The fall of Saddam Hussein, which took place on April 9, 2003 with the arrival of US tanks in the center of Baghdad, had many effects in the Middle East region. The reason is essentially based on the fact that Iraq, without a solid government in power, has turned into a potential powder keg. The country, historically crossed by strong sectarian tensions and a clear division between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, has become a battleground both between the various internal actors and between regional powers.

The war of 2003 can therefore be considered as a detonator of the various Middle Eastern turbulences and that is why it has helped to change the face not only of Iraq but also of the history of the surrounding countries.

Baghdad in the Iranian orbit

During the era of Saddam Hussein, Iraq lived in an almost paradoxical situation. Although the country had a Shiite majority, the rais and his circle of loyalists in Baghdad belonged to the Sunni minority. A circumstance that has not failed to create tensions during the 24 years of regime. Saddam has often viewed with suspicion the emergence of Shiite political and religious groups, mainly based in the south of the country. This led, among other things, to an increase in the level of confrontation with Iran.

In the same year that the rais took the keys to the Iraqi government, an Islamic revolution in Tehran brought to power the Shiite theocracy led by the Ayatollahs. An eight-year war broke out between the two countries, at the end of which diplomatic relations were never fully restored.

When the US overthrew Saddam, Iraqi Shiites immediately pressed for strong representation in the new authorities. The first elections in 2005 saw the victory of Shiite parties, at the expense of Sunni ones. Iran was thus able to get its hands on Baghdad. An effect certainly not intended and almost certainly not calculated by the US on the eve of the war. Between the pro-Shiite Iraq and the Iranian theocracy, a strong convergence was born. In doing so, the Ayatollahs began to control large parts of Iraq’s new power.

The effects of this sudden change have also occurred at regional level. Tehran has begun planning the so-called “Shiite crescent” strategy. A project aimed at ideally linking its government with the new post-Saddam Iraq, with Syria governed by the Alawite Shiite Bashar Al Assad, then extending its sphere of influence to Beirut. Here, in fact, Iran has begun to exploit the axis more with the Lebanese Shiite movements and, in particular, with the Hezbollah.

This has created the basis for heated discussions throughout the region. Iranian activism has in fact sharpened the tug-of-war between Tehran and its historical antagonists. These include Saudi Arabia and the Gulf petromonarchies. The wars that broke out in the following decade, starting with the one in Yemen, are attributable to the confrontation at a distance between the Shiite theocracy of the Ayatollahs and the Sunni monarchies. It is also important to underline the growing fears for its own security by Israel, another historic rival of Iran in the Middle East.

The rise of Al Qaeda and jihadist terrorism

The radical change at the top of Baghdad has also had consequences within the Iraqi Sunni world. In some fringes, the concern has emerged to become slaves of the Shiite majority. A circumstance that has created, among other things, fertile ground for jihadist propaganda. Already in 2014, several terrorist groups were active in Iraq. Inside, not only Iraqis but also foreign fighters. Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist movement, took the reins and took advantage of the situation to launch its own holy war against US troops.

Emerging in this context was the figure of the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. Bin Laden himself gave him his approval for the birth of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The jihadist insurgency went on for several years, finding support especially in the province of Al Anbar, between Ramadi and Falluja. The situation was particularly serious in 2007, with the country effectively hostage to a sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. Al Zarqawi was killed in 2006, but his successors implemented Al Qaeda’s activities in Iraq.

The group will later become “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) and with the new leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi will be engaged since 2011 in the Syrian civil war, alongside Al Nusra and other Islamist groups opposed to the Assad government. ISIL will become better known by the acronym of Isis and the group will give birth to the Islamic State, capable of conquering the entire north of Iraq and large portions of Syria between 2014 and 2017. Today th

e Islamic State is no more, but the country continues to be crossed by jihadist tensions.

The duel between Washington and Tehran in Iraqi territory

The fight against ISIS has brought the presence of various international forces to Iraq. On the one hand, the US-led coalition, engaged in eastern Syria and northern Iraq against the caliphate. On the other, an alliance between several Shiite paramilitary groups, assisted by Iran. Behind the common intent to defeat the Islamic State, the struggle to contend for its influence in Baghdad has also emerged.

In the heart of Iraqi territory, therefore, Washington’s forces still coexist with forces close to Tehran. An incompatibility that emerged especially in 2020, when a US raid in Baghdad killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimaini, architect of the Shiite crescent project. In response, Iran bombed US bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraq has thus turned into the battleground between the United States and Iran. A tug of war that has contributed to fueling tensions throughout the Middle East and that has dragged within it also the other regional powers.

The unresolved Kurdish question

The 2003 war and the end of Saddam’s power gave the Kurds the opportunity to manage their territories independently. The new Iraqi constitution recognized Kurdistan as an autonomous region with Erbil as its capital. Here is the de facto seat of a state within a state. The Iraqi Kurds have entered into trade agreements and ties independently of Baghdad.

But beyond the internal events in Iraq, the autonomy granted to the Kurds has also reignited the issue in all the other countries in the region where the Kurds constitute an important minority. Starting with Turkey. President Erdogan, after an initial opening to dialogue, has chosen a hard line against all the main Kurdish organizations. In Ankara, the fear is linked to the fact that the Kurds present in Turkey could claim the same autonomy achieved in Iraq.

In Syria, too, the issue has been at the center of discussions several times. The government in Damascus, before 2011, viewed with suspicion the activism of Kurdish groups. When civil war broke out in the country, the Kurds themselves took advantage of the problems of the central government to organize themselves. The Self-Defense Forces founded the Rojava region. Currently, the groups that bring together Kurdish fighters are partly supported by the US and are based in eastern Syria, beyond the Euphrates. This is also contributing to tensions, with Ankara starting to target Kurdish forces in Syrian territory since 2016.

L'articolo Setting the Middle East ablaze: the Iraqi War, 20 years later proviene da InsideOver.

After having been constantly on the crest of the wave of international attention for at least five decades, Iraq has for some time been overshadowed in the vast pantheon of crises that characterize this unfortunate beginning of the twenty-first century.

Partially over the American war epic from 2003 to 2011, with the invasion, regime change, the inglorious – albeit partial – withdrawal of the US contingent, the bumpy transition of the country towards democracy, and, after a brief period of distraction in which the Middle East was crossed by the so-called Arab Spring., Iraq had returned forcefully and disturbingly to prominence with the rise of the Islamic State in 2014. Iran’s timely intervention with IRGC militias and subsequent anti-ISIS Coalition prevented the country’s complete collapse, sparing it a bleak future under one of the most brutal forms of political Islam in recorded history, and to which even the Taliban would have paled.

After the recovery of Mosul, in 2018 the spotlight on the country slowly died down. However, this does not mean that Iraq’s problems are over or that it cannot return in the future to stir the waters of the precarious region surrounding Mesopotamia.

Iraq, because of its strategic position, its political dysfunctionality, and the kaleidoscopic melting pot of ethnic, religious and national tensions it gathers, as well as the magnitude of the work of reconstruction and national reconciliation that it is called upon to face, retains intact all the potential to destabilize the Middle East again. To sum up, we must do exactly the opposite of what was done with Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989; the country is, and must remain, a special observer.

A Western policy that wants to call itself far-sighted should therefore be based on a wide-ranging approach. Basically, for once, prepare to prevent problems instead of dealing with them belatedly and clumsily when they have already exploded. It could do so by discreetly accompanying the country in the transition towards more effective governance models that reach the entire population of the country, launching concrete support for the immense work of material and infrastructural reconstruction and, finally, facilitating the impressive work of national reconciliation, without which the fate of the country will inevitably remain marked, in a negative way.

It is nothing short of illusory that the United States, the European Union and the other major international donors have at this moment the desire, concentration, lucidity and resources to start this investment in the stability, reconstruction, development and progress of the country which, to all intents and purposes, remains the cradle of human civilization. For sixteen months, the priority of the so-called Global West, that is to say the NATO/EU/G7 triad and various ententellati, is only one, Ukraine; And it is safe to assume that it will be for a long time to come.

Iraq will have to find its own way and, above all, do it elsewhere than the usual circuits.

