As the decades-long conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is on the verge of a full-scale confrontation, Turkey is seeking to take advantage of the current developments. The problem bequeathed from the early years of the Soviet era – and utterly engineered by Joseph Stalin –  has now become another opportunity for the Turkish foreign policy to expand its strategic reach abroad.

Azeri-Turkish Ties and Mutual Interests

Ankara and Baku have traditionally been quite close. Directly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey rushed to establish strong ties with Azerbaijan. It is not only the common ethnic origins between the two countries – considering that the vast majority of Azerbaijani population is of Turkic descent – but also a thriving partnership has been built over the years in the fields of foreign policy, military affairs, energy and finance.

Armenia has historically been a common enemy for both Azerbaijan and Turkey; partly for this reason Ankara crucially stepped in to aid in the military build-up of post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Since the mid-1990s, through military consultants sent to Baku and training abroad facilitated by Ankara, Turkish governments have significantly contributed to the current defense status quo of the country. In 2010 the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and his then Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gül signed a strategic defense pact for mutual support in case of an act of aggression from a third country.

In terms of cooperation in the energy field, the landmark projects of the BTC pipeline and TANAP have greatly boosted the economies of both countries. But these grand pipeline ventures also had serious geopolitical consequences, reshaping the energy landscape in the wider region and bringing out Ankara and Baku as two key energy players in an area that had long seemed to be a Russian monopoly. We should highlight that this latest fact has also been one of the many reasons why Moscow is backing Armenia in the long-term bitter conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Turkish Assistance During the Summer and the Vital Role of Turkish drones

Prior to the most recent escalation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Turkey took various steps to strengthen Baku’s military capabilities and at the same time send the message that Ankara would be ready to actively engage in a potential conflict. Between July and August, Azerbaijan and Turkey conducted the iconic TurAz Eagle exercise, a mutual large-scale live-fire military drill with the participation of air and ground units of the Turkish and Azerbaijani Armed Forces. This exercise took place shortly after a reported Armenian attack in the proximity of Tovuz border region which caused the death of 12 Azerbaijani servicemen.

It should be noted that approximately a year ago, in the aftermath of the same wide-scale exercise, the Turkish state-run Anadolu news agency published an analysis where Azerbaijan and Turkey are described as two states, but one smart power. Given the current geopolitical balances the latest TurAz Eagle can be perceived as a rehearsal of the offensive that’s taking place in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Further to this joint exercise, Turkey has taken another crucial step which could possibly have a severe impact in a potential Armenia-Azerbaijan confrontation; the supply (and know-how) of Turkey’s emblematic TB2 drones. In July, the President of the Turkish Defense Industries Ismail Demir stated on Twitter that Ankara would militarily assist Baku with new systems, training and modernization of the existing equipment, emphasizing the “two states-one nation” concept at the end of his message.

Demir’s favorite aspect of the Turkish Defense Industry is its remarkable drone technologies, that have been predominantly developed by Baykar Defense. This is going to be the major moving force in the military aid towards Azerbaijan. In the case of Libya, the massive deployment of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones has been a game changer that literally tipped the balance of the conflict. At the moment we know that Turkish drones — most probably operated by Turkish personnel for now — will spearhead the Turkish assistance to Azerbaijan, and it only remains to be seen to what extent they could affect the developments on the ground this time around.

Reports of Turkish-backed Syrian Mercenaries in Azerbaijan

In addition to the Turkish military assistance in terms of weapons and training – a fact which Ankara has officially confirmed – the alleged deployment of Syrian mercenaries who are willing to fight on behalf of Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh front is also attracting a lot of attention. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and the investigative journalist Lindsay Snell, approximately 1,000 Syrian mercenaries have been brought to Azerbaijan under Ankara’s coordination.

The Armenian envoy to Russia recently added that this number could be much higher. According to an exclusive statement provided on condition of anonymity by an active in-country intelligence officer, the presence of Turkish-backed Syrian mercenaries cannot be disputed at the moment and the actual number should be estimated at approximately 3,000 troops with the possibility of further increases; there is also an unconfirmed estimate of approximately 100 casualties among the aforementioned ill-trained mercenaries.

Turkey has rushed to deny all reports around Turkish-backed mercenary presence in Artsakh, the name of the breakaway republic in Nagorno-Karabakh. This is a rational step from Ankara considering the possible international backlash of such a move. However we should always keep in mind that this has been the exact same reaction when Turkey was accused for the deployment of Syrian mercenaries in Libya, until the facts spoke for themselves and disproved any Turkish denials.

