As the war in Ukraine nears its one-year anniversary with little signs of abating, military analysts are drawing up the balance on how one year of large-scale conventional fighting in Europe has impacted thinking on modern warfare, hoping to draw lessons from the biggest land war in Europe since World War II. Though reports on the death of the tank have been greatly exaggerated, the war has highlighted the vulnerability of more than one weapons system as a multitude of new technologies and armament have made their combat debut.

The war in Ukraine has experienced several major phases: from the initial Russian advances in early 2022, to Ukrainian counter offensives with the aim of taking back lost territory in the summer of 2022, and then to an artillery duel spread across a largely static front since late 2022. During each of these stages, the ability to target enemy troop concentrations, ammunition depots and other high value targets far behind enemy lines has become crucial in gaining the upper hand. 

Artillery and multiple rocket launchers have played a prominent role in Ukraine ever since the outbreak of the War in Donbas in 2014. Especially the latter systems have proven capable of destroying enemy fortifications and breaking up enemy advances using only a few volleys of rockets. Yet precisely this capability is conspicuously lacking, or at least deficient, in the inventories of most NATO member states. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many European countries have over the past year sought to (re)introduce these types of weapons systems into the inventories of their militaries.

It was Russia that entered the war with a significant advantage in artillery firepower. Initially outgunned and outranged along most of the frontline, this situation began to change with the delivery of some 300 Western-made towed howitzers and self-propelled guns and some 40 HIMARS and MLRS rocket systems. These gradually allowed Ukraine to gain a decisive upper hand to the extent that it can be argued that Russian forces have not been able to close the gap since. This disparity has not merely been achieved through the delivery of the gun systems alone, as these systems came alongside an extensive arsenal of precision-guided munitions, scatterable mines and weapons-locating radars. Even if the first are generally considered too expensive for widespread deployment, they have allowed Ukraine to accurately engage high value targets that arguably justify their high production costs. The deployment of artillery-fired mines has seen Russian offensives being stopped dead in their tracks as newly laid minefields form an impassable hindrance in fields that had been cleared just a day ago. Weapons-locating radars for their part have allowed Ukrainian forces to engage in increasingly effective counter-battery fire, in which a radar detects incoming artillery shells and immediately calculates their point of origin. The artillery guns firing these shells can then be targeted and destroyed before they are able to relocate.

The War in Ukraine has also highlighted the need for far larger stockpiles of ammunition than had previously been anticipated for a land war of this intensity. Furthermore an extensive logistics and repair network is required that is capable of repairing sophisticated weaponry that can be prone to frequent breakdowns under the stress of intensive use. 

As in every conflict, it is only a matter of time before your opponent starts implementing solutions to deal with a certain threat. The large-scale use of loitering munitions, which are essentially unmanned drones packed with an explosive warhead that fly themselves into an enemy target, was especially looked at with much anticipation. However, the deployment of U.S.-made Switchblade loitering munitions on the side of Ukraine left much to be desired, and it would ultimately be Russia that first managed to effectively introduce this new mode of warfighting to the battlefield. Video footage of combat operations so far confirms it has used its Lancet loitering munitions to strike close to a hundred Ukrainian targets, amongst which dozens of Western-delivered artillery systems. Ukraine has attempted to mitigate their threat by installing mesh wiring above the location of howitzers, which are especially vulnerable to enemy drones for their inability to quickly redeploy after having fired. Evidently, the seemingly endless cycle of lethal innovation is playing out in real time on Ukraine’s bomb-scarred East.

Attracting more notice than the loitering munitions has been Ukraine’s (and to a more limited degree Russia’s) fleet of small drones used for target acquisition and, increasingly, bombing enemy tanks and positions. Small, agile and extremely difficult to spot, these small contraptions have in many ways exceeded the performance expected of larger drones, albeit operating at far shorter ranges. Especially in this phase, marked by mostly stationary frontlines, the constant harassment by these small systems can make life in trenches at the front a living hell. A myriad of different types are now deployed with integrated armament, ranging from heavy octocopters carrying multiple mortars to tiny models with a single anti-tank weapon, operated from first-person view using special goggles. And their popularity is justified: attrition amongst (particularly Russian) personnel and fighting vehicles from these new tools of war has been anything but insignificant.

