on its promise to protect its land and natural resources against foreign occupiers and plunderers alike. Thursday’s offensive on US troops and tanker trucks in northeastern Syria could trigger and signal a mini oil war or resistance movement to the American presence and looting the country’s oil in the days ahead.

L'articolo US Troops Guarding Syria’s Biggest Oilfield Under Attack proviene da InsideOver.

The Turkish strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean highlighted that Ankara will keep pushing with more and more expansionist claims, interpreting International Law to the best interest of the country. It makes perfect sense, that this policy has been unfolding at the expense of Greece and Cyprus; we have repeatedly noted that as long as Athens and Nicosia continue adopting a passive stance towards this situation, Turkey will keep raising further demands. If anything, Turkey’s latest moves in the region, keep confirming our assumptions.

Last Thursday, November 28, 2019, Turkish sources made the agreement between Ankara and the internationally recognized Libyan Government of Tripoli public. The agreement – in fact, a memorandum of understanding between the two sides – has been signed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Fayez al-Sarraj; according to the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, this has been an initiative for the “delimitation of the maritime boundaries”. The MoU per se and the following statements from the Turkish side triggered new tensions and wide controversy among the neighbouring countries.

From Idlib to the battle of Tripoli and back to Karpasia

If there’s one thing that cannot be questioned about the Turkish government, is the ability to make the most purposeful moves in terms of foreign policy amidst numerous challenges in several different fronts. The Turkish decisions up-to-date should be interpreted and assessed as a well-orchestrated, step-by-step and carefully-implemented long-term operation. Within the last three years, Turkey has managed to become one of the key actors in the Syrian front, achieving the strategic objective of mitigating the Kurdish presence in the area, with wide-scale offensives against YPG, namely in Idlib and Manbij. In the same time, Turkish forces have been actively engaged in the Libyan Civil War, playing a pivotal role in the developments on the ground and significantly contributing to the very survival of the Tripoli Government of National Accord (GNA)  even during the latest major Haftar’s offensive in June.

By providing equipment, like Bayraktar TB2 drones and BMC Kirpi Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, alongside vital intelligence support, Turkish involvement should be seen as a game-changer in the course of the conflict. The significance of these acts is even more important, considering that Turkey has ignored the UN arms embargo in Libya and openly criticized its purpose. Ankara’s stance in the Libyan front promotes Turkey´s position as guarantor of the Islamic world; Erdogan has been moving towards this direction by adopting a controversial attitude towards traditional allies, to protect fellow Sunni Muslim nations and groups against forces backed by the West – Haftar’s LNA in this case. Also, Turkey’s decision to ship equipment to Tripoli forces regardless of the UN sanctions, not only created greater leverage for Ankara towards the Government of National Accord but also consolidated further the image of Turkey as a fundamental regional player, able to form a surprising and unconventional foreign policy, independent of the western demands.

The achievements in Libya and Syria should be assessed alongside the Turkish moves in the EEZ of Cyprus, where Ankara has managed to establish a de facto presence and has been raising claims for a share in the Cypriot gas reserves ever since. The moderate response from the side of Greece, Cyprus and the European Union, has encouraged Ankara to keep up with the same approach, accomplishing to make the international community familiar with the idea of potential joint exploitation of existing and potential reserves in Greece and Cyprus in due time. The well-structured Turkish plan is being materialized over the last few months. Initially, military sources have been leaking generic information around Turkish demands and their lawful sovereign rights between the 28^th and 32^nd meridian. Then repeated statements have been made by the Turkish Minister of Defence Hulusi Akar about the concept of “Blue Homeland” and finally an official letter has been sent by the Permanent Turkish Representative to the UN, where Turkey rejects the existence of sea zone for the Greek island of Kastelorizo and claims that the Turkish EEZ overlaps a large part of Greek maritime boundaries. Therefore this latest development should not be perceived as a surprise, since the combination of Turkish soft and hard power recently, has been unambiguously pointing towards this direction.

Athens’ past, present and future stance

Athens promptly condemned the agreement and stressed out that there is no legal basis to justify the Turkish actions. Greek Minister of foreign affairs, Nikos Dendias, contacted his counterparts in Cyprus and Egypt, Nikos Christodoulidis and Sahem Al Suhri, to achieve a coordinated diplomatic response from all sides against Ankara. However, the Greek reaction gradually is setting the context for what we have previously predicted. The Greek foreign minister from the first days of his appointment has implied in a Bloomberg interview, that an agreement with Turkey could solve long-term problems and establish a beneficial partnership for both sides. Of course, such an approach is exactly what Erdogan is looking for, as Ankara is stepwise achieving to legitimize the idea of joint exploitation within Greek and Cypriot boundaries.

