The fall of Saddam Hussein, which took place on April 9, 2003 with the arrival of US tanks in the center of Baghdad, had many effects in the Middle East region. The reason is essentially based on the fact that Iraq, without a solid government in power, has turned into a potential powder keg. The country, historically crossed by strong sectarian tensions and a clear division between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, has become a battleground both between the various internal actors and between regional powers.

The war of 2003 can therefore be considered as a detonator of the various Middle Eastern turbulences and that is why it has helped to change the face not only of Iraq but also of the history of the surrounding countries.

Baghdad in the Iranian orbit

During the era of Saddam Hussein, Iraq lived in an almost paradoxical situation. Although the country had a Shiite majority, the rais and his circle of loyalists in Baghdad belonged to the Sunni minority. A circumstance that has not failed to create tensions during the 24 years of regime. Saddam has often viewed with suspicion the emergence of Shiite political and religious groups, mainly based in the south of the country. This led, among other things, to an increase in the level of confrontation with Iran.

In the same year that the rais took the keys to the Iraqi government, an Islamic revolution in Tehran brought to power the Shiite theocracy led by the Ayatollahs. An eight-year war broke out between the two countries, at the end of which diplomatic relations were never fully restored.

When the US overthrew Saddam, Iraqi Shiites immediately pressed for strong representation in the new authorities. The first elections in 2005 saw the victory of Shiite parties, at the expense of Sunni ones. Iran was thus able to get its hands on Baghdad. An effect certainly not intended and almost certainly not calculated by the US on the eve of the war. Between the pro-Shiite Iraq and the Iranian theocracy, a strong convergence was born. In doing so, the Ayatollahs began to control large parts of Iraq’s new power.

The effects of this sudden change have also occurred at regional level. Tehran has begun planning the so-called “Shiite crescent” strategy. A project aimed at ideally linking its government with the new post-Saddam Iraq, with Syria governed by the Alawite Shiite Bashar Al Assad, then extending its sphere of influence to Beirut. Here, in fact, Iran has begun to exploit the axis more with the Lebanese Shiite movements and, in particular, with the Hezbollah.

This has created the basis for heated discussions throughout the region. Iranian activism has in fact sharpened the tug-of-war between Tehran and its historical antagonists. These include Saudi Arabia and the Gulf petromonarchies. The wars that broke out in the following decade, starting with the one in Yemen, are attributable to the confrontation at a distance between the Shiite theocracy of the Ayatollahs and the Sunni monarchies. It is also important to underline the growing fears for its own security by Israel, another historic rival of Iran in the Middle East.

The rise of Al Qaeda and jihadist terrorism

The radical change at the top of Baghdad has also had consequences within the Iraqi Sunni world. In some fringes, the concern has emerged to become slaves of the Shiite majority. A circumstance that has created, among other things, fertile ground for jihadist propaganda. Already in 2014, several terrorist groups were active in Iraq. Inside, not only Iraqis but also foreign fighters. Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist movement, took the reins and took advantage of the situation to launch its own holy war against US troops.

Emerging in this context was the figure of the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. Bin Laden himself gave him his approval for the birth of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The jihadist insurgency went on for several years, finding support especially in the province of Al Anbar, between Ramadi and Falluja. The situation was particularly serious in 2007, with the country effectively hostage to a sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. Al Zarqawi was killed in 2006, but his successors implemented Al Qaeda’s activities in Iraq.

The group will later become “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) and with the new leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi will be engaged since 2011 in the Syrian civil war, alongside Al Nusra and other Islamist groups opposed to the Assad government. ISIL will become better known by the acronym of Isis and the group will give birth to the Islamic State, capable of conquering the entire north of Iraq and large portions of Syria between 2014 and 2017. Today th

e Islamic State is no more, but the country continues to be crossed by jihadist tensions.

The duel between Washington and Tehran in Iraqi territory

The fight against ISIS has brought the presence of various international forces to Iraq. On the one hand, the US-led coalition, engaged in eastern Syria and northern Iraq against the caliphate. On the other, an alliance between several Shiite paramilitary groups, assisted by Iran. Behind the common intent to defeat the Islamic State, the struggle to contend for its influence in Baghdad has also emerged.

In the heart of Iraqi territory, therefore, Washington’s forces still coexist with forces close to Tehran. An incompatibility that emerged especially in 2020, when a US raid in Baghdad killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimaini, architect of the Shiite crescent project. In response, Iran bombed US bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraq has thus turned into the battleground between the United States and Iran. A tug of war that has contributed to fueling tensions throughout the Middle East and that has dragged within it also the other regional powers.

The unresolved Kurdish question

The 2003 war and the end of Saddam’s power gave the Kurds the opportunity to manage their territories independently. The new Iraqi constitution recognized Kurdistan as an autonomous region with Erbil as its capital. Here is the de facto seat of a state within a state. The Iraqi Kurds have entered into trade agreements and ties independently of Baghdad.

But beyond the internal events in Iraq, the autonomy granted to the Kurds has also reignited the issue in all the other countries in the region where the Kurds constitute an important minority. Starting with Turkey. President Erdogan, after an initial opening to dialogue, has chosen a hard line against all the main Kurdish organizations. In Ankara, the fear is linked to the fact that the Kurds present in Turkey could claim the same autonomy achieved in Iraq.

In Syria, too, the issue has been at the center of discussions several times. The government in Damascus, before 2011, viewed with suspicion the activism of Kurdish groups. When civil war broke out in the country, the Kurds themselves took advantage of the problems of the central government to organize themselves. The Self-Defense Forces founded the Rojava region. Currently, the groups that bring together Kurdish fighters are partly supported by the US and are based in eastern Syria, beyond the Euphrates. This is also contributing to tensions, with Ankara starting to target Kurdish forces in Syrian territory since 2016.

L'articolo Setting the Middle East ablaze: the Iraqi War, 20 years later proviene da InsideOver.

Mali, one of Africa’s prized possessions and once known as the hub of democracy in the continent is facing its worst crisis since 2012. On August 18, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita  and his Prime Minister Boubou Cissé were arrested after some Malian soldiers fired gunshots at a key army base in Kati. The incursion led to a mutiny by another faction of Mali’s armed forces.

