Negli ultimi giorni, la situazione in Mali si è aggravata come non accadeva almeno dal 2012. Sabato 25 aprile le forze jihadiste di Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), insieme a quelle dei separatisti tuareg del Fronte di Liberazione dell’Azawad (FLA), hanno lanciato un’offensiva coordinata che ha portato alla conquista di alcune città chiave nel Nord-Est e alla sostanziale rotta dei governativi sostenuti dalle forze paramilitari russe dell’Africa Corp (già Gruppo Wagner). Tra domenica e lunedì, la cittadina di Kidal e quella di Gao – nella seconda regione più importante del Mali – sono state occupate dal fronte congiunto antigovernativo, costringendo i russi ad abbandonare le proprie basi fortificate.

Il Mali fatica a contenere i gruppi insurrezionali islamisti sin dalla ribellione scoppiata nel Nord del Paese nel 2012. Vaste aree del territorio rimangono al di fuori del controllo governativo, nonostante le promesse della giunta militare golpista di sradicare i jihadisti. Dal 2021, ovvero dopo un anno dal colpo di Stato che ha portato al potere Assimi Goita, Bamako si affida in larga misura alla collaborazione in materia di sicurezza con la Russia, prima con il Gruppo Wagner e ora con il suo successore, l’Africa Corp, creato dal Ministero della Difesa russo. I militari golpisti, come primo provvedimento una volta giunti al potere, hanno interrotto ogni collaborazione coi Paesi occidentali in materia di sicurezza per affidarsi – dopo anni di preparazione propagandistica da parte del Cremlino – alla Russia.

In Mali, infatti, le attività di controinsurrezione (counterinsurgency) erano affidate inizialmente ai militari francesi, con l’Operazione Barkhane cominciata nel 2014 su richiesta del governo di Bamako e con mandato ONU, e successivamente sono state ampliate alla Task Force multinazionale “Takuba”, che ha operato nel 2021-2022. “Takuba” era un’operazione di controinsurrezione e force building per addestrare le forze di sicurezza del Mali a cui ha partecipato anche l’Italia con circa 200/250 soldati, 8 elicotteri (di cui 4 da attacco A-129) e almeno una quarantina di veicoli.

Come risultato dell’intensa campagna antioccidentale orchestrata da Mosca, il governo golpista ha quindi deciso di interrompere ogni tipo di collaborazione coi Paesi europei – rei di un presunto “neocolonialismo” – per affidarsi alle forze paramilitari russe per stabilizzare il Paese. La PMC (Private Military Company) “Wagner” è stata chiamata a sostenere il governo golpista nella sua lotta agli insorti e ai terroristi, ma i paramilitari russi non hanno mai effettuato force building in modo efficace e si sono limitati a cercare di colpire i ribelli nelle loro roccaforti, a volte con pesanti ripercussioni sulla popolazione civile. Le forze russe non hanno mai avuto una presenza costante sul territorio e molto spesso hanno agito come prolungamento degli interessi economici di Mosca, accordandosi coi signori della guerra locali anche per spartirsi le risorse come forma di autofinanziamento.

Anche nel Sahel gli effetti della guerra in Ucraina

A complicare la situazione dal punto di vista internazionale, l’architettura di sicurezza del Sahel – faticosamente costruita a partire dalla destabilizzazione del 2012 generatasi come effetto domino nato dalla caduta del regime di Gheddafi per mano occidentale – è stata scossa dalla catena di golpe in quella regione subsahariana, che hanno portato al potere giunte militari che hanno guardato a Mosca come security provider ricusando la presenza europea. Inoltre, Mali, Burkina Faso e Niger sono usciti dall’ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) per fondare l’Alleanza degli Stati del Sahel, che guarda alla Russia come pilastro per il proprio sostegno politico ed economico, indebolendo così i piani di cooperazione regionale rivolti alla lotta al terrorismo e agli insorgenti e di fatto isolando i tre Stati dal resto della comunità dell’Africa Occidentale subsahariana.

Lo scoppio della guerra in Ucraina ha portato Mosca a destinare progressivamente meno risorse per il sostegno alle giunte militari nel Sahel, e la capacità militare delle PMC è andata diminuendo. L’esempio del Mali rappresenta bene quanto sia stato fallimentare questo sodalizio: se sino al 2022 i jihadisti controllavano solo il 15% del territorio, oggi ne controllano il 70%.

Già lo scorso anno, a dicembre, pesanti attacchi del JNIM avevano colpito i rifornimenti di combustibile per la capitale Bamako, generando una crisi che è andata peggiorando nel momento in cui i jihadisti hanno unito le forze coi tuareg, che sono stati capaci di attaccare e cacciare le forze russe e governative dalle aree desertiche del Nord e di entrare a Kidal, ex roccaforte dei gruppi paramilitari di Mosca.

Generalmente, la situazione ha cominciato a peggiorare dalla partenza delle forze occidentali, con attacchi a installazioni militari, governative e infrastrutture che sono andati aumentando nel corso degli ultimi 4 anni, scatenando rappresaglie governative che in alcuni casi hanno coinvolto anche civili innocenti. A dare un buon metro di giudizio della gravità della situazione di questi giorni giunge la notizia che il governo maliano lamenta anche l’uccisione del ministro della Difesa, generale Sadio Camara, e del capo dell’intelligence, Modibo Koné, durante la serie di attacchi su larga scala di sabato e domenica.

Ieri, un portavoce dei jihadisti ha affermato che la capitale Bamako sarebbe circondata, in una mossa tattica che ricorda quella attuata dal gruppo a dicembre 2025 quando il blocco e gli attacchi alle linee di rifornimento avevano messo in ginocchio il Paese. Ora si rischia un altro effetto domino, determinato dall’isolazionismo dei tre Paesi dell’Alleanza del Sahel, che potrebbe portare al collasso dell’intera regione, al punto che l’ECOWAS ha invitato tutti gli Stati, le forze di sicurezza, i meccanismi regionali e le popolazioni dell’Africa occidentale a unirsi e mobilitarsi in uno sforzo coordinato per combattere la piaga del jihadismo insurrezionalista.

L'articolo Mali: le milizie jihadiste assediano Bamako, l’Africa Corp russo non basta proviene da InsideOver.