Despite appearing stagnant, the conflict is in fact evolving faster than Western militaries are capable of tracking and analysing, let alone incorporating the lessons from. Although legacy armament can and will have a significant impact on the course of the conflict, truly effective tools that match all this war’s needs and particulars will only emerge as it plays out. Or as the legendary Will Rogers observed all the way back in 1929:

“You can’t say that civilization don’t advance, for in every war they kill you a new way.”

L'articolo How rapid innovation in modern warfare has shaped one year of war proviene da InsideOver.

After a year of war, it is possible to assess the Russian military strategy in Ukraine. The Kremlin initially applied the art of deception (maskirovka) at the strategic level, claiming that it was not going to attack Ukraine. For several months, Russian officials fiercely dismissed reports by Western intelligence agencies openly predicting an invasion. Operationally, the invasion began with an advance of motorized troops that attacked from three directions simultaneously: north, east and south. The Russian Air Force destroyed critical infrastructure (e.g., power stations) to plunge the country into chaos. In addition, the Black Sea fleet blockaded Ukrainian ports to stop any supplies from third countries. At the tactical level, Russian special forces attempted to create bridgeheads by seizing airports and carrying out acts of sabotage within cities. In effect, the Kremlin launched a blitzkrieg against Ukraine.

The strong resistance of the Ukrainians caught the Kremlin by surprise. Moscow underestimated the Ukrainian military doctrine, which calls for the mass mobilization of the population in the event of a foreign invasion. The Ukrainian leadership initially moved the war into and around populated areas, where the defender has the tactical advantage. Within the urban environment, small groups can easily set up ambushes and hit enemy targets with anti-tank missiles. In fact, urban warfare is the nightmare of all regular armies. The Ukrainian side was well aware that Moscow is still haunted by the “Grozny syndrome”. The first war in Chechnya (1994-1996) resulted in a humiliating defeat for the Russian army. Small groups of determined fighters destroyed entire columns of Russian tanks that had entered the centre and suburbs of the Chechen capital.

Yet, the Russian forces was expected to overwhelm the Ukrainian positions within less than a week. Putin’s battle-hardened army did enjoy numerical and technological superiority. Following the 2008 Georgian war, minister of defence Anatoly Serdyukov’s military reforms changed the force structure of the Russian army. The creation of the battalion tactical group (BTG) was intended to increase the firepower and speed of the Russian forces. Indeed, each BTG has a motorized infantry battalion together with tank and artillery elements; a total of 600-800 officers and men. However, the main disadvantage of BTGs is the relatively small number of light infantry troops (around 200 men) which makes BTG vulnerable to ambushes. During the first three months of the invasion, the Russian BTGs became an easy target for the Ukrainian fighters.

Apparently, the Russian military were not prepared for such a large-scale invasion. Due to poor military planning, the Putin’s army has failed to conduct combined arms operations. This should have come as no surprise. In the 2008 war against Georgia, the involvement of the Russian army was limited in time and geography. Yet, its performance was assessed by analysts as rather poor.  Six years later, the annexation of Crimea took place with a hybrid and bloodless operation. In the Syrian civil war, the Kremlin has mainly used its air power, special forces, and mercenaries to support the Assad regime. In other words, it is the first time since the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan that the Russian military has been called upon to subdue a large country with a hostile population. It should be noted that there was an insurgency in western Ukraine after the end of the Second World War that lasted ten years.

During spring and summer 2022, the Russian military used indirect artillery fire and ballistic missiles to defeat the Ukrainians. This is not the first time in recent history that Moscow resorted to such tactics. During the Second Chechen war (2000-2002), the Kremlin bombed Grozny to the ground without any concern for the international law of armed conflicts. The Russian leadership chose the same siege warfare in certain parts of Ukraine.

Following a three-month siege, the Russian forces managed to capture the city of Mariupol in the Azov region. However, the invaders failed to capture Kyiv and Kharkiv, which are the two largest cities of Ukraine. According to Professor Louis DiMarco two factors could play a decisive role in attacking urban centres: the size of the population and the size of the area. The larger the population and the area, the more forces must be devoted to occupying a city. The American professor has challenged the 3:1 rule in favour of the attacker and advocated a 6:1 ratio for launching an attack in urban areas.