The small army town of Kati is located right outside the capital of Bamako and is considered to be one of the most politically important places in the country.

Mali: a History of Never-Ending Problems

Mali is a country which has faced many problems. Islamist insurgency groups, political corruption and mismanagement of basic resources are only some of these issues. There are many militants who returned to the country following the end of Muammar Qaddafi’s reign in Libya in 2011. They were being supplied with weapons to fight the Tuareg rebels in the country’s north.

Nearly half of the country lives in extreme poverty without access to employment, education or healthcare and disruption caused by rebel groups has worsened the situation. The country’s economy is largely dependent on mining, agriculture and gold. Rebel groups in the country say they’ve taken matters into their own hands to fight excessive violence by security forces and widespread corruption by the government.

What Led to the Ouster of Mali’s Government?

In order to understand what led to the ouster of Keita we need to go back to March 2020 when the coronavirus started to spread rapidly across the world. At the same time, parliamentary elections were being held in Mali, where the now deposed president was trying to tighten his grip by gaining the maximum number of seats. The first round of voting went ahead despite the threat of the coronavirus and the frequent attacks by armed groups.

The second round was when all these problems deepened. The second round — which took place at the end of April — was disrupted by numerous incidents which led to the constitutional court overturning the results for 31 key seats and handing these seats to Keita’s Rally for Mali party.

Malians and opposition political parties joined hands in May the following month to form an alliance which was called the “Movement of June 5 – Rally of Patriotic Forces.” The alliance — led by famous Islamic preacher Imam Mahmoud Dicko — called on the president to step down due to his failure in controlling the extensive crises plaguing the country.

Problems Intensify

The months of June and July were extremely troublesome for Mali, with protests — not only in the capital Bamako but across the country — growing violent. The alliance called for civil disobedience and the dissolution of the parliament after Keita floated political reforms. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) called on politicians to form a unity government but that move was also rejected by protesting opposition groups who wanted the direct removal of Keita from office.

Just earlier this month on August 12, security forces clashed with protesters and fired tear gas to disperse thousands of protesters at a square in Bamako. Five days later on August 17 the opposition declared that they would not bow down to the pressure imposed by security forces and the Keita government. The very next day, Keita and PM Cissé were both arrested after some soldiers from the army mutinied and detained them.

The International Community’s Involvement in Mali

France is in Mali as part of Operation Barkhane, a counterterrorism operation against Islamic Jihadists who wish to impose their control in the whole Sahel region. France entered Mali in 2013 and has been heavily involved ever since. It also happens to be Mali’s former colonial ruler.

The G5 Sahel force is also another group of players deployed in Mali to monitor developments. The African Union and the United Nations are also playing a significant role in Mali. The UN is overseeing the implementation of the 2015 Accord, better known as the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process.

This accord was brought forward to control Islamic and ethnic militias operating in Mali. Like all other deals, this one has also failed to quell unrest. Finally, the United States is also a key player in containing the spread of violence, bloodshed and terror that militia groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda have continued to spread in the Islamic Maghreb.

The Aftermath of Keita’s Removal

With millions displaced and thousands killed, the future of Mali is on a knife’s edge. For France, this is an opportunity to fix emerging problems. Its presence in the country could be short-lived following the public uproar against the Malian government and its international partners.

Keita failed to clamp down on corruption by installing allies in the government. Despite numerous attempts to satisfy his citizens he failed miserably, proving that there was no democracy left in the country and showing the instability of the country’s institutions.

What’s Next for Mali?

Mali’s ever-growing problems can only be solved if a variety of genuine policies are implemented and long-awaited reforms are put into practice. It can do this by firstly integrating a peace process which would satisfy all stakeholders; the Mali government, the citizens of the country and the armed groups. Negotiations must take place between these groups to carve out a solution that would be beneficial for long-term survival.

Secondly, there should be new actors in Mali, those who are willing to respect the decisions of their people and are knowledgeable in running a country marred by years of civil wars.

Lastly, there should be new guarantors and the 2015 Accord must be used in a manner which takes the needs and wants of people into consideration. The new guarantors could be the United States or the United Nations which will help implement democratic values and oversee Mali’s reconstruction. Given the prevalence of jihadist and militant groups and its continuing political unrest, the road ahead is likely to be tough, but it can be countered if necessary actions are taken by the right leaders and stakeholders.

L'articolo Mali’s Political Crisis and the Long Road Ahead proviene da InsideOver.

The construction of a wall on the border between Egypt’s Sinai and the Palestinian Gaza Strip is nearly complete, after Egyptian authorities stepped up work on it with the aim of shielding Sinai against infiltration by jihadists from Gaza.

Closing Down Egypt’s Vulnerable Entry Point

Salafist jihadists from Gaza used to enter Sinai using a network of smuggling tunnels and a porous border with the Egyptian territory. Once in Egypt they would join Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorists operating in the Sinai region.

The wall construction started in 2014 to make Sinai inaccessible for the jihadists and make it difficult for ISIS terrorists to cross into Gaza and seek escape from Egyptian army attacks. The construction of the wall is part of a broader crackdown by the Egyptian army on tunnels between Sinai and Gaza. The tunnels were used in past decades in the smuggling of goods and arms to and from Sinai.

In recent years, they were also used in the infiltration into Sinai by Gazan jihadists and for travel into Gaza by ISIS terrorists to seek medical treatment in the Palestinian territory.

Stopping Infiltration With a Wall

The presence of a wall on the border between Sinai and Gaza is necessary for the protection of security in Sinai, especially with the Sinai branch of ISIS teaming up with Salafi jihadists in the Palestinian territory, as security analysts report.

The Gaza-ruling Hamas movement has long struggled to secure the joint border with Egypt. However, Hamas’ attempt to secure the border and prevent the smuggling of militants into Sinai can land it in trouble, given the alliance between ISIS Sinai and some jihadist factions in Gaza.

“This is why constructing such a wall is important,” said retired Egyptian police general, Ali Hefzi. “The presence of this wall will offer solutions to the infiltration of these militants into Sinai.”