The country continues to be burdened by two cumbersome neighbors, one standing for thousands of kilometers along its eastern border, namely Iran; the other, on the other hand, is not a neighbour in the geographical sense, but continues to be interested in Iraq, it is obviously the United States of America. While the former has capillary increased its presence in the most disparate ganglia of Iraqi power, the United States – distracted by many other, perhaps too many, issues – essentially operates a policy of interdiction towards Iran. They have little to offer Iraq but are content for the moment to hinder the “fraternal” embrace that Tehran intends to extend to it in an increasingly enveloping way.

In any case, imagining that Washington, or some Arab ruling house, could establish the kind of relations that Iraq will have in the future with Iran, with which it shares thousands of kilometers of border and millennial political, economic, commercial, cultural and religious relations, would seem, to say the least, presumptuous.

Every year 15 million Shiite pilgrims, the vast majority from Iran, go – mostly on foot – to the shrines of Najaf and Karbala for Ashura celebrations. These are numbers and related logistical-organizational needs that dwarf even the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. In the hundreds of kilometers they travel, pilgrims are cared for, fed and housed free of charge by the Shiite population of southern Iraq which, moreover, boasts miserable incomes. All this without the slightest incident. These ties are difficult to sever.

It would therefore be appropriate, but above all wise, to let the Iraqis decide what kind of relations they want to establish with Iran. Any interference will only put those Iraqis in difficulty, and there are many, even among the Shiites, who want to escape in part from the potentially suffocating embrace of Tehran.

However, the rapidly changing global and regional dynamics could broaden Iraq’s prospects.

The international system is undergoing a paradigm shift. After thirty years of unipolar Western leadership led by the United States, the so-called “world order based on rules“, the latter however dictated and, where necessary, interpreted exclusively by Washington, we are slowly moving towards a still undefined multipolar system that so far has only one point of convergence: no country – in the new competition between great powers that is emerging between the USA, Russia, China and the EU must feel bound and obliged to adhere to the peculiar vision of the world brought by one of the opposing sides according to the binary logic, which is also being reaffirmed, of “either with me or against me”.

The so-called Global Rest, or all the other countries outside the Global West triad, a heterogeneous grouping, confused and without a precise agenda, still wants to remain on the margins of this clash. The latter seems to be the only aspect that unites them.

The Middle East is no exception, with increasing frequency turning its gaze to Asia. This also opens up excellent opportunities for Iraq. The Middle East region is rapidly embracing this global paradigm shift. Several Arab countries, some close allies (at least until recently) of the United States, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, aspire to join the BRICS. The latter is the group of countries composed of Brazil, India, Russia, China and South Africa that is increasingly emerging as the authentic alter ego of the G7.

Several oil and gas producers in the region are concretely considering commercializing their energy resources with the Chinese yuan, abandoning the dollar.

China is intensifying relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council and has just achieved diplomatic success – which has strengthened its prestige, authority and moral suasion – facilitating the resumption of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, one of the cornerstones for stability in the area. Iraq – if it plays its cards right, launches a minimum of reforms, and initiates a credible national reconciliation – could benefit from a possible virtuous circle that the new season of Saudi-Iranian relations could generate. A serious and lasting revival of economic relations between the two giants of the area could have a multiplier effect also for the other neighboring economies, and Iraq should fully figure in it, also in the perspective of the inevitable diversification of its economy that will be imposed by the progressive abandonment of fossil fuels.

In summary, a region constantly characterized for decades by the so-called Pax Americana, now seems to be moving towards a sort of Asian Pax Economica administered – discreetly, and certainly not muscularly as the US is used to doing – by China. Several countries in the area could positively grasp this non-trivial difference and precisely Iraq figure among them.

Finally, the conflict in Ukraine should plausibly determine the necessary reorientation of China’s major infrastructure and economic project of the Belt and Road Initiative, better known as the New Silk Road. The northern axis of this vast project, namely the large network of land infrastructure and trade corridors that should connect East Asia, Central Asia, Russia, Eastern and Western Europe will presumably be compromised, we do not yet know for how long. This situation will inevitably give greater prominence to the southern axis that should transit through South-West Asia, or the Middle East, where Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey could suddenly acquire a much greater importance than initially imagined.

If this were to materialise, it would be an opportunity for Iraq that should not be missed.

L'articolo The role of Iraq in XXI century geopolitics proviene da InsideOver.

In May 2021, after eight years of military presence, the French President Macron announced officially the gradual withdrawal of the French troops from the Sahel and the termination of operation Barkhane. The decision came amidst the expansion of Jihadi violence in the whole Sahel region and the inability of the local States to quell those groups responsible for the violence. Indeed, since 2013, the international community has delivered a large amount of military help to the sahelian States, encouraging local initiatives to foster security cooperation such as the G5 Sahel in addition to deploying troops to combat terrorist groups. In spite of this, jihadi groups have been able to not only maintain themselves but even more to grow in strength and power in spite of a high level of attrition and losses, wreaking havoc among the local States. Among them, the two most powerful ones: the Jammaat Nusrat Al Islam wal Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and the Muslims) commonly known as JNIM affiliated with Al Qaeda and its archrival, the Islamic State in the Grand Sahara (ISGS). Today, and observing the current evolutions in Afghanistan with the rapid advances from the Taliban, one can only wonder if this what to be expected in the Sahel. In order to understand that, one needs to look closely at those organizations, their strategies and aims.

The Jamaat Nusrat Al Islam wal Muslilimeen – JNIM: The strategic threat

In November 2013, and shortly after the final break up between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) which was to become the Islamic State (IS) or Daech, Ayaman Al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda supreme emir sent a letter to all Al Qaeda affiliates around the world. A blue print for Al Qaeda strategy and certainly one of the most important documents released by the organization, it outlined the strategy and behavior its affiliates were to follow in order to establish an Islamic caliphate which was to be considered a long term goal rather than an immediate one. Thus, Al Zawahiri instructed his organization to target the United States and its allies all over the world however the goal was to exhaust its enemies and primarily the local allies and regimes in a conflict of attrition rather than achieving a decisive victory over the US or a major power, being conscious that this would be nearly impossible to achieve. It also called the affiliates to be close to the local populations, to preach to them, to help them and under no circumstances to commit acts of violence against them in order to gain their support. It also called to work and unite with all other Armed jihadi organizations including those not close to Al Qaeda as well as to those which were not Jihadi at all, as long as they were opposed to the regimes in place, they could be considered as allies. This strategy shows the high level of maturity acquired by Al Qaeda in terms of strategic thinking and which led the organization to posit itself on the long term interests and goals rather than the short ones.

The JNIM strategy echoes almost word by word the plan outlined by Al Zawahiri. Indeed, its leader, Iyadh Ghali, a major local Touareg figure initially created the organization Ansar Al Dine in 2012 which was allied with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a transnational organization affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Sahel led by the Algerian Yahia Abou Houmam. In 2015, those two joined their forces and allied with the powerful Jihadi organization Al Mourabitoune, initially a splinter and rival of AQIM , led by the notorious Mokhtar Belmokhatar while cooperating in the center of Mali with Katibat AL MECINA led by the popular Amadou Koufa. In 2017, all those groups merged together and gave birth to what is today known as the JNIM led by Iyadh Ghali. Ever since, they have also been cooperating closely in Burkina Faso with the local jihadi group Ansarul Islam. Moreover, in 2018, the JNIM entered into talks, which eventually failed, with the ISGS to cooperate together.

In parallel to this, the JNIM has followed a careful strategy of socialization and proximity with the local populations and is known for maintaining order and law in wherever localities it controls. The JNIM also abstained from committing any acts of mass violence against the locals. Instead, the JNIM has been actively involved in mediations among the various ethnic communities in Mali, filing in a State void. They also played an important role in the management of local natural resources making the JNIM an important economic actor. Towards the local governments, the JNIM has launched a strategy of harassment and exhaustion against their troops all over the Sahel, conducting massive attacks against them while also attacking international troops including the French Barkhane force, the MINUSMA and others. However, It has also shown that violence was not an end in itself and that it was open to compromise, showing its ability to make short term concessions to gain long term ones. This reinforced the positive image of the JNIM among some local populations and its power.

Thus in 2020, the JNIM agreed to the principle of negotiations with the Malian government to end the war. And strikingly, when one looks at the demands made by the JNIM, we can only be struck by the fact that they are similar to ones of the Taliban in the context the US-Taliban deal which is currently being implemented.

