A proposal for the extension of the deployment of Turkish forces in Libya has been submitted for approval in the Turkish Parliament.

In January 2020, the Turkey’s Parliament approved the deployment of Turkish assets to Libya in support of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord GNA).

Turkey’s Previous Deployment Approval

According to that bill, the Turkish Forces would assist Tripoli for one year, including – but not limited to – logistics coordination, training, intelligence services and shipments of weapons, arms, and provision of technical equipment. The motion for the extension of the Turkish military presence has already raised concerns, as it comes at a moment where a ceasefire is ongoing between the opposing sides and the international community is urging for an arms embargo in Libya.

Ankara has officially announced that the latest moves of General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) are worrying, and a potential restart of the clashes could put at risk the Turkish interests in North Africa and the Mediterranean. It should be noted that Turkey has invested heavily in its Eastern Mediterranean presence and the Memorandum of Understanding with Tripoli has been a crucial and integral part of Turkish foreign policy so far in terms of its 2020 strategy.

Turkey is allegedly seeking the consolidation of the ceasefire agreement which has been in force since late October, under the condition that the GNA will maintain and potential expand its power and control across the country. The motion will be discussed in the Turkish Parliament in late December, and the most probable result is its approval by the majority of the MPs.

The establishment of Turkish assets in the country is fully aligning with my previous conclusions on Erdogan’s long-term plans for Libya.

Recent Incidents That Provoked Ankara’s Wrath

Earlier last week the Libyan National Army seized the Turkish commercial cargo ship Mabrooka as it was en route to the port of Misrata. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has harshly responded to the incident declaring that these are attempts to target the Turkish interests in the region, and such moves come at the expense of any efforts for a peaceful solution to the Libyan conflict.

The vessel was seized on the grounds that it entered a restricted zone, and did not answer to repeated calls from the coastal authorities. The incident came a few weeks after the Merchant Vessel (MV) Roseline A was boarded and inspected as per the standard operating procedures of the EU Operation IRINI; during the search, Turkish authorities rushed to officially deny the right to inspection, prompting the EU personnel to disembark the ship. The incident has been deemed as illegal by Ankara and caused friction between Turkey and Germany, considering that the inspection team operated off the German frigate Hamburg.

Is the Ceasefire at Stake?

While Turkish foreign policy dictates bold moves across Mediterranean and North Africa, the context of the Libyan ceasefire on the ground seems more and more fragile. GNA Defense Minister Salahaddin Namroush has warned that actions of Haftar and teh LNA are putting the ceasefire agreement at stake and could force Tripoli to withdraw.

An attack against a GNA military camp near Awbari last week was attributed to an LNA-affiliated militia. Namroush urged that such moves could trigger a new round of battles in the country. Awbari is located near the Sharara oilfield, one of the most important oilfields in Libya, therefore the latest attack could easily lead to a rapid escalation, without warning.

In the meantime, according to the latest information from the Sirte-Jufra Joint Operations Unit, Haftar is boosting the presence of LNA forces and military resources in the proximity of Sirte and Jufra. Reportedly during the weekend there has been a – possibly Russian – shipment of at least 23 armored vehicles, arms, and ammunition. These indicators raise further concerns for the viability of the current ceasefire deal.

Growing Presence of Foreign Fighters in Libya and Proxy War Scenario

Stephanie Williams, the UN Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya, highlighted in her opening remarks on the October agreement, that the immediate departure of all foreign fighters should be a prerequisite for the effective implementation of the ceasefire. More than a month later, Williams sounded the alarm again, stating that an estimated number of more than 20,000 foreign fighters are still in-country.

This fuels a serious crisis and constitutes one of the greatest challenges in Libya at the moment.  Despite the continuous negotiations and attempts for a long-term agreement, the EU and UN efforts for an arms embargo and the progressive monitoring of the situation on the ground, the mercenary numbers in Libya at the moment are growing exponentially and a major military build-up through foreign shipments for both sides is still ongoing.

Despite the random skirmishes and the expansion of mercenaries, the most important factor is essentially the ultimate intentions of the foreign forces involved. The Libyan Civil War has taken on all the characteristics of a proxy conflict over the last two years, the prospects for a stable and peaceful Libya that could go through an institutionalization process undisrupted, are depending on the long-term objectives of the major powers, backing the opposing sides.

A lasting ceasefire and peace would be desirable for Ankara, considering that current GNA elements could ensure their certain win in the elections planned for December 2021, thus prevailing all across Libya. Abu Dhabi and Cairo on the other hand treat this scenario as a catastrophe, considering that such a political outcome could boost the Muslim Brotherhood presence and undermine erratically the regional and domestic security status quo at their expense.

Even though those powers would also like to see stability in Libya, they demand that it should be achieved under their own terms, which means the marginalization of the GNA forces. Finally Russia seems to be benefiting from the extension of the conflict, gaining time and influence in the war-torn country. The combination of these particular circumstances and the conflicting interests of each side could possibly compromise the current truce any time and quickly drag the country back into chaos once again.

L'articolo Turkey Prepares to Extend Military Presence in Libya proviene da InsideOver.