A Tall Order for the Egyptian Military

The Egyptian army spent a sizable amount of resources on the construction of the wall which extends over 12 kilometers, covering most of the joint border between Sinai and the Gaza Strip. The wall is six meters high and five meters deep underground. This means that it can be an effective mechanism against the renewed digging of tunnels along the border.

Egypt has destroyed hundreds of smuggling tunnels on the border with Gaza in the past years. Some of the tunnels were difficult to find, having begun in Gaza and ended inside the homes of some Sinai Bedouins.

“These tunnels posed a real threat to security in Sinai,” said security expert Hossam Suweilam.

Egypt’s Successful Strategy

The construction of the wall on the border with Gaza is only one measure in a series of others taken by Cairo to secure Sinai and end the threat of militancy in it. The Egyptian army has been fiercely cracking down on this militancy for over five years now, having deployed all army branches in the territory which also shares borders with Israel.

Apart from deploying tens of thousands of ground troops, the army also uses the air force and the navy to besiege the ISIS terrorists and prevent them from receiving supplies. This strategy has so far succeeded in trimming the power of ISIS, which is a vital reason for the failure of the terrorist group in maintaining attacks against army and police posts in Sinai.

This does not mean, however, that ISIS is over because the group is sometimes capable of staging deadly attacks. On April 30, it killed two army officers and eight conscripts in a bomb attack on an armored vehicle in the North Sinai city of Beir al-Abd.

Big Plans for Sinai

Sinai has always been absent from Egypt’s development agenda. Larger in size than Israel, the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian West Bank and Lebanon combined, Sinai is inhabited by only 600,000 people.

The Egyptian government wants to relocate between 3 and 5 million citizens to Sinai. To do this, it is spending billions of dollars on the development of the territory. The development projects implemented include dozens of roads, hospitals and schools. They also include tens of thousands of flats, and tourist and industrial facilities.

“A comprehensive development plan is being implemented in Sinai,” said economist Zeinab Anwar. “However, this development cannot be completed without the eradication of the terrorist threat in it.”

L'articolo Egypt Tightens Control Over Sinai With New Border Wall proviene da InsideOver.

On February 6, US President Donald Trump announced that al Qaeda leader Qassim al-Rimi had been killed during an airstrike strike in Yemen. The terrorist group has been in America’s cross-hairs for many years since declaring jihad against the United States.

What Is ‘Jihad?’

Radical terrorists like al Qaeda have used the term “jihad” to describe and defend their heinous acts around the globe over the years. For many in the West, it’s become the norm for many reporters to conflate the words “jihad” and “terrorism.” However, in the Islamic religion, “jihad” can also mean the struggle within oneself against sin.

Much to the chagrin of Islamic clerics and scholars who prioritize religious piety, Islamic radicals like the Taliban, al Qaeda and ISIS subscribe to the more radical and jingoistic physical definition of “jihad”: namely “a struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam.” It’s these Islamic radicals and terrorists, that have committed many of the atrocities around the world since al Qaeda attacked America on September 11, 2001, followed by the so-called global “War on Terror.”

The Post-Cold War Void

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a large void was created that was quickly filled by the military juggernaut of the United States. With the collapse, former Soviet countries were also freed from the grip of their rule and began fighting for independence. While involvement in military conflict rooted in religion was not a new issue for the United States, it was during the Bosnian War in 1992 when many Americans first became aware of jihadism.

At the same time the US was gaining exposure to this jihad in Bosnia, Osama bin Laden was further radicalizing his group of al Qaeda mujahideen in Afghanistan. He was backed by the US and Western powers in hopes his fighters would defeat the Soviet Union.

Capitalism, Communism And Jihad

The conflicting ideas of capitalism and communism and their influence was what defined the Cold War. In today’s cold war, however, Islamic jihad is seen as a singular force opposed to the forces of freedom. Jihad is overly simplified as solely being associated with Islamic violence, however as aforementioned, jihad is not only a military “fight against the enemies of Islam” but there is also a political componet to jihad that can not be denied.

In a recent article on The Intercept, anthropologist and author Darryl Li (The Universal Enemy: Jihad, Empire, and the Challenge of Solidarity) put it well when he wrote:

“Consider for a moment three different things: the Irish Republican Army, the Republican Party in the United States, and Plato’s Republic. All of these employ the term “republic,” and all of them somehow have a connection with violence. If you lumped them together and claimed they represent an ideology called “republicanism,” that obviously wouldn’t make any sense. Yet that’s what the category of “jihadism” essentially does.”

The Varieties Of Violent Jihad

While not always regional, today’s jihad militants can vary from a small army in one country to a splintered section of regionalized cells in others to mass shooters and automotive attackers. It’s this transient nature that makes the battle against jihad—or terrorism—more complicated.

The nearly two decades old “War on Terror” has seen periodic military successes, but given the nature, mobility, and breadth of the combatants, it’s proven a challenge to end. Many of those successes may have been short-lived. While they may have curbed further advancement of one Islamic terrorist or group, the success, in turn, radicalized others. After ten years on the run, the death of bin Laden would splinter al Quada and lead to an even more extreme version of jihad, the Islamic State or ISIS.

The ISIS Terror ‘Caliphate’

ISIS initially began by calling for a worldwide caliphate and would go on to help the Iraqi insurgency during the American invasion. ISIS has proven to be horrific in their jihad: they videotaped beheadings of civilians, aid workers, and journalists, in addition to the destruction of cultural heritage sites as well as human rights abuses, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide.

The group spent many bloody years fighting in Iraq and Syria, but in February of 2019, President Donald Trump declared that “ISIS was 100% defeated.” According to the US military, this was categorically “not true.” Like many of Trump’s comments about the US military, this bold statement was given without consulting military leadership. The Pentagon was left scrambling to defend the statement and explaining why the US should maintain involvement in Syria.

ISIS ‘Re-Surgence’

Six months later, the Pentagon issued a report saying that ISIS was “re-surging” in Syria, stating: “The reduction of US forces has decreased the support available for Syrian partner forces at a time when their forces need more training and equipping to respond to the ISIS resurgence.”

