September 7, 2021 will be the eight years anniversary of the establishment of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has accomplished remarkable achievements. From 2013 to 2019, China invested US$117.31 billion in BRI countries. Although the COVID-19 in 2020 affected the stagnation of the international economy, However in the first half of 2021, the investment of Chinese companies in the countries along BRI increased by 8.6%.

Furthermore, BRI has received both widespread “attention” and “hostility” from the world’s major powers. In order to counter China’s BRI, US President Joe Biden launched the “Build Back Better World (B3W)” plan at the G7 summit. Its purpose is to provide an alternative plan to invest in developing countries. Immediately afterwards, on July 12, 2021, the EU foreign ministers agreed to launch a global infrastructure plan, the so-called “A globally connected Europe”. The strategic plan is an attempt to connect Europe and the world as from 2022 to contrast China’s influence.

Biden wants to reshape the United States into a World leading country, and hopes this will increase the attractiveness of B3W. But whether the B3W plan can be realized remains a question mark. The world is more willing to sign BRI projects based on national interests than to choose the B3W project with the United States. So far, approximately 140 countries have signed a memorandum of cooperation on the BRI with China.

The BRI has become the “flagship” project of China’s overseas investment in the past eight years. According to Refinitiv, a data provider under Thomson Reuters, new infrastructure has been built under the framework of BRI, including railways, ports, highways, etc. As of July 2020, there are more than 2,600 projects related to BRI, with a total project valuation of approximately US$3.7 trillion.

In the last eight years, China has mainly increased investment in Central Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia, and gradually looked towards Central and Eastern Europe.

According to China’s investment in Central Asia is concentrated in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In the ten years from 2009 to 2018, China invested US$12.7 billion and US$3.246 billion in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, respectively. The investment in both countries is mainly concentrated in energy and minerals. But with China’s commitment to COP 21, energy investment in Central Asia is expected to slow down. Southeast Asia and Central Europe will become the next stage of China’s investment focus in implementing the “high-quality” BRI program.

Since signing the RCEP, China’s investment in Southeast Asia has gradually increased, but it has a long way to go to catch up with Japan’s investment. China’s investment in Malaysia reached an average of 3.9 billion MYR per year between 2012 and 2016. Since 2016, China has been the largest source of foreign investment in Malaysia’s manufacturing sector. In 2019 and the first half of 2020, Malaysia successively approved 32 projects from China for a total value of US$45243 million. It has been observed that Malaysia’s economic growth rate rose by 1.31% in 2014 after the implementation of the first Malaysia-China project under the BRI framework. However, the growth rate in 2018 and 2019 was less than 5%. Chinese investment has little impact on Malaysia as a whole: the start-up time of China-Malaysia cooperation projects is too short, and its economic effects are not easy to see. In addition, Malaysia’s economic growth is also affected by many external factors, such as tensions caused by geopolitics including the trade war. This is also a mirror of Southeast Asia.

Relatively speaking, China’s investment in Central and Eastern European countries has become a bright spot in recent years. From 2010 to 2019, China’s total investment in Central and Eastern Europe increased from US$310 million to US$14.69 billion, with an average annual growth rate of 53.4%. In 2017, the China-Central and Eastern European Banking Consortium was formally established. The China Development Bank(CDB) provided 2 billion Euros in financial cooperation loans to this region. The second phase of the China-Central and Eastern Europe Investment Cooperation Fund raised US$1 billion to be invested in Central and Eastern Europe. Strong policy support continuously which indicates that China’s investment in the region will grow rapidly in the future.

Generally speaking, China’s investment in Central and Eastern Europe presents the following typical characteristics. Firstly, as far as investment entities are concerned, China’s early investment in Central and Eastern Europe has been dominated by state-owned enterprises. Secondly, in terms of industry distribution, China’s cooperation projects in Central and Eastern Europe are largely concentrated in the energy and chemical industries. Third, China’s investment in Central and Eastern Europe is extremely unbalanced in terms of geographical distribution. Hungary and Serbia are the countries that receive the greatest contribution from China, and the two countries account for 1/2 of China’s total investment in Central and Eastern Europe.

However, the political risks within the Central and Eastern European countries have become the primary issue facing China’s investment projects in the region. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria have many parties are marked by frequent regime changes, with the ruling coalition often clashes due to differences in policy tendencies. In addition, the long-term sustainability of economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe still presents great uncertainties. Although countries in Central and Eastern Europe have experienced strong economic growth in recent years, in the long run, there is a risk of an economic decline. The “middle income trap” has become a real threat to all these countries.

China’s investment in countries along BRI mainly relies on state-owned and private enterprises. And the problem is that the proportion of state-owned enterprises’ overseas market revenue has increased significantly, but the level of internationalization has not followed suit. On the other hand, private enterprises show a two-tiered trend, with low overall profitability and weak investment sustainability.

When it comes to the choice of investment destinations for enterprises, state-owned enterprises will continue to invest in key areas of the BRI such as Southeast Asia, West Asia, Africa, and South Asia; while private enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises are currently investing more in developed countries such as the United States and Europe, but in the future , forecasts indicate they might increase investment in Southeast Asia, South Asia and other regions. Companies will also be paying more attention to safety, profitability and liquidity.

Regarding the question of whether the BRI is a strategy or an initiative, Chinese scholars express different opinions. Personally, I think it can be defined as a strategic initiative. In view of the long repayment period of the infrastructure investment and the limited debt repayment ability of various countries, it may be considered as an assisting instrumental Road Map. What is certain is that China needs to have an economic foundation if it wants to gain recognition from other countries. Extending it then to the political and diplomatic fields on this basis will be a long-term process. After all, if China cannot balance economic cooperation and obtaining strategic benefits (political influence), then China’s plan to promote the BRI will also be faced with greater risks.

L'articolo Infrastructure investment: the core instrument of BRI proviene da InsideOver.

The New Silk Road, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or One Belt One Road Initiative, was launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013. Designed with the goal of promoting Chinese geopolitical and economic ties with countries west and south of China, the project aimed to connect Asian, European, and African continents and strengthen trade and infrastructure development in the region. So far, over 60 countries have agreed to take part in the initiative, making up over 66% of the entire world population and affecting over 40% of global GDP.

