Why Lebanon? Some years ago the distinguished historian Jonathan Steinberg wrote a book entitled Why Switzerland? And a similar question can be posed for Lebanon which, like Switzerland, is host to several different communities. In the Lebanese case we need to go much further back in time than the thirteenth century AD which saw the birth of the Swiss cantons. Instead, we are looking at the thirteenth century BC. For the coast of Lebanon might appear to be a narrow strip hemmed in by mountains, an unlikely centre of trade and industry, but its original importance lay precisely in the extensive resources of wood. As far back as 1075 BC an Egyptian official named Wenamun set out from the Nile Delta on his way to Byblos (modern Jubayl in Lebanon) to obtain timber for the rebuilding of an Egyptian temple. His adventures, fictional or more probably true, are recorded on a papyrus scroll that has survived till today. The resources in wood of the Lebanese mountains were a vital resource for the Egyptians, who could obtain poor quantities of wood of poor quality in Egypt.

It is therefore no great surprise that the strip of coast that now constitutes Lebanon was the birthplace of trans-Mediterranean trade in antiquity. The Phoenician merchants were easily able to obtain the wood they required for building sturdy ships able to sail to and beyond the Strait of Gibraltar. The merchants of Tyre founded new settlements as far west as Carthage and Cádiz. They also looked eastwards towards the growing power of Assyria, providing luxury goods for the court of the Assyrian kings. They remained a significant presence in imperial Rome, bringing luxury goods from the east. Lebanon was therefore already the crossroads between the landmass of the Middle Est and the entire length of the Mediterranean, a role that it would preserve for most of its history.

In the Middle Ages this same stretch of coast was conquered first by Muslim armies, in the seventh century, and then by the crusaders at the end of the eleventh century. The crusaders held it for less than two centuries, but they eagerly exploited its resources. Near Tyre sugar plantations, many of them owned by Venetian merchants, supplied what was still a rare and costly delicacy to western Europe. The conquest of the coastline by the Mamluk rulers of Egypt in the late thirteenth century was accompanied by the destruction of many of the Levantine ports, but this only gave greater prominence to Beirut, which was preserved and built close business ties to the Genoese and Venetian merchants who operated out of Famagusta in Cyprus. Among the products these traders handled was cotton, exported to northern Italy and transformed into textiles including the famous fustians of Lombardy made out of a combination of cotton and wool.

This was also an area of great ethnic and religious diversity. A Spanish traveller, Benjamin of Tudela, passed through Lebanon in around 1170 and noted the presence in the mountainous interior of the Assassin sect of Shi’ite Islam and of the Druze warriors, members of a religious group that diverged from Shi’ite Islam in the eleventh century and preserves distinctive beliefs and practices; one is reincarnation but others are still kept secret. To these groups should be added the Maronite Christians in the interior, who venerated several local saints and from the sixth century onwards developed loose ties to the Roman Catholic Church as a result of their common theological position, a relationship that was confirmed during the late twelfth century and still holds. The religious map of modern Lebanon is further complicated by the very substantial Shi’ite population living between Tyre and the Israeli border, as well as a large population of Palestinian refugees and their descendants, who are predominantly Sunni Muslim, while the country’s Jewish population, once a significant element, has all but disappeared.

When Lebanon emerged from centuries of Ottoman domination (the Turks conquered the region in 1516) these religious divisions became crucial in determining its future. The Druze and Maronite leaders were already cooperating with one another in the local government of the region during the eighteenth century; but the French mandate in Syria following the First World War and the break-up of the Ottoman Empire at last offered a chance for the ambitions of the nationalists to become real. In establishing a republic of Lebanon within French Syria in 1926, France recognized the exceptional significance of its Christian inhabitants while trying to accommodate the interests of the other groups as well. French attitudes were moulded by a nostalgic affection for the era of the crusader states, which were seen by historians as an early expression of the mission civilisatrice of France in the Mediterranean (not a view held nowadays). An fully independent Lebanese republic came into being in 1943 amid the chaos of the Second World War; its constitution still insists that the president must be a Maronite and the Prime Minister must be Shi’ite.

Since 1948 one of the major issues in Lebanese politics has been the presence of Israel to the south. Lebanon sees itself as an Arab nation and is a member of the League of Arab States, even if it is the only member to contain such a high proportion of Christians, mostly of them descended from the pre-Islamic inhabitants of the Middle East. Although Lebanon joined the Arab attack on Israel that year it tried as far as possible to keep a low profile in the wars against Israel. However, the government has never been successful in limiting attacks on Israel first by the Palestine Liberation Organization (bearing in mind the large Palestinian population in southern Lebanon), and subsequently by the Iranian-funded Hizbollah organization. Following the Lebanese civil war that broke out in 1975 and lasted till 1990, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, in support of Maronite allies, reaching the outskirts of Beirut, and later occupying a small strip of land across from its northern frontier until 2000. Syrian troops moved into the country – Syria never having recognized the independence of Lebanon – and were only dislodged in 2005.