Two weeks after that report was issued American Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stated ISIS is “not in a re-surgent state” despite the Pentagon report.

Because this type of jihad or terrorism is so amorphous, it transcends state, region, country, and continent. It also isn’t limited to one fundamentalist Islamic concept. While ISIS may be considered the more extreme and well known, there are other international groups like the Afghan Taliban, Boko Haram, and al-Shaabab.

The Rise Of Terrorism In Africa

The Middle East is still ripe with plenty of military and ideological conflict. It remains the hotbed of jihad where peace, when found, is sporadic and short-lived. However, over the years Africa has seen the rise of these Islamic extremists and jihad, making it a growing global concern.

It’s gotten so bad in Africa that in January of 2020, France President Emmanuel Macron threatened to withdraw French forces from Africa. He summoned the presidents of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mauritania to a meeting to curb hostilities and work out how to stop the “rapid advance of armed Islamist extremists in their regions.”

Russia and China have also begun asserting more influence on the continent. Russian President Vladimir Putin has increased arms sales while creating security agreements and training programs for some of the unstable African countries like Libya. There Putin has dispatched both troops and aid to help militia leader Khalifa Haftar curb the civil war.

China has increased its commercial investment in Africa. They’ve helped build factories and infrastructure in addition to operating a major port in the East African country of Dijibouti. The Chinese military is currently considering a new port in Senegal under the pretense of assisting the Senegalese Navy.

This makes US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper’s weighing the withdrawal of forces in Africa perplexing. Esper’s stated goal is a re-alignment of American troops amid heightened tensions in the Middle East between Iran and the US. With the inroads being laid down by both China and Russia, it makes this move by the US Military rather confounding. Luckily, late in January Esper decided not to re-locate the troops.

US Kills An Anti-ISIS Partner

The American assassination of Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani further complicates the War on Terror, not only because it inflamed tensions in the Middle East but the US also lost one of their staunchest indirect supporters of the elimination of ISIS.

There is no doubt that Soleimani orchestrated the death of numerous American’s and allied forces in the Middle East. However, by mastering the art of the “proxy war” under Suleimani, he was equally as deadly towards ISIS.

Not helping matters is that both Germany and Britain have begun pulling their forces from Iraq and The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS has ceased operating. In a recent NYTimes Op-ed, former FBI agent Ali H. Soufan said: “In 2016, Donald Trump, then a candidate for president, described Barack Obama as the ‘founder of ISIS.’ In the end, it may be Mr. Trump who comes to be known not as the terrorist group’s founder, but as its savior.”

‘Jihad’ And ‘Terrorism’ Aren’t Synonymous—But The Line Is Pencil Thin

Regardless of what it’s called or referred to, the American led War on Terror has been a financial sinkhole. According to Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, as America’s global war inches into its second decade, the financial cost for the US on both military operations and veteran care is around $5.6 trillion.

In addition to the astronomical financial cost, the human toll has also been significant. According to a report in 2018 from Brown University’s Costs of War Project, the cumulative toll on impacted countries including Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan deaths by direct violence totals between 480,000 and 500,000, with fully 244,000 of them likely civilians. That number jumps into the millions when considering those impacted by disease, displacement, and loss of infrastructure. In addition the global wars have cost 10,003 American deaths and 56,422 injured or wounded.

Despite all the proclamations from various governments, the bombings, battles and the death in the Middle East—and increasingly in Africa—prove that jihad or terrorism is still very much alive and thriving. While the periodic leader may be killed or captured, there will be someone to replace them … and they’ll be even angrier. Given the shapeless and the inchoate existence of jihad militants, the global war may not be against terror but against time itself.

L'articolo Understanding Jihad And The Growth Of Terrorism proviene da InsideOver.

Jihadists linked to ISIS killed 600 people last year in Cabo Delgado, the northernmost province of Mozambique. In total, the ISIS-affiliated group claimed responsibility for twenty-six violent attacks in Mozambique last year.

The Atrocities Of The New Terror Group

The terrorist organization has beheaded, disfigured and dismembered citizens in the province, including children. Bordering Tanzania, the coastal province is made up of small villages, most of whom are populated by subsistence farmers and fishermen. Many of the villages have been burned and most have now been deserted.

Apart from its political affiliation, not much is known about the group which started in October 2017,  including its name, origins, mandate and funding. Videos posted on social media have supposedly shown the terrorist group waving the ISIS flag.

‘No Evidence … Of An Overarching Leadership’

According to Jasmine Opperman, an African expert on Islamic Theology on Counterterrorism, there are between seven and ten cells operating in Cabo Delgado. Ms Opperman claims that there is “no evidence at this point in time of an overarching ideology or an overarching leadership.”

“There are indicators of Islamic extremism involved in some of these cell structures,” she added. “We are sitting with a serious, serious, problem. The Islamic State does not need a well-run organization [operation]. They need a proxy and some of these cells are the ideal proxy.”

Further exacerbating the situation are the weak borders between SADC countries. Although the situation is not yet a “direct threat”, political and security risk analyst, Johann Smith said: “This is not a Mozambican problem, it’s a regional one.”

“After the first attack, the SADC Security Organ should have met to decide how they were going to deal with the problem. Up to now, the issue has not featured on the agenda during subsequent meetings.”

Mozambique: Our Troops Are Being Deceived

Last week, President Filipe Nyusi of Mozambique alleged that the terrorist group was disseminating “currents of disinformation” against Mozambican security forces. Speaking to the troops at a military base in Mueda, a Cabo Delgado town, Nyusi said the disinformation “shows a lack of respect for those who are sacrificing their lives in defence of the communities.”

“We are accompanying the attacks of the criminals and your [citizens’] response, because we have noted that the enemy strategy is to put us in conflict with our people.”

President Nyusi claimed that the insurgents had deceived Mozambican army and police that their terrorist attacks had been carried out by elements within the army and the police.

He said that people were “spreading messages against sovereignty, without being aware of the great sacrifices that are being made.”

Nyusi said he wants Mozambican forces to find out more about the terrorists, including their origins and their location.