Returning to the context of the Libyan-Turkish agreement, we should mention that one of its most worrying points, especially for Athens, is the provision that allows Turkey to have a physical presence in the Libyan fields south of Crete, next to critical strategic points of the Greek territory. Under those circumstances, Ankara is not only gaining access to a considerable part of the Greek exclusive economic zone but also can justify a permanent Turkish naval presence in the region. Such a development combined with the deployment of Turkish armed forces across the eastern and northern borders between the two countries, eventually leads to the Greek mainland and islands being equally surrounded, a situation that could turn out to be catastrophic for Greece from a military perspective.

Ankara’s prolonged gamble and General Haftar’s role

We have mentioned in the past that Turkey frequently adopts an opportunistic attitude in the fields of foreign policy, defence and diplomacy. In this case, counting too much on Tripoli Government of National Accord could prove to be a risky bet. General Haftar currently controls the largest part of the country and has been pushing towards Tripoli over the last few months. It is a fact that the efforts to seize the Libyan capital have been unsuccessful so far, however, it should be highlighted that both sides are working with in-country militias; such entities are prone to intra-conflicts, keen on crossing over and far from being perceived as trustworthy partners. To better assess the current situation, we should take a look at the key external actors supporting LNA and GNA. As already stated Turkey is backing the Tripoli Government of National Accord, with marginalized Qatar being the other major player in this “camp”. On the other hand, Haftar’s Libyan National Army, with a permanent base in Tobruk but with notable presence all across the country and currently at the gates of Tripoli, is being assisted by a complex “coalition” spearheaded by Russia, Egypt and the UAE. Simultaneously major Western powers including the US and France are favouring Haftar’s prevalence. Therefore in terms of foreign support, it is rather dubious if the Tripoli GNA could survive long enough, in order Erdogan’s decisions to play out well for Ankara.

Since Turkey has opened its cards in the Libyan conflict, Greek diplomacy is now left with the advantage to take the initiative; Athens could smartly reach out to President Sisi through official diplomatic channels and pursue a more aggressive stance towards Turkey’s regional claims, by establishing the EEZ with Egypt as an immediate response to the  Turkish-Libyan agreement. In the same time, backroom negotiations with General Haftar could be a well-purposed option for Hellenic diplomacy, so Greece could capitalize in case the Libyan conflict ends with his victory.

Conclusions

Greece has repeatedly condemned the Turkish policy in the eastern Mediterranean and has been presenting Ankara’s case as illegitimate and irrelevant to international law. Greek foreign minister has travelled to Egypt to discuss the recent developments, while the Libyan ambassador in Athens could be expelled. In the same time, a Greek delegation in the opening ceremony of the TANAP pipeline led by the Deputy Minister of Environment and Energy, Mr Dimitris Ikonomu, has left in protest against the provocative speech of the Turkish President. But most importantly the Greek Prime Minister has put forward the Greek agenda and has addressed the Turkish acts of misconduct in the context of the ongoing NATO conference in London. By the time these lines are written, a meeting between the Turkish President and the Greek Prime Minister has just been completed. According to the first reports, all the critical issues that are triggering the tension between the two countries, have been tackled and discussed in-depth, during the meeting.

From our side, we are quite sceptical about the results of the Greek approach, considering that all the quasi-measures adopted so far are seeking to maintain the popular political momentum, that the current government has been enjoying during the first months of the administration term, rather than consolidating a serious and well-respected international presence. The latest statements from the Greek Prime Minister amidst the NATO conference and those to follow are more of an effort to impress the in-country public.  Unless Greece implements a more determined policy – which is rather unlikely – the scenario of the joint exploitation between Greece and Turkey, always at the expense of Athens, will remain a probable one, regardless of the Greek government attempts to downplay this prospective.

L'articolo The Aftermath of the Turkey-Libya Agreement proviene da InsideOver.

