On June 10 the commercial vessel CIRKIN was sailing across the Mediterranean towards the port of Misurata in northwestern Libya. CIRKIN was reportedly carrying military equipment for the Libyan army under the command of the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and was being accompanied by three Turkish frigates. When forces from the European Council’s Operation IRINI approached the vessel for inspection, the Turkish convoy rejected the request and kept navigating as per their initial route.

The incident has prompted controversy among EU officials, as it raised concerns around the actual efficacy and enforcement capability of Operation IRINI.

What is Operation IRINI?

IRINI (Greek word for peace) is a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation in the Mediterranean which was launched by the European Council in the aftermath of the Berlin Conference on Libya in late January 2020. It came out of the conference where steps to end the Libyan conflict were discussed.

The predominant mission of IRINI is to ensure that the UN-imposed arms embargo in Libya is being implemented. This is achieved through the utilization of Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) and inspections of suspicious vessels in the wider region off the Libyan coasts. Secondary tasks include monitoring illicit exports of petroleum products from Libya, building and training the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy and constraining the human smuggling and trafficking networks in the region. The operation officially started on March 31, 2020 and is set to be completed by March 31, 2021, subject to further extension.

The deployed assets of the mission are three aircraft, provided by Luxembourg, Poland and Germany respectively and one frigate provided by Greece. The aircraft are mostly utilized for surveillance, reconnaissance, search-and-rescue and transport missions. The Greek frigate HS SPETSAI is the most crucial deployed asset of IRINI; it carries a single Sikorsky S-70B Aegean Hawk helicopter, which alongside SPETSAI, was involved in the aforementioned June 10 incident. We should highlight here that the number and the operational capabilities of the deployed assets are far from adequate, considering the vast area of operations they are covering and the scope of IRINI’s overall mission.

The Worrisome June 10 Incident

In the early morning of June 10, the Tanzanian-flagged vessel CIRKIN was sailing across IRINI’s area of operations. CIRKIN is a RORO ( Roll-on/roll-off, ship that carries wheeled cargo and vehicles) cargo ship and had set sail from Turkey on June 7, with destination the Libyan port of Misurata. The commercial vessel has been escorted by three ships of the Turkish navy and since its departure it has raised the alarm for a potential violation of the Libyan arms embargo. IRINI officials were monitoring the route of the ship and sought to approach it for an inspection once it entered the area of responsibility of the EU mission.

On June 10, in coordination with the Italian Commander, based in Rome, the Sikorsky S-70B Aegean Hawk helicopter launched from HS SPETSAI and approached CIRKIN. The helicopter crew requested over the radio that CIRKIN cooperate and allow the IRINI personnel on-board for an inspection. However, the reply came from one of the accompanying Turkish frigates, informing the helicopter crew that CIRKIN would not be inspected and that the ship was under the protection of the Republic of Turkey.

Back in Rome, IRINI Headquarters were immediately made aware of the sequence of the events; the command of Operation IRINI ordered the personnel in the area to comply with the Turkish request and HS SPETSAI was directed to monitor the route of the Turkish ships, following the convoy from a safe distance. CIRKIN reached the port of Misurata by June 11. Having completed its mission, as of June 13, the vessel is currently sailing back to Turkey, with final destination at the port of Samsun in the Black Sea.

The Lukewarm EU and NATO Reaction

The incident has raised substantial concerns across the Operation IRINI officials. Even though it has gained wide publicity in Greece, there has been an attempt to downgrade its significance. Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis held a video conference with President of the European Council Charles Michel and the European Commission Vice President -and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. Despite the fact that the Turkish provocations, and particularly the latest incident in the Mediterranean, would presumably be part of the agenda of the top officials to discussm there were no relevant statements following the meeting. To the contrary, the only issues that have been reportedly discussed, moved around the long-term financial goals of the EU and the Recovery Fund as a response to COVID-19.

At the same time there are ongoing talks as to how NATO could contribute to the capabilities of IRINI through NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian. Sea Guardian is a NATO naval operation in the Mediterranean, with a mission to “maintain maritime situational awareness, deter and counter terrorism and enhance capacity building.” There are no indications if these considerations are taking place due to the June 10 incident, however because of this event there is no doubt that the operational limitations and inefficiencies of IRINI were highlighted publicly.

What is Turkey Trying to Achieve?