What has come, perhaps, as a surprise is the outsourcing of the Russian military operations to mercenaries. Since the summer of 2022, an unknown number of Russian and foreign mercenaries have joined the regular Russian army in fighting the Ukrainian army in Donbass. The partial “privatization” of the war is an innovation in itself. During the tsarist period, the army was under strict surveillance because officers were the only ones who could challenge the regime. In the Soviet era, the role of the political commissar was to enforce political control over the military through his presence at the strategic and operational levels. The use of private military companies, such as the infamous Wagner, runs counter to Russian military culture that prioritizes political control of the military. However, mass mobilization is neither desirable nor feasible in a middle-class country like Russia. The use of mercenaries allows Moscow to hide casualties from the Russian public opinion that does not massively support the war in Ukraine. The Wagner’s force functions as a small army capable of operational and tactical support when is needed.

The war has entered a new phase since September 2022. The Ukrainian counter-offensive succeeded in recapturing territories in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Yet, the Russian forces managed to stop the Ukrainian offensive before Christmas. Currently, there is a stalemate on the eastern front because of the trench warfare. The Kremlin has mobilised human and material resources for a new Spring offensive in Donbass. Europe and the United States must do whatever is necessary to stop it before it begins.

L'articolo The Russian Military Strategy in Ukraine: An Early Assessment proviene da InsideOver.

Israel has launched its new spy satellite Ofek 16 into orbit in an attempt to improve the country’s military reconnaissance. The region remains volatile, particularly after a fire the previous week at an Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz.

Details of the Launch

Against the backdrop of new tensions with Iran, Israel launched a spy satellite into space on Monday, July 6. The Ofek 16 satellite was successfully launched into orbit at 4 a.m. from the Palmachim Air Force Base in central Israel, the Israel Defense Ministry confirmed. Data transmission had already started on schedule. However, several tests are planned before Israel can fully utilize the satellite for its intended purposes.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the successful launch significantly increases Israel’s ability to deal with the country’s adversaries “both nearby and far away”. Meanwhile, current Defense Minister and Alternate Prime Minister Benny Gantz also recognized the launch’s importance by stating that technological superiority and intelligence capabilities were “essential to Israel’s security.” Moreover, Israel would “continue to strengthen and maintain Israel’s capabilities on every front and every location.”

What Does the Satellite Do?

Like various previous models, the spy satellite is intended to contribute to improved military reconnaissance. Amos Jadlin, former head of Israeli military intelligence, said the use of Ofek 16 provided Israel “special strategic and intelligence capabilities” – skills rather crucial during a time when a possible escalation with Iran is emerging.

Israel is one of only thirteen countries that operate reconnaissance satellites and has worked with several countries on satellite technology, including Italy and France. The head of Israel’s space program, Shlomi Sudari, stated that its satellite network the country now possesses could observe the entire Middle East and beyond. The latter is all the more critical since Iran also successfully launched a spy satellite into orbit in April, after years of unsuccessful attempts.

Although the new satellite’s primary function is likely to monitor Iran and developments in its nuclear and missile programs, defense officials denied any symbolism in the launch, given growing reports that Israel could be responsible for a number of recent explosions in Iran.

Israel has previously proved its ability to penetrate sensitive Iranian facilities, including a 2018 raid in Tehran. Moreover, Israel and the U.S. are also believed to have been responsible for the Stuxnet computer virus that disrupted Iran’s nuclear program a decade ago.

Assessing Tensions With Iran

Only recently, Israeli Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi stated that Israel would continue to take any measure necessary to protect itself against the Iranian nuclear program.

If Israel were responsible for the fire in the Natanz nuclear facility, it would mark another in a series of daring strikes against Iran’s nuclear program. The latter would further increase the risk of Iranian retaliation on either Israeli or Western targets. However, Iran’s current situation with a crippled economy and no financial flexibility does not leave them in a promising position. In addition, Iran is experiencing rising domestic tensions against the government and the pandemic, which may prohibit Iran from executing any retaliation at this point, at least not without utilizing a proxy to carry out the attacks. The latter could explain why Teheran has been reluctant to call out Israel for the attack in Natanz publicly. After all, the mullahs would lose face if they accused Israel – which has been Iran’s default modus operandi since the Iranian Revolution – but without the option of retaliation due to the aforementioned factors.

In any case, Israel’s new satellite will provide increased coverage and early warnings of any Iranian activity such as planned Iranian missile launches and tests, and information on activities at sites where components of Iran’s nuclear program are developed and produced. Against Tehran, that has long vowed to eradicate Israel off the map, any form of increased security for Israel is hence positive news.

L'articolo Israel Launches New Spy Satellite Ofek 16 proviene da InsideOver.

