Il travagliato nuovo Piano di Investimenti per la Difesa (DIP) britannico ha portato a una svolta epocale per la Royal Navy: la marina di Sua Maestà del futuro sarà composta da alcune unità minori e da una flotta di grandi droni di superficie che assolveranno i compiti svolti dai classici cacciatorpediniere con equipaggio. Il concetto è quello di una “flotta distribuita”, che unisce unità crewed e uncrewed: una “Hybrid Navy” (Marina Ibrida) promossa dal Primo Lord del Mare, unitamente ai concetti di “Atlantic Bastion”, “Atlantic Shield” e “Atlantic Strike”, questi ultimi tre concetti operativi per esprimere deterrenza nel nord Atlantico nell’architettura NATO.

Più in dettaglio, la “Marina Ibrida” britannica dovrebbe configurarsi verso la fine degli anni Trenta prevedendo l’abbandono del progetto del cacciatorpediniere di classe Type 83 – che doveva sostituire la classe Type 45 – e la costruzione di sei unità del tipo Common Combat Vessel (CCV). Inoltre, le fregate di classe Type 32, annunciate per la prima volta nel 2020, secondo i piani dovrebbero fungere da navi madre per i droni autonomi cacciamine e antisommergibile, ma non sono mai andate oltre la fase concettuale. La Royal Navy si trova quindi ad affrontare una “lacuna di fregate”, per la quale le navi da guerra obsolete vengono dismesse prima che siano disponibili le loro sostituzioni.

Questa scelta del governo britannico, alquanto peculiare, è sicuramente dovuta più a questioni di bilancio che di modernizzazione: Dan Jarvis, il nuovo ministro della Difesa, è riuscito a ottenere tra 1 e 1,5 miliardi di sterline in più rispetto al suo predecessore, John Healey, il quale aveva lasciato il governo di Starmer a causa del rifiuto del Tesoro di concedere ulteriori fondi. Si prevede ora che lo stanziamento complessivo raggiungerà i 15 miliardi di sterline che è una cifra superiore a quella che è stata offerta a Healey dal bilancio, ma inferiore ai circa 28 miliardi stimati come necessari per la modernizzazione. Il Regno Unito deve anche pensare a mantenere efficiente la sua capacità di deterrenza nucleare, e per questo investirà oltre 63 miliardi di sterline nei prossimi quattro anni finanziando la costruzione di nuovi sottomarini lanciamissili balistici, di una nuova testata per armarli, nonché l’acquisto di dodici caccia F-35A destinati alla deterrenza nucleare tattica della NATO.

Tornando alla nuova flotta di droni, sebbene siano state diffuse poche informazioni tecniche, le unità CCV sembrano destinate a diventare l’elemento centrale della futura forza di scorta, quindi sostituendo i cacciatorpediniere. Questa nuova unità di superficie appare concepita come una piattaforma di comando in grado di gestire un gruppo di navi da guerra autonome ovvero fungendo da “centro di controllo”. Non si tratterebbe però di navi disarmate, come suggerisce il nome stesso, ma non è ancora chiaro il livello di armamento che sarà imbarcato. Un’ipotesi è che l’unità possa assomigliare a una nave di scorta convenzionale, dotata di un consistente armamento missilistico e di sensori avanzati, pur mantenendo il comando su unità di scorta senza equipaggio. È altrettanto plausibile l’idea di una nave molto più semplice, che deleghi gran parte delle proprie capacità offensive e difensive ai veicoli autonomi di supporto. Anche le dimensioni delle CCV sono in via di definizione sebbene si ritenga che possano essere paragonabili a quelle di una fregata prendendo spunto dal progetto della classe Type 31.

La nave arsenale e la nave radar

Secondo alcuni, questa soluzione permetterebbe di distribuire il carico di lavoro all’interno del comparto industriale navale britannico, evitando al contempo i costi e i ritardi legati alla progettazione di una classe di grandi cacciatorpediniere completamente nuova. Esiste anche un progetto per unità con equipaggio ridotto al minimo come le Type 91: una nave “arsenale” dotata di missili (della famiglia Aster e CAMM) che potrebbe imbarcare anche armi a energia diretta. Restando nel campo della progettazione delle unità per la “flotta distribuita” per il concetto “Atlantic Bastion”, la Royal Navy potrebbe dotarsi delle Type 92, ovvero di unità autonome antisom con ponte di volo per UAV di qualche tipo e delle Type 94, ovvero navi autonome “picchetto radar”.

In teoria, il concetto di “flotta distribuita” dovrebbe aumentare la massa delle forze in mare rendendo difficoltosa nel contempo la capacità di ingaggio per l’avversario: un elevato numero di navi autonome, di dimensioni e ruoli diversi, fornirebbe potenza di fuoco e ridurrebbe i costi delle possibili perdite.