Once again Turkey is using the typical power projection tactics, with which we are all familiar by now. Ankara has been always aware that an arms embargo is implemented in Libya, however Turkish military material never stopped being shipped to the Libyan shores in support of the GNA forces. In fact, this very Turkish participation, through the delivery of light and heavy weaponry, military vehicles and sophisticated drones, has eventually helped tip the balance of the conflict in favor of the GNA and its leader Fayez al-Serraj. Furthemore, this has been happening overtly all along as Turkey is openly bragging about these developments through its state media.

The latest incident was a direct incitement towards the EU; by ignoring the role and mission of Operation IRINI and by sending military equipment to Libya with a Turkish navy escort, Turkey is once again flexing its muscles in front of the EU. Yet here we are with most EU major players facing Ankara as an equal partner, stressing the essential Turkish role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and providing financial aid to the country instead of seeking to push it into compliance with the EU instructions by threatening to impose sanctions.

A last point we should consider is that the incident took place a few days after the Greek HS SPETSAI joined the operation. For the first months of the Operation, the FS JEAN BART of the French Navy was deployed without any similar incident. Therefore, we can assume that Ankara chose the June 10 timing on purpose, in order to send another provocative message to Athens. As the tension in Libya keeps rising, so does the Turkish aggressiveness in the Mediterranean, prompting serious concerns among Greek leadership.

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On a surprise move, Khalifa Haftar has visited Athens on Thursday 17 January, late evening.The next morning General Haftar met the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikos Dendias, before heading to the Hellenic Parliament, to meet Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis. The upcoming talks in Berlin have been at the top of the agenda between the Libyan strongman and Mr. Mitsotakis. Albeit the wide and enthusiastic coverage the visit has received from Greek media, there has been no official joint statement by General Haftar and the Greek side, once the talks have been completed.

Mr. Dendias has tried to highlight the key points of the meeting in an interview he gave on Friday night, 17 January, to the Greek state-owned broadcaster ERT. According to the Greek Minister, Athens would pursue – by all means – the establishment of an unconditional and open-ended ceasefire and at the same time the cancellation of the two Memoranda of Understanding between GNA and Turkey. Mr. Haftar is allegedly totally agreeing with the Greek pledges for the cancellation of the MoUs, a claim that makes absolute sense, considering that LNA wants to limit any Turkish involvement in the Libyan front. Mr. Dendias could not confirm if and to what extent General Haftar will put on the table the cancellation of MoUs, as a necessary condition for the smooth progress of the negotiations, during the Berlin summit tomorrow. It has also been stressed out that Greece is not seeing the current situation in the eastern Mediterranean as a zero-sum game between Ankara and Athens, and the ideal solution should guarantee benefits for all the sides involved.

At the same time Greek PM, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, stated that the absence of Greece in the Berlin summit is a sad fact and Germany has overlooked the crucial role of Greece, as a factor of stability in the region. Mr. Mitsotakis clarified that Greece was willing to veto any decision with regards to the Libyan crisis, that would not reject the validity of the two MoUs between Tripoli and Ankara. A statement that has been probably a part of the Government’s communication policy, considering that even if Athens tries to veto any decision about Libya in the level of EU foreign ministers, the impact on the outcome of the process would be minimal. Besides, we highly doubt that Greece could proceed to vetoing any such plans, in the first place.

Back to Haftar’s presence in Athens, we should look at the timing and the implications of the visit. Greece has been struggling to establish herself as an equal negotiating party on the Libyan process, especially after the Turkish latest moves, that impact directly the Greek vital national interests. Athens failure to secure a position in the table of negotiations in Berlin had a significant political backlash for the government, which had to be turned around the soonest.

Mr. Dendias has visited Libya and met with General Haftar in late December 2019 and expressed the Greek support to the LNA efforts. The two parties have agreed to hold another meeting in Athens, and the current timing could not be better for Greece. The absence of a joint statement and the limited comments from the Greek side about what has been discussed, indicates that little progress has been made in terms of promoting the Greek demands against the Turkish provocations in the region. On the other hand, the Greek major media -most of them friendly to the current administration- have presented the event, as an unprecedented Greek success that could constraint the EU and Turkish options and the only possible outcome from the Sunday negotiations would be the most favorable one for Greece. Briefly Haftar’s meeting has been sold to the Greek public, as a game –  changing development, speculating that Haftar is planning to decisively promote the Greek positions in Berlin. Apparently this approach is ignoring the fact that Haftar forces are waging war for almost six years in Libya, and the top priority for the General is to consolidate his power all over the country and secure his very survival.