In a landmark step that reflects Moscow’s growing and influential role in Syria, Russia has begun moving some of its best and latest attack and patrol helicopters, as well as other equipment to a new Syrian airbase on the Turkish border, only a few weeks after US forces, had left the area. As Russian and Syrian officials were reported to be putting final touches on a 49-year lease deal – similar to the one about the Russian lease of Tartous seaport signed last April – regarding setting up a Russian base within the perimeters of the Qamishli airport, next to the Turkish borders, at least two Mi-35 attack helicopters and a transport helicopter were moved from the Hmeimeem base on the Mediterranean to Qamishli airport in northeastern Syria. The move was officially confirmed by Damascus and Moscow and reported by Zvezda television, which is run by the Russian defence ministry. Some 200 Russian soldiers and over 50 military vehicles are already in the vicinity of Qamishli airport.

The city of Qamishli which is located in northeastern Syria, adjoins the Turkish city of Nusaybeen and is close to the Iraqi western borders, has a population of some 185,000 population, comprising of Syrian Christians, Muslims and Kurds. Al-Qamishli airport is about 600 kilometres away from the capital Damascus and 500 kilometres to the north-east of the main Russian base of Hmeimeem in the Mediterranean city of Latakia. The presence of Russian forces in the area was part of the last deal between presidents Putin of Russia and Erdogan of Turkey in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi following Ankara’s military offensive against Syrian Kurdish militias along the borders which has drawn strong international condemnation and caused a tide of outrage against the Turkish aggression with many Western nations, including the USA, threatening harsh punitive sanctions against Ankara should it not stop its military campaign in Syria’s northeast.

Moscow bolsters Role in Vital NE Syria

Although much of the region had been under the control of US-backed Kurdish YPJ/SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces, the civilian airport outside Qamishli has been under the control of the Syrian government forces throughout the nine-year conflict. The bolstering of Moscow’s military presence there is bound to change the balance of power in the area, and pose a serious challenge to any Israeli, American or Turkish plots in the northeast. This is despite an agreed 32km buffer zone along Turkish borders, void of any YPJ militia presence in the safe zone Turkey has long cherished, even under a unilateral military operation against Kurdish militias if need be. There have been widespread reports of excessive use of force, summary executions and even war crimes committed by Turkish soldiers and their National Syrian Army mercenaries since the beginning of Turkish military operations inside Syria.

Newly-arrived Russian helicopters were seen patrolling the border region from the sky as joint Russian-Turkish military police took part in patrols on the ground. They were seen near the town of Derbasiyah in Syria’s northeastern Hassakah province, along the Syria-Turkey border, less than five weeks after US troops had left the area amid massive Kurdish and international criticism and accusations of abandoning Washington’s closest Kurdish SDF allies in Syria.

Russian forces in Qamishli include helicopters, ground support, fuel and several military vehicles and is protected by a Pantsir air defence system with the aim of “ensuring continuous flights, safety of the helicopters and the defence of this territory,” air force official Timur Khodzhayev said. “The main goal is to ensure calm,” he maintained. The landing area is encircled by Russian military police. Moscow has expanded its presence in northeastern Syria following the withdrawal of American forces ordered by US President Donald Trump last month, which triggered a Turkish invasion into the mainly Kurdish-populated territory.

Lease Deal in Moscow’s Bag, More to Come

Russia’s Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu said SDF units had redeployed from the border area on October 29. That was followed by joint Russian-Turkish patrols to a depth of 10km.  In a nutshell, despite US promises not to abandon its Kurdish allies, Kurds have quickly turned to Russia and the Syrian government for protection from the advancing Turkish army and its NSA proxy militia, and Russian forces are moving into areas where American flags once flew. Defence correspondent Alexander Kots of Russian Komsomolskaya Pravda summed up Moscow’s plan in a tweet: “We should more actively occupy their bases so that they have nothing to come back to.”

With the 49-year lease deal for Qamishli airfield very much now in the Russian bag, civil aviation to and from the small regional airport is set to continue and expand with promised international flights under Russian protection, while a large section was to be closed off as a Russian military facility. Construction work is reported to have already started by the Russian a few days ago that will transfer this small airfield into a large airbase able to accommodate the landings of Russian fighter jets and larger air freights, granting Moscow an unchallenged upper hand in northeastern Syria.

L'articolo Deal Ups Russia’s Role in Syria With Control of Qamishli Airport proviene da InsideOver.

President Erdogan of Turkey visited the White House last week. At the meeting, Erdogan handed back a letter to Trump in which the American president told him not to be a “tough guy” and a “fool” by launching an assault on the Kurds.

Last month, Trump announced that he was withdrawing US troops from Syria, despite the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) previously establishing control over much of IS with the help of a US-led coalition. At the beginning of this month, it was speculated that Turkey had a call intercept of Jared Kushner, son-in-law and adviser to Trump, green lighting the arrest of Saudi Arabian journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, who was subsequently murdered in a Saudi consulate in Turkey.