After a year of war, it is possible to assess the Russian military strategy in Ukraine. The Kremlin initially applied the art of deception (maskirovka) at the strategic level, claiming that it was not going to attack Ukraine. For several months, Russian officials fiercely dismissed reports by Western intelligence agencies openly predicting an invasion. Operationally, the invasion began with an advance of motorized troops that attacked from three directions simultaneously: north, east and south. The Russian Air Force destroyed critical infrastructure (e.g., power stations) to plunge the country into chaos. In addition, the Black Sea fleet blockaded Ukrainian ports to stop any supplies from third countries. At the tactical level, Russian special forces attempted to create bridgeheads by seizing airports and carrying out acts of sabotage within cities. In effect, the Kremlin launched a blitzkrieg against Ukraine.

The strong resistance of the Ukrainians caught the Kremlin by surprise. Moscow underestimated the Ukrainian military doctrine, which calls for the mass mobilization of the population in the event of a foreign invasion. The Ukrainian leadership initially moved the war into and around populated areas, where the defender has the tactical advantage. Within the urban environment, small groups can easily set up ambushes and hit enemy targets with anti-tank missiles. In fact, urban warfare is the nightmare of all regular armies. The Ukrainian side was well aware that Moscow is still haunted by the “Grozny syndrome”. The first war in Chechnya (1994-1996) resulted in a humiliating defeat for the Russian army. Small groups of determined fighters destroyed entire columns of Russian tanks that had entered the centre and suburbs of the Chechen capital.

Yet, the Russian forces was expected to overwhelm the Ukrainian positions within less than a week. Putin’s battle-hardened army did enjoy numerical and technological superiority. Following the 2008 Georgian war, minister of defence Anatoly Serdyukov’s military reforms changed the force structure of the Russian army. The creation of the battalion tactical group (BTG) was intended to increase the firepower and speed of the Russian forces. Indeed, each BTG has a motorized infantry battalion together with tank and artillery elements; a total of 600-800 officers and men. However, the main disadvantage of BTGs is the relatively small number of light infantry troops (around 200 men) which makes BTG vulnerable to ambushes. During the first three months of the invasion, the Russian BTGs became an easy target for the Ukrainian fighters.

Apparently, the Russian military were not prepared for such a large-scale invasion. Due to poor military planning, the Putin’s army has failed to conduct combined arms operations. This should have come as no surprise. In the 2008 war against Georgia, the involvement of the Russian army was limited in time and geography. Yet, its performance was assessed by analysts as rather poor.  Six years later, the annexation of Crimea took place with a hybrid and bloodless operation. In the Syrian civil war, the Kremlin has mainly used its air power, special forces, and mercenaries to support the Assad regime. In other words, it is the first time since the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan that the Russian military has been called upon to subdue a large country with a hostile population. It should be noted that there was an insurgency in western Ukraine after the end of the Second World War that lasted ten years.

During spring and summer 2022, the Russian military used indirect artillery fire and ballistic missiles to defeat the Ukrainians. This is not the first time in recent history that Moscow resorted to such tactics. During the Second Chechen war (2000-2002), the Kremlin bombed Grozny to the ground without any concern for the international law of armed conflicts. The Russian leadership chose the same siege warfare in certain parts of Ukraine.

Following a three-month siege, the Russian forces managed to capture the city of Mariupol in the Azov region. However, the invaders failed to capture Kyiv and Kharkiv, which are the two largest cities of Ukraine. According to Professor Louis DiMarco two factors could play a decisive role in attacking urban centres: the size of the population and the size of the area. The larger the population and the area, the more forces must be devoted to occupying a city. The American professor has challenged the 3:1 rule in favour of the attacker and advocated a 6:1 ratio for launching an attack in urban areas.

What has come, perhaps, as a surprise is the outsourcing of the Russian military operations to mercenaries. Since the summer of 2022, an unknown number of Russian and foreign mercenaries have joined the regular Russian army in fighting the Ukrainian army in Donbass. The partial “privatization” of the war is an innovation in itself. During the tsarist period, the army was under strict surveillance because officers were the only ones who could challenge the regime. In the Soviet era, the role of the political commissar was to enforce political control over the military through his presence at the strategic and operational levels. The use of private military companies, such as the infamous Wagner, runs counter to Russian military culture that prioritizes political control of the military. However, mass mobilization is neither desirable nor feasible in a middle-class country like Russia. The use of mercenaries allows Moscow to hide casualties from the Russian public opinion that does not massively support the war in Ukraine. The Wagner’s force functions as a small army capable of operational and tactical support when is needed.

The war has entered a new phase since September 2022. The Ukrainian counter-offensive succeeded in recapturing territories in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Yet, the Russian forces managed to stop the Ukrainian offensive before Christmas. Currently, there is a stalemate on the eastern front because of the trench warfare. The Kremlin has mobilised human and material resources for a new Spring offensive in Donbass. Europe and the United States must do whatever is necessary to stop it before it begins.

L'articolo The Russian Military Strategy in Ukraine: An Early Assessment proviene da InsideOver.

Il Sahel, dall’arabo Sahil cioè “bordo del deserto”, è quella fascia di transizione fra le zone desertiche del nord dell’Africa e quelle ricoperte da vegetazione più vicine all’equatore. Considerata come una zona di passaggio e un luogo di intensi scambi commerciali, la fascia del Sahel attraversa i territori della Mauritania, del Mali, del Burkina Faso, del Ciad, del Senegal, del Sudan e dell’Eritrea. Storicamente si tratta di un area dove l’influenza francese è forte, tanto che Parigi ha sempre mantenuto una certa presenza militare nel Sahel, in particolare in Mali, Burkina e Ciad. A seguito della caduta del regime di Gheddafi nel 2011, il Sahel diviene un terreno fertile per numerosi gruppi jihadisti affiliati ad Al Qaida e all’ISIS che minacciano la tenuta dei governi alleati dell’Esagono.