While China has invested an estimated 4-8 trillion USD in 118 projects to date, success of BRI has been mixed, including both high profile successes and more controversial projects which have failed to live up to expectations.

Resounding BRI successes include the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, and the Jakarta-Bandung high speed rail project. They have created significant work opportunities for local labor, filled critical infrastructure gaps, and either already demonstrated economic gains or are expected to do so for recipient countries.

Officially launched in April 2015, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) involves construction of highways, oil pipelines, railroads, and power plants from Khunjerab to the Arabian Sea. Creating over 70,000 jobs for Pakistanis, China’s plans in Pakistan have already contributed to an estimated “two-percentage points in GDP growth”. Along with construction of the Gwadar airport, CPEC has led to the completion of Pakistan’s first electric-powered public transportation system, positioning Pakistan for future economic growth and more integration into the global economy.

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor connects China’s Yunnan Province to Myanmar. In addition to road and rail transportation, construction on gas and oil pipelines began in 2008, finishing in 2013. With the capacity of carrying over 12 million tons of crude oil every year, these pipelines provide a more direct path for Chinese crude oil imports rather than using the Malacca Strait; the project has been crowned one of the major successes of BRI given its strategic importance for trade and economic security.

The Jakarta-Bandung high speed rail project was announced by Indonesia in 2015. Following a fierce financing competition by China and Japan, Indonesia announced the joint venture between Indonesian state-owned companies and China Railway International in October 2015, of which Indonesia has 60% interest in the joint venture and China owns the remaining 40%. The project will connect Indonesian capital Jakarta to the textile hub of Bandung via a 150 km long railway traveling up to 250 km/hr, effectively cutting down travel times from the original 3-5 hours to just 36 minutes. China and Indonesia plan for the railway to be fully operational by end of 2022; the project has already created over 40,000 jobs in just construction alone.

However, there have also been heavy criticisms of various BRI projects and suggestions that China has used its BRI as debt-trap diplomacy designed to coerce recipient countries into giving China concessions once they default on project debt payments. One example is the Montenegro highway project. The project consisted of a highway that would run from Port of Bar to Belgrade, a distance of 170 km. Getting a billion USD loan from China in 2014, the highway remains unfinished, with only 40 km completed. Montenegro now faces financial instability as a result of the project, with its debt now amounting to more than 100% of its GDP. Another failure is the Sri Lanka Hambantota project. The Hambantota port, started in 2007 by current Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, was leased to China for 99 years in 2017 for 1.1 billion USD following issues related to debt repayments. The country still remains in debt to China from the initial construction of the port, totaling 5.8 billion USD as of June 2020.

The reality is that while not all BRI projects have been successes, emerging economies in Africa, Asia, and Europe desperately need investment into infrastructure projects and the developing world faces a massive investment shortfall. The African Development Bank (ADB) estimates that there is an annual investment deficit of 93 billion USD annually in Africa, and 459 billion USD annually in Asia. This investment will be necessary to support future development of these emerging economies. While the US and wealthy western European nations contribute significant development funds annually, the level of investment is not enough to improve conditions sufficiently or quickly enough to support long-term growth. China’s investment is sorely needed to close the gap and to jumpstart emerging economies.

The previously highlighted projects show that when done right BRI projects can have significant positive economic impact for both China and recipient countries. However, it is also possible for projects to go very wrong and create undue economic pressure. Moving forward, it is essential for China and its partners to focus on three key areas to make BRI a long-term success.

First, China needs to take the time to truly study the long-term feasibility of proposed projects and maintain transparent, consistent oversight of projects to ensure that only the right projects are undertaken and that funds are used responsibly towards stable economic gain. This will require a greater degree of multilateral cooperation with other global lenders so that project assessments and standards are unified across organizations granting project funding. Not an easy task but one that will create better long-term outcomes for projects.

Second, given the high-profile nature of BRI and China’s desire to be more involved on the international stage as a global power, it will need to put in place stronger mechanisms to ensure renegotiations take place when necessary to restructure loan payment plans to reduce chances of defaults by host nations. To this end, China has already announced its partnership with the Paris Club, a host of twenty-two creditor nations, as well as G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative, an initiative that offers aid to 77 developing countries who have debt repayments due by 2020, to create a global debt relief effort alongside BRI.

Finally, China should focus on undertaking projects that emerging economies need but that also highlight China’s desire to take a leadership position in emerging technologies. This is already happening with high-speed rail projects, but China has an opportunity to massively speed up global sustainable energy initiatives. To date China has financed projects involving non-renewables 9.7 times more than in renewable energy. However, China has taken part in significant green projects, like the Karuma Hydropower Project in Uganda, generating 600 MV of electricity at full operation. Given a growing global emphasis on sustainable development and China’s desire to be a leader in renewable energy, expect to see future BRI projects that leverage China’s clean energy knowhow.

China’s BRI legacy as it stands today is mixed but there is promise around what its investments can bring to emerging markets. To make BRI a resounding success China should consider more stringent project review plans and project feasibility procedures as well as increasing focus on projects that more directly support hiring of local labor forces; this would go a long way towards improving project perception in recipient countries and lead to a higher long-term success rate for BRI initiatives.

L'articolo What are the real needs of the New Silk Road now? proviene da InsideOver.

You don’t argue with the Tatmadaw – the Myanmar Armed Forces. It’s always their way, or the highway. Since the mid-20th century, the Chinese have come to understand it quite well.

How Beijing approaches the Myanmar maze is conditioned by four variables: natural gas; water; the drug trade; and the fractious clashes between the Tatmadaw and a dizzying patchwork of over 135 ethnic minorities.

Each Myanmar ethnic group exhibits its own peculiar history, culture and language. They control vast territories, whole industries and serious militias. Myanmar’s two-third majority is represented by the Bamar – also known as the Lowland Burmese. The Tatmadaw is largely a Lowland Burmese army – in perennial conflict with that large ethnic jigsaw puzzle.

The ethnic minorities live mostly in the hills and along Myanmar’s porous jungle borders. Myanmar is divided into seven states – named after the seven largest ethnic groups: Kachin, Chin, Karenni, Karen, Mon, Shan and Rakhine. Alliances tend to be quite fragile, but historically the Chinese have been inclined to support a few of them in their fight against the Tatmadaw.