All this has had a serious effect on the capital, Beirut, In its heyday it was one of the major business centres of the Middle East, and with wealth came a reputation for a hedonistic high life. Its hotels and clubs attracted hordes of visitors from more Puritan parts of the region. However, the destruction in civil war of parts of the city, followed by their rebuilding, followed by their renewed destruction, has helped destroy the economy as well. In 2022 it has been marked by steep inflation, power cuts, food shortages and – of course – renewed political crises. The political influence of Hizbollah seems to be impossible to break. One consolation, perhaps, is that the Bekaa valley still produces excellent wines including those of the prestigious Château Musar; but at the moment the economic and political future continues to look bleak. No longer the bridge between the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Lebanon risks becoming a failed state.

L'articolo The Bridge Between the Mediterranean and the Middle East proviene da InsideOver.

The weight of the Russian war in Ukraine is already being seen in our energy bills on a global level, as a result of the reorganisation of energy relations across the world (especially in Europe). Food safety is also a major concern, a complex issue repeatedly brought up in recent months. There will likely be a long term hit on this, although the first tremors are already being felt. If there is one area that will suffer more than others, it will certainly be the enlarged Mediterranean.

Energy and food are both part of this, but then there are also a number of issues when it comes to the relations between various states. Political and geopolitical games, instability and recomposition worldwide. A group of problems that Russia unfortunately has its hands dipped in. As well as the European Union, the United States, other Middle Eastern actors (Turkey, the UAE, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Qatar for example) and China. The effects of Russia’s assault on Kiev will be directed to all of these places. Wide reaching consequences from the long arms of conflict. 

The Russian Foreign Minister recently visited Libya, Mali, Central African Republic and Algeria. Meanwhile in Cameroon, Russia struck a military deal for further military cooperation. In the Arabian peninsula there is pressure in Syria, the great chokepoints of the red sea and the strategic peninsula the Corno d’Atrica. Moscow still wants to be a global power despite sanctions from those in Europe. The Russians are not retreating on any front despite being involved in an ongoing war that is far from being resolved. Although on the contrary: given the penetration in certain areas, it’s legitimate to think that Russia will try to use these fronts as a deterrent, a way to shift attention, interests and efforts.

The globalisation of the Russian war in Ukraine, emergencies with grains, energy, political instability and humanitarian effects finds its epicentre in the Mediterranean. New crises have the potential to explode. Not only the lasting Ukrainian war, but a number of possible hybrid conflicts are on the horizon. It is for this reason, given the centrality of the region for Europe and the world, in Brussels and Washington, but also in Rome, Paris, Madrid & Berlin – attention must be kept exceedingly high. This is why we can no longer postpone the duty to get work building a political movement with which to protect the Mediterranean from the fallout of war. 

There is a risk that this might trigger great chaos, an endemic disorder, when the basin – its policies and communities, ask for order and relaxation. Two countries, above all, can play a fundamental role in the future of the Mediterranean. Italy and France. Two Mediterranean powers that have an ability to exploit their weight within the EU to direct ideas and actions with which to build up a defence of the Mediterranean. Blocking the spread of crises. This can also work as a possible form of the containment of the war itself – in the global affairs that the Ukrainian war is stimulating, “Tout se tient!” The price of war will likely be felt everywhere, however the enlarged Mediterranean will feel it in a more direct and likely severe manner. This brings with it great risk of new social unrest and conflicts, on which Italy keeps its attention for reasons of national interest.

L'articolo The impact of the Ukraine War on the “enlarged Mediterranean” proviene da InsideOver.

The European Union enters 2022 with a dangerously declining ability to set the security agenda along its southern borders in the face of the strategic advances made by Russia, Turkey, and China in North Africa. A house divided, the EU delivery deficit in establishing a sustainable security architecture in the Mediterranean basin, particularly in Libya, created a vacuum that has been filled by the increasing military presence of Russia and Turkey in North Africa. As Russia and Turkey rewrite the rule sets in North Africa, China has also continued to gain strength strategically in the region and will seek to increase its military footprint along the southern rim of the Mediterranean basin.

Here are some of the key developments that have altered the strategic equation and will influence the trajectory of North African geopolitics and Europe’s ability to exercise a strategic impact on security matters along its southern flank.

The Resurgence of Russia power in the southern Mediterranean

The resurrection of the Russian-Egyptian military partnership is Moscow’s most stunning strategic comeback in the Mediterranean.  It is also one of Russia’s most strategically significant regional defence relationships.  Egypt is the largest nation by population in the entire Mediterranean basin and has one of the largest militaries in the region.  In the late stages of the Cold War, the United States had succeeded in peeling Egypt away from its alignment with the Soviet Union, turning Cairo into one of the most reliable American allies in the Middle East.  But that tight relationship frayed in the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’ uprising in Egypt that toppled the country’s long-time strong man Hosni Mubarak when U.S. President Barack Obama embraced the short-lived Muslim Brotherhood-led government. The 2013 ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood by the Egyptian military with popular backing and former General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi ‘s 2014 election as Egypt’s president led to a rift with the U.S. and NATO that persists to this day.