Nella realtà esistono delle limitazioni che difficilmente saranno superabili. La “Marina Ibrida” britannica così composta dovrà necessariamente affidarsi largamente su una capacità di trasmissione dati sicura e resistente alle interferenze dell’avversario, e in uno scenario bellico in cui la Guerra Elettronica (EW – Electronic Warfare) diventerà non più solo un effettore del campo di battaglia ma un vero e proprio dominio separato, sarà molto complicato mantenere la continuità delle comunicazioni dei segnali, col rischio di trovarsi con dei costosi e inerti bersagli galleggianti. Il concetto sarebbe anche valido per la deterrenza NATO nell’Atlantico del nord, coi porti dell’Alleanza a relativamente poca distanza e in presenza di copertura aerea, ma come potrebbe operare con efficacia in teatri lontani dall’Europa? Qualora, ad esempio, la situazione di crisi nel Pacifico occidentale dovesse ulteriormente deteriorarsi sino al punto di uno scontro bellico, come sarebbe possibile mantenere le comunicazioni in un ambiente altamente contestato, mantenere la capacità di difesa della flotta, e soprattutto effettuare il controllo dei danni di bordo? Quest’ultimo punto è dirimente: la capacità di controllo danni in combattimento è fondamentale per una nave da guerra – vedasi esperienza britannica durante il conflitto nelle Falkland o la sorte dell’incrociatore russo “Moskva” – ed essa viene svolta per una larga parte dall’equipaggio che reagisce tempestivamente e ripara il riparabile in mare. Secondariamente e per le stesse ragioni tecniche: come sarà possibile reagire tempestivamente per far fronte alle minacce aeree? La difesa antiaerea richiede rapida capacità di discernimento delle minacce, che devono essere distinte chiaramente e in breve tempo dal traffico amico. La catena di comando sarà quindi in grado di essere rapida ed efficace basandosi su un sistema autonomo situato magari a centinaia di miglia di distanza? Ci sono forti dubbi a riguardo.

L’automazione spinta è sicuramente un vantaggio, e gli USV/UUV che vengono usati per la sorveglianza, attacco e perfino missioni di soccorso lo dimostrano, ma una grossa unità navale uncrewed rischia facilmente di diventare una costosa “sitting duck”, per usare un’espressione ben nota agli storici del secondo conflitto mondiale nel Pacifico. Riconosciamo che eliminare l’equipaggio riduca i fattori di rischio umano – è lapalissiano – e i costi di costruzione eliminando alloggi e tutto quanto collegato alla vita umana di bordo, ma le dimensioni in gioco non sono quelle di un motoscafo autonomo o di una piccola unità, e la perdita di più vascelli di questo tipo resterebbe sempre costosa e difficilmente rimpiazzabile in tempi brevi.

L'articolo La Royal Navy punta tutto sull’uncrewed, e non è una scelta saggia proviene da InsideOver.

Charles III receives the crown as the United Kingdom goes through a phase of profound transition, in which the death of his mother, Queen Elizabeth II, appeared to many observers as a symbol of the real end of an era. The monarch, crowned on June 2, 1953, was the last and fundamental witness of a world in which London was still the capital of an empire and Europe was the great stage of history. And under his reign the British people somehow recognized themselves in a continuity that persisted in the face of great changes, real revolutions and wounds that significantly affected the life of the United Kingdom.

Today Charles finds before him a kingdom that also suffers the effects of what happened in the last years of the reign of his deceased mother. And although he is not a political leader, his role cannot and cannot be that of a simple ferryman, but that of representative of a monarchy in a period that may already be decisive for the fate of London. Several outbreaks, already spotted or tamed in the last decade, could reappear in the face of a monarchy that appears firm but at the same time still a harbinger of doubts. And both in Britain and in what is still the British “empire”, Charles III has before him several signals about the complex and systemic challenges he must try to manage from his position as king.

The hotbeds of the home front

On the domestic front, many observers believe that in the coming years, the Northern Ireland issue may reappear in a more or less short period of time. The post-Brexit agreement with the European Union has raised strong concerns on the part of the unionist front, where many fear that this could be the prelude to a form of isolation and excessive rapprochement with Dublin. The issue is rather felt by the British crown, to the point that in February a meeting between Charles III and the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen has already been skipped to prevent the summit from being used as a propaganda tool on the Northern Irish protocol wanted by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.

The issue of Scotland is less urgent, even if the 2016 referendum still represents a precedent not to be underestimated when it comes to the dynamics between Edinburgh and London. At the moment the path to independence seems shelved for several reasons, from the pragmatism of Sunak to the resignation of Nicola Sturgeon to a series of international issues that have deflated the dreams of secession. There is disaffection with respect to independence from the United Kingdom, as shown by the most recent polls. However, in such a turbulent period of European history and also of the life of the United Kingdom, it is not said that outbreaks of protest cannot be rekindled, despite the definitive “no” of the Court of London to a new referendum.

The crux of relations with the EU

On the international front, London must also deal with what is the big question mark of recent years: its definitive disengagement from the European Union. After the hottest period of Brexit, now the Kingdom must finally figure out “what to do when you grow up”. The throne of Charles III is contemporary with Britain’s hope of returning “global Britain”, as coveted by former Prime Minister Boris Johnson in his well-known strategic program in conjunction with Brexit. To do this, British foreign policy must inevitably focus on the ancient and now lost empire, transformed into a network of partnerships where undoubtedly the scepter of power is tranipped from London to Washington.