Drug trade in Myanmar is a virtually impenetrable matryoshka – with most of these groups connected across the Golden Triangle to partners in China, Thailand and Laos, and on top of it competing against each other.

The Shan traditionally have used huge profits in the drug trade to buy an array of weapons. There is a wealth of competing Shan groups, among them the army of the late, notoriously flamboyant drug lord Khun Sa, known as “The Opium King of Burma”; the former headhunters that compose the Wa tribe; and a bunch of Kokang Chinese who form the eastern Shan State army.

The opium/heroin business – and much of the ya ba (amphetamine) trafficking – in the Golden Triangle is now largely controlled by the much feared United Wa State Army: a 20,000-strong ultra-hardcore militia, one of the most powerful on the planet, complete with their private collection of surface-to-air missiles.

And that brings us to the Chinese angle – because many of these ethnic potentates, from Khun Sa to Kyi Myint, a.k.a. Zhang Zhiming, a former head of the Communist Party of Burma, have forged very close relations with Chinese Triads.

Yet what does the central government in Myanmar have to do with the heart of the action in the Golden Triangle? Not much. The Tatmadaw may strike the odd peace deal with these unruly actors, but they usually don’t last long.

What the Tatmadaw did over these past decades was a crash course on business – learning the ropes about post-Mao China. That’s how they evolved into a major corporate empire – much more than an army.

Myanmar was already on the front line when sections of the People’s Liberation Army (PL) in China got into business. For instance, Yunnan province in southern China was the operating base for the top three heroin Triad families. So the first step was Burma linked to the Chinese triads as the logistical arm of the Golden Triangle drug trade. The next step featured China building railways to link Yunnan to Burma/Myanmar.

Oil and gas star as the next piece of the puzzle. As France’s Total started to expand their initial oil and gas exploits off Rakhine – formerly known as Arakan state – the Chinese had the foresight to invest in a long oil and gas pipeline linking it to Yunnan. From Beijing’s point of view, what really matters is this Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline from the Bay of Bengal to southern China – with the Tatmadaw in charge of security.

While China invests in copper mines and dams, but arguably its key investment in Myanmar is a new deep-water port on the Bay of Bengal, with the accompanying Kyaukphyu Special Free Trade Zone. The port and the pipeline interconnect, representing the Myanmar backbone of the vitally important Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Southeast Asia corridor.

And that brings us to the intractable Rohingya problem.

China’s absolute priority is to protect the new port plus the Special Free Trade Zone being built in Rakhine.

For quite a while the Myanmar government’s income – now controlled by the Tatmadaw – has depended on the oil/gas from onshore and offshore operations in Rakhine as well as the rail/road connectivity.

The Chinese for their part are in close touch with the Kachin Army and the Kokang ethnic group. If the going gets tough, the plan is to use them as well as the Arakan Army, active in the region, to manage the Tatmadaw in case they start having funny ideas. The only thing that matters for the Chinese is the BRI corridor and the Rohingya find themselves caught in the middle of this serious power play.

The Myanmar puzzle is made even more complex by the issue of water. The Beijing leadership knows very well how strategic Myanmar is in terms of solving China’s critical water imbalance. China, with 20% of the world’s population, can count on only 7% of the world’s fresh water. And 80% of China’s water is in the south, while over 700 million Chinese and two-thirds of its farmland are in the north.

The solution has been to build 11 of the world’s largest hydroelectric dams on the key rivers which flow towards China’s neighbors. And this has given rise to dramatic problems, especially in the case of the Mekong, where every region below the dams, in Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, has been extremely handicapped. And the issue is far from over: 11 more dams will be built in the lower Mekong, in Laos and Cambodia.

The relationship between Beijing and the Tatmadaw was never a bed of roses. Overall, the Chinese were seen with much suspicion at the Ministry of Foreign Relations level during the NLD years, while most Tatmadaw Generals admire China’s economic power. Beijing’s immutable diplomatic law amounts to non-interference in the domestic policies of its partners – so it has refrained from weighing in on whether the military coup earlier this year was actually not really a coup, as the Tadmadaw argues.

Facts on the ground spell out the Tatdadaw making a lot of money over the years by collecting fees and owning shares in Chinese deals struck in the ethnic regions. At the same time the Tatmadaw know that the Chinese, even indirectly, provide military support to quite a few militias. And drug kingpins are only able to operate smoothly across the Golden Triangle because the Chinese allow it.

So, the relationship is undoubtedly an uneasy one. A great deal of Chinese influence in Myanmar was somewhat restricted during the NLD government. Now the whole situation is in limbo. Yet Beijing never takes its eyes off the Big Prize: BRI corridor projects should never be in danger, and Myanmar will always be an inextricable part of the New Silk Roads.

L'articolo How Myanmar fits into China’s New Silk Roads proviene da InsideOver.

In November 2019, the New York Times disclosed 400 documents regarding China’s education camps in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, built-in 2017 for the specific purpose of indoctrinating the Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim ethnic group. Although part of the International community recognized the Uyghurs’ “reeducation” as a thinly-disguised mass detention operation, the most influential Arab countries, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, did not adopt a firm position on the issue nor condemn it.

Deng Xiaoping’s Economic Plan

What might appear as a bizarre attitude from the Gulf Countries, has in truth an economic explanation dating back to the second half of the 20^th century, when China established diplomatic relations with all 22 Arab countries. At that time, China’s newfound interest in Arab countries matched with its intent of turning itself into a global economic power. By the end of the ‘70s, Deng Xiaoping’s strategy to open up China’s economy to the rest of the world by enhancing foreign investments and international import export trade played a key role in country’s economic development. Deng’s financial policy demonstrated itself to be more efficient than that of his predecessors as he de-collectivized agriculture previously managed by the Communist Party and enabled the household responsibility system. Between 1952 to 1978, China’s annual GDP growth grew to a rating of 6.1, proving the economically positive effects of Deng’s reforms on the real economy.