‘Go Forward To Face A Common Enemy’

“This is because, in a house where we don’t know who the thief is, people begin to distrust each other,” he explained. “We want to build trust and go forward to face a common enemy.”

Despite this, the common enemy has not doused the tense relationship between the Mozambique Defence Armed Force (FADM) and Russian-backed Wagner Group fighters.

Arriving to fight the Islamic militants, the Wagner troops were ill-prepared for the conditions in Mozambique, according to Smith. He clarified that their military equipment was ineffective, and that the troops were ill-equipped to deal with the heat.

Smith: Russia Making Mozambique’s Situation Worse

The Russian troops have now withdrawn to Nacala, a city also in Northern Mozambique, to plan and retrain. Wagner’s presence, Smith added, has served to increase insurgent attacks.

“The sophistication and the brazenness of the attacks are evolving.” Smith said. “They have access to intelligence, access to knowledge on where the deployments are when they are at their most vulnerable, they have access to FADM uniforms, they have seized weapons that Wagner has given to the FADM⁠—sophisticated weapons⁠—which means their sophistication I escalating day by day.

“The brutality against the civilians is an answer I am still looking for. I am not sure what their motive behind that is, [but] it is gruesome.”

The FADM and Wagner’s failure to curb the insurgency has emboldened the terrorist groups, and they have begun to move more inland.

The Wider African Fight Against ISIS

Mozambique is not the only African nation battling the presence of ISIS-affiliated jihadists. In West Africa⁠—particularly Nigeria⁠—Boko Haram insurgents pledged allegiance to ISIS in a video released in 2015. In Somalia, Al Shabaab members fight on behalf of al Qaeda, with some members pledging allegiance to ISIS.

As it loses ground in the Middle East, ISIS is increasingly moving towards Africa, spreading to Tunisia, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cameron and now, the SADC region.

The African Union’s reaction to the threat of ISIS, including conflict, war and violence has seen no success in the continent.

“During the 50th Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU) in May 2013, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted a landmark declaration,” a press release from the AU read in 2017.

“They vowed that Africa would not bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation and made a commitment to end violent conflict on the continent by 2020. This was translated into the AU initiative: Silencing the Guns by 2020.”

It is now 2020, and rather than stemming the progress of ISIS in the continent, the terrorist group is spreading rapidly throughout all of Africa. This is a massive threat to the security, stability, longevity and happiness of Africa’s 1.3 billion population.

L'articolo From Mozambique to Nigeria: The Alarming Expansion Of ISIS In Africa proviene da InsideOver.

Twenty-one Kenyans have been killed by the Al-Shabaab terrorist group since December last year, a telling indication that the Somali-based criminally inclined group has rebooted its murderous streak, leading the Administration of President Uhuru Kenyatta to change track in countering the insurgents.

This January 17, the Kenyan President announced security officers will begin mounting sting operations to flush out Al Shabaab operatives in the North Eastern and Southern regions of Kenya which have witnessed a spike in terrorist attacks since December.

“We will respond robustly by mounting the operation against the operatives and sleeper cells especially in the North Eastern and Coastal regions. I also expect the officers to use proactive measures in dealing with the attackers,” said Kenyatta during a meeting with security bosses in Mombasa, the capital of the country’s southern region.

The president said key financiers would be called out and would be listed nationally and internationally in a bid to cripple their operations. “Illegal deals fund Al Shabaab. I also expect more on dealing with the sponsors and the recruiters,” he added while singling out trade in contraband as a direct contributor to the Somalia-based terror group.

He also directed the administration officers including regional and county commissioners to engage politicians and religious leaders within communities to ensure that terrorists do not get space to make inroads with locals.

“Government administrators and police are to engage local politicians, religious and opinion leaders within vulnerable communities as a proactive strategy to deny terrorism entry points into radicalization, especially of our youth.”

Arguably, Kenya is frequently attacked by Al-Shabaab militants because it hosts several UN agencies and is a regional economic powerhouse that once attacked draws international media attention, experts say.
“Kenya has many foreign diplomatic missions and is the wealthiest in the region, so an attack creates global attention,” Yusuf Serunkuma, a research fellow at Uganda-based Makerere University says.

He said Kenya has many media houses with foreign journalists located in its capital Nairobi, so an attack on the country receives wide media coverage, which Al-Shabaab exploits to spread its propaganda. “Frequent attacks on Kenya also confirm that al-Shabaab still can strike beyond its borders in Somalia,” he says.

The Somali-based Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group has previously stated that it attacks Kenya in retaliation for its contribution to peacekeeping in Somalia. Kenya initially sent its troops to Somalia in October 2011 after Al-Shabaab terrorists reportedly abducted aid workers in the country. But it later decided to contribute troops to the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to help bring peace to its northern neighbour.

Other regional experts say the frequent attacks on Kenya are aimed at shaping public opinion in the country so that citizens pressure their government to withdraw troops from Somalia.

Andrews Atta-Asamoah, a security expert on the Horn of Africa, believes that withdrawing Kenyan troops from Somalia will not stop Al-Shabaab from continuously attacking its neighbour.

“Kenya is a major tourist destination and an attack on the country affects different nationalities that frequent is what Al-Shabaab wants,” he says. He also believes that high unemployment among Kenyan youths makes them vulnerable to extremist groups.

“The presence of sleeper cells and sympathizers of Al-Shabaab among radicalized Kenyans also makes it easier for the group to launch attacks in Kenya,’’ he says.

The recent increase in attacks by Al-Shabaab in northern Kenya has raised concern that the Somali terror group may be weakened but is not yet defeated and is still working hard to raise its profile in global jihadi circles.

Many analysts say different factions within the group have different objectives, though Al-Shabab as a whole continues to pursue its broad aim of establishing an Islamic state in Somalia. A major cleavage among the group’s leaders divides those known as nationalists, who largely seek to oust the central government, from militants with transnational aims.

Ms. Bronwyn Bruton, an expert on Al-Shabaab at the Atlantic Council, an NGO based in the US that galvanizes US global leadership and engagement in partnership with allies and partners, says hard-liners within the group have gained prominence in recent years.