Assessing the current power balance in-country and the ongoing international developments related to Libya, we believe that Haftar’s role will be considerably upgraded, opening the road to the General to eventually control the country. The Greek side is relying on this scenario to capitalize on the potential gains, assuming that things will play out well for the Libyan General. However, we should always consider that several regional powers have also supported Haftar, including Egypt, UAE and allegedly Israel. These powers have provided much more substantial support long before Greece and will certainly seek to use the potential Haftar’s prevalence in their best interest.

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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has submitted a motion to Parliament that would authorize the deployment of Turkish troops to Libya. The declaration came after the Libyan government requested military assistance in its war against renegade Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar who leads a sizable militia intent on capturing Tripoli.

Upholding A Security Agreement And Supporting An Ally

Erdogan first floated the idea of requesting legislative approval to officially enter the conflict on Dec. 27, a mere four days before doing so and earlier than his initial time-frame. Previously, he said he would hold off until the parliament returns from its winter recess Jan. 7, but Erdogan is pitching the idea as one that demands urgent attention. Critically, the bill does not call for combat troops, only advisors and trainers for the Libyan military.

The war, which teeters on the edge of a civil war, has consumed Libya since April 2019. Presently, Haftar is held back by government forces on the southern edge of Tripoli. The request for help by the Government of National Accord (GNA) followed the ratification of a security agreement between the two states, which was signed in November. The deal specified the terms and details of Turkish support, which it was already providing in the form of drones, weapons, and military equipment. 

Turkish Parliament Gives Green Light To More Help For Libya’s GNA

The Turkish parliament voted overwhelmingly in favor of the accord, 269 to 125, which raises the question of whether it will permit further escalation of Ankara’s involvement in the foreign conflict. Some parties have already declared their positions and it seems it will pass. Erdogan’s Justice and Development (AK) Party and the Nationalist Movement Party have both announced their support for the measure. Assuming every seat votes in line in with their party, those votes alone would be sufficient to pass the measure (340 votes out of 600). 

The Republican People’s Party, Good Party, and Peoples’ Democratic Party are all against the measure, which creates a partisan scenario likely to draw intense debate on the parliamentary floor Thursday during planned debate on the bill. A full vote will likely follow soon after the recess ends.

Erdogan’s plan to deploy military assistance to help his ally, Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, could be the push the GNA needs to squash Haftar’s surging campaign. However, it would put more troops in the middle of an already-crowded conflict. Haftar’s troops were bolstered in early December by the arrival of Russian mercenaries and Sudanese fighters. Russia has also supplied Haftar’s forces with anti-tank missiles – Kornets – which have proved devastating on the battlefield. Thus far, Sarraj’s government has not received the sort of backing that Haftar has, despite being recognized by the UN as the official government.

International Division Over Another Libyan Conflict

Politically, the international community is sharply divided on the conflict and Ankara is primary outlier in the Middle East that backs the GNA. Other Middle Eastern states, primarily Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, support Haftar’s renegade force. Even US President Donald Trump voiced approval of Haftar, speaking with him personally by telephone on April 15, 2019. The Trump Administration also managed to collude with Russia and Egypt to kill a UN Security Council resolution condemning Haftar’s campaign. 

Trump has managed to contradict his own State Department and military leadership on which side America actually supports in the conflict. In doing so, he tied up both possible US support and the support of its allies. The EU leadership is reluctant to become bogged down in another disastrous attempt to stabilize an Arab nation. Following the failed Arab Spring experiment in Libya, it is understandable why European powers refuse to dirty their hands once more in Tripoli. France joined Egypt in calling for the “greatest restraint” by the GNA, and the Arab League passed a resolution on Tuesday which outlined the need to prevent foreign interference.

Turkey’s Motives For Libyan Intervention

Despite the backlash Erdogan received, he is intent to join the fray. Although he justified it partially by security concerns, it is Ankara’s economic interests in Libya that have Erdogan pushing for a troop deployment. 

“Turkey’s interests … will be negatively impacted if attacks by the so-called Libyan National Army are not stopped and clashes become a severe civil war,” the deployment bill said. Turkey exported $1.5 billion to the state last year and it also has an incentive to protect its interests in natural resources lying in the Mediterranean. 

The maritime deal has incited protest from Egypt, Israel, and Greece, which claims it entirely ignores the presence of the island nation. Erdogan – from sending troops into Syria to strengthening his alliance with Sarraj, to threatening EU nations with refugees – is engendering more hate from nearly every other state in the region. Combined with his rebuke in domestic politics, he is setting himself up to be a leader with few friends. Ultimately, he will have to question whether maintaining an alliance with a failed state is worth it.