The Open door policy began in 1978, and membership to the WTO in 2005 significantly shaped China’s economy shifting it from a monopolized State economy to a liberalized free market system, which allowed foreign enterprises to set up in China and operate in Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Since the beginning of the reforms, China’s GDP has risen tenfold, boosting annual growth of a total factor productivity by 3.8% between 1978-2005. A year before China joined the WTO, the China-Arab State Cooperation Forum (CASCF) was created. No surprise then that on the wave of the economic revival, Beijing sought out new partnerships across the Middle East. The CASCF, strongly supported by the then-Chinese President Hu Jintao, followed four essential principles including fostering economic and trade exchanges between China and the Arab League. In just four years, the trade volume between Beijing and Arab nations rocketed, reaching $ 132.9 billion in 2008.

By 2016 Arab Countries Made Up One of China’s Top Trading Partners

The economic alliance comprised of annual official meetings to strengthen diplomatic relations between both blocks, as well as Entrepreneurs Conferences and dialogue seminars. The main purpose of China’s investment policy in Arab countries was engendered by the supplies of crude oil and natural gas available in those countries. In 2016 China superseded the US as the world’s largest importer of crude oil, and by September 2019, China imported roughly 10 million barrels per day. As domestic production was not sufficient to meet internal demand, China started to import crude oil by the of the ‘90s, addressing its needs in South East Asia and neighbouring countries. In 2016, Arab countries became the seventh-largest trading partners of China, as Beijing established a strategic tie with Gulf countries as part of the dialogue with the Gulf Cooperation Council.

However, China always appeared to be the most advantaged partner in international trades, as the overall Saudi Arabia imports from China in 2015 were worth US$ 24,655 million in 2015, slightly below Saudi Arabia exports to China in the same year, accounting for US$ 5,729 million. There were similar stories for other Gulf countries, such as Oman and UAE. Oman’s exports to China in 2015 accounted for US$ 1,330 million, while its imports from China came to US$ 3,739 million. China is not even included among the top five countries in terms of UAE exports, yet the UAE imports from China in 2015 accounted for US$ 22,845 million. Currently, Saudi Arabia is the second-largest provider of crude oil to China, with a value of $29.7 billion in trade exchange.

China’s Arab Policy Paper

The CASCF later evolved into what is known as China’s Arab Policy Paper, issued by the Chinese Government in 2016. Like the CASCF, the Arab Policy Paper followed the principle of mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, as an explicit act of rupture from US foreign policy. Yet other economic investments are linking Beijing to the Gulf Countries, apart from the crude oil imports, such as the Chinese railway construction built by the China Railway Construction Corporation Limited in Saudi Arabia, and the clean coal power plant in Dubai, partly built by China’s Harbin Electric International. While it is widely understood that the economic relationship between China and the Arab States is anchored in energy, it also true that the Belt and Road initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, has enhanced Chinese investments in 70 countries, involving many Arab countries in the project. The BRI considers the Middle East as a key junction between Asia and Europe, much like the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), which established pivotal hubs in Saudi Arabia (Jeddah) and in Egypt by passing through the Red Sea.

The economic interest China has shown towards the Arab countries has, therefore, a dual purpose: firstly, to grant itself a steady supply of crude oil and gas and, secondly, to establish critical locations in the Middle East to ensure the success of both the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. Although China’s geopolitical narrative aims at avoiding any involvement in the domestic policies of Arab countries, it also has a vested interest in maintaining a peaceful situation in those countries through its military presence (Djibouti) and because of its investments. This was proven by the announcement of the Chinese ambassador to the United Arab Emirates in the summer of 2019 about the likely participation of China in the security operations of the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, Gulf Countries took advantage of their relationship with China, gaining more room to maneuver, in deciding future relationships with the US and Europe. The US incapacity in dealing with the last summer turmoil in The Strait of Hormuz, stoked a new distrust against Washington and its military force.

Beijing Deliberately Avoids Involvement in Arab Nations’ Domestic Policies

However, Washington’s interference was felt in 2018, when US sanctions on Iran affected the trade exchanges between China and Tehran as the US desire to isolate Tehran resulted in a 34% decrease in commercial exchanges with Beijing. Before that, Iran consistently supplied China with crude oil and hostilities between the US and Iran were seen as both an opportunity for economic growth and trade exchanges for China. Back then, when Beijing and Tehran had prolific trade exchanges, China considered Iran as a critical geographic area for the development of the BRI, only to then focus its interests in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The change of plan provides an example of the policy China is pursuing while establishing relevant relationships with Arab countries: as long as the political situation is untroubled the economic benefits are significantly worth it. That explains why China has no intention of being involved in Arab countries’ domestic policies, leaving the US to deal with them.

Although China’s geopolitical relationship with Arab countries stems from its view of itself as a global political power- especially in light of international contention regarding Taiwan and Hong Kong and its desire to show its strength on a vast worldwide scale- its financial intents are predominant over any other aims, making the BRI the most ambitious and complex project for Beijing. It is not surprising then that the major projects China has developed in the Middle East include ports and industrial parks given the importance of the Arabian Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea as the leading connecting corridors of the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. This was made possible thanks to manifold factors, such as the longstanding action of diplomacy carried out by China throughout the last seventy years and the progressive lack of interest the US has displayed toward the Middle East since the beginning of Donald Trump’s Presidency back in 2016. In terms of diplomacy, China approached the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East through the action of special envoys appointed in relation to the Sudanese situation, the Israel-Palestine war, and the Syrian war.

In 2018 the trade volume between China and Arab League nations reached 244.3 billion US dollars, while the direct investment of Chinese firms in Arab countries accounted for 1.2 billion US dollars. These sums give an insight into the role Beijing is willing to play on the world stage, thereby redefining the playing field for major world players. The Arab countries’ lack of reaction to the news of the Uyghurs detention in the education camps should be interpreted against this background, where economic ties are being put on the fast track and human rights are being relegated to secondary importance.

L'articolo Beijing’s Strategy for Building Bridges with Arab Countries proviene da InsideOver.

Russia’s domestic and foreign policy is not fully understood without taking into account the centuries-long powerful influence it has exerted on pop culture, politics and clergy, by the idea of the “Third Rome”. Such a concept was developed in the aftermath of the Byzantine empire’s fall and, shortly, states that Russia is the spiritual heiress of Rome and Constantinople and, accordingly, the true defender of Christendom.

Although Russia indeed recognizes and promotes its cultural and religious pluralism since the tsarist times, it is equally undeniable the importance played by the Orthodox faith throughout the centuries in the creation and definition of the Russian identity and the shaping of the foreign policy, as shown by the “Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Nationality” 19th century doctrine or by the will to defend pilgrims and Christian worshippers living in the Ottoman-ruled Holy Land.