Per questo motivo, già nel 2013 l’allora presidente Hollande decide di intervenire in Mali con l’operazione Serval per fermare l’avanzata degli insorti Tuareg del Movimento Nazionale per la Liberazione dell’Azawad (Mnla). L’operazione Serval ha poi lasciato spazio alla più ampia operazione Barkhane (2014-2022) che aveva per obiettivo quello di eradicare i gruppi insorti di matrice islamica presenti nella regione. Contestualmente Parigi si fa promotore del G5 Sahel, un quadro istituzionale nato nel 2014 per favorire la cooperazione regionale in materia di sviluppo e – soprattutto – sicurezza fra Mauritania, Mali, Burkina, Niger e Ciad. Dal 2017 il Sahel è però divenuto il terreno di scontro di una vera e propria guerra di influenza fra Francia e Russia, culminato quest’anno con la fine dell’operazione Barkhane determinata dell’arrivo in Mali della Pmc Wagner. Fra colpi di stato (in particolare in Mali e Burkina), manifestazioni popolari anti-francesi e pro russe e un crescendo di dichiarazioni critiche nei confronti dell’operato francese da parte di vari capi di stato saheliani Parigi sembra aver perso il suo ascendente sul Sahel. Se l’influenza francese arretra, la presenza russa nel Sahel si espande: gli pseudo-mercenari del Cremlino, cifra distintiva dell’influenza di Mosca, sono ormai presenti nel Sahel in Ciad, Sudan, Mali oltre che nella vicina Libia, nel Centrafrica e in Nigeria.

La dottrina Gerasimov

Nel Sahel la Russia si è attenuta ad un copione ben rodato – quello della dottrina Primakov, attualizzata dall’attuale Capo di Stato Maggiore delle forze russe Gerasimov – che ha per obiettivo quello di massimizzare i guadagni strategici, minimizzando il più possibile i rischi e i potenziali costi. Il modello di penetrazione russa si costituisce quindi come un modello ibrido, volto a contenere l’influenza Occidentale (francese in particolare) alternando elementi di soft e hard power in svariati ambiti: dall’economia all’informazione, dalla sfera politica a quella militare. Le caratteristiche salienti di questo modello constano quindi nel largo impiego di “contractors” non riconducibili formalmente a Mosca, nell’utilizzo di vere e proprie campagne di (dis)informazione condotte sui media locali e nella fornitura di pacchetti di cooperazione militare. Questi ultimi nascono da accordi bilaterali fra Mosca e il paese target e spesso consistono nell’invio di armamenti e consiglieri militari russi, con lo scopo di equipaggiare e addestrare le forze locali.

In realtà i partner africani della Russia sono spesso Stati fragili, alle prese con elezioni (Ciad), colpi di stato (Mali), insurrezioni o guerre civili (Libia, Sudan). Il Cremlino fornisce loro dei veri e propri servizi di stabilizzazione (che implicano anche l’impiego della forza da parte dei “contractors” e dei “consiglieri militari”) in cambio di lucrative concessioni per l’estrazione di risorse naturali. Questo modus operandi permette quindi alla Russia di ottenere dei notevoli vantaggi economici, senza implicare direttamente le proprie forze armate.

Un esempio lampante di questa strategia è proprio il caso del Mali. Prima dell’invio degli pseudo-contractors del famigerato gruppo Wagner, e prima ancora delle tensioni fra Bamako e Parigi circa la ristrutturazione della presenza francese nell’area, la Russia era entrata in una vera e propria guerra di informazione con la Francia con l’obiettivo di screditare l’operato di Barkhane (la missione francese nel Sahel), facendo leva sul latente sentimento anti-francese e anticoloniale della popolazione maliana. Se il colpo di stato del colonnello Goita, avvenuto il 24 Maggio 2021, ha definitivamente incrinato i rapport fra la Francia e Mali, la macchina della propaganda russa aveva già gettato le basi per l’ingresso del paese dei suoi contractors. L’impiego del soft power, inteso qui come una campagna di propaganda volta ad esaltare le capacità militari della Russia e dei suoi contractors, si è quindi rivelato uno strumento decisivo per avanzare gli interessi russi in Mali.

Caratteristiche delle PMC russe

Rispetto alle controparti occidentali, le PMSC russe presentano due significative differenze. In primo luogo, offrono servizi di combattimento attivo e non esitano a menzionarlo apertamente, definendosi come PMC (Private Military Contractors) o aziende di consulenza militare (come nel caso dell’RSB group). In secondo luogo, non offrono quei servizi legati al c.d supporto militare, o quantomeno lo fanno in misura largamente inferiore rispetto ai gruppi occidentali. Inoltre, il termine Pmc in questo caso è improprio poiché sebbene si tratti di aziende nominalmente private, i vari contractors russi (fra cui figurano l’Anti-terror Group, Center R, Moran Security Group, RSB Group, E.N.O.T., Shchit, Patriot e l’ormai famoso Wagner Group) sono tutti legati ad agenzie di sicurezza russe come l’Fsb, il Gru o direttamente il ministero della Difesa.

La nomea di alcuni di questi gruppi potrebbe far pensare a piccole unità di operatori altamente specializzati assimilabili alle forze speciali ma non è così. Le Pmc russe hanno diverse componenti al loro interno che vanno da interi reparti di fanteria a unità specializzate passando per istruttori e personale tecnico e di supporto. Altresì eterogeneo è il loro impiego: oltre a condurre operazioni di combattimento i contractor russi sono anche in grado di fornire servizi di intelligence e analisi (humint, sigint, osint), di protezione di personale Vip, di sicurezza per siti strategici ed operazioni di informazione e propaganda. I “contractors” russi operano poi in un vuoto giuridico: formalmente illegali in patria queste aziende consentono a Mosca di mantenere una “plausible deniability” circa il loro operato, non essendo riconducibili direttamente al Cremlino.

Il Modus Operandi

Divenute un formidabile strumento per proiettare l’influenza russa nel mondo, queste Pmc spesso agiscono secondo un preciso modus operandi. Bersagli d’elezione sono quei paesi relativamente deboli, la cui governance del territorio è spesso contestata da gruppi ribelli: il Mali rientra a pieno titolo in questa categoria, ma visto il recente colpo di stato anche il Burkina Faso potrebbe divenire il prossimo obiettivo russo. I primi contatti tra “contractor” russi e stato target generalmente avvengono a ridosso di elezioni o altri momenti salienti della vita politica di un paese. I primi servizi offerti sono quindi quelli di “consulenza politica”, volti a far eleggere o riconfermare un politico designato. Poi viene l’aiuto militare, sotto forma di armi e tramite l’invio di istruttori. Questi istruttori però partecipano attivamente alle operazioni di combattimento, facendo uso ove possibile di una forza soverchiante, volta a sconfiggere i gruppi insorti rapidamente.