As Sisi was consolidating his power, Russian President Vladimir Putin demonstrated Moscow’s mettle with Russia’s successful 2015 military intervention in Syria, ostensibly to fight ISIS and other jihadi militants.  President Sisi turned to Putin’s Russia for assistance in combatting jihadi militants in Libya to secure Egypt’s eastern border. This led to the 2016 establishment of the annual ‘Defenders of Friendship’ joint Russian-Egyptian military exercises. Expanding in scope over the past five years, the original 2016 exercises involved joint tactical actions that paved the way for the 2017 deployment of Russian special forces and drones to Egypt’s Sidi Barrani air base near the Libyan border to assist the Egyptian-backed, Libyan General Khalifa Haftar to gain full control of Benghazi in July of that year. In late 2017, following that success, Cairo granted Moscow permission for the Russian air force to use Egypt’s air space and air bases, requiring only 5 days advanced notice.

During 2016-2020, Russia also became Egypt’s largest arms supplier with Cairo purchasing 41% of its weapons imports from Russia,  a laundry list of weapons that includes attack helicopters, fighter jets, and air defense systems.  In 2018, Egypt purchased 24 Su-35 fighter aircraft from Russia for $2 billion. In 2020, Egypt reportedly agreed to purchase 500 Russian T-90MS tanks that would be assembled in Egypt at a facility built by Russian tank manufacturer Uralavagonzavod.

Building on its deep defense cooperation with Egypt, Russian power has become entrenched in Eastern Libya, from the coastal city of Sirte, the western entrance to Libya’s oil crescent, to the highly strategic al-Jufra air base further south.  Utilizing upwards of 2,000 mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group backed by Russian air force assets, Moscow has succeeded to emerge as one of the main power brokers in Libya with a much lighter commitment of personnel and hardware than in Syria. The Wagner Group has extended Russia’s influence across adjacent regions of sub-Saharan Africa, most recently in Mali.

Concurrently, Russia revitalized and expanded its long-standing military relationship with Algeria. Shrewdly, Russia’s Putin cancelled Algeria’s Soviet-era military debt of $4.7 billion while Algeria committed to purchase almost twice that amount from Russia with future oil and gas revenues. The deal resulted in Algeria becoming Russia’s third largest arms buyer during 2016-2020, surpassed only by India and China. Algeria’s astounding Russian weapons shopping spree included 203 T-90SA main battle tanks, 300 ‘Terminator 2’  BMPT-72 armored fire support vehicles, 38 Pantsir-S1 air defense missile/cannon systems, 100 SA-17 Buk-M2 air defense missile systems installed on tracked vehicles, and 12 Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missile systems.

Algeria also possesses 6 Russian-made, Kilo-class submarines. As a sign of Moscow’s renewed power projection into the western Mediterranean, Russia and Algeria conducted a landmark joint naval exercise of the latter’s Mediterranean coast.  Russian-made Kalibr Club-S type cruise missiles fired by those Kilo-class submarines and Algeria’s land-based, Russian-made Iskander ballistic missiles are capable of striking the Spanish coast.

The distance between Russia’s naval and air bases in Syria and Egypt’s massive Mediterranean military base at Marsa Matruh is approximately 900 km. Combined with Russia’s extensive military presence in eastern Libya and deep defence relationship with Algeria, Moscow now presides over an arc of hard power across the southern rim of the Mediterranean spanning the southern border of Turkey and the eastern border of Morocco.

Turkey’s Strategic Advance in North Africa

The resurgence of Russian power across the Mediterranean basin has been matched by Turkey’s impressive advances to become one of the top powers in the region.  Turkey is the second most populous nation in the Mediterranean with one of the region’s most powerful militaries. Turkey’s efforts to expand its power projection capabilities in the Mediterranean is part of Turkey’s wider strategic agenda to establish forward bases in the Middle East and Africa, an ambition enabled by the impressive transformation of its domestic weapons manufacturing to become an industry leader in several categories.