After a 80-year oblivion caused by the atheistic goals of the Soviet Union, the Third Rome has been brought to new life during the Putin era and is helping the country gain increasing credibility and support worldwide, from the Middle East’s persecuted Christians to the Vatican, from European far-right populists to American Christian fundamentalists.

The Vatican-Moscow axis

As part of its pro-Christian global agenda, in recent years, Russia has been showing a growing interest in the improvement of bilateral ties with the Vatican. The approachment started just before the death of John Paul II and recorded an impressive intensification during the Pope Francis era, whose Third World-focused and China-friendly agenda fits perfectly with Russia’s long-term ambition to accelerate the transition to multipolarism.

The most important event was the 2016 joint declaration signed in L’Avana by Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill. The 30-point document was intended to be the first step towards the reconciliation and identified common culture wars to fight together, such as the culture of death, the defence of natural family, and the capitalism-driven de-humanization of people, and common goals in the international arena, such as the protection of persecuted Christians.

In the aftermath of the L’Avana declaration, Vatican – and Moscow Patriarchate – backed organizations raised a degree of cooperation on humanitarian assistance in war-torn Syria and Iraq to unprecedented levels and extended the range action to the rebuilding of damaged churches and historic landmarks.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Pope Francis seem tied by a very good relationship as they met three times since 2013 and share publicly a common position on the world-most important issues, from Ukraine to Venezuela and Syria. Last July, Putin’s trip to Italy was the occasion to pay a visit to the Vatican, where he signed a memorandum of understanding on health cooperation and re-confirmed Russia’s front-line engagement in the protection of persecuted Christians and defense of “traditional values“.

But the Middle Eastern and North African region is not the only front in which Russia and the Vatican are working together. Pope Francis made clear that his goal is to de-westernize the Catholic church and give voice to the outskirts of the world. Accordingly, the pontiff strengthened the ties with Russian-friendly rising powers currently involved in open confrontations against the West, namely Iran and China.

In the first case, he lobbied at international level for the nuclear deal, while in the second case he is trying to normalize the status of the Chinese Catholic Church, to take advantage of the ongoing Christian-oriented demographic revolution and lobbied the Italian government to join the New Silk Road.

Moscow in the Middle East

From the very beginning of the Syrian civil war and the expansion of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS), the Kremlin was helped in gathering information by the Patriarchate of Antioch, whose local prelates acted as informants for the Patriarchate of Moscow following the rising terrorist threats and writing their reports. The latter worked jointly with the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society to help the Christians face food scarcity and basic needs and in the year 2013 alone, they sent 70 tons of aid and $1.3 million.

When in 2015 the ally Bashar al-Assad was on the verge of overthrow due to the rising pressure coming from Al Qaeda-linked opposition rebels and the IS, Russia opted for a military intervention to restore order and peace in the unrest-plagued country and to prevent terrorists from extending further.

The protection of a long-tormented Christian community from an extinction scenario played an important role in convincing Moscow to intervene, according to Putin itself, and was warmly welcomed by Catholics, American Protestants and Orthodox Arabs, contributing to significantly improve the image of Russia among them and, in particular, in the Middle East.

Hungary joins the holy axis

From now on, Russia is going to be supported in the protection of Arab Christians by a former great power which was historically engaged in the defense of Christianity: Hungary. On 30 October, Putin landed Budapest for an official meeting with the Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Many topics were matter of talks, from economy to energy, but a reserved place was given to the plight of Christians in the Muslim world.

According to Hungary’s state secretary for the aid of persecuted Christians, Tristan Azbej, the two leaders discussed the foundation of an international alliance between nations interested in fighting Christianophobia and ending the worldwide persecution, which is about to reach “genocide levels” in several parts of the planet and makes Christianity the world-most persecuted religion.

The Hungarian government presented the proposal to Putin, who showed much interest in it, and is set to unveil it on the world stage very soon. Eventually, the leaders agreed on the need to extend the bilateral cooperation to the help of Christians in North Africa and the Middle East with the double-aimed goal of protecting them and avoiding their mass exodus to Europe.

L'articolo Russia’s Return As Defender of Christianity proviene da InsideOver.

China’s international dominance is well-known, but does it have what it takes to become a global hegemon? Some might argue that it’s lacking an international approach while comparing the country to the United States whereas others suggest the Asian giant has better capability to navigate its way to the top. China has always made its way to the hearts and minds of people in remarkable ways. From producing everyday products to developing the latest technologies and assisting neighbors and far-flung allies through political and economic strategies, China has pretty much achieved it all. Its latest show of strength comes in the form of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

What is the Belt and Road Initiative in the first place? October 2019 marks the 6th year of the plan’s announcement by Chinese President Xi Jinping. A glorious idea aiming to revolutionize how the world views China and the benefits it can bring to their economies. The program consists of a series of global projects aimed to increase business opportunities, connect continents and most importantly export China’s influence abroad through cultural exchanges. The BRI comprises of nearly 140 countries where China seeks to enhance trade collaborations through cost-effective measures. Logistics and transportation networks are the key ideas here as China tries to revive the Silk Route.

China’s ability to oversee development projects; an art it has successfully mastered over the years, promises a host of opportunities and benefits for not only the southeast Asian region but also Africa, the Middle-East, Europe and parts of South America. A global resurgence may just be around the corner. Southeast Asia, in particular, has been swamped with growing debts, social injustices and environmental issues and it must consider this as the future towards progression since China has spent over $500 billion into the region. This investment targets transportation links to China from countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia to combine their diverse societies into one major regional player spearheaded by Chinese know-how and supremacy.

China has the finance and the authenticity of delivering demands when required. Majority of the countries today are facing problems that need external support and assistance. Pakistan, China’s neighbor across the Karakoram range has benefited from China’s power through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a set of projects again connecting both countries through a multitude of transport links, social and economic projects and the Gwadar port, the next hub of maritime trade.

The Middle-East is another region which although is self-sufficient when it comes to finance but lacks human resources. China was quick to make its impact regarding the market niche that exists in this region despite facing a challenging political and security environment by signing deals with almost every country in the region. Currently it has constructed a high-speed rail system in Saudi Arabia and plans on inaugurating another in the Kingdom’s regional foe Iran over the next years.