Poco attenti al rispetto dei diritti dell’uomo gli pseudo-contractors russi si rivelano, nel breve termine, più efficaci delle forze già presenti sul territorio (cioè i soldati francesi di Barkhane o i caschi blu di Minsuma in Mali). Le Pmc russe di fatto agiscono come moltiplicatori della forza, e i loro successi vengono ampiamente sottolineati nei media locali e regionali grazie a vere e proprie campagne di comunicazione che sovente si appoggiano a troll factories dietro cui si cela l’ombra del Cremlino. Se ad oggi non è possibile sapere come le Pmc russe vengano retribuite per il loro operato, generalmente l’arrivo di contractors avviene in parallelo a lucrative concessioni per l’estrazione mineraria concluse con aziende russe. In Mali ad oggi non si rileva nessuna attività estrattiva, ma la presenza di importanti giacimenti aurei nel nord del paese suggerisce la ragione dell’intervento russo.

Gli effetti della presenza Russa

Se la presenza dei “contractors” del Cremlino in Ciad, alleato chiave della Francia nella regione, non è stata foriera di grandi stravolgimenti, il potere sovversivo della penetrazione russa in Mali è evidente. Non solo Parigi ha dovuto porre un termine a Barkhane, ma anche la missione Eutm (European Training Mission) in Mali è a rischio. Presente nel paese dal 2013, la missione a guida europea ha addestrato più di 18 000 militari affrontando delle spese ingenti. Solo la Germania dal 2014 al 2020 ha investito due miliardi di Euro per la stabilità del Sahel e il rischio di perdere questo investimento è alto.

Uno scenario come quello Centrafricano, dove interi battaglioni formati da Eutm Rca sono di fatto passati sotto il controllo diretto degli pseudo-mercenari russi, potrebbe infatti ripetersi in Mali con esiti ancor più disastrosi per la sicurezza del Sahel e per il controllo dei flussi migratori in direzione dell’Europa. Ad aggiungere ulteriori preoccupazione c’è poi la notizia di un incontro al vertice fra Mali e Burkina Faso, che potrebbe preludere ad un riavvicinamento fra i due paesi e che probabilmente porterebbe Ouagadougou nell’orbita dell’influenza russa. Anche il Niger non è esente dall’influenza russa, come dimostrano le recenti manifestazioni ove affianco a slogan anti-francesi sventolavano bandiere della Confederazione Russa.

L'articolo L’ombra dei contractors nel Sahel proviene da InsideOver.

According to a Janes report from early September approximately 5,000 Turkish-backed Syrian mercenaries have been deployed to Libya to support the Government of National Accord (GNA).

The report quotes sources from the US Africa Command and the US Office of the Inspector General. The same sources reveal that dozens of military advisors of the Turkish company SADAT are also in Libya, training the Syrian fighters and monitoring the day-to-day operations of Turkish-affiliated militias.

Rumors around SADAT have started circulating shortly after the publication of the report, and some recent comments of the company’s President Adnan Tanriverdi for the Daily Telegraph did not provide any further clarity. We shall now have a brief look into the company that according to many commentators could be the Turkish counterpart to the Russian Wagner Group on the Libyan front.

Who is Adnan Tanriverdi?

Adnan Tanriverdi is the founder and current President of SADAT Board of Directors. A former General in the Turkish Armed Forces, Tanriverdi was discharged back in 1996 allegedly due to concerns around his strong religious beliefs.

Tanriverdi became widely known to the public in August 2016, when President Recep Erdogan chose him as his new military advisor. The appointment came shortly after the failed coup attempt against the Turkish President; this move indicated Erdogan’s intention to establish a network of supporters and allies in key positions of the country’s administration in order to cement his position in the long-term and diminish any internal threats that might lead to another regime change attempt.

Further to his SADAT Presidency, Tanriverdi was also appointed President of the Turkish-based NGO Association of Justice Defenders back in 2004,, a Group Member of the Union of NGOs of the Islamic World.

What is the SADAT International Defense Consultancy?

SADAT is a private registered company, providing Security and Military Training and Consultancy Services. It was founded in 2012 by Tanriverdi who has also been serving as President since then. The personnel is exclusively composed of Army Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Turkish Armed Forces from all ranks, with many having a Special Forces background. As clearly stated the company is not providing services to individuals; SADAT is working entirely with branches of the Turkish government and possibly with fellow Muslim governments which hold friendly ties with Ankara.

The company’s Vision and Mission is to “reorganize or modernize the Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces of Islamic Countries in a modern and effective sense to ensure National Defense and Internal Security.” Inspired by the concept of Private Military and Defense Companies, which has thrived in Western Countries over the past decades, Tanriverdi came up with a plan to establish a Turkish Private Military Company that would fit in an anti-Western religious and political context.

The ex-military personnel, which should be estimated at approximately a hundred individuals directly employed by SADAT, is reportedly utilizing its broad experience in the Turkish Armed Forces to deliver services ranging from urban warfare operations training to training courses for helicopter pilots.

A Counterweight to the Wagner Group?

Even though SADAT has been presented by mainstream media, as the Turkish equivalent to the Russian Wagner Group, there are some critical differences. Wagner has managed to establish its presence out of nothing. The term Wagner today refers to any Russian-affiliated foreign fighter operating abroad. There is no official record about Wagner, its activity is not advertised online or through other means and there is no company registered under that name either in Russia or abroad.

The “Wagner Group” is a ghost entity pushing Kremlin’s interests overseas, and since it doesn’t officially exist, the Russian President and his administration can’t be held accountable for the activity of the Group under any circumstances.

On the other hand, SADAT does officially exist and there is nothing secret about its presence and area of operations. Headquartered in Istanbul and under Tanrverdi’s leadership the company does not seem to be keeping anything covert about its very existence. The company is publicly advertising its activity through its website and the press. There is a precise organizational chart and an approximate estimation on the number of personnel acting as consultants and advisors.

In this respect there is no point comparing the ambiguous and shadowy Wagner group to the commercial entity registered in the issue 8015 of “Turkish Trade Registry Gazette” and doing business under the name “SADAT International Defense Consulting Construction Industry and Trade Inc.”