Following Russia’s Syria intervention, Turkey conducted four cross-border interventions in Syria to carve out a buffer zone in northern Syria along the length of the Syrian-Turkish border. However, the turning point for Turkey’s Mediterranean military footprint came with Turkey’s 2020 military intervention to preserve the Government of National Accord then ruling western Libya.  Ankara’s first intervention far from its land borders and shoreline was an unqualified success – stopping Haftar’s Wagner-assisted assault on Tripoli in its tracks and then pushing Haftar’s forces 450 km eastward to the Sirte-Jufra line. Ankara now stands as the main security provider in western Libya, creating an important strategic beachhead for Turkey in the central Mediterranean.  Turkey maintains an air power deployment at the re-captured al-Watiyah air base, located 27 km from the Tunisian border, and is reported to be developing a naval base in Libya’s coastal city of Misrata.  Its first Mediterranean forward basing beyond North Cyprus, Turkey’s outsized military presence in Libya is nothing short of a strategic breakthrough, enabling Turkey to project its influence into the western Mediterranean.

The Libyan intervention also showcased the power of Turkey’s home-grown combat drone and electronic warfare technology that would be later used by Ankara to assist Azerbaijan in the Autumn 2020 Karabakh war that ended 30 years of stalemate against Armenia and changed the map of the South Caucasus.  In 2020, Tunisia bought $150 million of Turkish armaments, including Anka medium-altitude long long-endurance (MALE) drones, Kirpi mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, and Ejder Yalçin armored combat vehicles.  The sale of three Anka drones and their ground control systems to Tunisia was Turkish Aerospace Industries’ first foreign sale of the Anka UAVs.

For its part, Algeria has kept Turkey at arm’s length when it comes to military cooperation.  Despite Turkey being one of Algeria’s leading foreign investors – Turkish investments in creating local factories and businesses have made Turkish firms collectively into Algeria’s largest foreign employer –  Turkey has not been able to translate its growing economic clout into Turkish arms sales to Algeria.  The Algerian military and political elite have been divided over Turkey’s role in Libya and especially Ankara’s use of Syrian jihadis as mercenary forces. In its effort not to become too over-reliant on Russia as its principal weapons supplier, Algiers has opted for German and Chinese-made weapons.

More recently, as Algeria-Morocco tensions have intensified on their border and in the disputed Western Sahara between Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front, Rabat has turned to Ankara as a weapons supplier.  In 2021, the kingdom purchased 13 Bayraktar TB2 drones, the system that has repeatedly proved itself effective against Russian air defense systems in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus.  Members of Morocco’s Royal Armed Forces has traveled to Turkey during the second half of 2021 to receive training in operating the drones and Morocco reportedly ordered an additional six TB2 drones at year’s end. The Turkish system complements Rabat’s recent purchases of Israeli drones as well as Israeli anti-drone technology.  Moroccan media has also reported that Rabat is now engaged in negotiations with Ankara to purchase naval vessels – 7 fast attack craft and an Ada-class corvette. While the warship purchase has not been confirmed, Turkey’s military cooperation with Morocco, should it expand, has long-term implications. Already the managed competition between Turkey and Russia sets the agenda for the security environment in Syria and Libya. This same dynamic could become influential in the western Mediterranean as well.

A Chinese Naval Base in North Africa?

At the close of 2021, the Wall Street Journal broke a story revealing Beijing’s plan to create a permanent military facility in Equatorial Guinea to provide China with its first naval base on the Atlantic ocean.  Could a Chinese naval base in North Africa be next? China is already poised to dominate the commercial ports across the entire southern and eastern arcs of the Mediterranean basin.  In addition to its massive transhipment hub in Piraeus, Greece, China upgraded and built ports in Tripoli, Lebanon and in Haifa bay in Israel. Hong Kong-based Hutchison Port Holdings similarly operates Egypt’s major Mediterranean port of Alexandria port and its auxiliary El Dekheila port. Hutchison is also an equivalent capacity port at Egypt’s nearby Abu Qir Peninsula that is scheduled to start operations in 2022. In the western Mediterranean, China is constructing Algeria’s El Hamdania transshipment port 60 km west of Algiers with three times the capacity of Egypt’s Alexandria port. China is also one of the main investors in Morocco’s Tanger Med port, which has surpassed Spain’s Algeciras and Valencia ports in container capacity to become the Mediterranean’s largest port.

With so much at stake for Beijing’s in China’s Mediterranean commercial network, an increased Chinese naval presence in North Africa is not a matter of if, but when.  China has already delivered a two frigates to Algeria and will deliver a Type 056 (Jingdao-class) corvette to Algeria in 2023. Egypt has purchased drones from China and Chinese-made Wing Loong II drones, purchased by the United Arab Emirates, have been a mainstay in Haftar’s arsenal in Libya. Should China establish a naval base on Africa’s Atlantic coast in addition to its Red Sea corridor naval base in Djibouti, then a base on the North African coast becomes Beijing’s missing puzzle piece for establishment of Chinese sea lines of communication from the Suez Canal to the Strait of Gibraltar. The logic for a Chinese base in the central Maghreb is compelling for strategic planners in Beijing.