Even though Ankara suggests that the mobilization of Syrian mercenaries does not make sense in an area where the Azerbaijani Armed Forces can be much more efficient, there is one important aspect which can justify such a move. As we have clearly seen in recent regional conflicts, advanced technologies cannot be the only means to achieve territorial gains and boots of the ground are always necessary.

In this respect, the potential loss of some low-paid Syrian rebels is minimal from Turkey and Azerbaijan’s perspective compared to the time and resources that have been invested on the experienced Azerbaijani and Turkish soldiers or officers; this is not to mention the political cost for both sides of losing citizens at war. Therefore the presence of mercenaries in this battle is highly likely and it will likely just be a matter of time until this is definitively proven.

L'articolo Turkish Footprint in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: from Drones to Boots on the Ground proviene da InsideOver.

One of the last Turkish-backed rebels strongholds and a current hotbed in the Syrian conflict is drawing international attention once again. Turkish forces are building up in the city, while the Russian-backed Syrian Army is approaching. Worries about another major intensification in the refugee and humanitarian crisis are growing. These worries seem justified, especially considering that the population of the city has almost doubled since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, reaching approximately three million people at the moment. Under thesee circumstances, it is understood the tremendous impact a full-scale confrontation would have in the stability of the wider region.

Turkish Concerns

Even under the pressing conditions, Ankara is determined to consolidate the Turkish presence in Idlib under any circumstances. More than 100 military convoys have been deployed in the area, over the last few days. The strategic significance of Idlib has led Turkey to install approximately 10,000 soldiers, in the form of armored and mechanized infantry brigades, with special forces teams also having been dispatched during the last months. Turkey is trying to limit the Syrian advances in Idlib at any cost, as President Bashar Al Assad could turn to other key areas held by Turkish or Turkey-backed forces once Idlib is once again under Syrian control. Ankara is particularly worried that a successful Syrian offensive in Idlib could put region from Afrin to Jarablus at risk, namely all the Turkish gains that have been achieved over the last three years through Operations Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch. To this end, Turkish President Recep Erdogan will keep building up the Turkish military presence in Idlib despite the growing tensions and chance of wider confrontation.

The Syrian Army’s Recent Strategic Advances

In the meantime, Syrian regime forces have continued advancing towards Idlib, reaching a distance less than 10 kilometers from the town center. This is the closest to Idlib that Syrian forces have gotten since the Syrian conflict intensified back in 2012. On Tuesday, February 11, regime troops took control of the M5 highway as well, another major strategic gain for Assad, considering the M5 is the main road between Damascus and Aleppo. Capturing the M5 brings most of the arterial roads in Syria under government control. Syrian forces managed to recapture the highway after focusing on the western suburbs of Aleppo and regaining control of some of the last rebel-held positions in the area. The latest victories of the Syrian government came without strong opposition by the Turkish-backed rebels, or by the Turkish forces stationed in Idlib. The control of these strategic points by government forces enables the Syrian Army to be much more well-prepared and logistically efficient, as the last major offensive to retake Idlib and eliminate the last rebel cells is likely soon approaching.

Unilateral Turkish Action Unlikely Without Kremlin Approval

Last week Erdogan warned Syria—before the Turkish Parliament—to step back from the Turkish posts in Idlib threatening that otherwise the Turkish army would drive them out by force. As mentioned earlier, Ankara will seek a stronger military presence in Idlib. This is a necessary step, so the Turkish President can keep up with his aggressive rhetoric and be in a position to threaten the Syrian regime, calling them to respect the Turkish precautions. However, the activity of the Syrian Army so far indicates that the Assad regime is not willing to back down amidst the Turkish statements and threats. Apparently, Turkey would be able to materialize these warnings, only with Moscow’s blessing; a highly unlikely scenario, considering that President Putin perceives the Syrian government as a much more reliable ally in the region, since the Russian intervention has been the turning point for the prevalence of the current regime, and to some extent Damascus is still (and will be) dependent on Moscow. At the same time, Kremlin would not favor the continuous expansion of the Turkish presence, which might put the aspirations of Ankara out of control.