Evaluating Claims of SADAT in Libya

Until now there have been many claims that SADAT has a presence in Libya, and the latest AFRICOM report comes to further strengthen these assumptions. Tanriverdi for his part has repeatedly rejected these claims. The most probable scenario is that SADAT personnel could be actively involved in the Libyan front, however no traceable connection between the company and operators deployed to Libya should be expected.

The fact that SADAT is gaining international attention could also prove to be a very useful tool for massive recruitment if played right by the Turkish authorities. In the case of Wagner we have seen that the wide media coverage urged hundreds of Syrians to rush to sign up with Wagner for a deployment in Libya.

We should not expect by no means an open recruitment process for fighters willing to fight in Libya or Syria on behalf of the company; however the public talk around SADAT could prompt several individuals to become involved in one of the Turkish fronts abroad, with the company acting strictly as an initial point of contact, if there is any involvement in the whole process at all.

In the case of Wagner, President Vladimir Putin, a mastermind in psychological operations and political manipulation, undoubtedly managed to turn the whole Wagner story to his advantage. We only need to stand by and see if Ankara could exploit the noise around SADAT in a similar way at this particular moment.

L'articolo New Report Says 5,000 Turkish-Backed Syrian Rebels Deployed to Libya proviene da InsideOver.

As tension heats up in Libya, the conflicting sides are finding themselves in a race against time. Despite the unceasing negotiations and the international pleads for ceasefire, Government of National Accord (GNA)-affiliated forces are getting ready for a major offensive in Sirte, the most crucial strategic point for Libyan National Army (LNA) leader General Khalifa Haftar at the moment.

Over the last few months, a massive recruitment operation has been taking place in several areas of Syria, as a desperate effort by the LNA to bolster its manpower and establish a new balance in the operational theater across Libya. The deployment of foreign fighters to Libya is also closely related to the proxy nature of the Libyan conflict, with the roles of Turkey and Russia being  especially fundamental.

Ankara Deployed First Mercenary Forces From Syria to Libya

Haftar wasn’t the first to use mercenaries in the Libyan conflict. By late 2019, when Turkish President Recep Erdogan made clear that the Turkish aspirations towards Libya were far from superficial or simplistic. To that end, a significant number of Syrian rebels were recruited by Turkey and sent to Tripoli. The individuals to take over this mission had previously formed a part of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, fighting against President Bashar al Assad in Syria, and allegedly participating in anti-government and anti-Kurdish operations in Afrin, Azaz, Idlib, Manbij and tal Abyad.

Even though the GNA and Turkey have consistently denied that Syrians fighters were transferred to Libya, according to reliable reports thousands of Syrian rebels who had been formerly fighting in the Syrian civil war have joined the Libyan conflict over the last six months. The foreign fighters are lured by a mixture of religious and political motivations, alongside an attractive financial deal. Ankara is playing the card of radical Islamism and adding support to the transnational movement of the Muslim Brotherhood, while an impressive — by regional standards — salary of approximately 2,000 USD per month is being provided to the hired fighters. According to the same sources, despite the fact that Turkey is responsible for the total funding of these grey operations, the GNA handles all payments to the deployed forces.

Haftar Forces on the Verge of Collapse and the Massive Russia-Backed Recruitment Operation

While the developments on the ground indicate Haftar could ultimately prevail in the long-lasting conflict, the gradual GNA gains since last March have gradually shifted the balance drastically. At the moment LNA forces are under severe pressure, struggling for their very survival. Since the first signs of this balance shift appeared, an aggressive Russian-coordinated effort began to deploy Syrian mercenaries in support of Haftar in Libya.

According to Syrian sources, the recruitment process is being conducted and overseen by Russian authorities through an umbrella network of Syrian security companies. The recruits are coming from several rural areas and villages across Syria, such as As-Suwayda, Harran, Nimreh, Qanawat, and Shaqqa. There are also instances of recruitment taking place in major Syrian cities with a strong Russian presence, including Damascus, Homs, Lattakia, and Tartus. The recruits agree to join various operations starting from simple tasks, such as guarding oil facilities and other targets of high importance, and expanding to actual engagement in battle.

How Does Recruitment Work?

Once recruited the fighters are going through a 2-week training course in the Khmeimim Air Base and then they are flying directly to Benghazi. As most of the recruits have already participated in military operations, during the decade-long severe Syrian civil war, it seems that the training is not a priority considering the time-sensitive nature of their scheduled deployment. There are instances of recruits who flied to Libya without undergoing any training at all, as part of their recruitment process. It has been confirmed through local sources that Khmeimim Air Base is being predominantly used as the primary training facility and point of departure.

Cham Wings Airlines, has been reported to be involved in the air transfer of the mercenaries from Latakia Governorate to Western Libya. Earlier this year, Cham Wings opened an office in Benghazi. In an official statement in March the GNA Ministry of Interior accused the company of transferring mercenaries from Syria to the Libyan front. Cham Wings is a private Syrian company, which has been sanctioned by the US Government over alleged ties with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; the airline has also been accused in the past of transferring fighters from Russia to Syria, possibly members of the “Wagner Group,” to support the government forces in the Syrian conflict. Key Russian players coordinating the whole operation are reportedly acting on behalf of either the GRU, the Russian Military Intelligence Service, or the infamous “Wagner Group.”

Motivation and Coercion

Leaked documents indicate that the contracts which Syrian mercenaries are signing -issued in both Arabic and Russian — provide a monthly salary ranging between 2,000 and 3,000 USD. Even though inconsistencies in payment have been reported, with some unconfirmed statements suggesting that the salary received has been only a fraction of the agreed sum of money, there is no solid evidence to back this claim.

What we do currently know is that numerous contractors have left from Khmeimim to Libya, receiving a stipend of 500 USD each prior to their deployment and a promise that they will receive the rest of the agreed compensation upon their return. There are also additional provisions in the contract covering for any medical support that the contractors might need and providing a reimbursement to the fighters in case they are seriously injured, and a compensation to the family in case a contractor is killed in service. There are no clear indications around the insurance reparations, however according to the data available the figures do not seem to be particularly high.

At the same time, local sources have confirmed on condition of anonymity that in many instances the recruiters are choosing Syrian citizens who have been subject to criminal prosecution or investigation. This way the individuals can be indirectly forced to accept their deployment to Libya and the contract terms can be negotiated accordingly.