Also, in late 2020, the JNIM struck a major exchange of prisoners with Bamako in which nearly 200 of its fighters were released from prison in addition to millions of euros in ransom in exchange of the JNIM releasing 3 western hostages. This was perceived a major success as never such a deal has occurred in the whole region. This played a role in reinforcing the JNIM supremacy in the region. This deal also occurred in the context of the exhaustion of the Ouagadougou government which was unable to counter the JNIM and its allies, and de facto agreed to a truce in Northern Burkina Faso. Furthermore, All this took place in the context of a one long year conflict between the JNIM and ISGS which also saw the victory of the JNIM and the defeat of ISGS.

Thus, and in spite of heavy losses and the killing of almost all of its founders including Yahia Abou Houmam, the number 2 man of the JNIM and of AQIM supreme emir Abdelamalek Droukdal in addition to hundreds of fighters, the JNIM has emerged as the most powerful jihadi organization in the Sahel. Indeed, all those losses, however substantial, never really affected its long term operational capabilities and the organization was always able to continue its expansion and to regenerate itself with new leaders rising. This eventually led the JNIM to impose itself as the most powerful Al Qaeda affiliates in the region shifting the epicenter of Jihadism towards the Sahel and marginalizing its North African acolytes, who are currently in a virtual state of collapse. The JNIM is certainly today the most powerful jihadi organization, very well entrenched in the local populations and thus more dangerous than any other jihadi organization.

Putting itself on the long term, believing that time is on its side, the JNIM has followed a very articulated strategy of harassment and entrenchment which proved very successful and insured it resilience. As a matter of fact, many argue that the Iyadh Ghali is modeling his strategy on the Taliban in Afghanistan with the successes that we can see. Thus, in the context of the French withdrawal, and the inability of the Malian army nor of other armies to stop the JNIM with the exception of the Chadian army, the future of the Sahel is raising major concerns at the regional and international level. Those concerns are furthered by the fact that the ISGS although smaller has proved itself as well very resilient and even more violent.

The Islamic State in the Grand Sahara: The Khilafa at all cost

The Islamic State in the Grand Sahara (ISGS) was created in May 2015 after its founder, Adnane Abou Walid al-Sahraoui split from the Al Mourabitoune from which he was the number 2man. Indeed, al-Sahraoui, has initially joined the MUJWA (Movement for Unicity and Jihad in Western Africa), considered then as one of the most radical jihadi groups in the sahel between 2011 and 2013. In 2013, the MUJWA joined forces with another powerful radical organization Those who sign with blood (El-Mouaguiine Biddam) led by the notorious Mokhtar Belmokhtar who had separated himself from AQIM due to major disputes with its supreme leader Abdelmalek Droukdal. This merger led to the birth of the Al Mourabitoune organization in 2013, affiliated with Al Qaeda, but more spectacular and violent than AQIM. Al Mourabitoune was among others responsible for the mass hostage taking of Ain Amenas in Algeria in January 2013 during which over 700 people were taken hostages and released only after a violent assault form the Algerian special forces.

By 2014, when ISIL proclaimed the establishment of the caliphate and the changed its name to IS, many jihadi groups from around the world faced major divisions between those who wished to remain loyal to Al Qaeda and those who wanted to join the newly created IS. Al Sahraoui whose jihadi trajectory denotes one of further radicalization at each step, argued strongly in favor of Al Mourabitoune joining the more radical and extremist IS. However, Belmokhtar a veteran of the Afghan jihad of the 80’s and a long term loyalist of Al Qaeda, refused. Thus in the Spring of 2015, Al Sahraoui faction split from Al Mourabutoune and pledged its allegiance to IS.

At this point one should note that IS is very different from all point of views from Al Qaeda. Indeed, for IS, the caliphate is an immediate objective and so is the creation of State structures modeled along Islam as it did in Syria-Iraq with the creation of a proto-State between 2014and 2017. This was expected by IS leadership to provoke a sort of electroshock all over the world among the Muslims to unite, join IS and overthrow the regime in place.

Also while Al Qaeda argues for a defensive Jihad, IS argues for an offensive one which aim is universal. As a result and becaus the caliph is supposed to be the head of the Umma, the community of the Muslims, anyone and any organization who/which does not pledge his allegiance to him is a mourtad (traitor), including the jihadi organizations such as Al Qaeda which need to be fought and destroyed. Moreover, and while Al Qaeda ideology is Salafism jihadism, IS ideology is neo-takfirism which is the most extreme branch of jihadism. Thus, for the neo-takfirists, those who do not practice pure and Islam, including civilians are often to be treated as infidels and traitors. In that context, IS does not refrain from exercising extreme violence against civilians.
From there however, and initially when Al Sahraoui created the ISGS, he was followed only by a small number of supporters as he was relatively unknown compared to the massive figures that Ghali, Houmam or Belmkohtar were. Also after some initial clashes with Al Qaeda affiliates, ISGS refrained from attacking them and instead withdrew to the eastern border of Mali towards the region called the 3 borders (zone des trois frontieres).

Almost insignificant in 2015-2017, it received little attention from anyone including IS leadership itself in Raqqa. Indeed, IS recognized ISGS as its affiliate only in September 2016, that is almost a year and half after it was created. Until then, IS recognized only Boko Haram which became known as the Islamic State in Western Africa Province ( ISWAP) as its affiliate in the region. This recognition of ISGS took place only in the context of the battle of Mossul when IS decided to recognize as many affiliate as possible including the then rather obscure Al Sahraoui. Nonetheless, it is only in 2017 that ISG rose to prominence, after a successful and almost accidental ambush against US special troops in tongo tongo. This ambush allowed Sahraoui to gain his “letters of nobility” among jihadists and public attention in the Sahel and thus support from the radical fringes in the Sahel. Also he had until then been rather spared from Barkhane pressure as the French troops were more concentrated on the Al Qaeda affiliates which allowed the ISGS to grow in numbers and strength.

Galvanized by the success of the ambusg, new recruits poured into ISGS while also many JNIM fighters defected to al-Sahraoui. This allowed ISGS to launch a series of violent and spectacular attacks in the Sahel region from 2017 onward.
In term of his relations towards the local populations, initially Al-Sahraoui showed continuity with Al Qaeda, in the sense that while officially part of IS, he did not exercise any particular violence against the locals. However, starting from 2018, many testimonies emerged accounting for “a radicalization” of ISGS towards the local populations including beheadings of civilians suspected of being informants. By 2019-2020, many large massacres against civilian populations were committed by the ISGS. One should note here that the JNIM systematically denied being involved in these massacres and condemned them. Moreover, and towards the JNIM, and while the two tried to cooperate in 2018-2019, the fact that ISGS was pushing its grip towards central and northern Mali, JNIM historical territories, its harsh treatment of the local populations, the encouragement of JNIM loyalists to defect to ISGS and the condemnation of the JNIM-Bamako negotiations led eventually by the spring 2020 to clashes that escalated to full scale war in the summer 2020. The ISGS went as far as declaring the takfir (apostasy) on the JNIM. However weaker, less well and structured than JNIM, and under now pressure form Barkhane and other military operations, ISGS was weakened and pushed back to the 3 borders area. In spite of this, ISGS has shown resilience and remains able to launch extremely violent and bloody attacks all over the Sahel from its strongholds. This strength of ISGS in spite of those setbacks is reinforced by the comparatively enduring weakness of the local governments.

To that extent and while weaker and less well entrenched than the JNIM, and focused on immediate tactical goals rather on long ones, the ISGS has proved nonetheless extremely resilient and dangerous. The organization has proved willing to attack all its perceived as enemies without distinction (Sahelian States, Algeria, JNIM etc) and using all the means of violence including beheadings or suicide Bombings which were never used before in the region.

What lays ahead

In the context of weak States and ever rising of powerful jihadi organizations, the French gradual withdrawal from the Sahel raises major concerns including the possibility of a major security vacuum. So far the Sahelian States, with rare exceptions, have proved to be totally unable to stop on their own these jihadi organizations. Thus many fear that we can expect a collapse of these after the end of Barkhane and a reproduction of the Afghan scenario in the Sahel. However, several points have to be made. First, while extremely powerful and well entrenched, those jihadi organizations do not amount to more than 2000 men according to various estimates. Other groups are way more powerful than them. Second, one would note that these nourish themselves from State weakness more than anything else. Thus, the reinforcement of the State capacities, local, regional and international cooperation coupled with a real attempt to address the needs of the local populations would certainly play a major role in preventing such a scenario as those groups often nourish themselves on local populations grievances in the context of States weaknesses more than on their own strength.