Charles, a monarch who seems aware of the role of his country, will therefore have to represent a kingdom that wants to expose itself again on the international scene, and do so by reconsidering a foreign agenda that at least must recover ground in the East and Africa and that is building a role of Atlantic standard-bearer especially in the war in Ukraine. The post-Brexit Kingdom is in fact above all a power that bases its relations with Europe on bilateral agreements and loyalty to NATO. And this implies not only an insight into the strategic adversaries of the Euro-American bloc, starting with Russia, but also a more active role in consolidating partnerships with the West and with the countries traditionally linked to the Anglosphere. A somewhat unrealistic plan, given the internal difficulties of the country and also given the weight of international organizations and alliances.

The role of Charles III is certainly not the decisive one on the foreign or domestic policy front. But the new king can be incisive both in terms of image, fundamental even in a society like today’s, and on that of managing the divisions that the kingdom can live and the tensions between its territories and with the world of new and old alliances.

L'articolo Charles III between the (Dis)United Kingdom and the Global Britain proviene da InsideOver.

The government of the United Kingdom is facing some difficult choices about what kind of role the country intends to play in both European and global affairs.  In some ways, the current challenges constitute the continuation of a process that has been underway for years.  Brexit marked an especially significant tipping point, since British voters decided that their country would no longer be one of several leading powers in the European Union.  However, it was not clear at the time, and it remains murky, about what kind of role London intends to play over the longer term.

There appear to be four major options for the United Kingdom.  One possibility would be to rescind Brexit and rejoin the EU.  Another option is to be a European Union fellow traveler.  That approach would give British leaders the opportunity to act with greater independence and flexibility than formal EU members, but it would still enable Britain to be a significant factor in European affairs.  In either case, Europe would be the principal focus of UK foreign policy.  

A third scenario would be for London to attempt to become a truly independent great power with interests and objectives throughout the international system.  In some respects, that strategy would attempt to recapture and revitalize the global role that Britain played before the country was so severely weakened by World War II that it was forced to retrench.  With the fading of U.S. global hegemony, and the emergence of an increasingly multipolar world, Britain may have the opportunity to be one member of a concert of great powers. 

The final option is to continue the current policy of being Washington’s obedient junior partner in global affairs.  That approach has significant advantages, but it also entails some worrisome disadvantages.  

One crucial advantage is that the “special relationship” has given London disproportionate influence over U.S. foreign policy decisions.  For example, it is not certain that George H. W. Bush’s administration would have opted to confront Iraq militarily after Saddam Hussein’s forces invaded and occupied Kuwait, if it had not been for London’s insistent lobbying.  British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher insisted that the development had far-reaching adverse implications and reportedly urged Bush not to “go wobbly” on repelling Baghdad’s aggression.  Bush and his advisers eventually concluded that Iraq’s conquest of its neighbor set an unacceptable precedent in what was emerging as a post-Cold War world. 

However, Washington’s increasingly brash, confrontational approach to world affairs is creating situations which could endanger Britain’s best interests and even its survival.  The willingness of Prime Minister Tony Blair to blindly embrace George W. Bush’s crusade to oust Saddam not only entangled the UK in mounting Middle East turmoil, his stance also impelled him to deceive both parliament and the British public, thereby damaging the country’s democratic system.

Matters have been equally bad on other occasions when British leaders have attempted to match the ill-advised hawkishness of the UK’s American patron.  London has been enthusiastically supporting the Biden administration’s policy of getting NATO members to provide Ukraine with military aid.  Indeed, there are indications that both U.S. and British intelligence agencies have aided Kyiv in its battle plans.  Such an approach carries serious risks of getting the UK as well as the U.S. entangled in a direct military confrontation with Russia.  

Washington’s increasingly hardline policies toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on both Taiwan and economic decoupling entails similar unpleasant risks.  However, despite some earlier deviations, London now seems fully on board with the Biden administration’s approach.

The risk-reward ratio for continuing to be Washington’s junior foreign policy partner is not promising for British interests.  The other options have more upside potential.  Focusing on Europe’s future rather than trying to play a global role should have considerable appeal for a mid-size power.  Trying to do so while remaining outside the structure of the European Union, however, makes that task difficult.  Being an EU “fellow traveler” would give Britain some additional policy flexibility, but it also would limit London’s influence on important matters. 

If Britain rejoined the EU, the country automatically would again be one of the “big three” players in determining that association’s approach to both European and world affairs.  At the same time, British membership would give the EU greater heft in dealing with the United States, the PRC, India, and other major countries.  Rejoining the EU also would have considerable appeal to factions within Britain (especially Scotland) who were unhappy with Brexit in the first place.  

However, being a truly independent power in a multilateral global system also has its own advantages.  It would spare Britain from being subject to excessive regulatory meddling by the EU’s bureaucracy in Brussels.  That attempt at economic micromanagement was a crucial reason why UK voters embraced Brexit in the first place.  There is no guarantee that a similar problem won’t arise if Britain decides to rejoin the EU.

A key question is whether the global system is now sufficiently multipolar so that a mid-size power such as the UK could be an effective player, economically, diplomatically, and militarily as part of a new concert of great powers.  That picture remains somewhat unclear, but it is apparent that both the bipolar system of the Cold War and the post-Cold War unipolar system that the United States has dominated to this point no longer reflect reality.  Russia has become a second-tier power in the international system, both economically and militarily, as its surprising difficulty in subduing Ukraine confirms.  The United States is still dominant militarily, but economically the world already is clearly multipolar.  Indeed, the Biden administration appears to be having mounting difficulties preserving the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.