L'articolo Erdogan Sends Troop Deployment Bill to Parliament proviene da InsideOver.

Rage, resentment and multiple resignations among high-ranking Syrian rebel leaders and commanders have come fast at the heels of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan‘s unilateral decision to dispatch thousands of proxy Syrian fighters – with the possibility of sending additional Turkish military forces – to Libya. Erdogan is sending the fighters there in support of his ally in Tripoli, prime minister Fayez al-Sarraj, who heads the internationally recognized Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA). A major offensive has been gaining momentum in recent weeks launched by forces loyal to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar‘s Libyan National Army, who is quickly advancing to overtake the capital Tripoli and topple Sarraj and his government whom they perceive as a gang of pro-Turkish and pro-US traitors. Al-Sarraj himself is said to be of Turkish origin and his birth name was Fayez Fawzi Mohammad Agha from the city of Manisa, Turkey. His grandfather is also reported to have served as an officer in the Ottoman army, although such claims have not been independently verified.

Erdogan’s Plan Splits Opposition, Leads To Collective Resignations

The Turkish leader’s Libya intervention effort has rapidly split the so-called military wing of Syrian opposition factions, including some of the main Ankara-backed militias in Syria. Collective high-level resignations followed Erdogan’s unilateral move and selective dispatching of hundreds of pro-Turkish Syrian National Army (SNA) fighters to Libya without any consultation with their military commanders outraged some Syrian factions. A statement issued earlier this week by the so-called Interim Government’s Ministry of Defense and circulated widely over social media carried the resignation of all four SNA top commanders as well as those of three main hard-line Syrian rebel groups.

The statement reads: “We, the following names, hereby declare our resignation from the Syrian National Army in opposition to the dispatching of fighting groups to Libya without our consent:

1-General Salim Idriss, SNA’s Chief of Staff and Defence Minister in the Interim Government.

2-Brigadier Adnan Al Ahmad, SNA’s Deputy Chief of Staff.

3-Colonel Fadl Al Hajji, Commander of National Liberation Front.

4-Colonel Afif Suleiman, Idlib Army Chief.”

The resignation statement also included Jaber Ali Basha, Commander of ‘Sham Liberation Front’, Abu Eissa Al Sheikh, Commander of ‘Sham Hawks’ and Abu Saleh Tahhan, Commander of ‘Army of the Free’ rebel militia groups.

Opposition In Turkey, Outrage In The Region And Beyond

Erdogan’s latest controversial move has sparked fierce both regional as well as international condemnation especially  by Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Tunisia—despite Erdogan’s visit to Tunisia five days ago to discuss his Libya intervention plan with his newly elected Tunisian counterpart Kais Saied, amid strong popular resentment towards Erdogan’s visit and policies—as well as by leaders of some EU nations such as France and Greece. Yet, Erdogan seems unwavering in his Libya intervention plan which is already underway.  Recently published reports and released footage both confirm the arrival of hundreds of Syrian and foreign pro-Turkish fighters in Libya, including some senior Turkmen militia leaders as an ‘avant guard force’ preparing for the imminent dispatch of some 8,000 fighters promised by Erdogan to his ally Al Sarraj.

There is also strong opposition to Erdogan’s Libya adventure within Turkey itself. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the second most powerful political force in the country and main opposition party in Turkey, the Republican People’s Party (GHP), has publicly denounced Erdogan’s plan for Libya, reiterated his party’s outright rejection and opposition to sending any Turkish servicemen or forces to Libya. GHP is a Kemalist ‘secular’ party established in 1923 by Kemal Mustafa Ataturk, founder of the Turkish republic, first leader of the party till his death in 1938. GHP was the only political party in Turkey until 1946.

From The Syrian Fire Into The Libyan Frying Pan

Earlier this month, Erdogan took another controversial and destabilizing step when he signed a trade and security deal with al-Sarraj during a visit to Tripoli, that gives Turkey unprecedented gas and oil exploration privileges and production rights in the Mediterranean. The deal radically which overhauls historic maritime lines and exploration rights in favor of Turkey at the expense of other nations, mainly Greece and Cyprus, has met with strong condemnation and even threat of military action against any Turkish vessels or rigs in the Mediterranean, particularly by Egypt.

Erdogan has used his AK Party majority in the parliament to pass and adopt the deal with Libya orchestrated by Erdogan and al-Sarraj who, as agreed, later invited Turkey to provide military support and protection to GNA against Haftar, who has the full political and military backing of Erdogan’s arch enemy, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. In a speech in Ankara on Thursday, Erdogan said on January 7, he will present a bill to the Turkish Parliament authorizing deployment.