L'articolo Is Afghanistan Present Sahel’s future? proviene da InsideOver.

Reportage / Religion 12.03.2021

Among The Christians of Iraq

In Qaraqosh before ISIS there were 50,000 Christians. Twenty thousand fled the fury of the Islamic State

Fausto Biloslavo

The burly engineer has the task of repairing the statue, which comes from the proud Christian village of Karemlash. Here the Caliphate’s cutthroats defaced the symbols of the “infidels”, even breaking open tombs to plunder anything of value. “I am a Christian and I am convinced that we must not leave the Middle East, the land of our fathers,” stresses Kadifa in a sad voice, the tone of one who still feels persecuted today.

On the footbridge at the entrance to the village of Karemlash, north of Mosul, the yellow and white Vatican flags fly together with those of Iraq. Two large photos of Pope Francis rise above the street bearing the word “welcome”. Christians in arms of the Nineveh Protection Units guard the small town and patrol the entrances. With weapons, camouflage jackets and special corps equipment, the some 500-600 men were trained by the Americans and answer to Baghdad in the chain of command.

Father Paolo guides us through the rubble of Karemlash, recently liberated from Islamic State. The church is as good as new, but the bell tower still bears the marks of the explosions and the cross is bent in half. “We decided to leave it like this to bear witness and not forget what the Christian community has suffered,” the priest explains in perfect Italian.

The tolling of the bell which has remained intact calls the faithful to prayer. Inside the church a nun plays the organ, accompanying the choir of young Christian girls wearing a light white lace veil over her head. This is the same choir that will sing for the Pope amid the rubble of Mosul.

Qaraqosh is the heart of Christianity in the Nineveh Plains. The church of the Immaculate Conception is over a thousand years old. Outside, a photo of Pope Francis rises above the arches devastated by the bullets fired by terrorists, who used the square as a shooting range. The church is packed with worshipers for the first Sunday mass at 7 a.m. The ancient vaults, the clouds of incense, the priest wearing the robes of the past, the marks made by bursts of machine-gun fire, the portraits of Jesus and the saints, all remind us of the faith of the Christians in the catacombs. The faithful elder who can barely stand upright, the brave women telling their beads, the children with lighted candles at the side of the altar and the ringing “amen” that echoes when the faithful make the sign of the cross all heighten the sense of expectancy for the Pope’s visit.

50,000 Christians lived in Qaraqosh before ISIS. Some 20,000 fled mainly to Lebanon and Jordan to try to reach Europe or the United States. Of the others, 90% have returned and are rebuilding their destroyed or looted homes, but there is no work and their safety is always uncertain. 45.53% of the Christians have returned to the Nineveh Plains. The pontifical foundation Aid to the Church in Need has invested almost 50 million euros, particularly in rebuilding their homes. Occupation by the Caliphate destroyed or damaged 369 churches and 14,035 Christian homes in the Nineveh Plains alone.

And when he crosses the threshold he will find himself faced with a kind of “museum”, tangible proof of the persecution of Christians. A blow from a scimitar split the head of a statue of St. Joseph in two. Father Ammar almost weeps over a little headless baby Jesus beheaded by Isis. The Islamic cutthroats scarred sacred portraits, burned books of the Christian faith, and vented their fury on an ancient wooden cross, breaking it in two. Over 120,000 Christians fled within a few days, in August 2014, in the face of the terrible advance of the black flags of ISIS.

Today the new threat casti g its shadow over the Christian presence is that of the Shabak, the Shiite ethnic group of the Nineveh Plains. They are seeking to expand by buying or conquering lands with the support of the militias. On the main street of the Christian town of Bartella, a photo of the Iranian Pasdaran general, Qassim Suleimani killed in January last year by an American drone in Baghdad, is posted on every lamp post.

L'articolo Among The Christians of Iraq proviene da InsideOver.

This report was produced thanks to a contribution from Aid to The Church in Need

(Mosul) Engraved on the vault of the entrance, indelible over time, is a white cross. A lean man in his forties with shaven head comes to open the iron door in the ancient alley where you can only pass one at a time. Majdi Hamid Naqash , 45 years old, was the first Christian to return to Mosul after the city’s liberation from the clutches of the Caliphate.

“We were driven out and they destroyed the Christian symbols, but now the only thing that matters is that we are coming back to live in our city again,” points out Majdi Hamid Naqash. His family home, standing for over a century, was damaged in the fighting. The UN refugee agency gave him a hand by rebuilding some walls and painting them a cloying lilac colour. The lonely and courageous Christian is having a hard time, he is jobless, but he is determined not to give up. “Where should I go? Live as an illegal immigrant in Europe and end up under a bridge?” Naqash wonders. “My Muslim neighbours bring me some food and the church helps me. I’m no longer afraid. ISIS is finished.” Islamic State had seized his house marking it with the Arabic letter “nun” which means Nazarene, or infidel. All around still lies the rubble of the furious battle in the last redoubt of the Islamic State in ancient Mosul, west of the Tigris, a tangle of alleyways and houses.

The Christian, who has placed an image of the Madonna on his front door, is part of a small group of 70 families who have returned to Mosul.

A fraction of the Christian presence of the past.

“My dear Christian brothers and sisters from Iraq, who have testified to your faith in Jesus amid harsh sufferings, I cannot wait to see you,” the Pope announced yesterday in a video message on the eve of his departure for Iraq. “I am honoured to encounter a Church of martyrs. Thank you for your testimony!” Francis lands today in Baghdad for the historic journey to the cradle of civilisation and Christianity, which will last three days. A capital under heavy security measures, with the churches guarded by the Iraqi special forces in black uniforms is awaiting the Holy Father’s arrival. The authorities have proclaimed a total lockdown with the pretext of the virus, but in actual fact it is a measure to ensure maximum safety for Francis. In his heartfelt message, the Pope recalled the Christians who have undergone “harsh trials” and “images of houses destroyed, churches desecrated ” as well as “the wounds of affections left behind and abandoned homes”.

The message is addressed to all those Iraqis who have suffered from war and destruction: “Now I come to your blessed and wounded land as a pilgrim of peace and a penitent.” The Pope explained that he is arriving in Iraq, “in search of fraternity, animated by the desire to pray together and to walk together, also with brothers and sisters of other religious traditions, under the sign of our Father Abraham, who unites Muslims, Jews and Christians in one family.” Francis also spoke of the Yazidis, massacred by the ISIS cutthroats. “Finally I will be among you,” announced the Pope, who wants to bring “the affectionate caress of the whole Church” to the persecuted Christians of Iraq. And finally, he ended the video message with the traditional salute “Alsalam eleikum”, peace be with you.

During his visit to Mosul, the Pope will pray in the rubble of the great battle in the “capital” of the Caliphate, which destroyed churches and mosques. Unesco is spending 50 million dollars donated by the Arab Emirates to renovate the Square of the Four Churches, reduced to stone skeletons in the old part of the city, as well as the al-Nouri mosque, not far away, where Abu Bakr al Baghdadi proclaimed the Caliphate.

Isis used Al Tahera, the church of the Pure built in 1862, as a Taliban court and fearsome jail. The black lettering, “no entry by order of Islamic State”, still appears on the walls riddled with bullets. In front of the gutted dome, Anas Zeyad, a young engineer who is leading the work in the field, says, “We have finished removing 2500 tons of rubble. Ten ready-to-use explosive traps and a mined vest were found among the rubble” for suicide bombers. Used as an ISIS base, it was bombed by the allies supporting the advance of Iraqi troops. It will take another two years’ work to restore the Square of the Four Churches, the mosques at Nouri and the leaning minaret to its former glory.

On Sunday, Pope Francis will kneel before the impressive amphitheatre of war that has not spared the places of worship. Thanoon Yahya Yusuf is a blacksmith born in Mosul, but his family descends from the Christians of the ancient crusader stronghold of Acre, now an Israeli city. His brothers and sisters have emigrated to the United States, Jordan and Australia. On his living-room wall he has hung a picture of the Last Supper with Christ and the disciples. Many Christian friends have remained in Kurdistan, in northern Iraq, after fleeing in the face of the brutal advance of Islamic State in 2014. “I tried to explain that they could return, but you can’t persuade people to change heaven for hell,” Yusuf explains. And on the Pope’s visit, which he is awaiting with pride and joy, he admits with a joke not so far from reality, that “even if the Messiah arrived, the Christians who fled would not return to Mosul”.