Even Washington’s military primacy is fading.  The PRC has emerged as a serious challenger, especially in the Pacific.  Several war games conducted by the Pentagon and independent think tanks in recent years indicate that the United States probably would lose a war trying to defend Taiwan against the PRC.

In such an emerging multipolar international system, the concept of a concert of great powers is no longer fanciful.  British leaders need to give serious consideration to that option.  It probably is a close call between that choice and again becoming one of the three leaders of the EU with a primary focus on developments in Europe.  The least appealing option for the UK, by far, should be to remain as Washington’s junior partner.

Ted Galen Carpenter is a senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute and a senior fellow at the Libertarian Institute.  He also served in various policy positions during a 37-year career at the Cato Institute.  Dr. Carpenter is the author of 13 books and more than 1,200 articles on international affairs. 

L'articolo Which role in global affairs? Britain’s hard choice proviene da InsideOver.

How business is seeking rich rewards from surging military spending triggered by the Ukraine war

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has piqued the self-interest of private investors and military firms which calculate that the increased military spending spurred by the conflict will boost growth for defence-focused companies.  

And there’s little wonder why, with world military spending growing for the eighth consecutive year in 2022 to an all-time high of €2,042 billion, according to new data published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

By far the sharpest rise in spending (+13 per cent) was seen in Europe, largely accounted for by Russian and Ukrainian military expenditure. However, military aid to Ukraine and concerns about a heightened threat from Russia strongly influenced many other states’ spending decisions, as did tensions in East Asia.

Serge Weinberg, chairman of €43 billion French pharmaceuticals and healthcare multinational Sanofi,  is one of the most prominent of the private investors tapping into this heightened state of defence awareness in the wake of the Ukraine war. 

He is championing the consolidation of France’s fragmented aerospace and defence supply chain via Weinberg Capital Partners, his investment firm which has raised over €100mn for a new fund backing French defence companies. It expects further fund-raising to double that figure.

Weinberg’s campaign coincides with president Emmanuel Macron calling last year for French defence contractors to emulate a “war economy”. Macron’s administration backs the creation of investment funds to support some 4,000 small and mid-sized companies supplying the likes of defence and aerospace titans Airbus, Dassault Aviation and Thales. 

“The bigger defence companies are concerned about having a solid supply chain. This is becoming even more important given the perspectives of additional military spending that is set to come through with the next multiyear military budget,” Weinberg told the Financial Times in March. 

“There is a need for additional production capacity, ability to build up stocks, and therefore there is a need to strengthen the financial structures [of these groups],” the former chairman of PPR and CEO of Rexel added.  

High-impact expenditure

SIPRI data shows that military expenditure by states in Central and Western Europe totalled $345 billion in 2022. In real terms, spending by these states for the first time surpassed that in 1989, as the cold war was ending, and was 30 per cent higher than in 2013. Several states significantly increased their military spending following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, while others announced plans to raise spending levels over periods of up to a decade.

‘The invasion of Ukraine had an immediate impact on military spending decisions in Central and Western Europe. This included multi-year plans to boost spending from several governments,’ said Dr Diego Lopes da Silva, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘As a result, we can reasonably expect military expenditure in Central and Western Europe to keep rising in the years ahead.’

Some of the sharpest increases were seen in Finland (+36 per cent), Lithuania (+27 per cent), Sweden (+12 per cent) and Poland (+11 per cent).

‘While the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 certainly affected military spending decisions in 2022, concerns about Russian aggression have been building for much longer,’ said Lorenzo Scarazzato, Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘Many former Eastern bloc states have more than doubled their military spending since 2014, the year when Russia annexed Crimea.’

The war in Ukraine has sparked plans for a significant increase in military spending in many other European countries, including France, Germany, Poland and the UK. With governments investing more in drones, sensors, cyber and artificial intelligence, private investors’ antennae are twitching. 

That said, environmental, social and governance (ESG) consideration weigh heavily on some fund managers’ minds. Many are wary of being seen to support weapons manufacturers, opting instead to invest in developing dual-use technologies for both civil and military applications. 

The two top private equity defence deals by value were consummated by Advent International, which bought UK-listed groups Cobham for £4bn in 2019 and Ultra Electronics for £2.8bn in 2022.   

Tanks a lot

The war has also seen the number of military vehicles sold by private dealers in the UK to Ukraine soar since Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion last year.

As Ukraine’s forces have scrambled to arm themselves in the face of Russia’s onslaught started by the full-scale invasion in February 2022, with towns like Bakhmut and Avdiivka now under daily attack in the war, the demand for weapons has never been higher.

British businessman Nick Mead spent decades buying military vehicles from the UK Ministry of Defence for his entertainment company Tanks A Lot, but since February 2022, Ukrainians desperate for tanks and armour have been buying them off him. But Mead’s vehicles are not the only ones on the road to the war.

More than €34 million-worth of military vehicles were shipped from the UK to Ukraine between April and September 2022 alone, according to government data, while in the whole of 2021 only £37,000 worth of vehicles were sold, in 2020 it was £550,000 and nothing in 2019.