“People who are still calling themselves Al-Shabaab are more and more committed to the idea of sharia law,” she says “The unifying idea of Al-Shabaab is opposition to the Western-backed government.”

In areas it controls, Al-Shabaab enforces its own harsh interpretation of sharia, prohibiting various types of entertainment, such as movies and music; the sale of khat, a narcotic plant that is often chewed; smoking; and the shaving of beards. Stoning’s and amputations have been meted out to suspected adulterers and thieves. The group bans cooperation with humanitarian agencies, blocking aid deliveries as famine loomed in 2017. This forced some eight hundred thousand to flee their homes, according to the United Nations.

Counterterrorism experts say Al-Shabaab has benefited from several sources of income over the years, including other terrorist groups; piracy; kidnapping; and extortion of local businesses, farmers, and aid groups, among others. The Eritrean government has in the past been accused of financing the group but it denied these claims.

Presently Al-Shabaab has built up an extensive racketeering operation, with checkpoint taxation on illicitly traded charcoal bringing in upward of US $7.5 million annually despite a UN ban on Somali charcoal exports in place since 2012.

In recent years, Al-Shabaab has increased its reliance on smuggling contraband sugar across the border into Kenya, bringing in millions of dollars annually. Kenyan forces have been accused of involvement in the scheme since 2015.

The UN Security Council authorized the African Union to lead a peacekeeping force in Somalia, which is known by its acronym, AMISOM, in early 2007. Its primary mandate was to protect the country’s transitional government, which was set up in 2004 but had just returned to power in Mogadishu.

Neighbouring Uganda was the first nation to send forces into Somalia under AMISOM, and it maintains the largest contingent in the regional force, at more than six thousand troops. Other military forces come from Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. In total, AMISOM comprises around twenty thousand troops.

It remains to be seen whether the current strategy by the Kenyan government will cripple the operations of Al-Shabaab within East Africa’s largest economy.

L'articolo Kenyan Government to Use Sting Operations to counter Al-Shabaab Terrorist Group proviene da InsideOver.

Crimea’s stability is under threat, and the danger is not coming from Ukraine, nor the West, but from the Tatar community. Since the peninsula was annexed to Russia in 2014, the ethnic minority has been showing increasing concern, opposition and criticism against the alleged religiously-motivated persecution campaign launched by local authorities.

Turkey, which has historic hegemonic ambitions over the peninsula, is monitoring the situation very closely, because it is trying to gain greater influence over Turkic peoples. Some factors indicate that Crimea could turn into Russia’s next Islamist hotbed.

The Tatars after the annexation

Tatars, which count for up to 15% of Crimea’s population, did not welcome warmly Russia’s annexation as they still remember a centuries-long mistreatment based on segregation, discrimination and forced population transfers. They largely boycotted the popular referendum held after the occupation to decide the destiny of the peninsula and the vast majority did not renounce to Ukrainian citizenship.

Russian authorities started a crackdown against the minority’s institutions and groups, targeting the main leaders and putting under control mosques and Islamic schools with the alleged goal of fighting political and religious extremism.

More than 20,000 Tatars fled Crimea and found refuge mostly in Ukraine and Turkey because they feared persecution. Some of them were able to escape by belonging to Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), a London-based religious organisation aiming at uniting Muslims from all over the world into a caliphate and convert non-Muslims through large-scale proselytism. HT operates legally and freely in more than 50 countries, including Ukraine and the United States, but Russia listed it as a terrorist group in 2003.

Despite the outlawing, HT keeps working underground in the country as shown by the numerous police operations that have taken place over the years. More recently, HT has been accused of plotting terrorist attacks and recruiting foreign fighters to be sent in Syria. It is noteworthy that most of the operations are focused in the Turkic-majority republic of Tatarstan.

Since Crimea’s annexation, several FSB-run operations have been carried out to target the group. Only this year, more than 30 Crimean Tatars have been jailed, accused of being HT members and sentenced on terrorism charges. During the raids many weaponswere found and seized.

Furthermore, in 2016 Mejlis, which functioned as the Tatars’ autonomous governing body since the 1990s, was outlawed because it was considered to be an extremist organisation. The body was soon replaced by the Kremlin-controlled Council of the Crimean Tatar People.

But Turkey, Ukraine and the European Union have raised growing concern and have accused Moscow of leading a campaign of repression based on illegal detentions, false charges, disappearances, and social pressure. According to them, the arrested would not be terrorists but political activists whose only fault is to protest against the annexation.

Turkey’s ambitions over Russian Tatars

Turkey is the only Muslim-majority country that has been showing interest in Crimean Tatars and the reasons are both cultural and geopolitical. Tatars are a Turkic ethnic group which was converted to Islam between the 13th and 14th century. Russians conquered the peninsula in 1783, under Catherine II’s imperial expansionist campaign, and overthrew the then-existing Ottoman-controlled Khanate.

Turkey never ceased to pay attention to Crimea, because its control is of critical importance for hegemony over the Black Sea. With the political rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, pan-Turkism and neo-Ottomanism have become the leading ideological platforms of the country’s foreign policy and many Russian-owned or -controlled regions are inevitably receiving greater attention.

Ankara focused efforts on the establishment of closer ties with countries hosting large Turkic-speaking peoples, such as the once-Soviet-ruled Turkestan republics, and is trying to pursue the same strategy in Crimea and Tatarstan. The latter is an autonomous republic that is granted the right of having a semi-free foreign policy, but in the recent years such right was limited in light of the growing influence exerted by Turkey through umbrella organizations, such as the International Organization of Turkic Culture, and the radicalization of the Muslim community.

Erdoğan has always declared that he is not going to recognize Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea since he considers the annexation as “illegal”, and some days ago discussed the Tatar question with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky during a two-day state visit in Ankara. The Turkish president defined the protection of Crimean Tatars as a priority of his foreign agenda and stressed that the peninsula is their historic homeland. 

The presidents attended the inauguration of the Crimean Tatars’ representative office in Ankara and signed several agreements to strengthen bilateral cooperation – two meaningful messages addressed to Vladimir Putin. A peninsula threatened by a foreign-fostered ethno-religious unrest would be in the interest of both countries since they are looking to outcast Moscow from the Black Sea and the potential for an insurgency is ready to be exploited.