On October 9, Turkey invaded northern Syria. Erdogan began ethnically cleansing the Kurds immediately after. As Turkish and Syrian militia advanced into Kurdish-held areas, videos surfaced of civilians being dragged from their cars and shot by the side of the road. Journalists visiting hospitals reported children dying from the flesh-eating effects of white phosphorous, delivered by bombs and shells fired and dropped by advancing Turkish militia. Under international law, these weapons are illegal.

US diplomat, William V. Roebuck, wrote in an internal memo leaked last month that Turkey plans to expel the 1.8 million Kurds living in their semi-independent state of Rojava.

Titled: “Present at the Catastrophe: Standing By as Turks Cleanse Kurds in Northern Syria and De-Stabilise our D-Isis [sic] Platform in the Northeast”, he continued:

“Turkey’s military operation in northern Syria, spearheaded by armed Islamist groups on its payroll, represents an … effort at ethnic cleansing, relying on widespread military conflict targeting part of the Kurdish heartland along the border and benefiting from several widely publicised, fear-inducing atrocities these forces committed.”

For many, the old twentieth-century ideals of national sameness to mean true nationality is still God’s truth. The idea of what it means to be American, for example, was cleverly reconstructed by the mass of immigrants who arrived on its shores in the twentieth century.

We may not be descendants of the founders, they claimed, but we arrived with the same values of wealth, economic equality, success, and hard work. Together, these immigrants found national sameness under one title: American.

“American” was a construction of sameness and difference. Not just anyone could be American. They had to be similar. So the “white American” ethnicity was created. In Europe, where many of the immigrants originated, whiteness was not recognised to be an ethnic similarity. To fit in, to survive, to thrive in the US, whiteness became a uniform race, encompassing nationalities that, before, had not been considered ethnically or racially similar enough to be considered truly white. This included the Slavs, the Italians, the Irish, the Scots and the Jews.

“American” could neither be applied to the children of black slaves who have been part of the US history for long nor could it be applied to the Indigenous owners of the land: the Indians. For America’s new “whites”, citizenship might encompass national and racial difference, but ethnic nationality was a strict club that only similar people could join.

This sameness would protect America’s white nationalities from threats of violence and institutional oppression. Despite the abolition of slavery, the Ku Klux Klan, Jim Crow laws, the police, the American legal system, and the presidencies of Reagan and Nixon would rob African Americans of their political autonomy and their basic human rights.

In Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Armenia, the indigenous Kurds have neither political autonomy nor basic human rights. The ethnocentric attitudes of the nations in which they inhabit force a distinction between those ethnicities who belong to the nation-state, and those who are stateless.

Citizenship and nationality are both evanescent. Unlike race or ethnicity, they are unstable. They can be denied, revoked or ignored. Individuals and groups have historically been cheated of their citizenship and nationality by governments hiding their oppression under bureaucracy. Unsettlingly, they are only granted under laws crafted by the oppressive majority.

“I used to be someone who would not even tread on an ant. But this is a war for honour and self-defence. A 100 per cent elimination policy (by Ankara of the Kurds) has forced me to defence and it has become a glorious defence of a people,” the founder of the fight against Turkish oppression of Kurds, Abdullah Ocalan, said.

Nations are “mental constructs”, claim professors from the University of Vienna. West Asian nations have constructed the Kurds as threats to their national consciousness. Comprising between 7% and 20% of the population of these nations, the fear of the difference of the minority threatens the mental constructs of Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi nationalistic sameness.

Without the protection of a nation of their own, the Kurds are inherently vulnerable to oppression and violence from legitimised nation-states seeking easy scapegoats for their nations’ narcissism. Without the backing of the global community, the Kurds cannot win their nationalistic fight against ethnic-cleansing.

L'articolo The Kurds: Our Unstable Definition of Nationality and Citizenship proviene da InsideOver.

Turkey said it was in the process of repatriating foreign ex-Islamic State members and fighters to countries where they were citizens before joining the jihadist group in Syria and Iraq. The Turkish Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu recently said Turkey was not a “guest house or hotel” for Islamic State former members and fighters.

Thousands of former Islamic State members are in custody in northern Syria, a predominantly Kurdish area before Turkey’s incursion into the region, after the United States decided to withdraw its troops in early October. But as Turkey advances in its incursion, the Kurdish forces are pushed back from areas they controlled and where thousands of Islamic State ex-members are imprisoned.