The Need for European Action

From the Eastern Mediterranean to Libya to the escalating tensions between Algeria and Morocco, the European Union’s continued inability to act in a coordinated manner has eroded the union’s power to set the agenda for relations across its southern borders. The EU’s continued delivery deficit in establishing a sustainable security architecture in the Mediterranean will inexorably result in outcomes that neither represent European values nor serve Europe’s interests.

Prof. Michaël Tanchum is an associate senior fellow in the Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute (MEI) in Washington, D.C.  @michaeltanchum

L'articolo Russia, Turkey, and China in North Africa: a challenge for Europe proviene da InsideOver.

The Eastern Mediterranean has witnessed a relative calm this year in contrast to last year’s dangerous escalation spiral that almost set off a geopolitical maelstrom involving parts of Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. But is the current calm just a temporary lull?  Has a stable balance of power been established to create a new equilibrium? Or, has escalation been continuing by other means and the geopolitical storm will break out again in 2022? Here are some of the key factors to consider when looking over the horizon to determine the state of Mediterranean maritime security in the near future.

The 2020 Eastern Mediterranean Crisis was a Turning Point Event

Back in August 2020, the most combustible naval stand-off between Greece and Turkey during the 21st century nearly ignited into open conflict when a Turkish warship and a Greek warship collided at the height of the tensions. Rallying to Greece’s side, France dispatched warships to the contested waters, eventually sending its flagship Charles de Gaulle nuclear aircraft carrier. Egypt conducted joint naval exercises with Greece while the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Ankara’s staunch antagonist along the Mediterranean’s southern rim, sent its F-16 fighter jets to conduct joint air force exercises with Greece in the air space above the conflict zone.  With France, Egypt, and the UAE already in open conflict with Turkey in Libya, international alarm bells sounded that any further escalation could lead to a Mediterranean-wide conflagration.  Although a NATO-brokered de-confliction process achieved a climbdown in tensions, neither side has been idle. Swiftly changing geopolitical currents in the region have created new strategic conditions whose implications need to be examined.

Greece’s New Strategic Depth

In the absence of a convincing security guarantee from its European partners, Greece has spent the last half decade skilfully developing its defence relations with Egypt and Israel, and then subsequently with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.  Athens’ efforts are paying off big.  Combined with engaging select EU members, notably France, Greece is building an effective deterrent capability outside European Union and NATO frameworks. Since the striking demonstration of Middle Eastern solidarity with Greece during its August 2020 naval confrontation with Turkey, Greece’s regional security partnerships have reached an even greater level of strategic cooperation.

The 15 September 2020 signing of the ‘Abraham Accords’ normalising relations between the UAE and Israel was a strategic boon for Greece by more deeply connecting its circle of security partnerships broadly aligned to offset the expansion of Turkey’s “coercive diplomacy” in the region. On 18 November 2020, Greece and the UAE signed a security pact that included an Article V-type mutual defence clause.  In 2021, the juggernaut of Greece’s military diplomacy has gathered even more steam. In January of this year,  Israel signed a $1.68 billion, 20-year agreement with Greece – the largest defence deal between the two countries – in which Israel’s private defence company Elbit Systems will establish and maintain an air combat training facility in Greece for the Hellenic Air Force.  Italy’s defence manufacturing giant Leonardo will supply the M-346 advanced jet trainers. The state-of-the-art air combat training academy builds upon Greece’s 2020 agreement with France to purchase at least 18 fourth generation Rafale fighter jets for $2.5 billion, all helping to close the gap in air combat capabilities between Turkey and Greece.  By late September 2021, Paris and Athens signed a new bilateral mutual defense pact between Paris and Athens, accompanied by Greece’s $5 billion purchase of three Belharra frigates and three Gowind corvettes from France.

These relationships provide Greece with much needed strategic depth – geographically, technically, and psychologically. Bolstered by the early stages of an economic recovery, Greece is no longer Europe’s troubled and dependent appendage on the Balkan peninsula, as many in the European Union attempted to portray Greece during the EU’s sovereign debt crisis.  Greece is realising itself as an Eastern Mediterranean power leveraging its strategic links to North Africa and the Middle East.  Greece’s new found strategic depth continues to expand with the Hellenic Republic’s deepening military relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which began its first bilateral military exercise with Greece, Eye of the Falcon 1, in March 2021. Demonstrating the power of its new regional status, Greece hosted the September 2021 “Hercules 21′ exercises – the first multilateral joint military exercise between Greece, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

Turkey’s Becomes a Blue Water Power

Greece’s recent efforts to gain strategic depth were prompted by Turkey’s impressive advances to become a blue water power. Turkey’s efforts to expand its power projection capabilities in the Mediterranean started two decades ago with Ankara’s $3 billion ‘National Warship’ program, known by its Turkish acronym MİLGEM, to expand Turkey’s capacity to deploy naval forces far from its coastal waters. In March 2012, a decade into the MİLGEM program, then Turkish Navy Commander Admiral Murat Bilgel declared Turkey’s naval objective was “to operate not only in the littorals but also on the high seas,” identifying the Turkish Navy’s goals for the coming decade as “enhancing sea denial, forward presence, and limited power projection capacity.”  Supported by the rapid growth of its domestic defence industry, Turkey successfully implemented its strategic agenda to establish forward bases in the Middle East and North Africa region.