As additional rapid developments are set to take place in the Libyan front quite soon, it remains to be seen if the massive recruitment of Syrian mercenaries could pay off for the Libyan National Army and its foreign backers.

L'articolo The Syrian Mercenary Battleground in Libya proviene da InsideOver.

Jihadists linked to ISIS killed 600 people last year in Cabo Delgado, the northernmost province of Mozambique. In total, the ISIS-affiliated group claimed responsibility for twenty-six violent attacks in Mozambique last year.

The Atrocities Of The New Terror Group

The terrorist organization has beheaded, disfigured and dismembered citizens in the province, including children. Bordering Tanzania, the coastal province is made up of small villages, most of whom are populated by subsistence farmers and fishermen. Many of the villages have been burned and most have now been deserted.

Apart from its political affiliation, not much is known about the group which started in October 2017,  including its name, origins, mandate and funding. Videos posted on social media have supposedly shown the terrorist group waving the ISIS flag.

‘No Evidence … Of An Overarching Leadership’

According to Jasmine Opperman, an African expert on Islamic Theology on Counterterrorism, there are between seven and ten cells operating in Cabo Delgado. Ms Opperman claims that there is “no evidence at this point in time of an overarching ideology or an overarching leadership.”

“There are indicators of Islamic extremism involved in some of these cell structures,” she added. “We are sitting with a serious, serious, problem. The Islamic State does not need a well-run organization [operation]. They need a proxy and some of these cells are the ideal proxy.”

Further exacerbating the situation are the weak borders between SADC countries. Although the situation is not yet a “direct threat”, political and security risk analyst, Johann Smith said: “This is not a Mozambican problem, it’s a regional one.”

“After the first attack, the SADC Security Organ should have met to decide how they were going to deal with the problem. Up to now, the issue has not featured on the agenda during subsequent meetings.”

Mozambique: Our Troops Are Being Deceived

Last week, President Filipe Nyusi of Mozambique alleged that the terrorist group was disseminating “currents of disinformation” against Mozambican security forces. Speaking to the troops at a military base in Mueda, a Cabo Delgado town, Nyusi said the disinformation “shows a lack of respect for those who are sacrificing their lives in defence of the communities.”

“We are accompanying the attacks of the criminals and your [citizens’] response, because we have noted that the enemy strategy is to put us in conflict with our people.”

President Nyusi claimed that the insurgents had deceived Mozambican army and police that their terrorist attacks had been carried out by elements within the army and the police.

He said that people were “spreading messages against sovereignty, without being aware of the great sacrifices that are being made.”

Nyusi said he wants Mozambican forces to find out more about the terrorists, including their origins and their location.

‘Go Forward To Face A Common Enemy’

“This is because, in a house where we don’t know who the thief is, people begin to distrust each other,” he explained. “We want to build trust and go forward to face a common enemy.”

Despite this, the common enemy has not doused the tense relationship between the Mozambique Defence Armed Force (FADM) and Russian-backed Wagner Group fighters.

Arriving to fight the Islamic militants, the Wagner troops were ill-prepared for the conditions in Mozambique, according to Smith. He clarified that their military equipment was ineffective, and that the troops were ill-equipped to deal with the heat.

Smith: Russia Making Mozambique’s Situation Worse

The Russian troops have now withdrawn to Nacala, a city also in Northern Mozambique, to plan and retrain. Wagner’s presence, Smith added, has served to increase insurgent attacks.

“The sophistication and the brazenness of the attacks are evolving.” Smith said. “They have access to intelligence, access to knowledge on where the deployments are when they are at their most vulnerable, they have access to FADM uniforms, they have seized weapons that Wagner has given to the FADM⁠—sophisticated weapons⁠—which means their sophistication I escalating day by day.

“The brutality against the civilians is an answer I am still looking for. I am not sure what their motive behind that is, [but] it is gruesome.”

The FADM and Wagner’s failure to curb the insurgency has emboldened the terrorist groups, and they have begun to move more inland.

The Wider African Fight Against ISIS

Mozambique is not the only African nation battling the presence of ISIS-affiliated jihadists. In West Africa⁠—particularly Nigeria⁠—Boko Haram insurgents pledged allegiance to ISIS in a video released in 2015. In Somalia, Al Shabaab members fight on behalf of al Qaeda, with some members pledging allegiance to ISIS.

As it loses ground in the Middle East, ISIS is increasingly moving towards Africa, spreading to Tunisia, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cameron and now, the SADC region.

The African Union’s reaction to the threat of ISIS, including conflict, war and violence has seen no success in the continent.

“During the 50th Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU) in May 2013, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted a landmark declaration,” a press release from the AU read in 2017.

“They vowed that Africa would not bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation and made a commitment to end violent conflict on the continent by 2020. This was translated into the AU initiative: Silencing the Guns by 2020.”

It is now 2020, and rather than stemming the progress of ISIS in the continent, the terrorist group is spreading rapidly throughout all of Africa. This is a massive threat to the security, stability, longevity and happiness of Africa’s 1.3 billion population.

L'articolo From Mozambique to Nigeria: The Alarming Expansion Of ISIS In Africa proviene da InsideOver.

Recent comments by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan about mercenaries fighting in Libya have once again triggered speculation about the so-called “Wagner Group”. This fighting force has been gradually gaining significant public attention, since the very first appearance of the “group” in Ukraine back in 2014. The 2015 deployment of Russian forces in Syria and the assumption that numerous civilians have been operating within the Russian lines for the duration of the Syrian conflict, has set the ground for building a myth around this shadowy and deadly entity. Mass media have promptly created an overstretched image that would form the ideal narrative for exposing the private-public sector complex in Russia, Putin’s connections with his trusted oligarchs and Russian imperialistic Cold War-like ambitions.

Take all those elements combined with a touch of conspiracy theory and some Tom Clancy drama elements and you have the mainstream media’s fallacious version of the Wagner Group. The Wagner Group is either described as a Private Military Company (PMC) or as a group of mercenaries, however neither of these approaches is accurate. Nonetheless, moving forward we will understand that many inaccuracies and unfounded assumptions have been spread around with regards to this peculiar organization if it can be described as such.