Two recent articles in consecutive days ended up revealing much deeper issues of what happens when advanced military technology meets insufficient basic skills of those using it. The first piece of news touted a new smart gun. The SMASH Fire Control System promises to “combine simple-to-install hardware with our own advanced image-processing software to cost effectively turn basic small arms into 21st century smart weapons.”

SMASH: Revolutionary Upgrade?

That sounds like an amazing and almost revolutionary upgrade. The system attaches to a weapon and allows you to lock onto the target and only fire when its guaranteed to hit. The Israelis have done the most advanced testing and they plan on using it to better track and target drones. This would make their riflemen a supplement to their laser and missile-based defenses.  This seems like a smart use of smart technology to integrate riflemen into a low-cost missile defense against low tech items.

Over-Promising And Under-Delivering

The problem with these smart technologies was revealed a day later in a discussion about the Ford Class carrier. (My only surprise was that it wasn’t on the same day.)  Much like the F35, the Ford Class carrier was designed to be a next level ship that implemented new technologies to dominant its competition for the next 40 years. So far, however, it has instead become a floating monument to over-promising and under delivering.

The money quote comes from Cmdr. Mehdi Akacem who heads up the carrier: “The biggest challenge is managing the complexity,” Akacem said. I think there is more technical complexity packed into this ship than the Apollo program…There are so many new systems. … The challenge is sustaining that focus on one new thing after another. I don’t think there are any five people who understand all the complexity on this ship, all these technical challenges happening in parallel.”

Military Tech Upgrades Are Needed But They Need To Be Competently Managed

Implementing new technology is great, and in fact is needed in the face of new and complex weapon systems being fielded by potential adversaries like Russia and China. I have consistently praised military forces for fielding new laser technology and upgrading older systems like radar on Aegis ships. But, as seen in the Ford case and throughout military history, high-tech wonder weapons can sometimes be an obstacle instead of an advantage.

Case Study: The World Wars

Historian Richard Overy pointed out that the allies won World War II using old technology while Germany lost using new ones. Tanks, airplanes, trenches, and machine guns were all used during World War I. The allies simply had slightly more advanced versions of weapons they already fought with, but they mass produced them and had solid battle doctrine and strategy which they used to win the war. The Germans invented innovative ballistic missiles, jets, rockets and helicopters. But they were too expensive to produce in mass numbers, and the tactics and doctrine to properly implement them were not sufficiently developed. Even the Germans’ mainline battle tanks like the King Panther had significant development issues that limited their effectiveness during the war. So, the Germans lost the war with advanced technology and the allies won the war with better implemented older technology. This irony was explored in Arthur C. Clarkes short story “Superiority.”

Advanced Weapons Don’t Mean Advanced Combat

The new smart weapon touted by the army very much reminds me of the cautionary tale in fictional World War Z. This book is already on my mind and seems prophetic because it describes the spread of the zombie menace the same way the real Corona virus has spread.  In World War Z American infantry with smart weapons networked with advanced generation fighters awaiting the zombie horde coming from New York City. But their smart technology didn’t kill as many zombies as they thought it would. The infantry rifleman did not have enough ammunition distributed and lacked the proper formation. They relied too much on technology instead of the basic skill of the rifleman.

After years of retreat and reform they reengaged the zombies. This time, the US had mothballed its expensive technology that was less effective in fighting low tech zombies. Instead, they armed their soldiers with a basic rifle that would never jam, put them in a simple line or square and then distributed ammunition and water. The firing line that often turned into a square formation recalled the Greek Phalanx, Roman Legion, and British firing line. Using sound tactics, good training, and a basic but effective rifle they defeated the enemy (spoiler alert).

Can SMASH Work Well?

The SMASH technology promises simple, easy to install hardware, advanced images, and low cost. But the history of the US military suggests it will not be any of those things. Outside of the Israelis that are using it to enhance basic riflemen skills and better kill low tech drones, SMASH simply seems to be a technological replacement for important skills like marksmanship training and maintaining small unit discipline. With a navy that increasingly doesn’t show proper seamanship in steering their ships, and generals that have difficulty with basic rifle techniques SMASH is unlikely to be the silver bullet that solves the military’s challenges. The training and hence the power influence of the infantry⁠—sea and air⁠—is in danger of being neglected in favor of the next new and big technology.

L'articolo Smart Weapons, Complex Carriers⁠ – And Poorly-Trained Soldiers And Sailors proviene da InsideOver.