The turning point in this policy came with Turkey’s 2020 military intervention to preserve the Government of National Accord then ruling western Libya.  Ankara’s first intervention far from its land borders and shoreline was an unqualified success and created an important strategic beachhead for Turkey in the central Mediterranean.  Turkey maintains an air power deployment at the re-captured al-Watiyah air base, located 27 km from the Tunisian border, and is reported to be developing a naval base in Libya’s coastal city of Misrata.  Its first Mediterranean forward basing beyond North Cyprus, Turkey’s outsized military presence in Libya is nothing short of a strategic breakthrough, enabling Turkey to move beyond the efforts to contain its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Libyan intervention also showcased the power of Turkey’s home-grown combat drone and electronic warfare technology that would be later used by Ankara to assist Azerbaijan in the Autumn 2020 Karabakh war that ended 30 years of stalemate against Armenia and changed the map of the South Caucasus.  Turkey’s continued advances in drone warfare technology are changing the face of warfare in the Mediterranean and could upend the military deterrence for which Greece has been striving, especially as Turkish-made, unmanned surface and underwater combat vessels come into service.  Changing the Mediterranean’s strategic equation in 2022 is Turkey’s soon-to-be-operational, light aircraft carrier the TCG Anadolu – a landing helicopter dock based on the Spanish Navy’s Juan Carlos I-class design. The TCG Anadolu will be able to carry a formidable arsenal Turkish combat drones to any location in the Mediterranean theatre. As an amphibious assault ship, it will be able to transport a 1,000 troop battalion along with 150 vehicles, including battle tanks, for a marine troop landing. A blue-water power projection vessel par excellence, the TCG Anadolu will considerably augment Turkey’s efforts to set the strategic agenda in the Mediterranean.

Equilibrium of Escalation in 2022? Cyprus could be the Key

Greece’s deeper level of defense cooperation with its non-European partners also prompted Ankara to engage in serious diplomatic outreach to Egypt and Israel and then to the UAE and Saudi Arabia as a counter-balancing measure.  During 2021, Turkey has acted on its need to recalibrate its policy toward its Levantine and Gulf state neighbors to ease its isolation. This diplomatic opening creates the opportunity to increase commercial cooperation among the regional stakeholders that could act as a brake on renewed naval escalation in the future. While there is at least a temporary balance of power, such an opportunity should not be missed.

With its interlinked flashpoints, there is little reason to think that a stable equilibrium has been achieved in the Eastern Mediterranean. None of the underlying core issues has been resolved.  The most vulnerable point in the current security architecture is Cyprus.  A member of the European Union but not NATO, Cyprus was under military embargo by the United States until 2020 and consequently has insufficient naval capabilities to defend itself. Turkey maintains over 30,000 troops on the north side of the island and has established base for its combat drones in the self-declared Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. In 2021, Turkey upped its ante on the issue by formally declaring that North Cyprus should be internationally recognized as an independent state.  If a new cycle of naval escalation does break out in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2022, Cyprus is likely to be in the eye of the storm.

L'articolo Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Security in 2022 – Equilibrium or Escalation? proviene da InsideOver.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a region plagued by conflict and instability. The Syrian civil war has turned into a regional crisis, drawing other neighbouring counties into it. Post-Mubarak Egypt has sought a new role as a leading Arab country. Israel has been involved in a shadow war with Iran and its Shia allies. Simultaneously, Turkey is becoming increasingly assertive in pressing its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. The United States, Russia, and France have shown strong interest to engage in the regional security architecture. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has not diminished Greece’s diplomatic capability to cope with new complex security environments. In fact, Athens has developed a new foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean that deserves some attention.

The new geopolitics of energy

Following the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, the need to reduce dependence on Russian gas exports has forced European governments to consider the Eastern Mediterranean as a potential source of energy. Israeli, Egyptian, and Cypriot gas exports could contribute to the diversification of supply. The Eastern Mediterranean has an estimated 122 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered, but technically recoverable, natural gas. Greece’s geographic location makes it a natural bridge between the energy-rich Eastern Mediterranean and the energy-consuming Western Europe.

Hence, Athens has negotiated with Nicosia and Jerusalem the construction of the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline, which would connect Israeli and Cypriot gas fields to Europe via Crete and mainland Greece. In January 2020, the three countries signed an agreement, although the final route is still under consideration. However, the EastMed pipeline project is feasible only with U.S. political and financial backing. The passing of the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 by the U.S. Congress sends that message.