Turkey’s recent repatriation wave came after President Erdogan met with President Trump in the White House on Wednesday, November 13. Erdogan said Turkey had thousands of former Islamic State-affiliated individuals in its custody, and that the country was in the process of sending them back to “their countries of origin”.

Two days later, on Friday, November 15, Turkey’s Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu said an American Islamic State suspect had been deported by plane to the United States. “Upon the commitment of the United States to issue a travel document, necessary procedures have been initiated to send the foreign terrorist fighter to the United States,” the Turkish Ministry of Interior declared.

Seven other German nationals were deported to Berlin, the ministry also declared, and one Briton to London.

But if the United State has shown support to Turkey’s aim at deporting former Islamic State-affiliated individuals to countries where they were nationals, some countries in Europe have long objected to taking back those individuals. President Trump, who agreed with President Erdogan that Western countries should take back their Islamic State-affiliated citizens, recently said European nations were a “tremendous disappointment” after they refused to bring back those persons.

Turkey’s state-run news agency Anadolu recently reported that several Europeans countries have reiterated their refusal to take back former Islamic State-affiliated nationals now in Turkish custody. Danish, Irish and French citizens were also due to be deported as part of the repatriation process, the agency also reported.

Turkey said it was intent on sending back those prisoners to their countries even if they were stripped of their citizenship. The United States, where other foreign Islamic State ex-members are detained as well, threatened to deliver those prisoners to their countries nevertheless too.

“I said to them, if you don’t take them back, I’m going to drop them right on your border. And you could have fun capturing them again,” President Trump said in a news conference in late October when he announced the killing of the former leading of Islamic State Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

If citizens are presented at their national soil, the international law requires that they be let in. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates, “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”

The Syrian Democratic Forces, who controlled prisons in northern Syria where thousands of ex-Islamic State members are detained, previously said they had about 800 European fighters in their prisons, as well as 700 women and some 1500 children in camps.

Some European countries said they were willing to take back the women and children, in whom they nevertheless see a political and social threat, but categorically refused to repatriate the fighters and male members. The United States proved less reluctant, analysts said, because it has fewer nationals who were involved with Islamic State.

In anticipation of being called upon to forcibly take those individuals back, some European countries revoked their citizenship after cutting diplomatic ties with Syria amid the war. Those prisoners are then left in a political limbo where Syrian institutions are far from being able to bring them to justice and where conflict still lurks.

Many were said to have escaped the prisons after fights between Kurdish and Turkish forces broke in northeast Syria following Turkey’s incursion on October 9.

After cutting diplomatic ties with Syria and revoking many individuals’ citizenship, countries from Europe say they are not obligated to proactively go into Syria to take those persons back. Some fear that even if brought back to Europe, those prisoners won’t face enough individual-based evidence to be convicted for charges of terrorism.

Many were imprisoned merely for something they had posted on social media or because of the presence of their name in Islamic State documentation.

An idea of establishing an international tribunal to try the prisoners had been brought forth by many actors in the hope of resolving the issue. The Syrian Democratic Forces proposed that the international tribunal be held in territory it controls. Yet it isn’t clear under what international law the prisoners could be tried, as there is no international definition of terrorism, for example. (The Kurdish forces in Syria are considered as a terrorist group by Turkey because of ties they have with the PKK)

US officials said the United States rejected suggestions such as asking countries in the region to detain those former Islamic State members or establishing an international tribunal to try them.

“Each country has a responsibility to handle this situation on their own,” Nathan Sales, the director of the U.S. State Department’s counterterrorism bureau, said. “Our view is that it’s not a viable option to ask other countries in the region to import another country’s foreign fighter and pursue prosecution and incarceration there.”

On Thursday, November 14, a day after Erdogan met Trump, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also stressed on coalition-member European countries to take back their citizens who belonged to Islamic State, in a Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS meeting held in Washington.

“Coalition members must take back the thousands of Foreign terrorist fighters in custody and impose accountability for the atrocities they have perpetrated,” Pompeo said in the meeting.

L'articolo No Room at the Turkish Inn for the So-Called Islamic State proviene da InsideOver.

United States President Donald Trump is has no reservations using military force in Syria against the Turkish army, accord to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. During an interview with CNBC on Monday, Pompeo was grilled on possible American responses to Turkish aggression again the Kurds.