The German warship FGS Hamburg is en route to join the EU-led Mission Irini. As the German Navy announced, the warship left the port of Wilhelmshaven on August 4 to join the task force. The deployed forces of Operation Irini, form a coalition with primary mission to monitor any illicit movements related to the Libyan civil war and implement the UN arms embargo in the North African country.

Putting the latest developments in a wider context, one must admit that Berlin is clearly trying to showcase that the German role is critical not only in the field of diplomacy but also in the developments on the ground — or in this case in the developments at sea.

FGS Hamburg and the Operational Upgrade of the Mission

FGS Hamburg is a Type 124 Class Guided Missile Frigate (FFG). With a displacement of 5800 tons, FGS Hamburg comes as a considerable addition to the HS Spetsai frigate of the Hellenic Navy and the ITS San Giorgio of the Italian Navy, which are already deployed in the area. The armament of the ship consists of a Mark 41 Vertical Launching System with RIM-66 Standard medium-range surface-to-air Missiles and RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles. Four secondary missile launching systems (Mark 141 and Mark 49) can be also found in the frigate, while OTO Melara 76 mm and Rheinmetall MLG 27 mm machine guns are included in the main weapon systems of the ship. Thales and Atlas Electronic L-long rage and surface radar systems are also used by the FGS Hamburg and will provide an additional benefit to the monitoring power and capabilities of the deployed assets. Finally, 2 Naval Helicopters Westland Sea Lynx Mk.88 will be stationed on the ship for the duration of the deployment.

Apparently the addition of FGS Hamburg to the mission contributes drastically to the operational capabilities of the task force but at the same time Berlin is making a political statement, over-stressing its re-emerging role in the new status quo of the troubled Mediterranean region.

Berlin Looks into Boosting its Role in the Mediterranean

FGS Hamburg will be part of the Operation Irini for five months, with 250 navy personnel being reportedly onboard. Prior to the deployment of FGS Hamburg, Germany has been contributing to the mission with only one P-3C Orion aircraft. The decision for the deployment of the German Navy frigate comes at a moment when Berlin is trying to boost its role in the Mediterranean in several fronts.

Since early 2020, Germany has been playing a pivotal role in the developments of the Libyan conflict During the Berlin Conference, held on January 19, 2020, Chancellor Angela Merkel has hosted a meeting where all the major regional players participated. The ultimate objective of the conference has been to assist the opposing sides coming to an agreement and setting the context for the steps forward, in order peace to be established and the state-building process to start promptly. The conference has addressed the key regional and international factors that have been fueling the crisis, but at the same it highlighted the significance of the German element in international politics.

Berlin as a Gatekeeper of Regional Balance

Following the recent escalation between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea in late July, Berlin has once again emerged as a mediator and a gatekeeper of the regional balance. Germany not only intervened in the aftermath of the provocative Turkish NAVTEX but — as the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu divulged — Berlin has also organized an undisclosed trilateral meeting at some point before mid-July, among Greece, Turkey and Germany.

Last week, Germany took further steps to stress its role in the Libyan de-escalation process. Following the resignation of the UN Special Envoy for Libya Ghassan Salame, discussions have been taking place for the successor of the Lebanese academic and the very structure of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The US has reportedly tried to promote a specific candidate to overtake Salame’s role, but Germany responded via Dr. Christoph Heusgen, Germany’s Permanent Representative in the UN. Dr. Heusgen stressed that the UN Secretary-General should nominate the candidate without any US interference.

German Controversies Caused by Berlin’s Previous Actions

The tension in the Libyan front and in the Eastern Mediterranean also coincide with a critical moment in German politics. Since July 1 and until the end of the year, Germany holds the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Merkel’s close ally, Ursula von der Leyen is currently serving as the President of the European Commission, while Merkel herself is gradually moving to the end of her term without any intention to run for another one in 2021, as per her own statements. In this particular timing, both German institutions and Merkel would like to emphasize the stabilizing role of their country in a regional and international context.

On the other hand, besides the mediation efforts and military support that Berlin has been pursuing in order to secure stability in MENA and the Levant, controversy has been raised with regards to the arms deals that Germany has approved since the start of the year. According to data available from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), Berlin has proceeded forward on arm deals with some of the major foreign actors involved in the Libyan crisis, of a total value of approximately €331 million, specifically €308.2 million with Egypt, €15.1 million with Turkey and €7.7 million with the UAE, respectively. Such a move amid the escalation in the Libyan civil war and knowing the role that the aforementioned countries in the conflict hold has prompted several prominent accusations of misconduct and hypocrisy against Germany.

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On June 10 the commercial vessel CIRKIN was sailing across the Mediterranean towards the port of Misurata in northwestern Libya. CIRKIN was reportedly carrying military equipment for the Libyan army under the command of the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and was being accompanied by three Turkish frigates. When forces from the European Council’s Operation IRINI approached the vessel for inspection, the Turkish convoy rejected the request and kept navigating as per their initial route.

The incident has prompted controversy among EU officials, as it raised concerns around the actual efficacy and enforcement capability of Operation IRINI.

What is Operation IRINI?