As a result, Turkey feels even more left out and isolated. Therefore, Ankara needs allies to support its position. In November 2019, the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord of Libya signed a maritime agreement with Turkey in exchange of military support. The agreement has established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between the two countries by ignoring Greek islands, including Crete which is the fourth largest island in the Mediterranean. The legality of the agreement is disputed by the Libyan opposition but complicates the situation. Against this background, Athens was forced to reach out to Cairo. In August 2020, the two countries signed an agreement for a partial demarcation of maritime boundaries between Crete and the northern coast of Egypt.

But this is not all. The Cypriot government’s determination to exploit its offshore gas deposits has provoked a military reaction from Erdogan’s regime. Turkish drilling ships have repeatedly entered the Cypriot EEZ, accompanied by warships, to conduct various activities; yet, Nicosia has already licensed parts of its EEZ to foreign energy companies. Due to ethnic ties, Athens has supported the Republic of Cyprus in its confrontation with Ankara.

Energy geopolitics also play a role in Greece’s ambitious plans for renewable energy. In October 2021, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Egyptian Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi signed an agreement to build an undersea electricity interconnector via the new Greek-Egyptian EEZ. This project aims at bridging Europe and Africa by building a submarine power cable of total capacity 2000MW in either direction. In combination with the other interconnections that are developed in the region, including interconnections with Italy and Bulgaria, the interconnector with Egypt could transform Greece into an energy hub of cheap, environmentally-friendly energy.

Building realpolitik alliances

The partnership with Israel is the cornerstone of the Greek foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterraean. The deterioration of the Turkish-Israeli relations after the Gaza flotilla incident in May 2010 paved the way for a new era in Greek-Israeli relations. On the initiative of Netaniahu government, the two countries signed agreements in the field of security, energy, trade, and tourism. Jerusalem has shared Greek concerns about Turkish assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara has not only supported the Palestinians, but it has also offered moral support to Hamas. Not surprisingly, the air forces of Israel and Greece have conducted several joint exercises in recent years. Additionally, Athens plans to purchase advanced Israeli systems for its army, navy, and air force.

Moreover, Athens has built a new relationship with pro-Western Gulf countries. In late November 2020, Greece and the UAE signed a defence pact which includes a provision for mutual defence if one country’s territorial integrity is threatened by a third party. Three months earlier, Emirati F-16 jets were deployed at the Souda Air Base in Crete for training with the Hellenic Air Force. Abu Dhabi opposes Ankara’s attempt to dominate the Muslim world and supports the anti-Turkish opposition in Libya.

The UAE is not the only Gulf country that has developed military cooperation with Greece. In September 2021, Athens decided to deploy Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia for the protection of critical energy infrastructure. Some months earlier, Saudi F-15 jets flew to Greece to participate in joint military exercises. Like the UAE, Saudi Arabia has also opposed Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East.

At the same time, Athens has attempted to balance Turkey by forming an alliance with Paris, which views Erdogan’s Turkey as a geopolitical competitor. In late September 2021, Greece and France signed an agreement which includes a clause on mutual defence assistance. Consequently, the Hellenic Navy will soon purchase advanced French frigates to conduct operations far away from Greece’s shores.

An evolving scenario

Energy development and transportation in the Eastern Mediterranean is a game-changing factor. The Greek pivot to the Eastern Mediterranean serves as a test of capabilities and intents. Athens has formulated a new foreign policy by collaborating with key neighbouring countries, such as Israel and Egypt. Both Jerusalem and Cairo have shared Greek concerns about Turkish assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, the Athens has reached out to pro-Western Gulf countries that have their own problems with Turkey’s leadership and aspire to play a region in regional affairs. The French-Greek military agreement also confirms the growing commitment of Paris to regional security. This all amounts to a concerted, deliberate diplomatic effort to increase Greek presence in the volatile region of the Eastern Mediterranean.

L'articolo Greek foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Energy and Realpolitik proviene da InsideOver.

On June 10 the commercial vessel CIRKIN was sailing across the Mediterranean towards the port of Misurata in northwestern Libya. CIRKIN was reportedly carrying military equipment for the Libyan army under the command of the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and was being accompanied by three Turkish frigates. When forces from the European Council’s Operation IRINI approached the vessel for inspection, the Turkish convoy rejected the request and kept navigating as per their initial route.

The incident has prompted controversy among EU officials, as it raised concerns around the actual efficacy and enforcement capability of Operation IRINI.

What is Operation IRINI?

IRINI (Greek word for peace) is a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation in the Mediterranean which was launched by the European Council in the aftermath of the Berlin Conference on Libya in late January 2020. It came out of the conference where steps to end the Libyan conflict were discussed.