“We prefer peace to war. But in the event that kinetic action or military action is needed, you should know that President Trump is fully prepared to undertake that action,” he added.

The US controversially withdrew its military from Syria, troops that had been assisting Kurdish soldiers in their fight against ISIS. The move drew widespread condemnation from both parties in the US Congress.

“The decision to pull back U.S. troops along the Turkey-Syria border area has grave consequences for U.S. national security and our allies and partners in the region,” a bipartisan group of senators wrote in the letter to Pompeo. “With the assistance of our partner force, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), comprised of Kurdish, Arab, and minority forces, we have erased ISIS’ physical caliphate from the region. While everyone suffered from this difficult fight, the SDF lost more than 10,000 fighters, far more than anyone else.”

Immediately after American forces vacated the country, Turkish troops entered to create what Ankara termed a ‘safe zone’ along the Syria – Turkey border. An economic downturn and increasing anti-refugee sentiment have combined to put Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the defensive and in his eyes, repelling Syrian refugees is a winning strategy. However, beneath those intentions is also an intense layer of racial conflict against the Kurds. Decades of problems between the Kurds and Turks provide Erdogan with a rationale for attacking them. 

Sure, the proposed safe zone would create a buffer between the two nations and an area for Syrian refugees to resettle, but the brutal manner in which Turkish forces are taking over the area cannot be excused. If it truly wanted to create a safe zone, why attack the Kurds who are allied with the US against ISIS? The safe zone Turkey intends to carve out of Syria is solely in Kurdish ruled territory which by most accounts would be considered the safest part of Syria. The only reason for the violent offensive is to ethnically cleans the region in preparation for replacing the Kurds with Syrians refugees. 

Ankara’s actions were difficult to defend, but Pompeo tried anyway. During a visit to his hometown of Wichita, Kansas on Wednesday, Pompeo was asked about whether Trump’s decision to abandon Kurds would affect US credibility. 

“The whole predicate of your question is insane,” Pompeo said. “The word of the United States is much more respected today than it was just two and a half years ago.” 

He also revealed that he was behind the recommendation to Trump to lift all sanctions on Turkey after Erdogan agreed to a temporary ceasefire. 

“Was I comfortable? Yes. I recommended that to the president,” Pompeo said. “We went and laid out for President Erdogan the fact that we were against what he had done – the president was very unhappy that he conducted an incursion into Syria.”

In the wake of the US leaving, Russia has also moved into the country. Pompeo’s assertion that Washington is keeping military force on the table ignores the reality that any new American offensive would have to contend with Moscow forces. The two superpowers have been opposed to one another previously with regards to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime; Russia was arguable all that managed to keep him in power as US-backed rebels — including Kurds — fought against Damascus. If the Turks were to resume their slaughter of Kurds, the US would have a difficult time reclaiming the positions it so easily forfeit. 

Pompeo is operating under the impression that the ceasefire he and vice President Mike Pence brokered would benefit the Kurds, despite the fact that they gain nothing from it and must leave their occupied territory.  

“Well, the work that we did was very clearly aimed at [saving lives]. Indeed, I am highly confident that we saved lives,” he said.”

Pompeo did not seem to have a solid answer as to what actions would constitute a military response. Iran’s drone attack on Saudi Arabia and Turkey’s wholesale slaughter of the Kurds are two recent military attacks on US allies. Neither of them provoked Washington to retaliate militarily. However, according to Pompeo, the option is always there, even if he cannot say what it would take for Trump to use it. 

L'articolo Military Force Always an Option, Pompeo Says proviene da InsideOver.

Yesterday witnessed two important developments occur with regards to the conflict in Syria that sent strong indications in finding an end to the nine-year war that has ravaged the country. The first was the landmark agreement made during the Sochi summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his visiting Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The second, being the field visit by Syrian President Bashar al Assad, on the same day Erdogan headed for Russia, to the front line Syrian army forces in al Habeet, Idlib.  The region was recently liberated by the SAA following a major offensive and fierce battles with Islamic extremist militias, some Turkish-backed, including al-Nusra, Syria’s version of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization.

Both landmark events coincided with the deadline Turkey had set for its five-day ceasefire in its military offensive against Kurdish militias in northeastern Syria which runs out today. It is virtually impossible to envisage any viable solution without an overall agreement over Idlib; the two main remaining obstacles before the curtain is drawn announcing the closing chapter of the war in Syria. The deal struck by Putin and Erdogan in Sochi yesterday over the Kurdish dilemma, could well be a compromise arrangement that has averted more bloodshed and destruction amid growing international outrage, condemnation and sanction-brandishing Western nations if Turkey doesn’t stop its operations in northern Syria immediately.

