Washinton seeks to reimpose sanctions against Iran at all costs. America’s weapon of choice, the snapback option, is opposed by the Europeans. Nevertheless, the White House could have more leverage when it comes down to resolving the matter.

Washington’s Plan

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo followed up on his announcement and recently submitted a complaint to the UN Security Council arguing that Iran failed to meet its obligations under the nuclear deal. Pompeo attempted to trigger the snapback, with which all sanctions against Iran suspended in 2015 would come into force again.

Washington believes that no other nation can stop Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The American government differentiates between the regulations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known as the Iran nuclear deal and those in UN Resolution 2231, with which the agreement became part of international law.

The JCPOA’s dispute settlement mechanism calls for phases of dialogue before the UN Security Council gets involved. On the other hand, Resolution 2231 provides every “participant” to the agreement to reinstate the sanctions unilaterally.

Can the US Still Trigger the Snapback Option?

The snapback mechanism sets a legal precedent as it removes a state’s right to veto the Security Council. If a “participant” claims the right to trigger a snapback, only a new Security Council resolution can ensure that the sanctions remain suspended. However, Washington would veto such a resolution.

After the United States existed the deal in 2018 and reinstated its sanctions against Iran, opinions differ as to whether Washington remains a “participant” and can trigger a snapback. Paragraph 10 of Resolution 2231 names the signatories to the 2015 agreement as “participants.” The United States sees itself as such, even after its withdrawal.

Most importantly, paragraph 10 does not contain any provision that this status can change due to future behavior. Thus, it is more probable than not that the United States continues to be a “participant” from a legal point of view. Meanwhile, the Europeans continue to claim that no legal basis for the snackback exists, as, in the eyes of London, Paris, and Berlin, Washington is no longer a “participant.”

Washington also argues that even after withdrawing from the nuclear agreement, they insisted on unreserved compliance with Resolution 2231, which — in contrast to the agreement as a political agreement — is binding under international law. This also applies to the question of how to proceed if Iran fails to meet its obligations. Washington rules out that procedural maneuvers in the Security Council could block the snapback initiation and that the countdown of 30 days could be stopped.

However, the USA failed on Tuesday with its application to resume sanctions via the snapback. With the law arguably being on the US’s side, however, it seems inconceivable that Pompeo will concede to the defeat. The US could now draft its own resolution, which could create even more confusion.

Europe’s Perspective

In Berlin, the actions of the Trump administration continue to be viewed with great concern. During the entire dispute over the nuclear agreement, the Federal Foreign Office has always attached great importance to the fact that the three European participants in Germany, France, and Great Britain, should appear in a coordinated and uniform manner. They are cognizant of the issues the American position, as well as China’s and Russia’s position regarding Iran and understand the challenge this poses.

Therefore, the three Europeans wanted to develop a “smart alternative” and want to put particularly offensive types of weapons under an extended embargo period. Considering Washington has made now made sanctions its sine qua non, the European leaders are convinced that Trump’s administration’s ultimate goal is to bring the nuclear deal to a standstill before the election in America. One can almost be certain that secretly one hopes for an occupancy change at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

The Europeans want a new President in office for good reason.

In the worst case, the ongoing diplomatic dispute could lead to a split in the Security Council over the question of whether the old sanctions against Iran will apply again or not. Most countries could essentially ignore a snapback triggered by a unilateral US approach, which would lead to drastic distortions between Europe and the USA and, most importantly, could establish a precedent with severe consequences for the UN, its members, and international law itself.

L'articolo Why Europe Fears Snapback Sanctions for Iran proviene da InsideOver.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recentl;y paid Europe a visit. Within a week, he toured the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Austria, and Poland. His stops were anything but random, and they show the contradictions and rifts in Washington and within the EU.

What Was the Main Purpose of Pompeo’s Trip?

The main topics covered were the recently announced relocation of US troops out of Germany, energy security, including the dispute over the German-Russian gas pipeline Nord Stream 2 and technical cooperation in nuclear power and regarding 5G networks.

The overarching goal was to curb the influence of China and Russia and advance American influence in Europe.

Czech Republic

Pompeo first arrived in Pilsen, Czech Republic on Tuesday and visited a new memorial to the liberation of western Czechoslovakia by US forces nearby. On Wednesday, he gave a speech in parliament to enhance the importance of parliaments in general, which are receiving less attention in the course of digitization and the direct meetings of the heads of government.

The Czech Republic must maintain good relations with the US. In projects such as the Three Seas Initiative launched by Poland, it does not seek the choice of whether to cooperate with its Central European neighbors. As far as the withdrawal of 12,000 soldiers from Germany, the Czech Republic remains just as skeptical as the Baltic states as it reduces the permanent US presence in Europe. Only 5600 of them are supposed to stay in Europe, mostly not all the time, but on a rotating basis.

Moreover, the Czech Republic is less dependent on China than Hungary or Poland and would like to remain open whether it follows the US demand for exclusion in the dispute over Huawei’s participation in 5G networks or German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s efforts to take a softer pan-European line.

Slovenia

In Slovenia, Pompeo was concerned with precisely this signal on Thursday: resistance to China’s influence via Huawei in the EU is growing. The government in Ljubljana has signed a voluntary commitment only to allow “clean 5G networks”.

It would exclude corporations under the control of foreign governments. Poland, Estonia, and the Czech Republic have already signed such an agreement with the USA.

Austria

Pompeo’s visit to Vienna on Friday, meanwhile, had several purposes. It served as a replacement for Chancellor Sebastian Kurz’s canceled visit to President Trump. The visit to Austria should primarily send the signal that Pompeo and the USA do not want to split the EU into old Europe (West) and new Europe (East). Pompeo left out Paris and Berlin on this trip, but not Vienna, which is also part of the old EU. Vienna is also the seat of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA.

Pompeo has called for the continuation of the sanctions against Iran, including an arms embargo that is currently limited to October 18 — with little success.

Poland

Warsaw on Saturday was a harmonious day for Pompeo. Poland sees itself as the best new ally in the USA. And for a good reason. President Donald Trump just helped President Andrzej Duda to win his re-election bid. After difficult negotiations regarding specific legal implications, the US will deploy additional US soldiers to Poland. Not permanently, but as part of a rotation.

Moreover, the US sanctions against companies that participate in Nord Stream 2 are in Poland’s favor. Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki recently used Trump’s argument that it was against solidarity for Germany to use gas deals to provide Russia with money and influence, which Moscow will subsequently invest in weapons, directed against NATO.

Washington’s New Strategy

The countries that Pompeo visited were chosen with care. Washington is cognizant that the Trump method does not work for the European powers Germany and France. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, which always feels a little neglected by its western neighbors, America is mostly welcomed with open arms and therefore has an easy time asserting its interests.

The fact that Europe is further divided with this method is deliberate, but unfortunately also due to the EU, which has never really been able to develop a coherent strategy that would make the East impervious to outside interests.

L'articolo Pompeo’s Visit to Europe proviene da InsideOver.