Linking China to Europe is a tactical strategy that China is willing to venture into considering the abundance of opportunities it may obtain in the continent. China has always considered Europe to be a dominant force with a mix of different ideologies but a progressive force. China’s economic and political integration with Europe at this point in time must be one where it can stand up against its main rival, the United States. The support of Europe for Chinese actions may give the country leverage while negotiating with the Americans be it politics, intellectual property protection or global trade and dependence. Hence, gaining access to Europe is a key idea that Beijing is more than willing to dwell into.

In March this year, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte inked a Memorandum of Understanding. It had previously taken Greece, Portugal, Bulgaria and Latvia on board. With Italy, China is working in the areas of culture, finance, and sports. Furthermore, key shipping ports have also been secured along with the modernization of depleted infrastructures. Scientific, financial and cultural exchanges would not only make Italy a reputed figure in the Chinese market but will also give the European country access to Asia, a key market where Italian goods are exported. Strategic influence and a geopolitical bonds look on course to be strengthened through this lucrative MoU.

Another similar step was taken in April with Switzerland where China signed an MoU locking Switzerland’s cooperation in BRI projects. This will specifically target social and environmental impacts and capital for private projects between the two countries.

China’s road to global hegemony can now clearly be highlighted considering the efforts it is ramping up to make itself the dominant powerhouse it has always aimed to become. The involvement of billions of dollars along with the necessary understanding of technicalities involved in dealing with social, political and economic shortcomings could well establish China’s role as the number one international player in the near future.

L'articolo From China To The World: The Belt and Road Initiative proviene da InsideOver.

The friendship between Pakistan and China has stood the test of time for decades. Cooperation between the two brotherly nations thrives in various sectors ranging from the economy to regional developments. Diplomatic ties were established in 1950, two years after Pakistan gained independence. Pakistan’s relationship with China has also been a deterrent for India as the country enjoys exuberant support from President Xi’s government.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a project that lives to tell the tale of this close bond. Under this $63 billion initiative, numerous infrastructure projects are under construction across Pakistan. It is aimed at reviving Pakistan’s slagging economy and modernizing the country’s worn-out infrastructure. What else does this “project of friendship” include? To begin with, there are many energy projects, modern transport networks and special economic zones. Secondly, it is also targeting the social sector by launching development programs which are keen in taking into account the many problems faced by Pakistan on a social level. China’s technological capabilities will also be tested through a $37 million cross border optical fiber cable system and a crucial Early Warning System for Pakistan’s meteorological department.

What sets CPEC apart from other initiatives China has taken across the world is the development of the significant Gwadar port, a strategic location detrimental for the transport of cargo across the south Asian and middle-eastern regions. This is just a small part of China’s grand expansion strategy but a key goal that Pakistan has successfully achieved through Chinese finances. This can be lauded as a great step forward considering the dire situation of the country’s economy which has faced numerous repercussions from the lack of political stability. According to official studies conducted by Pakistan’s government, China’s mammoth investments will stimulate an 8%-10% increase in Pakistan’s GDP by 2030. However, it has not always been an easy ride. Many problems continue to exist considering active terrorism in the Balochistan region where a number of key projects are set to be deployed. Furthermore, challenges have also differed from province to province. Pakistan’s political domination is deeply embedded within its provinces. While terrorism may be a problem in Balochistan as anti-state elements repeatedly target the government, the basic infrastructure might be another headache up north where development has not been so significant.

The port was inaugurated by Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s army general in 2007, at a cost of $248 million. In 2015, it was leased to China until 2059 and was given the go-ahead to be developed under CPEC at $1.6 billion. Along with the pivotal shipping port, the project aims to unlock other plans within the coastal city which include an airport, expressways, hospitals, universities, vocational institutes, smart city plans and lastly, a strong focus on petrochemical and steel industries in which Pakistan has the potential to flourish at a great scale.

The reason why this particular port is touted to be a game-changer is because of the incentives it will give to those docking at the port. For example, along with high-quality infrastructure, there will be no cargo demurrage charges and will also give 3-month storage facility options.

The port was officially opened for transit trade on the 2nd of October, 2019 but will be fully functional in November this year. Another aspect why this port holds immense value for the Chinese is because of their own personal interests. China’s navy will be allowed to use the port and it also connects China’s Xinjiang province with the grand port in Baluchistan province. Furthermore, the implementation of additional taxes on Chinese companies establishing fish processing facilities inside and outside the port have also been scrapped to facilitate China in generous ways.

At this point, we may say that the CPEC project is a win-win situation for both sides. For Pakistan, the allocation of financial resources is a major source of concern and China is willing to provide whatever necessary help the neighbor might ask for. However, this is also China’s tactical decision to connect itself with other countries and revive the Silk Road, which the Belt and Road Initiative seeks to acquire.

Gwadar’s main competition will be against the ports in the UAE. The main source of revenue for the UAE is currently earned through ports Rashid and Jebel Ali. Over 5,000 companies from more than 120 countries use the port for trade. The Gwadar port, on the other hand, is a more strategic location just 600km away from the strait of Hormuz, a key shipping destination for oil. Furthermore, the Gwadar port is also closer to China. This is in China’s interest because it becomes easier to use this port rather than a costlier route through the UAE.

For the time being, Gwadar may not possess the capability to outshine the UAE but over the coming period with the development of an oil city funded by Saudi Arabia and a host of other residential development projects and the inclusion of Pakistan’s biggest airport, luck might just be in favor of the Pakistanis.

L'articolo Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: Bridging East and West proviene da InsideOver.

For three decades, China had been on the rise. With its economy continuously growing, the country reappeared in the circles of international relevance. China was the nation that would cease American dominance and reshape the world into a bipolar one.

This used to be the Zeitgeist surrounding China. Now, after more than thirty years of reoccurring economic apogees, the past and present are responsible for a reversal in China’s future course.

When Napoleon Bonaparte once famously stated that one should let China sleep as the world would change once she had woken up, he displayed a remarkable degree of clairvoyance. China has indeed changed the world. Until 2015, it remained the fastest-growing major economy in the world with an average of 6% growth over three decades. It quickly became one of the world’s biggest economies, an achievement almost unparalleled in modern history. Nonetheless, the year 2019 has been a reminder that China’s economic narrative has been imperfect.