Winners and Losers in Sochi deal

Although the Turkish and Russian leaders have been meeting regularly over the Syrian cause, their summit held in the southern Russian city of Sochi on Tuesday could be considered the most successful between Putin and Erdogan so far, particularly in light of humongous challenges, the exceptionally intricate circumstances and the outcome of the meeting detailed in joint Russian-Turkish press conferences which followed the deal which appeared to be shaping the endgame in Syria’s past eight-year conflict.

Whilst President Putin emerged as the kingmaker in Sochi, Erdogan was the beleaguered runner-up and President Assad of Syria the eventual big winner. The deal after many lean years of steadfast patience, diligence and stamina, saw judgment poured over US president Donald Trump by many critics of his foreign policy who saw him as handing over Syria and the Kurds to Russia, Turkey and Assad’s government. They reiterated that both Putin and Erdogan have emerged as the main geopolitical power brokers in the region. Many US, EU and regional writers and analysts have considered Trump as the biggest loser in the Sochi deal, followed by the Syrian Kurds themselves as the second-worst losers. They maintained that the unstated bottom line in Sochi was: “The Americans do not have a place in shaping the future of Syria”.

What did Putin and Erdogan agree to?

The Russian-Turkish memorandum of understanding announced in Sochi on Tuesday included ten main points of a wide-ranging agreement that addresses Ankara’s main concern – the presence of Kurdish YPG forces near their border, yet it acknowledges a major fear of the Kurds – that Turkish-backed Syrian rebel groups might unleash a campaign of ethnic cleansing against them and other minority groups in northeastern Syria.

Under the deal, Russian military police and Syrian border guards will enter the Syrian side of the Syrian-Turkish border from noon Wednesday. Over the next 150 hours, they are to remove the YPG and their weapons, back to 30 km from the border. From 6 pm local time next Tuesday, the Russian military police and Turkish military will begin patrols along that line to a depth of 32 km. Russia seems to be planning to facilitate the reproduction and re-implementation of the Adana Agreement between Turkey and Syria regarding border security and combating terrorism, signed in 1998.

However, the town of Qamishli will not be included in that ten-kilometre zone, and it was not clear if the agreement applies the entire length of the Turkey-Syrian border, or just the areas where the Syrian Kurds exercised control. A controversial point in the deal was that, at least for the time being, Turkey will keep control of the areas it has taken in their recent incursion into northern Syria. Damascus has categorically refused any permanent Turkish or any other foreign presence on its territories, and pledged to get back “every single inch”, and by force, if need be.

The agreement asks the US-backed SDF or YPG forces to concede outside of the current area of conflict. The YPG are meant to withdraw from the towns of Manbij and Tal Rifat. The deal also implies that Russia has become the Kurds’ new guarantor, after President Trump effectively abandoned the Kurds, by ordering the sudden withdrawal of US forces from Syria and leaving the YPG exposed to a Turkish offensive.

With Russia not having enough troops on the ground to carry out the new obligations – more Russian troops are anticipated to arrive and quickly deploy in new areas as per the deal – many Kurds who have well-founded fears of Turkish oppression might well opt to allow in the Syrian army itself, as happened in recent Kurdish agreement with the government in Damascus.

Assad’s daring visit to Idlib’s front line posts

President Assad’s surprising visit to al Habeet – a replica of similar presidential visits to the strategic Eastern Ghouta of Damascus during March 2018, and to Baba Amr, Homs in March 2012,  at one of the most violent and crucial phases of the conflict – was intended to send clear and unmissable messages in all directions, particularly to Erdogan himself, concerning the official Syrian approach to the liberation of Idlib, Syria’s last major and conclusive battle/chapter of the conflict. Assad, accompanied by his Minister of Defence General Ali Abdullah Ayyoub, toured the front line army units, had a hands-on picture of the situation on the ground and engaged in friendly chats with some of the soldiers before he was given a detailed military briefing by senior army officers in the area.

The mere timing of Assad’s visit to Idlib’s hotbeds was a message by its own right; exploring diplomatic avenues for a solution to the crisis doesn’t overrule military readiness to finish the job in Idlib, should that become the only way out. Among the president’s welcoming group of high-ranking officers in al Habeet’s advanced military posts, was Brigadier Suhail al Hassan, nicknamed ‘Tiger’, commander of the recent military operations which liberated some 720 square kilometres in rural Hama and Idlib a few months back.