Between the lockdown and security measures, Iraqis will see the Pope on TV. Not everyone is applauding the visit. Abu Ali al Askari, security officer of the Shiite militia, Kataeb Hezbollah, praised the launching of rockets two days ago against an American base. Washington has announced massive retaliation. Al Askari, after complimenting the “Iraqi resistance”, said he was “not very optimistic about the Pope’s trip” raising doubts “about inter-confessional dialogue in Ur”, the home of Abraham and a crucial stage of the visit.

By contrast, the Shiite brigades of the Guardians of the Blood, who on 16 February launched rockets against the American base in Erbil, where the Italian compound is also located, have welcomed “the visit of the Pope of the Vatican, a man who deserves respect” . And they have announced a truce during Francis’s trip to Iraq.

Bashar Matti Warda, Archbishop of Erbil, reveals that “some religious fundamentalists are taking a hostile attitude on social media towards the Pope’s trip. Anything coming from the West is considered a crusade. These people see the Pope as the king of the crusaders arriving in the country as a missionary.”

In Baghdad this evening, Pope Francis, after his official visit to the Iraqi presidency, will meet the Christians in the cathedral of the Mother of Hope, where in 2010 jihadists massacred over 42 worshippers and 2 priests with bursts of machinegun fire during mass. The large drawings on the wall that protect the church depict the smiling pontiff with doves of peace flying around him. Father Majid Atalla will welcome Francis and he explains that, “The number of Christians has fallen due to wars and persecution, but we have to continue to bear witness to our faith in this land. This is why we need the Pope, to come among us to give us strength, courage and peace.”

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Al-Qaeda’s second-in-command Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah – who went by the name Abu Muhammad al-Masri (“the Egyptian”), was allegedly gunned down in Tehran on August 7 by Israeli agents operating on behalf of US officials, according to the Daily Mail. 

Al-Masri’s Record of Terror

Twenty-two years ago, al-Masri masterminded devastating attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people and injured thousands more.

He also allegedly ordered an attack in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002 that murdered 13 Kenyans and three Israeli tourists.

Yet as of Friday, he was still listed on the FBI’s most wanted terrorist list with a $10 million bounty on his head.

The Secret Death of al-Qaeda’s Second-in-Command

It remains unclear what precise role the US may have played in al-Masri’s death but they are known to have been tracking his movements for years.

The death of al-Qaeda’s number two has remained a secret until now.

Ordering the assassination of senior al-Qaeda leaders certainly has an impact on the terrorist group’s ability to initiate attacks against Western targets. Since the death of leader Osama Bin Laden in 2011, al-Qaeda has been overshadowed by the Islamic State (ISIS), with the latter taking advantage of the former’s demise by making huge gains in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

ISIS also succeeded in capturing large swathes of Iraq and Syria, something that al-Qaeda was never able to do.

Earlier this year, the US confirmed the death of al-Qaeda’s affiliate leader in Yemen, Qassim al-Rimi. Assassinating al-Rimi – who served as the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula – also hampered the organization’s ability to orchestrate operations against the West, American and European counter-terrorist experts told the New York Times.

Al-Qaeda is Still a Threat to America

However, considering al-Qaeda remains an active terrorist group to this day, this only proves that assassinating these groups’ leaders only has a short-term impact. As Max Fisher of the New York Times suggests, terrorist organizations depend upon a steady stream of recruits and a pool of potential leaders. Support among civilians in areas in which the groups primarily operate also makes them more stable, by expanding support networks and helping them to safely retrench when necessary.

South Asia expert at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson Center Michael Kugelman told DW in 2016 that it is too early to write off al-Qaeda. He added that the group remains extremely relevant in South Asia, despite claims from the U.S. Government that it has largely disappeared from the region. There is no solid evidence that al-Qaeda has become an almost obsolete terrorist group.

Al-Masri’s Changes Nothing for al-Qaeda

In February, al-Qaeda claimed in an audio recording made before al-Rimi’s death that it had ordered a Saudi military officer to carry out the shooting at an American military base in Florida in December 2019 that killed eight sailors and wounded eight people. Considering there was sufficient evidence that the gunman, Second Lt. Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani, had spoken to al-Qaeda officials before the incident, many experts concluded that Alshamrani was indeed acting on behalf of the organization.

The US has deployed the strategy of killing terrorist leaders in Syria, Somalia, Pakistan’s tribal regions and Yemen. They more than likely pursue this option because it is cheap, low risk and allows American leaders to credibly say that they are doing something about terrorism. Bin Laden’s assassination provided Barack Obama with a significant boost in May 2011, with 56 percent of Americans approving of the job he was doing at that time.

Until al-Qaeda’s support networks drastically decrease in size, the group will continue to remain a considerable threat to the US. Assassinating these organizations’ senior leaders definitely sets them back, but such moves are not enough to severely weaken terrorist groups in the long-term. The US is facing a lose-lose situation, no matter how hard it tries to defeat terrorism.

The Pentagon needs to explore alternative strategies.

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Fox News reports that US President Donald Trump and the Pentagon intend to cut the number of American troops in Iraq from 5,200 to about 3,500. A US official confirmed that the Iraqi government supports Washington’s troop reduction.

Trump informed reporters that he “looks forward to the day when we don’t have to be there.” The remarks came during an Oval Office meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi.

Trump is Withdrawing the Troops for Electoral Reasons

The announcement comes at a critical time for the Trump administration and it could have a significant domestic impact. There is a presidential election fast approaching and the US President’s latest decision regarding troop reductions in Iraq has come alongside many other significant foreign policy successes. These include the UAE-Israeli agreement and the recent pact between Kosovo and Serbia.

Yet the upcoming US presidential election means that the timing of these decisions is no coincidence, as they help reinforce the image that Trump is a ‘peaceful president.’ Also, if Trump does lose the election as so many opinion polls predict, he has a limited amount of time to achieve many of his aims.

The US President is not withdrawing American troops from Iraq altogether, and he would be wise to do so for now. Obama made the mistake of completely withdrawing US troops from Iraq in 2011, only to return years later to tackle the threat that the Islamic State (IS) posed to the country’s stability. The New York Times discovered that ISIS has mobilized as many as 18,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria. These sleeper cells have carried out sniper attacks, ambushes, kidnappings and assassinations against community leaders and security forces.

ISIS Remains a Threat to Iraq

ISIS has a substantial war chest of as much as $400 million and the terrorist group uses extortion to finance clandestine operations. Farmers in northern Iraq who refuse to pay have their crops burned. Therefore, Trump has managed to balance the need to reduce troop numbers for electoral purposes whilst preserving Iraq’s security.

There are other threats to Iraqi sovereignty beyond ISIS. The US wants to preserve its hegemony in Iraq to counter the threat that Iran and Turkey pose to the Middle East in general. In September 2019, a drone and missile attack targeted an Aramco oil facility in Saudi Arabia. Houthi rebels, known to be supported by Iran, claimed responsibility for the attack.

Michael Rubin, scholar at the Middle East Institute and author of Dancing with the Devil, told Al-Ahram Weekly that attacks by Iranian-sponsored militias will ensure the US remains in the Middle East.

The Iraq War is Adding Trillions to US Debt

A recent online presidential meeting between Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reaffirmed both leaders’ commitment to preserving Iraq’s sovereignty. It will be harder for them to interfere in Iraq’s affairs if the US remains there.

Regardless, the US cannot remain in Iraq forever due to the impact the Iraq War has had on America’s finances. The Balance found as of August 2020 that the conflict added $1 trillion to the US’s debt, which included increases to the base budgets of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Veterans Administration (VA). The DOD base budget grew by $193 billion and the VA budget expanded by $47.7 billion.

Successive US presidents will find it difficult to justify spending billions of dollars on overseas operations if the results do not match the funding required for them. At what stage does the US say enough is enough?

Until the threat that ISIS, Iran and Turkey pose to Iraq has been tackled, the presence of US troops in Iraq will continue to have a positive impact. Trump is right to suggest that America cannot fight endless wars, but Iraq must be able to defend itself in the future. It is clear that the day when US soldiers can leave Iraq forever has not yet arrived.