The soaring demand for British armoured vehicles has driven prices up, leading some to accuse sellers of profiteering. Mead says: “There’d be some people who’d think we’re profiteering out of war, and I guess we are and that hurts. What I’m trying to do is help Ukraine, and I wish a lot more people would help Ukraine.”

As for whether the surge in demand for matériel will intensify rivalry between suppliers belonging to the ‘Atlantic’ and European blocs, SIPRI’s Scarazzato reveals there are many discussions at the European level to coordinate procurement in favour of companies in the European Defence and Technology Industrial Base (EDTIB).

‘But the issue is notoriously thorny, as countries tend to favour their national industry. Moreover, the urgency and the pressure created by the war in Ukraine are pushing some countries towards off-the-shelves acquisitions often from the US companies or (in the case of Poland) South Korea.

Scarazzato adds a caveat, however. ‘European companies have been wary about ramping up production, wanting to see contracts signed before committing to investments. The reason is they want to make sure their return on investment is guaranteed, and not at the mercy of political wills.’

L'articolo Cashing in conflict: the Ukraine War and its business implications in Uk and Europe proviene da InsideOver.

Nick Bostrom is a Swedish philosopher and professor who heads the Future of Humanity Institute at the British University of Oxford. Bostrom’s field of study is that of transhumanism and embraces areas such as cloning, Artificial Intelligence (AI), superintelligence, the possibility of transferring consciousness to technological supports, nanotechnologies and theses on simulated reality. As far as AI and its future developments are concerned, the professor and researcher is animated by a long-term “pessimistic” position: substantially, Bostrom believes that when AI will reach the level of superintelligence, i.e. when it will exceed human intelligence, it could easily pose a danger to all of humanity. Something that could happen over a very long period of time, even generational, but according to him could easily happen. To deepen this position and understand what the risks really are, but above all how AI works in view of the possible advent of superintelligence, we interviewed him.

Professor, you are strongly critical of the development of AI, with a very pessimistic long-term perspective on the dangers it could have for all of humanity. So I ask you: is it possible to teach a machine ethics, empathy and compassion, exclusively human values? How?

I’d say rather that I’m ambivalent about AI. I’m very optimistic about the potential upside, if we get things right, though I do also think there are serious risks involved with developing machine superintelligence. Exactly what we need to steer advanced AI systems to get a good outcome is not known yet, and that is an active research field. Many of the smartest people I know are now working in that field.

If human values could be taught to AI, knowing that man is not only characterized by positive values but can also be petty, sneaky and violent, could there be a risk that the machine, autonomously, knowing us, would assume these behaviors and become aggressive towards us?

Yes, though it could also become aggressive to us without such values.

Can Asimov’s laws of robotics be applied to AI? Yes/no why?

Asimov’s approach was too simplistic.

You believe that controlling the capabilities of AI can only be a temporary measure. Wouldn’t it be enough to insert a different type of algorithm that automatically inhibits any aggressive behavior? Is it possible to define such an algorithm?

Is it aggressive behavior when we pave over an ant colony to build a parking lot?

Knowing that AI works based on the dataset that we give it, wouldn’t it be enough to choose the dataset wisely to avoid nasty surprises?

Smart AIs can generalize beyond their training data, and they can build models of the world and use those models to understand novel situations and to make plans.

AI machines are faster than humans in learning concepts and reasoning, but they are still not capable of performing automatic human actions, those that are based on instinct. Will this gap ever be filled?

I think currently AIs are slower than humans in learning concepts. For example, ChatGPT-4 was trained on approximately all of the internet, but individual humans achieve similar concept understanding based on vastly less data.

L'articolo “AI is a risk for all humanity”, the interview to Nick Bostrom proviene da InsideOver.

Ever since the British people voted for Brexit, it has become incredibly fashionable to argue that their economy will decline while the European Union’s will power ahead. For more than five years, one economist after another lined up to predict economic doom, gloom and catastrophe.

The reality is that we were never going to know the impact of Brexit for years to come but this did not stop one professional economist after another from making increasingly speculative forecasts. The UK, we were repeatedly told, would crash and burn. It would return to be the ‘sick man of Europe’, as it was before 1973 when it joined the European Community.

The latest data on the volume of trade between the United Kingdom and European Union was seized upon by these commentators. In January, countless writers pounced on data which showed a collapse in trade with the EU.

Total UK exports to the EU fell by about 42% compared to previous years. Yet what has been much less reported on is that since then the UK’s exports to the EU have made a striking recovery, jumping by 47% in February. While they still remain slightly lower than last year’s level, they are rapidly moving in the right direction.

What these and other numbers are telling us – notes the respected analyst Wolfgang Münchau of Eurointelligence – is that even this bit of the Brexit scare stories will not come true

Several financial organizations agree, pointing to strong tailwinds behind the UK economy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) just raised its forecast for the UK’s growth in 2021 to 5.3%, compared to 4.4%for the Eurozone and 3.6% for Germany. The UK will now almost certainly return to its pre-Covid output before the Eurozone and is tipped to go much further. In recent days, countless others have also been raising their growth forecasts for the UK – the EY Item Club, JP Morgan, UBS, the OECD, Deutsche Bank, to name only a few.