The predominant mission of IRINI is to ensure that the UN-imposed arms embargo in Libya is being implemented. This is achieved through the utilization of Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) and inspections of suspicious vessels in the wider region off the Libyan coasts. Secondary tasks include monitoring illicit exports of petroleum products from Libya, building and training the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy and constraining the human smuggling and trafficking networks in the region. The operation officially started on March 31, 2020 and is set to be completed by March 31, 2021, subject to further extension.

The deployed assets of the mission are three aircraft, provided by Luxembourg, Poland and Germany respectively and one frigate provided by Greece. The aircraft are mostly utilized for surveillance, reconnaissance, search-and-rescue and transport missions. The Greek frigate HS SPETSAI is the most crucial deployed asset of IRINI; it carries a single Sikorsky S-70B Aegean Hawk helicopter, which alongside SPETSAI, was involved in the aforementioned June 10 incident. We should highlight here that the number and the operational capabilities of the deployed assets are far from adequate, considering the vast area of operations they are covering and the scope of IRINI’s overall mission.

The Worrisome June 10 Incident

In the early morning of June 10, the Tanzanian-flagged vessel CIRKIN was sailing across IRINI’s area of operations. CIRKIN is a RORO ( Roll-on/roll-off, ship that carries wheeled cargo and vehicles) cargo ship and had set sail from Turkey on June 7, with destination the Libyan port of Misurata. The commercial vessel has been escorted by three ships of the Turkish navy and since its departure it has raised the alarm for a potential violation of the Libyan arms embargo. IRINI officials were monitoring the route of the ship and sought to approach it for an inspection once it entered the area of responsibility of the EU mission.

On June 10, in coordination with the Italian Commander, based in Rome, the Sikorsky S-70B Aegean Hawk helicopter launched from HS SPETSAI and approached CIRKIN. The helicopter crew requested over the radio that CIRKIN cooperate and allow the IRINI personnel on-board for an inspection. However, the reply came from one of the accompanying Turkish frigates, informing the helicopter crew that CIRKIN would not be inspected and that the ship was under the protection of the Republic of Turkey.

Back in Rome, IRINI Headquarters were immediately made aware of the sequence of the events; the command of Operation IRINI ordered the personnel in the area to comply with the Turkish request and HS SPETSAI was directed to monitor the route of the Turkish ships, following the convoy from a safe distance. CIRKIN reached the port of Misurata by June 11. Having completed its mission, as of June 13, the vessel is currently sailing back to Turkey, with final destination at the port of Samsun in the Black Sea.

The Lukewarm EU and NATO Reaction

The incident has raised substantial concerns across the Operation IRINI officials. Even though it has gained wide publicity in Greece, there has been an attempt to downgrade its significance. Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis held a video conference with President of the European Council Charles Michel and the European Commission Vice President -and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. Despite the fact that the Turkish provocations, and particularly the latest incident in the Mediterranean, would presumably be part of the agenda of the top officials to discussm there were no relevant statements following the meeting. To the contrary, the only issues that have been reportedly discussed, moved around the long-term financial goals of the EU and the Recovery Fund as a response to COVID-19.

At the same time there are ongoing talks as to how NATO could contribute to the capabilities of IRINI through NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian. Sea Guardian is a NATO naval operation in the Mediterranean, with a mission to “maintain maritime situational awareness, deter and counter terrorism and enhance capacity building.” There are no indications if these considerations are taking place due to the June 10 incident, however because of this event there is no doubt that the operational limitations and inefficiencies of IRINI were highlighted publicly.

What is Turkey Trying to Achieve?

Once again Turkey is using the typical power projection tactics, with which we are all familiar by now. Ankara has been always aware that an arms embargo is implemented in Libya, however Turkish military material never stopped being shipped to the Libyan shores in support of the GNA forces. In fact, this very Turkish participation, through the delivery of light and heavy weaponry, military vehicles and sophisticated drones, has eventually helped tip the balance of the conflict in favor of the GNA and its leader Fayez al-Serraj. Furthemore, this has been happening overtly all along as Turkey is openly bragging about these developments through its state media.

The latest incident was a direct incitement towards the EU; by ignoring the role and mission of Operation IRINI and by sending military equipment to Libya with a Turkish navy escort, Turkey is once again flexing its muscles in front of the EU. Yet here we are with most EU major players facing Ankara as an equal partner, stressing the essential Turkish role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and providing financial aid to the country instead of seeking to push it into compliance with the EU instructions by threatening to impose sanctions.

A last point we should consider is that the incident took place a few days after the Greek HS SPETSAI joined the operation. For the first months of the Operation, the FS JEAN BART of the French Navy was deployed without any similar incident. Therefore, we can assume that Ankara chose the June 10 timing on purpose, in order to send another provocative message to Athens. As the tension in Libya keeps rising, so does the Turkish aggressiveness in the Mediterranean, prompting serious concerns among Greek leadership.

L'articolo Operation IRINI Efficacy in Question, as Turkey Ignores the Libyan Arms Embargo proviene da InsideOver.