The rave in favour of China’s success and international pedigree is logical: A superior economy equals power and success. However, what if the economy in question was primarily evaluated based on nominal GDP? In a vacuum, the latter appears stellar. Yet, it omits clarity regarding the country’s prospects as a whole. In 2011 experts began to project China as the world’s biggest economy of the future. For some, it even seemed conceivable that China would surpass the United States – all based on nominal GDP.

In 2019, China remains the world’s second-largest economy by nominal GDP ($14.2 Trillion) and the world’s largest by purchasing power parity (PPP) at $27.3 Trillion. It is a rigid contrast between perception and reality. Inevitably, a population of almost 1.4 billion has the tools to generate an overall impressively looking economy. However, size and sophistication are not always interchangeable. This is confirmed when looking at the per capita stats.

According to the IMF, on a GDP per capita income basis, China ranked 67th in the world at $10153, on the same level as countries such as Bulgaria, Lebanon and Kazakhstan. In terms of PPP per capita, China ranks 73rd at $19520, in close company with Azerbaijan, Iraq and Botswana. In comparison, Germany is at $53000, the United States at $63000. Nominal GDP therefore does not necessarily represent the overall economic influence nor a country’s relative capabilities. If it did, India would have surpassed Britain in 1850.

China had rightfully been credited for its very modern and financially capable yet a corruption-prone coastal region. However, its countryside remains vastly underdeveloped, with only ten of thirty-one provinces producing a per capita income above the national average and hundreds of millions of Chinese people continue to live in obscene poverty.

Nonetheless, projections for China’s economy had continuously been favourable, based on the extrapolation of the country’s previous track record, and the most optimistic circumstances. In China’s case, it meant projections could only move into one direction: upwards. However, China’s last three decades had been so impressive that the extrapolation was never a coherent approach in the first place. And there are some valid reasons for it.

First, not even China is immune to a standard economic principle: All economies slow down once they have developed. Hence, any substantial growth, moving forward, faces the obstruction of the economy’s increasing complexity. Unsurprisingly, the year 2019 marks China’s slowest growth rate in the last twenty-seven years at 6.2%. That is after it had slowed down from 14.2% in 2007 to 6.6% in 2018. Lofty future projections have now been recanted. For example, the IMF has China growth decreasing to 5.5% by 2024. By 2030, China GDP per capita is projected to be half of the United States’ GDP. And while no longer in the same league with Bulgaria, Lebanon and Kazakhstan, it would place China in the company of today’s Slovenia and Greece. Both not known as economic powerhouses.

Second, China had always been unlikely to sustain the previous as well as current growth rates due to its domestic policies. In 1979 China introduced its one-child policy to control the country’s rapid increase in population. With the long-term effect, that China’s overall population growth has decreased from 1.5% in the 1980’s to 1% in the 1990’s to today’s 0.6%. It makes China one of the most rapidly ageing countries in the world. As a result, the percentage of elderly dependents will be higher than the percentage of children in the country by 2030. Due to more dependent individuals, China will be burdened with a significant monetary issue in terms of pension financing. The late great Charles Krauthammer once summed up this development perfectly: “China will get old before it gets rich.”

Moreover, these figures and projections correlate with one of China’s most significant detriments: Its state ideology. China remains a de facto totalitarian state, in which its sacrosanct economy is not only dominated but to a large extent dictated by Beijing and its one-party government. In 2011, 34 of China’s largest companies listed at the Shanghai Stock Exchange were either partially or fully owned by the government. In 2016, 66.6% of China’s overall GDP was generated by state-owned companies. Hence, China’s economic growth is highly dependent on foreign investments and technology. These investments, however, are no certainty in future. A government-controlled economy will never be as profitable as a far advanced open market system in the west. Skilled workers and entrepreneurs are often not inclined to offer their labour under the aforementioned circumstances. Tens of millions have already left China and applied their crafts, invested their assets and culminated their idea in foreign countries. The next generation may also be lost already. Alienated by a subpar university system, 85% of wealthy Chinese send their children to foreign universities. A significant number of these students will never apply their skills in China nor contribute to the economy. This, combined with the demographic issues of ageing, could not even let growth stagnate, but reverse the trend back to the 90’s figures of 5%. The current developments in Hong Kong will have a significant impact on this matter. Needless to say, a second Tiananmen Square moment will not be seen as the best investment incentive by foreign patrons, nor for young Chinese, who might have hoped for a paradigm shift.

Whether China’s efforts to set up a new Silk Road or its investment in Africa in exchange for securing desperately needed raw materials will create the subsequent desired success, is not a certainty either. The projects were only made possible by China’s strong economy. It remains to be seen; how much monetary power China continues to invest, if its economy will significantly slow down. Meanwhile, the remaining states in the region have not always been cordial to one another, to begin with, and China’s goal to become, if not to maintain the role as regional – and eventually – world leader does not fall on fertile ground in a region with different cultures and vast differences in geopolitical interests.

Moreover, in many of Africa’s states, in which China has become a massive investor, governments are rather volatile. Sponsorship of dubious regimes in exchange for guaranteed access may sound promising, but only if the current government or leader remains in office and adheres to the deals made with China.

Additionally, the current trade war effects, will not have gone unnoticed by China’s competition. Particularly the US and Europe have an interest in keeping China on a short leash and hence what the world has witnessed under President Trump, might only have been the beginning of a new stance towards China. More economic scrutiny may follow.

For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Or more simplified: What goes up, will come back down. Newton’s 3rd law of motion applies to China’s economy fairly well. While the success had been tremendous, the level in which it progressed was not sustainable. The Cinderella story has ended. Time for China to address its plentiful issues.

L'articolo The Facade has Begun to Erode: The Fallacies of China’s Economy proviene da InsideOver.

The New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are the most wide-ranging, far-reaching, multinational, multicultural economic development project of the 21st century, spanning Eurasia and beyond. There are no alternatives in the market – any market. The West, especially the US, has not even begun to understand the tectonic geopolitical and geoeconomic game-change embodied in BRI.