Goldman Sachs also just predicted that the UK economy will grow by 7.8% this year, faster than America. If it meets this figure, then it would be the sharpest rate of growth in peacetime since 1870. EY ITEM Club says that it will expand by close to 7%, the fastest pace since 1941. UBS, Bank of America and Barclays have also raised their forecasts, largely because of the UK’s successful vaccination rollout, which was the first serious test since Brexit – and one that it passed with flying colours.

This really does matter, not least because a sharp rebound from Covid-19 will disguise any short-term friction that followed Brexit. A year or two from now, it will be incredibly hard to make a convincing case to the British people that Brexit has been an economic disaster when they are looking at growth rates of 7%.

Some argue that Brexit could still undermine the longer-term growth of the UK. For example, some banks estimate that even with a strong 2021 the longer-term impact of Brexit could be to reduce the UK’s gross domestic product (GDP) by about 3.5% over the next few years.

Yet even if this does materialise, it will have to be considered alongside two facts. The first is that the performance of any economy is always relative. When weighing up the benefits and costs of Brexit, the British people will now routinely compare their economic performance with the Eurozone, which will continue to diverge between the more affluent north and the left behind and heavily indebted south.

The second is that even if a long-term economic squeeze from Brexit does emerge, we should remember that this is, ultimately, secondary to why people voted for Brexit in the first place.

For the 52% of voters who ticked ‘Leave’, the vote was as much about reclaiming national sovereignty, independence and control over immigration as capturing the economic advantages that will come from diverging from the EU model. Any economic gains are an additional bonus, not the underlying rationale.

As Münchau and others argue, one fundamental problem over the last five years is that many of the forecasts about Brexit were always based on shaky foundations. They were either produced by anti-Brexit economists who put politics ahead of objectivity, or relied on models that were based heavily on long-term trade flows while ignoring other areas, like data, in which the UK excels and is one of the fastest growing sectors.

In short, when future historians judge the contribution of economists to the Brexit debate, they will not be kind. And by the time they are writing I suspect that the real impact of Brexit in Europe will be visible for all to see.

L'articolo Brexit has disproved all the economists’ scenarios proviene da InsideOver.

A British judge recently ruled that Wikileaks founder Julian Assange cannot be extradited to the US to face charges of espionage and of hacking government computers.

Judge: Assange is a High Suicide Risk

Delivering her ruling, District Judge Vanessa Baraitser said Assange was likely to be held in conditions of isolation in a so-called supermax prison in the US. She said that safety procedures described by US authorities would not stop him from potentially finding a way to take his own life, which she believes is a real possibility given his struggles with serious depression.

Lawyers for US authorities are to appeal against the ruling, which was delivered at the criminal court by Baraitser on Monday, Jan. 4.

Assange is currently incarcerated at HMP Belmarsh, a high-security prison facility that houses some of Britain’s most dangerous criminals. Assange is there because he was found guilty of skipping bail in 2012; he previously escaped to Ecuador’s embassy rather than hand himself in to British authorities for possible extradition to Sweden. Investigators in the Scandinavian nation wanted to question him over sexual assault allegations linked to two women.

Was it Right to Deny Extradition?

The US Department of Justice has indicted Assange on 18 counts, alleging 17 forms of espionage and one instance of computer misuse crimes linked to Wikileaks’ dissemination of caches of secret US military documents provided to him by former US Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning.

However, if Assange’s mental health is at risk, then it is only right that the Wikileaks founder is not extradited back to the US. This is similar to the case of self-confessed hacker Gary McKinnon, who was wanted for targeting US government computers. In 2012 the British government barred his extradition, saying that he was too ill to face trial abroad. The same principle applies in the Assange case.

There are Powerful Arguments in Favor of Granting Assange Freedom

Of course, there is a strong case as to why the Wikileaks founder should not be prosecuted for espionage other than for mental health reasons. Edward Fitzgerald QC, the activist’s lawyer, argued over a year ago that his offences were political, so were not sufficient to merit his extradition to America.

This argument is supported by the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI), which states that a potential extradition of Mr. Assange from the UK to the US would:

• be in contravention of Article 4 (1) of the Extradition Treaty between the US and the UK;
• constitute a violation of freedom of expression;
• set a dangerous precedent in the restriction of press freedom in the UK and the US;
• potentially subject him to an unfair trial in the US.

Assange Should Stay in the UK for Now

Despite this, certain figures within the US believe that Wikileaks should not be classed as a media organization. When Secretary of State Mike Pompeo served as the CIA’s director, he said during his first public speech as head of the spy agency that “Wikileaks walks like a hostile intelligence service and talks like a hostile intelligence service.”

Assange’s detractors claim he does not write stories or interview anyone and that the dissemination of unclassified documents should not count as journalism. Yet the weakness with this argument is that it is a slippery slope toward clamping down on national security journalism that holds the powerful to account. The Obama administration ultimately decided they could not prosecute the Wikileaks founder for revealing national security secrets for that reason.

Regardless of whether the government classes Wikileaks as a news organization is besides the point. Prosecuting Assange would result in the gradual erosion of press freedom. John Kiriakou, a former CIA analyst who blew the whistle on a U.S. government-sanctioned torture program in 2007, states that if you are able to prosecute someone who has a powerful case to be classed as a publisher, what is next?