The next jihadist hotbed?

In 2014, Mejlis leader Mustafa Dzhemilev warned that Crimea could be soon affected by Islamist insurgency as he was approached by a number of Tatars interested in fighting through Jihad what they perceived as an illegal occupation. In particular, he was concerned about the increasing influence played by the HT and Wahhabi preachers among Crimean Tatars, that would receive funds from abroad. His claims are supported by two facts; the existence of ascertained ties between local radical Muslims and global terrorist organizations and the online discussions on jihadi forums after the annexation.

Ten years ago, Dzhemilev himself was targeted by Crimea-based radical Muslims because of his activism. An assassination plot was discovered and three people linked to HT were arrested and sentenced. During the house searches the police seized explosives and assault rifles.

According to the US-based think tank American Center for Democracy about 100 Crimean Tatars have fought in Syria alongside jihadi-linked anti-Assad rebels, while only in the year 2013 at least 30 joined the Islamic State. It is precisely in Syria that Crimean fighters would have been approached to discuss the opening of a battlefront in the peninsula.

The post-annexation web monitoring showed that radical Muslims, mostly based in Saudi Arabia, were calling on volunteers to travel to Ukraine and defend the Tatars by using the hashtag #NafirforUkraine. “Nafir” is an Arabic word that Islamist terrorists use as a call to action; its usage was particularly spread and noticed during the early stages of Syrian civil war and experts believe that fostered the arrival of foreign fighters in the country.

The most important reason for which Crimea is likely to become Russia’s next Islamist problem is that all the ingredients for a conflict are present: religious revival, presence of foreign-funded radical preachers, deep-rooted hostility toward Russian rule, increasing social distance between Russians and Tatars, connections with the international Islamist network, rival powers’ interest in exploiting the discontent in order to bring instability. 

L'articolo Why Crimea Could Turn into Russia’s Next Jihadist Hotbed proviene da InsideOver.

There is no future here for the young people of El Principe, who see nothing but poverty and misery in their future. Girls and boys in this disarray are left easily influenced, and end up in the Jihadist recruitment network

L'articolo El Principe, Where a Jihadist is Born proviene da InsideOver.

Ceuta (Spain) “Today that are fewer routes, it’s a holiday today. But you just wait here, the next bus that passes close to El Principe arrives in ten minutes.” Those ten minutes saved us from a shooting.

It’s a few minutes after 3pm. The sun beats down on the Spanish citizens while the stores of famous European brands welcome residents and tourists enjoying the first warm weather of the holidays. A few kilometers away, near the border with Morocco, the city changes in nature. We are in the heart of the El Principe Alfonso. From here, in recent years, ten young people have left to join up with jihadists in Syria and Iraq.

Underneath El Principe

“El Principe has been abandoned by the law, by the authorities, by everyone. Here everything has been left to itself. There is dirt and rubbish. They burn cars and the people go around armed. It is true chaos,” a resident of the neighbourhood says. El Principe presents itself as a tangle of colourful alleys. Three thousand houses of every colour are enclosed within 1400 square meters and host between eight and ten thousand people. Only five cafés are open in the Muslim barrio, which, in contrast, hosts 14 Mosques lead by Moroccan imams. It is a neighbourhood where only a few people speak Spanish; the majority only know the local Arab dialect. Kamal Mohamed, the neighbourhood president, explains:

Unemployment, a high birth rate, abandoned schools, youth without structure and purpose. This is El Principe

These are all factors which favour the development of narcotrafficking and terrorism. “Today, Ceuta is one of the areas of Spain from which the most people are departing for war zones,” continues Kamal. “There have been 15 to 16 youths that have travelled to the Middle East from our barrio.”

“I know a man whose daughter and her husband left for Syria where they were killed,” says an old man. There are many stories like this along the narrow alleyways. All types of people, men and women alike, have been recruited to bo abroad. “It’s all over social media, where they exchange photos and information. The girls, for example, are attracted by the jihadists with blue eyes, 6 feet tall, beautiful – like Brad Pitt”, explains Karim Prim, a security officer in the neighbourhood.

The enlistment

Dozens of children run up and down the alleys all day. Some run after balls while others ride on skates and bicycles. For the little ones, the colourful streets are their home. For adolescents, they represent a prison. “The young people can’t find a way to get out of this situation. They lose themselves and so fall easily into the recruitment networks that convince them to leave and fight,” says Kamal.

There is no future here for the young people of El Principe. “In the barrio, I would like to change everything,” agrees a young girl. She is still not of age and, like her friends, she has left school. Her future, she tells us, is already written: “In ten years time I will be without work, without anything, without a home. On the street. We will get married, we will have a child, our husbands will cheat with other women. This will be our lives,” she says with regret.

Girls and boys in this disarray are left easily influenced, and end up in the recruitment network. “The last arrest was made here,” says Kamal, indicating to a yellow house behind him. “The person that they took was accused of having recruited young people to go and fight. The police have also found many weapons in this part of the barrio.” In the past few years, many operations by the Spanish authorities have promised to dismantle the numerous cells that have formed in the enclave.

“El Principe is favourable for radicalisation because it brings together all the right conditions,” explains Karim, “there is a lot of misery, a lack of infrastructure, security. There aren’t any police or institutions. There is a lot of, even too much, freedom.” But the socio-economic factors are not the only things enticing the younger people. “Some did not study, are marginalized and come from a poor family, but there are also those who are untied by Isis ideology and a desire to fight a jihad that does not exist,” continues Karim.

Living in El Principe

Plaza Padre Cervòs is at the beating heart of the neighbourhood. Just a few minutes before our arrival, a shooting took place in broad daylight. The victim was brought to the hospital by family members – police and ambulances do not enter El Principe. “It was an act of revenge,” someone says, careful not to give too many details away. Nobody here wants to speak; many simply deny that they saw anything. They fear for their safety and that of their family. “There is often fighting and shooting,” I’m told. “The situation here is unlivable.” “It is a sad reality that we are self-managed, without any laws,” another inhabitant adds. “Everything is missing here,” denounces Habiba, a mother of ten who has spent all her life in the neighbourhood.