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Al-Jazeera reports on a study conducted by the US Army War College, which suggests that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) remains a “persistent threat” in Libya and could rise again unless the nation’s ongoing conflict is brought to an end.

It added that the terrorist group retained its capacity to launch “small-scale” attacks in Libya, which is a shift from its previously predominant tactic of “shock and awe raids.”

ISIL is Still Active in Libya

Considering the UN and Turkish-backed Government of National Accord’s (GNA) armed forces succeeded in defeating ISIL in May 2016 in the strategic city of Sirte, this is an alarming development. The study suggests that most of the terrorist group’s activities have moved to Fezzan in the southern Libyan desert.

If ISIL was going to succeed in expanding its number of recruits, then Libya is an easy target for the terrorist group for many reasons.

Firstly, the country has been torn apart by a civil war conducted by two opposing armies. One of the main rival forces in Libya is the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar, which has the support of Russia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The GNA, the LNA’s main adversary, has the backing of the US, the UN and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. If the international community should learn any lessons from the last decade, then it is that IS’s recruitment strategy thrives during civil wars.

As The Atlantic’s David Ignatius argues, ISIS’s rise in Syria was made possible by several factors. The terrorist group began as a bottom-up movement, with mosques gathering their own young recruits to defend their local areas.

Syria Showed How Civil Wars are a Breeding Ground for Terror

Because of a lack of US intervention, the Free Syrian Army, whose stated goal was to overthrow Assad’s government once the Syrian civil war started in 2011, received inadequate training. Although the US tried to bolster covert Syrian missions with an overt “train and equip” program backed by $500 million in congressional support, the initiative proved to be a disaster. President Obama terminated it in October 2014. This meant that Jabhat al-Nusra and his ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates were able to fill the vacuum left by the moderate opposition in Syria.

Poverty is another factor that can cause terrorist groups like ISIS to prosper, and according to the Index Mundi, about one-third of Libyans live at or below the national poverty line. The country suffers from widespread power outages, caused by shortages of fuel for power generations. Living conditions, including access to drinking water, medical services and safe housing have declined since 2011. A study conducted by International Alert in 2016 discovered that poverty, desperation and the desire for revenge pushed many Syrians to join ISIS, particularly among adolescent boys and young men between the ages of 12 and 24. There is no reason why many Libyans today would not feel the same way as many Syrians did back then.

The Libyan War Must End as Soon as Possible

Therefore, it is vital that the Libyan people are involved in a peace settlement between Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. As Thomas M. Hill of the US Institute of Peace argues, Libyan citizens have played an active role in making peace a reality through initiatives like successfully convincing some youth in the city of Misrata to quit the local militia.

Fehim Tastekin of Al-Monitor argues that Turkey could acquiesce to Russian control over the city of al-Jufra in exchange for Turkish control over Sirte. However, carving up Libya between Russia and Turkey could only boost ISIS’s support further. That is why it is vital that US President Donald Trump intervenes in this conflict to prevent Putin and Erdoğan from exerting their influence over the war-torn state.

Because of recent history, there are many reasons to believe that the findings of the US Army War College could come true. It is vital that all the superpowers that have a stake in the Libyan conflict come to an agreement soon, and that the Libyan people are consulted on any progress toward peace. The worst outcome for Libya right now is if many of its citizens fall under ISIS’s influence again.

L'articolo ISIS Could Re-emerge in Libya if Conflict Continues proviene da InsideOver.

Six months ago, US President Donald Trump ordered the death of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad. It was a decision that provoked mixed responses throughout the world and almost sparked a conflict between Iran and the US. That is because he was a significant figure in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who directed the nation’s overseas proxy forces and military operations.

Voa News reports that General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., the commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), said on Wednesday during a webinar with a Washington-based think tank called the Middle East Institute, that Soleimani’s death has had ‘a significant effect in establishing and reestablishing a rough form of deterrence in the theater.’

Iraq remains vulnerable to Iran’s influence

Seventeen years after the Iraq War, the country remains vulnerable to Iran’s influence. The Islamic State (IS) is also continuing its relentless terror campaign in Iraq. However, many Iraqis remain divided over whether American troops should remain in their nation. Trump’s desire is for US soldiers to return home and to end America’s ‘endless wars’, but that is easier said than done when the Iraqi Government still needs American assistance to defeat IS and Iranian proxy forces.

When Soleimani was killed, Eric Edelman, a practitioner senior fellow at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs and a career U.S. Foreign Service Minister, told the University of Virginia that the reason why the former Iranian general flew to Iraq in the first place was to try and ensure Iranian-sponsored Shiite militias in the country could suppress Iraqis protesting against Iran’s influence at the time. He added that Soleimani’s death may embolden Iraqis who resent Iran’s influence in their nation.

Soleimani’s death triggered Iraqi militias

However, Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr announced that he would be reactivating his Mahdi Army militia in the immediate aftermath of Soleimani’s killing. This is the same militia that behaved like a major death squad that murdered and abused many Iraqi Sunnis during the Iraqi civil war.

Aside from Sadr, Qais al-Khazali declared that his Asaib Ahl ul-Haq [AAH] militia will attempt to expel American forces from Iraq. In the short-term, Soleimani’s death only radicalized many militias in the country.

Despite this, the Associated Press says that Iran is struggling to maintain its influence among Iraqi Popular Mobilization Front (PMF) militias. This is because Esmail Ghaani, who succeeded Soleimani, is less of an established name for leaders of the many militia groups operating under the PMF umbrella.

Ghaani also has the disadvantage of being unable to speak good Arabic and he depends upon an interpreter to resolve any disputes.

The PMF is struggling to receive Iranian funds

Because of Trump’s campaign of ‘maximum pressure’ against Tehran through targeted sanctions, many PMF leaders received no funds from the Iranian Government recently.

In a further blow to Iran, Iraq’s Shi’ite establishment, led by Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani, has supposedly stated its unwillingness to tolerate Tehran’s grip over Iraq. It is clear that Soleimani’s death has made it harder for the Iranian Government to expand its influence over Baghdad, and that will only become more difficult over time if Tehran cannot fund militias who intend to destabilize Iraq’s current government.

The biggest obstacle to Iraqi-Iranian relations is the presence of US troops in Iraq, but Soleimani’s death has provided a further wedge between both nations. Without an influential figure in the IRGC, Iran will struggle to increase its support among the Iraqi population, and that task will be made harder if it cannot fund the PMF either. Iraq is stuck in the middle between the US and Iran and as tensions between Washington and Tehran worsen, Baghdad will be affected regardless. But how much further can Iran’s regime go before the Trump administration decides the time is right to go to war with them?

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Islamdeen Bahaduri woke up, washed his face and began his morning routine. He ran for an hour and then returned back to his home in the Barchi neighborhood of Kabul, the Afghan capital. Bahaduri ate breakfast and went to accept his certification for completing his TOEFL iBT preparation course and then walked home for lunch. Bahaduri’s passion was for shoot boxing, in which he had won an international gold medal and after lunch he went to practice shoot boxing in a nearby sports club.

The next day on March 6, Bahaduri went to to attend a gathering in Kabul. The 21-year-old and winner of 26 medals was thinking about opening a new sports club in memory of his fellow athlete and friend who had been killed in an attack in the past, Mohammad Baqir.

Suddenly two militants opened fire on the crowd.

A friend of Bahaduri’s called his brother Mahram Ali Bahaduri to ask about Islamdeen after hearing of the attack, so Mahram called Islamdeen. Islamdeen’s phone rang without an answer. Mahram called again, and this time someone else picked up the phone and told him that Islamdeen had been killed. Mahram fell on the ground and his uncles helped him to regain consciousness.

Bahaduri’s Brother: ‘This Attack Will Be Forgotten’

In the United States, Bahaduri’s other brother commented on the awful situation.

“There is a new thing happening and previous incidents are forgotten,” said Jumakhan Buhaduri, who was in Washington D.C. where he learned about the death of his brother from social media pages. “We do not know who the perpetrators are. There is no ending the impunity and people do not know who their enemy is.”

“I am a peaceful man and nobody should be miserable,” said Jumakhan. “But peace will not heal my wounds from losing my brother. This attack will be forgotten, like other attacks and their victims. He was our hope.”

The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the shooting on civilians which came amid US-led peace efforts to end the long Afghan war. Hundreds of people had gathered to commemorate slain Hazara leader Abdul Ali Mazari in a large venue in the western part of Kabul on Friday, March 6 where top Afghan politicians, including Abdullah Abdullah and senior leaders of the Hazara Shiite ethnic group were present.