From Washington’s perspective, BRI may be interpreted as “contentious” or a “made in China, for China” project only because the United States government, as I have detailed, made a strategic choice to antagonize it instead of trying to profit from it. That’s a stark contrast to no less than 152 – and counting – nations and international organizations that have formally endorsed BRI as of March 2019.

BRI amassed over $410 billion

A relentless demonization campaign, as acute in some EU latitudes as in the US, derides BRI as “debt imperialism” or a “debt trap” scheme. Facts spell otherwise. Only over the initial 2014-2018 period, BRI amassed over $410 billion in Chinese investment. It’s always essential to remember that BRI, according to the original timetable, is still in the planning stage, up to 2021. Only then “implementation” starts, all the way to 2049.

Western myopia, focused at best on corporate quarterly gains or the next election campaign, is incapable of grasping how BRI is open – not limited to nations across the Ancient Silk Road but to everybody; flexible, drawing partnerships beyond Eurasia and Africa all the way to Latin America and the Pacific; and inclusive, respecting different modes of development and favouring what amounts to a true dialogue of civilizations.

It’s inevitable that BRI, due to its complexity, moves more like an icebreaker in the Arctic than a runaway high-speed train. At least six economic corridors are in play; the New Eurasian land bridge; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor; the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor; and two corridors linked to the Maritime Silk Road, the China-Indochina Peninsula and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar.

Top Chinese scholars such as Peking University Professor Wu Bingbing tend to concisely describe BRI as a “network of partnerships (and) projects“. Underlying this network is the key geoeconomic concept; infrastructure building supporting economic development across vast swathes of the Global South.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the northern part of which I have recently visited, is BRI’s flagship and most ambitious project. The logic underneath CPEC is to create a solid basis for troubled Pakistan to become a middle power around 2035. The basis, once again, is the building of indispensable infrastructure, including industrial parks, ports and power plants.

The same applies to the economic corridor from the southern Chinese province of Yunnan to its “extension” in mainland Southeast Asia; that will soon translate, for instance, into rail travel from Kunming to Vientiane, the capital of Laos, in three hours instead of three days.

The Jakarta-Bandung railway to be developed as a BRI project could not be more pregnant with meaning; Bandung was the setting of a landmark conference in 1955, already in the post-colonial era that set the stage for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Iran, India and Russia are to be linked via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), with Iran also partnering with Russia via a trade agreement under the framework of the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU).

Syria, whose post-war reconstruction will be essentially managed by China, Russia and Iran, is also considered by Beijing as a future key BRI node

When Iranian President Hassan Rouhani recently visited Iraq and clinched myriad deals, one of them concerned a railway from the Iran-Iraq border at Shalamcheh, across Iraq, all the way to Latakia, Syria, in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is all about the Iran node of the New Silk Roads. Syria, whose post-war reconstruction will be essentially managed by China, Russia and Iran, is also considered by Beijing as a future key BRI node.

President Putin, years ahead of BRI, proposed to the EU the concept of a free trade area from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Now, inspired by BRI, Russian analysts at the Valdai Club have proposed the concept of Greater Eurasia – where Russia develops as a “civilizational bridge”, linked with BRI even as Moscow continues to cultivate its myriad trade relationships with Europe.

The best and brightest independent analysts in China, Russia, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan agree that in terms of Eurasia integration, it’s all interconnected: BRI, Greater Eurasia, EAEU, INTSC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the expansion of the BRICS, known as BRICS Plus; and ASEAN.

I have been tracking BRI in detail since the concept was first unveiled by President Xi Jinping in 2013, in Central Asia (Astana) and then Southeast Asia (Jakarta). Mirroring what happened to Made in Italy, BRI by now is imprinted worldwide as the essence of brand China. That’s inevitable, considering that, geopolitically, BRI will be the organizing Chinese foreign policy concept for the foreseeable future.

Wang Yiwei, director of the Centre for EU Studies at Renmin University, and author of the indispensable China Connects the World: What Behind the Belt and Road Initiative, has shown, in detail, how Beijing, through BRI, has launched what could be defined as Globalization 2.0. Or 3.0. And even 4.0.

The contrast with the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the push for color revolutions and regime change in different latitudes, and the tearing up of international treaties could not be more glaring.

BRI’s emphasis is of course on the Global South – which badly needs technology, capital, infrastructure, and jobs for skilled workers; China abounds in capital, technology, and infrastructure know how, but it lacks markets. At the same time BRI’s expansion may also work for the developed West.

The fatuous controversy about Rome signing a memorandum of understanding as a partner to BRI overshadows a key dynamic.

Revamping and upgrading ports from Venice and Trieste to Genova and Ravenna translates into Italy channelling supply lines from China via the Mediterranean towards Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Slovenia and Hungary, in parallel and in competition with the northern super-ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg, which are also BRI-linked.

But the beauty is in the implicit “win-win”; the new maritime corridors are bound to turbo-charge the export of Made in Italy to China.

French geographer Christian Grataloup, among others, has shown in detail how Eurasia should be interpreted as a geo-historic entity, “the hard node of world history”.

BRI, developing as the 21st century New Silk Roads, re-institutes the historical importance of the “hard node”. Or what geopolitics defines as the heartland. A massive paradigm shift is in progress, leaving behind the world we’ve known for the past half millennium. Eurasia is back. With a bang. Get used to it.

Cover photo by Marco Negri, Brazil, Sertao do Araripe, 2010

L'articolo The New Silk Roads Will Shape the 21st Century proviene da InsideOver.

For the last five years, talking about China has meant talking, whether explicitly or not, about the “New Silk Road“. The Belt and Road Initiative is the great project (but it would be better to call it a “system”) that Beijing is working on to relaunch the infrastructural and commercial connectivity of the great Eurasian continental mass and create a new economic-commercial architecture.

Announced in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping and promoted from the outset by Prime Minister Li Keqiang on various trips around Europe and Asia, the New Silk Road is being presented by the Chinese government as the first step to “reinforce regional connectivity and build a radiant shared future”, as stated in March 2015 by Xinhua news agency.

The New Silk Road’s name evokes the golden age of trade across the vast Eurasian spaces, the age of caravans wending their way through Syria, Iran and Central Asia to foster trade between the Mediterranean basin and China. At the same time, it is a strategy, a paradigm shift and, in its own way, a hope.

L'articolo What is the New Silk Road and why is it so important? proviene da InsideOver.