There are years in which I don’t work. I have asked for help, but no one will listen – not even the social services. There are people here that have nothing to eat. We are left on the brink

A barrio abandoned, far away from the waterfront and the center of Ceuta. In the city, the residents speak about El Principe like it is something separate from them. There are even those who have never ventured into it. “How could I ever go there? There are weapons, terrorists,” a city resident states. “It’s dangerous!” adds another. “It isn’t a place that attracts me. I don’t believe that any citizen that isn’t a muslim would decide to pass through that area.” “Unfortunately, the leaving of young people to Syria and Iraq, and the arrests that take place, serve to solidify the dangerous image of El Principe and its inhabitants,” Karim says gravely. But the neighbourhood does not want the label of terrorism to stick. Hamid Adil, the first Muslim senator of El Principe, has stated: “Everything can change if people believe in themselves. You need to work hard in order to fight poverty, violence, discrimination and to improve the lives of young people. They don’t have great expectations for their future and we have to reverse this wheel.”

While we are leaving the hills and colourful houses of El Principe behind, Karim confides in me: “Our trouble begins now, with the return of the fighters, or with the liberation of those who are prisoners, seeing that Spain is one of the few countries that does not have a plan of deradicalisation.”

L'articolo El Principe, where a jihadist is born proviene da InsideOver.

In the heady days of its territorial expansion across Syria and Iraq, the so-called Islamic State (IS) drew in Western recruits like moths to an incandescent flame. For a group looking to internationalise its bloodthirsty cause, each defection was a propaganda coup.

That was then. A single stronghold, Baghouz, now remains in the hands of the broken caliphate. Its power is sapped, its cause diminished – and the fate of those who risked life and limb to join the group is unclear.

Shamima Begum is one such individual. Alongside two school friends, she left her East London home aged just fifteen to become a jihadi bride, marrying a Dutch fighter. Tracked down in a Syrian refugee camp, her story is one of suffering and hardship – she’s just given birth to a baby boy, having previously lost two young infants – but also bearing the burden of her own decisions.

Professing her innocence and claiming she poses no threat, Begum wants to return to the UK with her child. Making her case for repatriation in a spree of interviews, she says she is capable of rehabilitation. Her narrative is muddled, beseeching sympathy while talking glibly of IS’s ritual beheadings. She is everything you would expect of an indoctrinated 19-year-old – contrite, conflicted, and desperate.

Begum’s case and those like it have opened up fierce debate in the West about the return of IS recruits. The group fed on the impressionable minds of marginalized youngsters, weaponizing their discontent with Western society. Should these people be offered a chance at rehabilitation with the goal of rejoining the society they so robustly rejected?

In Shamima’s case, age must be a factor. At the time of her departure, she was – in the eyes of accepted societal norms – too young to drive, to drink, to consent to sex. It is not too far of a leap to believe she was capable of a mistake about ideology.

But she was, by her own frank admission, “okay” with the executions and other horrors wrought by IS. Youth may explain her insensitivity to such atrocities, but it does not equal ignorance – oblivious to the group’s butchery she was not.

The British Government has moved swiftly to strip Begum of her UK citizenship, arguing that “there must be consequences for those that back terror”.

She now finds herself in a legal no-man’s-land. A government can’t render an individual stateless under international law, but they can rescind nationality if citizenship is held jointly elsewhere – the Brits believe Shamima is a Bangladeshi national on her mother’s side (something Dhaka fiercely disputes).

As fractious as her return might be, good could come of Begum’s repatriation. Having lived and breathed the horrors of a militant religious society, her voice would be a formidable asset in tackling radicalization. Slickly produced videos convinced her to pursue an Islamist life – her account of that existence could help cast out the false promises of fundamentalism.

Tania Joya, a former IS bride who renounced her faith and fled the caliphate, argues that “humanism and secular values” are often not taught in conservative Muslim homes – Shamima’s experience could be a help break down those strictures.

And there is risk in shutting the door on her altogether. For many disenchanted youngsters, the British Government’s response is typical of an institution which cares little for them – one which would rather let a young mother fester in a squalid camp than offer a helping hand. If Shamima, or worse, her baby, were to die overseas, they risk becoming martyrs for the very cause the civilized world is trying to stamp out.

But deterrents are often most effective when they’re dull, uncompromising instruments. By barring Begum, a powerful message has been sent: when it comes to terrorism, there are no second chances. If she were to return and looked to propagate her adopted doctrine, the damage could be immense.

Marshalling the force of the criminal justice system could achieve the best results. Putting Shamima and other returnees on trial in their home countries would stamp the rule of law’s dominance over twisted ideology, and contest any claims of wilfully inhumane treatment. Presenting fundamentalism as flagrant criminal activity would also help degrade its allure in impressionable minds.

The legal avenue can be complicated though. Criminality undertaken overseas is often difficult to prove in domestic courts, with evidence sparse or inadmissible. The USA has seen some IS recruits imprisoned – one man received a 20 year sentence – but others have walked for lack of proof. Shamima says she is prepared to go to prison if her return is greenlighted – though there’s little evidence her time as an Islamist housewife breached the law.

Behind bars may seem the most sensible place for returning militants, but radicalism can be contagious for those festering in prison. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) says it has some 800 foreign fighters in its custody – US President Donald Trump argues they must be put on trial in their mostly European nations of origin. An influx of radicals converging with organised crime within prison walls may have catastrophic consequences.

In Shamima’s case, the prospects of her returning to her family are very slim. Even if the expected appeal against the government’s ruling is successful, the use of British resources to bring back the teenage mother and those like her has been ruled out.
With IS’s final enclave about to fall, a hard fought victory against the brutal caliphate beckons. At a devastating human cost, primarily in the Middle East, but also on the blood-stained streets of Europe and elsewhere, the civilised world is on the brink of winning the war against barbarism. But with thousands of their nationals now caught in limbo, the question is: can they win the peace?

L'articolo A Returning Problem proviene da InsideOver.