Twenty days later, one Islamic State militant dressed in a local police uniform killed a Muslim guard at a Sikh temple in Kabul. The militant begin shooting at civilians trapped inside the temple complex, also using grenades. He besieged the temple and took Afghan Sikhs hostage while exchanging fire with Afghan security forces for six hours. The militant killed 25 people in that attack.

Islamic State’s Bloody Campaign in Afghanistan

The two attacks on minority groups by the Islamic State were part of larger efforts by the terrorist group to establish a branch of the Islamic State of Sham and Iraq in Afghanistan. Since its emergence in 2015, the group gained various territories and terrorized the country with their brutal attacks on civilians. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for two recent high-level attacks. On April 9, a vehicle was parked near the Bagram airfield and five rockets hit the large US base. Last month in March, President Ashraf Ghani was taking his oath of office when three rockets hit nearby. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for both attacks.

Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security said in a statement that his agents later captured the leader of Islamic State in Afghanistan whose name is Abdullah Orakzai, also known as Aslam Farooqi, along with 19 other members of the group. Orakzai became the first leader to be arrested, unlike other leaders of the group that were killed in airstrikes and raids.

The Afghan Government had formally announced the defeat of the Islamic State in November 2019. The US as well as the Taliban also announced the group was destroyed.

But the reality on the ground was far different than the official story.

Emergence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan

In 2010, a number of militants from Pakistan’s Orakzai, North Wzisristan and Khyber tribal groups arrived into the eastern Nangarhar area of Afghanistan. Their numbers increased over the years in Nangarhar and Pakistan’s army attacked them in their homes, pushing them out with their families.

The new wave of the militants known as refugees arrived in October 2014 and March 2015. The Afghan Government welcomed them and the intelligence agency opened connections with them as a small-scale tit-for-tat against Pakistan’s strategic support for the Taliban group inside Afghanistan.

With the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham in 2014, the trouble with the Islamic State started also started to intensify in Afghanistan. Tahreki Taliban Pakistan’s leader died in November of 2013 and the militants were divided over who should succeed him. They split into small groups, forming the ideal situation for the rise of another, stronger group: the Islamic State.

In October 2014, Pakistani national Hafiz Saeed Khan was chosen to lead Islamic State in Khorasan, which is the old name for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia. The leadership council of the Islamic State was made up of former Tahrik-e Taliban Pakistani commanders. Factions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tehrik-e-Khilafat, Jandullah, and the Bajour faction of Pakistani group’s also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.

“Khorasan is an important base and place for the Islamic State in Asia overall, which includes Iran, India, Bangladehs, Central Asia and Xian chin of China,” explains Davood Azami, a researcher focused on extremism. “There has been a long attempt to build a Waliat since the British colonization of India.”

ISIS Afghanistan Announces its Official Formation in January, 2015

ISIS officially announced their expansion in Afghanistan in January 2015. The Islamic State was appealing for youths in region where they were unhappy with the existing groups, like the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the official government. ISIS represented the so-called caliphate for youths that wanted to build one in the world.

With the ultimate aim of replacing all other existing extremist groups, the Islamic State recruited from lower and middle class youths in the country and in the region. Many fighters joined the Islamic State in Afghanistan and from Gulf countries, Central Asia, Chechnya, Europe, and the sub-continent of India and Pakistan.

“We came here expecting an Islamic life, and life under Islamic law,” said Sonia Sebastian, an Indian woman who had joined the Islamic State and was interrogated by Indian security agents in Kabul after surrounding to Afghan forces. “Many things were not up to our expectations.”

ISIS’ Afghan Recruiting Efforts

The Islamic State aimed to recruit students from Afghan universities, institutions that were vulnerable to exploitation. Ramin Kamangar, a researcher at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies in Kabul, conducted research that found half of 373 surveyed students at three universities in Herat, Kabul, and Nangarhar universities supported an Islamic Caliphate as a political system.

Many of the students were entranced by propaganda from the Islamic State. Lecturers at Kabul University, for example, were responsible for the recruitment of fighters among students. The first step was encouraging them to become Salafi, a strict branch of Sunni Islam. The students were sent to strongholds in Nangarhar province for training and then the students would become fighters of the Islamic State.

The Islamic State built a complex network of supporters and strongholds in the country within three years. Hussain Ehsani, who co-authored a research on Islamic State for Afghan Institute of Strategic Studies, said that the Islamic State had three sub divisions in the eastern swathes, in the north, and in the west of Afghanistan.

“The Islamic State has very complex sponsors,” said Ehsani, who has interviewed policymakers, security agents and Islamic State fighters for his research. “It is unclear which non-state actor or which state supports the Islamic State in Afghanistan.”

How Does Afghanistan’s ISIS Get Their Funding?

Pakistan’s intelligence Agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, has been accused of funding the Islamic State and supplying the group in the country. The Afghan Government has also made such claims.

ISIS has been largely self-reliant. The majority of their financial support comes from smuggling, mining, and taxation from locals. The group also enjoyed control over the Khyber Pass border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, controlling the flow of mines like talc and timber resources, according to Ehani’s book, “Islamic State Wilyat Khorasan.”

Haris, owner of a shop in a luxuries shopping mall in the heart of Kabul, used to fundraise from European and gulf countries in the name of helping poor Afghans, according to a statement by Afghanistan’s intelligence agency. In reality, Haris worked for the Islamic State with nine others in Kabul, running small shops to financially and logistically support the group.

Ruthless Attacks on Afghan Civilians

With fighters from all different parts of the world, the Islamic State in Afghanistan waged war to establish a caliphate similar to what they believed it had been in the time of the Prophet Mohammad, following the hardline doctrine of Salafism. The group primarily targeted soft targets and minorities, mainly Shiite Muslims that they consider to be blasphemous infidels.

The Islamic State conducted many of the most brutal attacks in the country even by the standards of the long Afghan war. The militants bullied villagers, executed farmers, displaced thousands of people, and attacked soft-targets that were not heavily protected but were crowded, such as in mosques, educational centers, sports clubs, and even wedding halls.

Their attacks happened across Asia, from Bangladesh to Sri Lanka and Afghanistan and Pakistan. Islamic State fighters killed dozens of Afghan forces, Taliban fighters, and Pakistani forces. Reportedly the Bangladesh bombing was even traced back to the Islamic State in Afghanistan as well as the attack on Sri Lanka.

In a propaganda video, Afghanistan’s Islamic State put 10 male prisoners on a green hill of eastern Nangarhar province and placed land mines under them. As the men kneel down, the explosives went off and they were killed instantly. The graphic video sent shockwaves across the country in August 2015.

Kidnappings and Executions

Militants of the Islamic State in Afghanistan kidnapped civilians multiple times and then executed them. In November 2015, the Islamic State kidnapped seven Hazara civilians, including a nine-year old girl and then cut their throats with metal wire in the southern Zabul province of Afghanistan.

The Islamic State conducted their first high profile attack on the Afghan capital of Kabul in July 2016, which is when they first emerged as a serious enemy of the nation. As Hazara Shiite protesters marched in Kabul, two Islamic State suicide bombers detonated in their midst, killing 80 civilians and wounding more than 400 others.

Attacks on civilian gatherings, mostly the Shiite Muslim minority, became routine for the Islamic State. Mosques have been their favorite spot to hit because they have little security and yield high causalities. In October 2017, an Islamic State suicide bomber entered a Shiite mosque in Kabul, killing 56 worshipers and 55 wounded others.

“Zakria, 14-year old, was killed,” said Barat Ali Khaleqi, whose brother was killed in the October, 2017 suicide bombing. “The attacks cripple the society and these attacks are on all of people, not only one person.”

In August 2018, students were at an education center in Kabul to prepare for a university entrance exam when an ISIS suicide bomber entered the center and blew up the entire building. The bombing fatally tore apart 48 teenage students and wounded 67 others in a blink of eye.

“In Afghanistan, there is nothing safe. Losing our talented youths disappoints me,” said Mohammad Rezai, 18-year student who lost his peers in the bombing on the education center. “I don’t see a bright future. Everything is disappointing. These attacks stole our hope. I don’t feel safe at any gathering.”