Much to the US government’s disappointment, it appears unlikely that Assange will ever face trial in the near future. But until they can guarantee that his trial will be fair and that they can safeguard his mental health, he has every right to stay in the UK.

L'articolo Was the UK Right to Refuse to Extradite Assange to the US? proviene da InsideOver.

The transition period for the UK’s exit from the EU has ended after both sides miraculously drafted a trade agreement before the end of 2020. It did not take British and European politicians long to approve of the pact prior to January 1, and the anticipated disaster of a no-deal Brexit was avoided.

Brussels has proven yet again that it is notorious for approving of deals at the last minute.

What’s Next?

Now that Britain has left the EU, its member states no longer have to deal with a nation that was seen as an obstacle to its integrationist ambitions. The UK was once a valued member of the bloc thanks to its influence in the US and its significant contributions toward the EU budget, yet it was always the awkward partner when it came to further integration, particularly under Conservative governments. Brussels’ approval of a trade pact managed to prevent economic disruption. However, the EU’s greatest challenges lie ahead.

Further EU Integration is Likely on the Way for the Sake of Survival

In theory, integration should be a lot simpler, particularly when it comes to monetary union. Former British chancellor Gordon Brown vetoed the UK’s participation in the eurozone and his successors have followed suit. This always made economic integration harder, but now the EU no longer has that excuse.

Last year, the coronavirus exposed the eurozone’s weaknesses. In July, the European Council hosted its longest meeting that it has had since the Nice, France gathering in 2000, and agreed upon a €750 billion recovery package. The package consisted of grants and loans to counter the economic impact that the coronavirus has inflicted on the bloc since March 2020.

Yet the negotiations revealed how divided the EU is as Sweden, Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands and Finland opposed grant extensions, whilst Spain and Italy favoured this outcome. Should the coronavirus continue to devastate the EU’s economy, some longer-term solutions will be necessary to ensure that the bloc can survive.

Strong Eurozone? Not So Fast

Milton Friedman and Martin Feldstein warned in 1999 that the eurozone cannot succeed without a political union. Given how the 2008 recession and the coronavirus pandemic revealed how vulnerable the euro is, they were right to make this argument. Even though Britain has left the EU, a strong eurozone is in the UK’s best interest as Europe will remain London’s strongest trading partner for now. Despite this, a strong eurozone may be nothing more than wishful thinking.

Now that Brussels has awarded Britain a free trade deal, many remaining EU member states could realize that they may be able to achieve the same outcome should they leave the eurozone or the bloc itself. The economic impact of the coronavirus has frustrated the populations of EU nations who have suffered as a result of the pandemic.  The Daily Express reported on one survey which suggests that 50 percent of Italians support an “Italexit,” or Italy’s exit from the EU, whilst 27 percent of Italians prefer to remain within the bloc.

Eurozone membership makes it impossible for Italy to devalue its own currency which is part of the reason why Italy’s economy has stagnated since 2008. This makes the prospect of southern European countries leaving the eurozone a possibility, should Italians vote for a coalition government committed to this pledge in the future.

Political Union isn’t Easy

Political union will be impossible to achieve without the full support of all of the EU’s member states. Polish Prime Minister Andrzej Duda and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban blocked the approval of the EU budget in November 2020. Both Poland and Hungary seem to be pursuing their own paths contrary to the democratic principles the EU is meant to uphold.

This led to Tom Theuns of EU Observer suggesting that a new EU could be founded without the support of Budapest and Warsaw.  This is a radical idea, but one that could gain momentum in the future should Brussels get even more frustrated with Orban and Duda.

Brexit is an exciting opportunity for both the UK and the EU. Regardless, the latter may find its ambitions could be thwarted by obstacles that are still prevalent post-Brexit. What happens to Europe next is anyone’s guess.

L'articolo Brexit: U-Turn for the Whole EU proviene da InsideOver.

Governments have tried various strategies against the coronavirus. But what measures were most effective at preventing new infections? Two recent studies attempted to provide an answer.

Oxford Study Looks at Public Life in 41 Countries to Find out What Works in Fighting COVID

Governments around the world have taken drastic measures to prevent further infections with the coronavirus. There are hardly any areas of life that are not affected by closures or restrictions.

Oxford University scientists conducted an extensive study of public life in 41 countries to find out what works in preventing the spread of COVID. The study also looks at the actions taken against the pandemic in the spring.

A ban on gathering for more than ten people and the closure of schools and universities from January to May were likely the most effective measures to contain the corona pandemic, according to the study. The closing of all shops except the essential ones had only a moderate effect and the requirement to stay at home had a little additional effect.

How Was the Oxford Study Done?

To conduct their research, the scientists looked at the number of cases and the number of people who died of Covid-19.

Using a computer model, they put these figures in relation to individual measures taken against the disease’s spread, such as those taken in 34 European and seven non-European countries. The researchers measured the effectiveness by reducing the reproductive number R, which was 3.3 without government intervention.

The fact that the individual measures were decided at different times in the different countries helped the researchers calculate the individual regulations’ efficacy. Since schools and universities were closed simultaneously in almost all countries, the effect of these measures could not be calculated individually, but only as an additional effect.