Turkey and Russia have backed opposing parties in the Syrian war, but the agreement said that the two leaders had agreed to uphold “sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Syria. This implies that Putin seems to have ensured that Erdogan’s Turkey to negotiate directly with Assad’s government in Damascus.

In view of Assad’s statements made only yesterday- during his landmark visit to SAA troops in rural Idlib- describing Erdogan as ” a thief who had stolen Syrian factories, wheat grain and oil and who is now stealing our land”, it is understandably difficult to imagine the two leaders sitting at one table in the near future. Despite President Putin’s phone call to President Assad Tuesday following the Sochi deal, Turkish-Syrian negotiations are expected to remain, in the near future at least, at security and military officers’ level at best.

L'articolo Sochi Deal: A Step Closer to Ending the Conflict in Syria proviene da InsideOver.

Turkey’s military operations in Syria continue, while the army of Syrian President Bashar al Assad is heading for the border to support the Kurds in defending the north-east of the country. Many have deemed the Turkish head of state’s decision to attack the Rojava region as a political move, with the aim of distracting public opinion away from his country’s internal problems and to regain lost voter support. In fact, once a “safe zone” along the border has been established, President Erdogan’s plan is to resettle two million Syrian refugees who have arrived in Turkey to escape the war, and whose presence there has alienated a large part of his AKP (Justice and Development Party) electorate.

However, as explained to InsideOver by Ertuğrul Kürkçü, honorary president of the pro-Kurdish HDP (People’s Democratic Party), this strategy will not necessarily give the desired result. “Domestically, Erdogan may have gained two to three months of government, but internationally he has lost almost all the credibility he had managed to achieve among regional and international powers. Not all members of the NATO Security Council, for example, are in favour of the president’s actions and the Arab League itself described the military operation as an invasion that violates international law. Norway, Germany, France, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands have suspended arms sales to Turkey, and Russia, Iran and China said they were concerned about what is happening, and the US establishment itself, with the exception of Donald Trump, does not approve of the intervention in Syria.”

But the biggest problems are on the home front. “The costs of war, combined with the education of foreign investment,” and the economic crisis that has long affected Turkey, “are getting Erdogan in trouble.” According to Kürkçü, the Turkish president’s plans for the period post-invasion are too ambitious: “Erdogan wants to relocate two million people to the safe zone and invest in rebuilding the area.” This objective would require an economic commitment that the Turkish government would not currently be able to support, given the state of its finances. “If Erdogan does not go to the polls in the next three to four months, he will lose the next election. For this reason, among others, he has started the military campaign [in Rojava].”

The Turkish political landscape

The start of military operations in Syria has also had an impact on the balance of internal politics, and in particular on relations between the HDP and the Kemalist CHP (Republican People’s Party). In local elections, the pro-Kurdish HDP had encouraged its voters to support the CHP candidates in order to deny victory to President Erdogan’s AKP. This was not a real alliance between the two parties, instead a political manoeuvre by the HDP.

However, with the election of Ekrem Imamoglu as mayor of Istanbul, it finally seemed that position of the CHP towards the Kurds had changed, but its decision to vote in favour of armed intervention in north-eastern Syria has cooled relations between the parties again. “Our hopes were disregarded due to the internal complexity [of the CHP]”, which was “formed by a conservative and nationalist wing opposed to a progressive one.” Support for the military operation was actually no surprise. “As far as security issues are concerned, the CHP leadership has always stood in favour of the military, each time supporting the sending of troops to Iraq and Syria that the government wanted. The vote supporting the operation [was merely] a repeat of what happened during the incursion into Afrin. This is nothing new, which is why we must look to the future, and, most importantly, rely not so much on the leaders of the CHP as on its grassroots.”

According to Kürkçü, these grassroots are starting not to support the party leadership’s line in matters of security and foreign policy. However, a change at the top of the CHP in the near future does not seem likely. “There is no real challenge to the current leadership, nor any candidates who can take its place. Imamoglu seems to have aligned himself with the party’s position regarding the incursion into Syria. There are divisions within the CHP on other points, but certainly not on the military. If the operation in Syria were to take a turn for the worse, if it did not succeed and if there were large losses, then public opinion would change, and a change at the top of the CHP could be feasible. But for now this is just speculation.”

L'articolo The operation in Syria has earned Erdogan a few more months in government proviene da InsideOver.