Two other attacks claimed by the Islamic State made it extremely clear that no public gathering was safe. In September 2018, one suicide bomber detonated his vest at a wrestling club packed with young athletes and one car bomb torn apart an emergency team, killing 26 people and 91 others, including two journalists.

In August 2019 an Islamic State militant walked into a packed wedding hall in Kabul carrying a sports bag. The suicide bomber approached the men’s reception area of the wedding hall as the celebration was reaching its peak. The blast killed 83 civilians and wounded 160 others that included both Shiite and Sunni Muslims.

Fighting Back Against the Islamic State in Afghanistan

The atrocities of the Islamic State eventually contributed to their own fall over the years. Davood Azami, author of Countering the Islamic State in Asia, said that the horrific tactics used by the Islamic State made locals stand up against them.

“Takfir and Salafi ideology [of the Islamic State] was against Hanifi and Sunni religious and practices that are widely followed in Afghanistan,” said Azami. “They [Islamic State] did not understand the culture of local people. Daesh (ISIS) destroyed shrines of local people in Ghazni province and other provinces.”

Locals near ISIS strongholds were armed and fought back the Islamic State in eastern Afghanistan. The local forces, made up of farmers and elderly people who had mostly lost family members to the Islamic State’s attacks, were part of larger undeclared joint-operations of US air power, Taliban fighters, and the Afghan Government in a combined thrust against ISIS.

The United States conducted its first airstrike against the Islamic State in July 2015. The airstrikes aimed to kill senior leaders of the militant group, paving the way for junior militants to occupy their leaders’ places. The Islamic State had to choose a new leader sometimes within three to six months as their leaders were being repeatedly killed in American airstrikes.

MoAB

“The Islamic State is leader orientated, rather than strategically coordinated group,” said Hussain Ehsani who has studied the Islamic State in Iraq and in Afghanistan closely. “If there is a comprehensive strategy, their fighters would follow the strategy regardless of leaders.”

In April 2017, the U.S. Air Force dropped the “mother of all bombs”—the most powerful conventional bomb in the American arsenal—on complex caves used by the Islamic State located in the entrance to the Mamand Valley in the Asadkhel area of Achin district of Nangarhar province of Afghanistan. It killed a number of IS militants.

The US conducted such airstrikes by relying on operatives on the ground, mostly CIA agents and US Special Forces that coordinated attacks on the Islamic State hideouts. The US helped Afghan forces to battle the Islamic State, but they also provided “very limited support” to the Taliban in fighting the Islamic State.

After the Taliban’s initial failure to broker a deal with the Islamic State during the group’s emergence in 2014 and 2015, the Taliban also waged war on the Islamic State. First the Taliban asked ISIS leave the area in 2014, but the militants opened a new branch of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. The Taliban sent a message to the Islamic State headquarters in Iraq, demanding that they leave the jihad in the country to them but the group dismissed the Taliban’s demands.

“The Islamic State was the first group that challenged the Taliban, both militarily and ideologically,” said Azami. The Taliban supported “uprisings” against the Islamic State in July 2015 in their strongholds in eastern Nangarhar and fought ISIS over resources, such as mining, recruitment, as well as preventing an increase of their own unhappy fighters who had joined ISIS.

Ongoing Taliban Clashes with ISIS

The Taliban clashed with the ISIS across the country, not only in eastern Nangarhar province. In the northern Jawzjan province, in the western Herat and Ghor province, in the southern Zabul province, and elsewhere, the Taliban waged a bloody war to wipe out ISIS. Both the Islamic State and the Taliban suffered significant casualties in the mountains and they regrouped in swathes of the country where they enjoyed shelter from the eyes of US airstrikes and Afghan forces.

The main battlefield has been the eastern Nangarhar province. The Taliban battled ISIS fighters in mountains, mobilizing their Red Unit and their foot soldiers from other provinces, while the Afghan Government and their pro-uprising forces battled ISIS from low-ground areas.

The Islamic State gained increased attention from the Afghan Government in the summer of 2015. The Government supported local forces known as public uprising forces against ISIS and paid agents to collect information for battling ISIS in the country, while continuing to fight the Taliban on the larger scale.

US-Afghan Joint Ops Against Afghan ISIS

The US and the Afghan Government joint operation launched a number of strikes in the last four years to target the ISIS strongholds. US Special Forces and Afghan Commandos launched operations of targeted killings as well as coordinated airstrikes. On April 27, 2017, 50 US Army rangers and 40 Afghan commandos raided the compound of IS leader Sheikh Abdul Hasib, killing him and several other leaders of the militant group.

Adding on to these kind of operations against ISIS strongholds, the Afghan intelligence agency operated on cells of support and recruitment for the Islamic State in the country. The agency killed and destroyed several cells in Kabul, arrested university lecturers and students, and cut financial support to the group.

“The weakness of these anti-ISKP forces [government, tribal and Taleban] was coupled with the vitality of two pro-ISKP forces: small militant groups lacking fixed loyalties and the Salafi militants fighting in the ranks of the insurgency,” Borhan Osman, a former researcher for Afghanistan Analyst Network, wrote in September 2017.

The different operations by US forces, the Afghan Government and the Taliban reached an important phase in November 2019. The three operations led to the overall defeat of the Islamic State in the country, as all of them claimed credit for the defeat of the group in their stronghold of the Nangarhar province.

The Islamic State in Afghanistan broke into pieces. With many ISIS fighters killed, others escaped into deep mountains, and some surrendered to the Afghan Government. The defeat of the group in their initial stronghold did not mean the end of the group in the country that has been burning in war for 40 years.

“With a vast recruitment pool on both sides of the border [Afghanistan and Pakistan], it is hard to defeat [them] militarily without addressing the reasons for the emergence of ISKP in the first place,” said Borhan Osman, head of the Crisis Group for Afghanistan. “You can’t just kill them to death.”

Looking Ahead

Afghanistan and Pakistan have been an ideal place for extremist groups for decades and will likely continue to be so for years to come. The US-Taliban deal signed in February 2020 signaled a way for negotiations to end the long insurgency in the country, but it can serve as a reason for the regrouping of extremist groups. Atiqullah Amirkhil, an Afghan Army General, said that there is a possibility radical Taliban fighters who are not pleased with the prospect of peace could join the Islamic State in the country.

“If the government and the Taliban unite against the Islamic State and all forces cooperate with each other, Daesh [Islamic State] will be wiped out. If the deal leads to such a scenario, the peace is worthwhile,” said Amirkhil. “If nobody fights the Islamic State, it will remain in the coming years.”

Even the United States agreed to pull troops out of the country per deal with the Taliban, the US has established a network of Special Operations forces that will fight the Islamic State. The Afghan Government and the Taliban both vow to fight the extremist group, but in an absence of a strong state, the Islamic State may continue claim the lives of civilians, using complex underground cells and without holding territories.

“I am concerned with continuation of such attacks” said Sima Samar, member of UN High-Level Advisory Board on Mediation, referring to March 6 ISIS attack in Kabul. “Two persons who are willing to kill themselves [suicide attack], they can do it at any gatherings.”

The March 6 massacre is a prime example of how the Islamic State might survive despite losing territories in eastern Afghanistan. It can continue waging war on civilians to claim lives of those who are considered infields by them, like Islamdeen, the 21-year-old who was killed in the March 6 shooting in Kabul.

Born in a poor family, Islamdeen grew up weaving carpets to survive poverty. When he was only 9-years-old, he started exercising without the knowledge of his family. He asked his local club to waive one month of fees so he could do training. When he come the gold medal in 2018 his neighbors found out in surprise that he had been exercising and training secretly for years.

“Islamdeen was one of few who excelled in different fields of sports, gymnastics, shoot boxing, MMA, Free Fight, Muay Thai,” said Jumakhan Bahaduri, the 27-year old brother of Islamdeen. “He was known was Tiger Killer. Before even fighting, many athletes would give up to him. He had a statement: ‘I am fighting to bring smiles to face of Afghans.’”

Islamdeen was fighting against the odds. He had secured many offers to participate abroad, but the Government did not support him and he could not go there to compete for championships. Islamdeen found his way from poverty to be a champion, only to be killed instantly in a shooting by the Islamic State.

“His dream was the success of Afghanistan on the international stage,” said Islamdeen’s elder brother Mahrim Ali. “When Islam was alive, I felt like there was a mountain behind us.”

L'articolo The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan proviene da InsideOver.