How the Oxford Study Judges Efficacy

The study describes a measure as “very effective” if the calculated median value for reducing the number of reproductions is over 35 percent. This is the case with the ban on gathering for more than ten people and the closure of schools and universities.

There are significant differences between countries. As a result, the effect of the ban on assemblies is in the range of 17 to 60 percent, and the case of schools and universities being closed in the range of 16 to 54 percent.

The forced closings were moderately effective for everyone except essential businesses (27 percent).

The effect of the requirement to leave the house only for a few permitted activities could not be determined individually. As an additional measure to the others mentioned, their effect was only 13 percent.

There were also moderate effects from the assembly bans for more than 100 people (34 percent) and more than 1,000 people (23 percent). The same applies to the closing of facilities that are considered high-risk regarding the pandemic, such as gyms, nightclubs, cinemas, and restaurants (18 percent).

Additional Study Highlights Danger of Eating Out

Meanwhile, a different French study has now also given clear insights into the matter. According to a study by the Pasteur Institute in Paris, socializing with guests for dinner increases the likelihood of infection, as does staying in a restaurant or bar.

The study confirms assumptions that eating together carries a higher risk than, for example, using public transport or shopping.

The scientists examined which factors differentiated infected people from those who had not been infected with the coronavirus. To do this, they compared the test persons’ statements with regard to professions, means of transport, and places visited. In total, the researchers surveyed around 3,400 people who had contracted the virus and 1,700 people without a coronavirus infection.

Health authorities worldwide advise against meeting in crowded indoor spaces — numerous government-imposed measures such as the closure of restaurants, bars, and gyms. Scientists increasingly agree that the new virus is spread via fine particle clouds, so-called aerosols, and this happens above all in poorly-ventilated rooms.

L'articolo New Studies Reveal Best Way to Minimize COVID Infections proviene da InsideOver.

As countries are busy buying COVID-19 vaccines, a new virus strain was found in the UK around a week ago and then spread to numerous countries, forcing them to temporarily restrict flights.

The new virus strain is called VUI-202012/01 as the first mutated virus was probed in December. It is 70 percent more contagious than the old version of the virus. The new virus type was also linked with the drastic surge in the numbers of new COVID-19 cases in the UK.

The mutation is not the first time given that a new strain has appeared. A mutation called D614G was found in Malaysia last August. This mutated virus – which was first detected in Europe in February – was 10 times more dangerous than SARS-CoV-2 and caused COVID-19 with flu-like symptoms.

As COVID-19 continues to mutate, questions about the COVID-19 vaccines’ efficacy linger, even though many health experts claim vaccines are still effective in containing the mutated virus as well. 

Viral Mutation is Normal

A virus mutation is a condition where a virus changes its genetic material, which is a normal process.

Deputy Director of the Eijkman Institute in Translational Research at the Eijkman Institute, Professor David H Muljono told Kompas last August that viral mutation is inevitable as a virus adapts to survive around its receptor inside a human’s body.

Viruses must adapt in order to disguise themselves and bypass a host’s immune system. After the mutation, a body’s immune system will find it hard to detect the virus, allowing the virus stay longer and attack its host.

However, human intervention can intentionally help the mutation, aimed at weakening that virus for the vaccine development’s process.

How Effective are COVID-19 Vaccines for Stopping a Mutated Virus Strain?

New coronavirus mutation sparks a question of whether current COVID-19 vaccines can contain the virus’ new strain which is believed to be more dangerous than SARS-CoV-2.

Pfizer-BionTech and Moderna uses the latest technology called mRNA (messenger RNA). mRNA vaccines teach our body’s cell to produce protein that stimulates an immune response in our body.

While a traditional vaccine development method uses inactivated virus, such as found in the chicken pox and flu virus. One of the vaccine producers that still use this old technology is China’s Sinovac.

Pfizer-Biontech and Moderna’s vaccines have efficacy of more than 90 percent, as shown in the Phase III clinical trial. However, suppose the virus continues to mutate several times. In that case, those viruses will no longer be effective, said Dr. Taruna Ikrar, an Indonesian doctor and scientist based in the U.S. in a webinar held by Kabari Indonesia.

He elaborated that researchers are studying T cell – a part of a body’s immune system that protects us from infections and can memorize past illnesses.

Indonesian pulmonologist Erlina Burhan told TVOne that so far those COVID-19 vaccines are effective in tackling the new virus strain, yet further research is still needed as the situation is growing.

“Vaccines are still effective, but not everything as the most important thing is we implement health protocols by maintaining distance, washing hands regularly, and wearing masks,” she said.

The specialist added that the PCR and rapid antigen only detect the virus’s presence, not the mutation. A more advanced technology equipped with more costly test kits are needed to spot the mutating virus.

Novavax – one of the largest vaccine makers – stated in a release that it was actively testing its vaccine on the new UK strain.

“Development and results will take several weeks,” the release said.

Ikrar claimed that annual vaccination is the most suitable alternative for COVID-19 given that flu virus also mutates and the vaccination is held every year.

“Which vaccines should we choose? As long as the efficacy is above 50 percent, safe, and they provide longer immunity, that’s fine,” Ikrar said.

L'articolo How Effective is COVID Vaccine at Fighting the New UK Virus Strain? proviene da InsideOver.