IRINI (Greek word for peace) is a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation in the Mediterranean which was launched by the European Council in the aftermath of the Berlin Conference on Libya in late January 2020. It came out of the conference where steps to end the Libyan conflict were discussed.

The predominant mission of IRINI is to ensure that the UN-imposed arms embargo in Libya is being implemented. This is achieved through the utilization of Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) and inspections of suspicious vessels in the wider region off the Libyan coasts. Secondary tasks include monitoring illicit exports of petroleum products from Libya, building and training the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy and constraining the human smuggling and trafficking networks in the region. The operation officially started on March 31, 2020 and is set to be completed by March 31, 2021, subject to further extension.

The deployed assets of the mission are three aircraft, provided by Luxembourg, Poland and Germany respectively and one frigate provided by Greece. The aircraft are mostly utilized for surveillance, reconnaissance, search-and-rescue and transport missions. The Greek frigate HS SPETSAI is the most crucial deployed asset of IRINI; it carries a single Sikorsky S-70B Aegean Hawk helicopter, which alongside SPETSAI, was involved in the aforementioned June 10 incident. We should highlight here that the number and the operational capabilities of the deployed assets are far from adequate, considering the vast area of operations they are covering and the scope of IRINI’s overall mission.

The Worrisome June 10 Incident

In the early morning of June 10, the Tanzanian-flagged vessel CIRKIN was sailing across IRINI’s area of operations. CIRKIN is a RORO ( Roll-on/roll-off, ship that carries wheeled cargo and vehicles) cargo ship and had set sail from Turkey on June 7, with destination the Libyan port of Misurata. The commercial vessel has been escorted by three ships of the Turkish navy and since its departure it has raised the alarm for a potential violation of the Libyan arms embargo. IRINI officials were monitoring the route of the ship and sought to approach it for an inspection once it entered the area of responsibility of the EU mission.

On June 10, in coordination with the Italian Commander, based in Rome, the Sikorsky S-70B Aegean Hawk helicopter launched from HS SPETSAI and approached CIRKIN. The helicopter crew requested over the radio that CIRKIN cooperate and allow the IRINI personnel on-board for an inspection. However, the reply came from one of the accompanying Turkish frigates, informing the helicopter crew that CIRKIN would not be inspected and that the ship was under the protection of the Republic of Turkey.

Back in Rome, IRINI Headquarters were immediately made aware of the sequence of the events; the command of Operation IRINI ordered the personnel in the area to comply with the Turkish request and HS SPETSAI was directed to monitor the route of the Turkish ships, following the convoy from a safe distance. CIRKIN reached the port of Misurata by June 11. Having completed its mission, as of June 13, the vessel is currently sailing back to Turkey, with final destination at the port of Samsun in the Black Sea.

The Lukewarm EU and NATO Reaction

The incident has raised substantial concerns across the Operation IRINI officials. Even though it has gained wide publicity in Greece, there has been an attempt to downgrade its significance. Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis held a video conference with President of the European Council Charles Michel and the European Commission Vice President -and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. Despite the fact that the Turkish provocations, and particularly the latest incident in the Mediterranean, would presumably be part of the agenda of the top officials to discussm there were no relevant statements following the meeting. To the contrary, the only issues that have been reportedly discussed, moved around the long-term financial goals of the EU and the Recovery Fund as a response to COVID-19.

At the same time there are ongoing talks as to how NATO could contribute to the capabilities of IRINI through NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian. Sea Guardian is a NATO naval operation in the Mediterranean, with a mission to “maintain maritime situational awareness, deter and counter terrorism and enhance capacity building.” There are no indications if these considerations are taking place due to the June 10 incident, however because of this event there is no doubt that the operational limitations and inefficiencies of IRINI were highlighted publicly.

What is Turkey Trying to Achieve?

Once again Turkey is using the typical power projection tactics, with which we are all familiar by now. Ankara has been always aware that an arms embargo is implemented in Libya, however Turkish military material never stopped being shipped to the Libyan shores in support of the GNA forces. In fact, this very Turkish participation, through the delivery of light and heavy weaponry, military vehicles and sophisticated drones, has eventually helped tip the balance of the conflict in favor of the GNA and its leader Fayez al-Serraj. Furthemore, this has been happening overtly all along as Turkey is openly bragging about these developments through its state media.

The latest incident was a direct incitement towards the EU; by ignoring the role and mission of Operation IRINI and by sending military equipment to Libya with a Turkish navy escort, Turkey is once again flexing its muscles in front of the EU. Yet here we are with most EU major players facing Ankara as an equal partner, stressing the essential Turkish role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and providing financial aid to the country instead of seeking to push it into compliance with the EU instructions by threatening to impose sanctions.

A last point we should consider is that the incident took place a few days after the Greek HS SPETSAI joined the operation. For the first months of the Operation, the FS JEAN BART of the French Navy was deployed without any similar incident. Therefore, we can assume that Ankara chose the June 10 timing on purpose, in order to send another provocative message to Athens. As the tension in Libya keeps rising, so does the Turkish aggressiveness in the Mediterranean, prompting serious concerns among Greek leadership.

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