“Since there is an invitation right now, we will accept it,” Erdogan told members of his AK Party. “We will present the motion to send troops to Libya as soon as Parliament resumes. God willing, we will pass it in Parliament on January 8-9 and thus respond to an invitation” from the Tripoli-based GNA, Erdogan maintained.

Many observers and experts predict that Erdogan’s Libya intervention carries a good deal of risk and danger, both politically and militarily. While optimists in Syria and the region hope that, by transferring terrorists and jihadists from the Levant to Libya – be it by Turkish military planes, cattle freight ships or even by swimming to Tripoli—could at long last bring about an end to the Idlib dilemma, pessimists ,including many anti-government rebel groups, feel that Erdogan is hopelessly trying to revive an Islamist Neo-Ottoman empire that stretches from the Levant to Africa and the Far East. However, they warn that, by wearing shoes far too big for his real size, Erdogan might well be writing his own epitaph, as well as spelling his AK Party’s demise, through a final precarious war dance and rope walking from Syria’s fire into Libya’s frying pan.

L'articolo Outrage, Rift and Resignations Over Erdogan’s Libya Plan proviene da InsideOver.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated his intention to provide military support to Libya’s recognized government in his latest attempt for increased geopolitical relevance and projection of Turkish power. In order to facilitate the deployment of Turkish troops, Erdogan will request the Turkish parliament to vote on the plan early next month. The corresponding law will likely be submitted by the beginning of January Erdogan confirmed in a speech to representatives of his party AKP.

Turkey’s Libya Deployment Timeline

Erdogan stated that “based on the security and military cooperation memorandum, once Parliament opens the first thing we will do is to submit a resolution on the deployment of soldiers.” Specifically, the resolution authorizing deployment to Libya is expected to be passed on January 8 or 9.

Moving forward, Turkey would go to places where it was invited but never anywhere where it was not wanted, Erdogan continued. The latter is his rationale for his Lybia plans, as Libya’s GNA government has invited Ankara to intervene and requested it. It’s an invitation that Erdogan is more than willing to accept. In fact, Turkey will provide the Tripoli government with “any kind of support against a coup-planning general backed by several European and Arab countries,” Erdogan said, adding that “we stand alongside Libya’s legitimate government.” The legitimization of the current government, however, remains a conundrum among the international community.

Libya’s Bloody Civil War

Libya has been suffering from a civil war since 2014. Erdogan already agreed on Sunday to provide more military support to the UN-recognized government in Tripoli, headed by Fayez al-Sarraj, and to examine the possibilities of deploying boots on the ground, as well as air force and navy assets. At this stage, it is hard to predict what type of troops Erdogan will ultimately send. However, as NATO’s biggest army other than the US, Erdogan certainly has several options to explore.

Turkey and the al-Sarraj government in Libya had already concluded on a comprehensive security and military cooperation agreement, which allows Turkey to send military trainers and advisers. The Turkish government also has authorization for joint military exercises and may send weapons and military vehicles to Libya on request. Moreover, Turkey has pledged to help build a protection force to undertake police and military duties. In order to deploy combat troops, Erdoğan’s government requires separate parliamentary approval. The latter can be seen as a pure formality, however, as Erdogan’s AKP and his coalition partner, the MHP command a majority in the Turkish parliament.

Turkish Deployment Could Lead To An All-Out Proxy War In Libya

Nonetheless, Turkey’s increased involvement will likely further complicate the current situation in Libya with the fear of an actual proxy war becoming conceivable. The UN-recognized al-Sarraj GNA government and the powerful opposition Libyan National Army (LNA) forces commanded by dual American-Libyan citizen, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, have been competing for power since the overthrow of Muammar al-Gaddafi in 2011. Haftar’s Libyan National Army has been trying to capture the capital, Tripoli, since April. According to the UN, more than 280 civilians have been killed and more than 140,000 people displaced since Haftar’s offensive began eight months ago.

Amongst as-Sarraj’s primary supporters are Turkey, Qatar, and Italy. On the other side, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE have been supporting Haftar. Meanwhile, Russia, which also supports Haftar in Libya, has expressed concern about Turkey’s possible involvement. A delegation from the Turkish government traveled to Moscow on Monday to speak to Russian diplomats about Libya and Syria. The latter demonstrates Turkey’s status as an opportunistic power, as Ankara has been increasingly fraternizing with Russia in recent times, a development that is seen highly negatively in the West. The move now appears to be solely in Turkey’s interest.

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