Defining PMCs, Mercenaries And Investigating The Wagner Group

To begin with, let’s clarify what Private Military Companies and mercenaries are and the difference between the two. Mercenaries⁠—from the Latin word merces for reward⁠—are individuals who are take part in a foreign conflict in exchange for money or any other material gain. Mercenaries are not motivated by parameters such as ethnicity, ideology, religion or political views. The only factor that ties them with the party on behalf of which they are fighting is profit. Mercenaries also cannot be nationals of the country that is engaged in the operational theater. Mercenaryism has been defined by the UN and is recognized by numerous states as an illegal activity and individuals that fall within this category are prosecuted accordingly under domestic law. Furthermore, mercenaries are unlawful combatants and thus they are not granted prisoner-of-war rights if they are captured during a conflict.

On the other hand, PMCs are for-profit lawful entities, providing services that would normally be assigned to the armed forces of a country. PMC work ranges from intelligence analysis and consulting to training on tactics and guard and protective services. There are several instances where PMCs have been actively involved in an armed conflict, acting always on behalf of the legitimate authority of a given state, with rules and terms defined by a mutual contract. The pivotal step to legalize the concept of force outsourcing to private actors was made by former Lieutenant-Colonel of the South African Defence Force (SADF) Eden Barlow. Barlow established the emblematic Private Military Company Executive Outcomes in the late 1980s, fundamentally changing the concepts around PMCs and Mercenaryism.

How The Wagner Group Relates To PMCs and Mercenaryism

So, how does all this relate to our questions about the Wagner Group? Well, as mentioned, PMCs are commercial entities pursuing profit; therefore, there are two essential conditions in order one entity to be characterized as such. Firstly, to be registered under a commercial name, which is used for its main business activity and secondly to put as its main objective the attraction of new clients and the achievement of profitable contracts, through the right marketing strategies and apparently by minimizing reputational risk. None of these parameters is being fulfilled by Wagner; on the contrary, the group seems to be a ghost entity with contradictory reports about the company’s registered offices putting in question the very existence of Wagner, at least in the form that it is widely⁠—and falsely⁠—perceived.

Last year Wagner was mistakenly described as a Hong-Kong-registered company in a Vice report. Another article in “Telegraph” suggests that the company is registered in Argentina and has a training camp in Moscow, close to a GRU base (the GRU is the main military and foreign intelligence service of Russia). Both of those claims are wrong, but before  further examining this lack of accuracy around Wagner, we should clarify that the legal framework for PMCs in Russia is still vague. Despite the efforts to create a more flexible framework, a relevant bill has not yet been passed by Russia’s Duma (parliament). Nonetheless, companies involved in the security business in Russia are far from untraceable and can generally be clearly identified; for instance, the RSB Group Headquarters are located in Moscow and the overseas activity of the company is transparently advertised on their website. Or, as another example, the record of the controversial⁠—currently out of business⁠—Slavonic Corps, can be easily found on page 153 of this document listing various Hong Kong-registered companies. Therefore, what is the point for this secrecy surrounding the Wagner Group, and more importantly why is so much Western media buying and reproducing the narrative that they are PMCs?

What Is The Wagner Group?

According to what has been discussed so far the so-called Wagner Group does not fall within any of the two categories of being a group of PMCs or mercenaries that journalists tend to adopt. Just the opposite: it is obvious that the Wagner Group constitutes a quite useful geopolitical tool in the hands of the Kremlin.

The Wagner Group serves both the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense; as we will see below, the group is mobilized in places where strategic Russian interests are at stake or in places where President Vladimir Putin wants to expand Russian influence and upgrade Moscow’s international standing. At the same time, the group is allegedly participating in military operations, where if things go awry Russia’s Ministry of Defense can wash its hands from of any responsibility. The group allows Russia to claim that the individuals involved in specific incidents were not acting under any official or government-ordered capacity. Deceptive as this may seem, it certainly serves some primary Russian objectives.

Many questions yet remain, considering that there is an obvious gap here, especially from an international law perspective. This debate goes a few years back when the first Russian forces were deployed in Crimea. Things are much more complicated however, since the deployments of Wagner Group personnel in several conflict zones and theaters worldwide have created an unprecedented reality. It still difficult to define Wagner operators as combatants under the Geneva Convention, for example. Accordingly, when these “contractors” take part in an armed conflict⁠—like in Syria or Libya⁠—it is still dubious the way they should be treated under international laws of war and if they should be given POW rights by law. It is also still to be seen how Russian authorities would handle such an incident.

Putin Looks Towards Africa Amid Alleged Kremlin Connections To The Wagner Group

As we have explained, the Wagner Group has no official capacity for military action and the entity does not technically exist. The concept of the Wagner Group has been created due to several reports identifying linked individuals that have been deployed to numerous conflict zones as part of an organization under this name. All these reports connect the activity of the so-called Wagner Group back to one individual: Yevgeny Prigozhin. Prigozhin is a Russian entrepreneur, mostly known for his catering business and his ties to President Putin. The close relationship with the Russian President has allegedly granted him several government contracts, including catering services for the Russian Army among others. He is also connected to the infamous Internet Research Agency, which has been accused of conducting unorthodox political influence operations. On these grounds and with clear implications about involvement in interfering in US elections, the US Treasury has sanctioned Prigozhin by targeting several of his assets and businesses.

The only tangible entity that can be tied to the Wagner Group is LLC Concord Management and Consulting, a registered company that falls under Prigozhin’s umbrella and provides a variety of diverse services. The Chief Executive of Concord Management and Consulting is allegedly Dmitry Utkin, a former Spetsnaz GRU Officer, with proven battle experience and links to the private security sector, namely through Moran Security Group and Slavonic Corps. This is where the plot about the Putin-Prigozhin-Utkin complex comes in and is what the allegations about the Wagner have been based on. Unsurprisingly, the catchy name Wagner Group is being attributed to Utkin, but it is not clear if it was invented by Prigozhin-Utkin and their circle or by journalists covering the issue.

Wagner operators have allegedly been operating in eastern Ukraine and Syria. There have also been reports about a current Wagner presence in the Libyan conflict in support of General Khalifa Haftar’s forces. Considering that these operations have already received extended media attention and have been extensively examined, we will now focus on two cases of Wagner activity in central and southern African countries, where Russia is pushing to boost its presence. The alleged deployment of Wagner troops has been a strategy to achieve this goal through the development-security nexus in these unstable and war-torn countries.

Case Study: Mozambique

Mozambique has suffered a long-term civil war since shortly after its independence in 1975 until 1992. The legacy and political fallout of the civil war has dominated the country for several years, making Mozambique one of the continent’s poorest states. The discovery of a massive natural gas field near Mozambique’s Cabo Delago in 2011 seemed to be a game-changer. However, there has been a considerable delay in the resource exploitation process due to severe bureaucracy and endemic in-country corruption. The news about the reserves set the expectations of Cabo Delgado citizens way too high, and when they realized that their living conditions would hardly improve, their grievances skyrocketed. This development alongside the gradual turn of many citizens to radical Islamism triggered an insurgency in 2017. A newly formed group under the name Ansar al-Sunna conducted the first attack of extended scope in October 2017, causing 40 fatalities. This group has been operating ever since and has carried out several lethal attacks, hitting a mix of government forces and civilian targets.

Over the last few years Moscow has been strengthening its ties with Maputo; the trade volume between the two countries is over a hundred million US dollars and a 25 percent increase has been noted in 2019 compared to last year. Russian intentions to expand into Africa can be interpreted in a dual context: enhancing the international standing of the Russian Federation and also diversifying the commercial and economic activities of the country, especially in the light of the long-term sanctions imposed since 2014. Mozambique presents an interesting case, as the Kremlin could restrain the insurgency in the north and create the appropriate circumstances for the exploitation of the natural resources, obtaining significant geopolitical and economic gains.

Once again unconfirmed sources indicate that a number of Russian operators, probably linked to the so-called Wagner have been deployed in Nacala and Nampula, two cities in the immediate proximity of Cabo Delgado. These allegations also mentioned that in addition to the “armed Russian contractors” sophisticated equipment⁠—including drones⁠—has been spotted. There have also been claims that the number of Russian personnel could be close to two hundred and that there are plans for a permanent military presence and probably a Russian naval base in Mozambique. All such allegations have been officially denied by the Russian authorities.

According to similar reports the presence of Russian operators in Cabo Delgado has not been as successful as anticipated. The unique terrain and weather conditions of the country create an ideal context for guerilla warfare, ambushes, and hit-and-run tactics. In this context, the approximately two hundred Russian operators, who are supposedly in the country must face major challenges. Around ten Wagner operators are reported to have been killed in the country, even though there are contradictions over the exact number. Ossufo Momade, the Leader of Mozambique’s Opposition Party, Renamo [Mozambican National Resistance], has openly accused Russia’s government of deploying “Russian mercenaries” though murky processes, without supporting his claim with any evidence, however. On the other hand, Eben Barlow, the unquestioned expert on the subject, has taken Wagner’s presence in Mozambique for granted and has criticized through his personal blog the inability of the operators to cope with the local challenges, due to lack of experience in this part of Africa.

Case Study: Central African Republic

The security context and political landscape of CAR have been quite unstable ever since the independence of the country in 1960. Over the last decade a fierce violent conflict has been ongoing, with the main actors being the government forces, the anti-balaka Christian militias and a group of mostly Muslim factions under the name Seleka. Even though various peace agreements and ceasefires have been signed during this period, the UN efforts to establish long-term peace have not been successful so far. A UN arms embargo imposed on the CAR in 2013 was recently lifted  and President Faustin-Archange Touadera is seeking to make the most of it.

The peacekeeping mission of the United Nations (MINUSCA) and the African Union (MISCA) have been two major parameters that kept the country from falling into a full-scale civil war, but one should not overlook the role of Russia in the conflict. President Touadera has pursued to establish strong bilateral relations with Moscow, given the fact that Russia has been the primary arms supplier for the government forces. On the other hand, President Putin understands the promising potential of establishing diplomacy, defense and commercial ties with CAR, considering the country’s reserves of valuable natural resources, including uranium, gold, and diamonds.

In the Central African Republic, Wagner troops are allegedly stationed approximately 80 km from the capital Bangui, in what used to be the palace of the notorious self-proclaimed CAR Emperor Jean-Bédel Bokassa. The number of in-country operators cannot be confirmed, but relevant reports estimate them to be up to two hundred. The role of the Wagner personnel is also vague, as their duties could be from training and consulting services to intelligence, participation in ongoing operations and even acting as the personal security detail for the country’s president. What has mostly attracted the media attention for the presence of the group in CAR though, was the death of three Russian journalists⁠—Orkhan Dzhemal, Aleksandr Rastogruev, and Kirill Radchenko⁠—who were investigating the activities of the Wagner Group in the country. However, all the reports covering the incident downgraded the fact that the ambush took place almost 200 km from Bangui, in the proximity of Sibut village, a hostile environment where deadly attacks are not that rare.

Conclusions On The Wagner Group

It is now clear that the myth around the Wagner Group is based upon several inaccuracies and overstatements, to say the least. The media have repeated so many times the narrative about the PMC and mercenary Wagner Group that it now seems obvious to the public that we are talking about a private military company, which is far from the truth. If we accept that the foregoing reports around the Wagner Group are accurate to some extent, the most precise way to describe those operatives would be as a special covert branch of the GRU.

The fallacy of the mainstream media lies within exactly what President Putin would have tried to achieve in the first place in terms of crafting perceptions of the Wagner Group. By accepting the existence of the Wagner Group as a PMC, the focus moves away from any Russian operations abroad and everyone looks instead to uncover the details of a specific Private Military Company, which in the end does not even exist. This fact allows official Russian sources to reject any connection to incidents in conflict zones, where Russian non-military personnel are involved. Even more apt, no one can challenge this narrative, considering the absolute lack of solid evidence with regards to the existence of the Wagner entity. Readers should also be skeptical about the Kremlin’s stance towards the issue. Moscow’s passivity does not indicate whatsoever that Putin and Prigozhin are particularly anxious about the publicity that the Wagner story has been attracting. It seems more likely they have been pleased to see the PMC narrative ramp up. It seems that a considerable part of the Western media world, analysts and journalists who are so keen to provide in-depth insights on Russian Hybrid Warfare and the Gerasimov Doctrine, have ironically bought into a well-played Moscow bluff.

L'articolo The Wagner Group Paradox proviene da InsideOver.