Thus, the key point for the developments from now own will be Moscow’s stance. The airspace over Idlib is controlled by the Russian forces, therefore Turkey would not be able to resist a potential Syrian offensive with no air force cover, regardless of how many Turkish forces have been mobilized in the ground. As has been discussed in previous articles, Erdogan hardy ever makes decisions where the risks are too high. In this case, we can conclude that the Turkish military build-up in Idlib is not aiming for a direct full-scale confrontation with the Syrian army; on the contrary, Ankara is trying to use this expanded military presence in the region in order to obtain a better position at the negotiations table.

While Assad’s forces are advancing, Ankara is struggling to boost its position and buy time, while the confirmed deaths of Turkish servicemen in Idlib rise further the political grievances at home. The ultimatum that Erdogan has announced remains to be confirmed—or not—by developments on the ground in the weeks to follow.

L'articolo Syrian Army Gains as Turkey Resets its Strategy in Idlib proviene da InsideOver.

Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Kyiv on Feb. 3 to meet Ukranian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The timing of the meeting is quite significant for its relation to tense Turkish-Russian relations. The triumphal announcement of the joint TurkStream project, a development supposed to strengthen the economic and geopolitical ties between Ankara and the Kremlin and further boost their footprint in the energy landscape of Europe took place on early January. Since then we have witnessed growing tension between the two powers, triggered by their opposing interests in Libya and Syria.

Turkish-Ukrainian Relations

Among the main issues of the Kyiv meeting and the simultaneous Turkey-Ukraine business forum was the increase of the bilateral trade volume between the two countries from 4 billion USD in 2019 to 10 billion USD in 2020. Also, there have been talks about a remarkable partnership in the defense sector, as the two countries are considering the joint production of drones, a project to be led by the Ukrainian Ukrspecexport and the Turkish Baykar. However, the part of the meeting that almost exclusively drew the media’s attention was Erdogan’s reference to the annexation of Crimea as illegal and his support for the Turkic ethnic group of the Crimean Tatars.

Denouncing Crimea Annexation: Not A New Turkish Narrative

In 2014, in the aftermath of Euromaidan and the ensuing revolution and ouster of Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine Russia increased its deep involvement in Ukrainian internal affairs with a combination of diplomatic means and force projection. The Kremlin swiftly moved and annexed the Crimean peninsula⁠—where traditionally the vast majority of the population have been ethnic Russians; the paradox of the integration to Ukraine can be traced back to the early years of the Khrushchev administration in the USSR when the newly-appointed Soviet leader made a gesture of goodwill to his favorite oblast in Ukraine because of how much Ukrainians suffered during the horrifying Holodomor famine.

Since the very first moment of the Russian annexation of Crimea⁠—which was officially declared after a regional referendum in March 2014⁠—Ankara has refused to recognize Russian authority in the region and has constantly questioned the legitimacy and credibility of the whole process. Considering that Ankara has been moving closer and closer to the Kremlin since 2015⁠—with the exception of the accidental Sukhoi Su-24 shoot down⁠—the Turkish persistence on denouncing Crimea might seem odd. There are two main reasons why Ankara keeps adopting this rigid stance.

The Turkish Perspective

A vital part of the Turkish foreign policy is obtaining political leverage through affiliated religious or ethnic groups abroad. This is the case in Azerbaijan, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in the People’s Republic of China, Northern Cyprus and in specific parts of Thrace in Northern Greece, just to name a few. This is also the case in Crimea, where the Crimean Tatars account for approximately 13% of the population⁠—between 250,000 to 300,000. Crimean Tatars are a Turkic group of Sunni Muslims. Massive numbers of them were deported during the mid-1940s, over alleged and dubious accusations of collaboration with the Nazis. Even though it would be outrageous to compare Stalin’s atrocities to the way President Putin is treating Crimean Tatars today, it goes without question that their rights are not being adequately respected. As we have seen before, Erdogan is relentlessly trying to portray himself as the protector of Turk or Turkic communities, and fellow Sunni Muslim minorities worldwide. This is why the highlighting of the Crimea issue during the Kyiv meeting is fitting and consistent with his approach.

Erdogan’s Political Acumen

At the same time, Erdogan knows how to play his cards right and utilize all means available in a foreign policy and diplomacy context. Russia and Turkey have been in a standoff lately with accusations from both sides about the developments in the Libyan and Syrian front. Ankara has been accusing Russia about the involvement of the so-called “Wagner Group” in Libya, through official channels or government-affiliated media.

In Syria, Erdogan understands that his role is being gradually limited as the Assad regime is establishing itself across the country and keeps gaining further strength day by day. Syrian government forces backed by Russian Airforce have been moving towards Idlib, in order to clear the last rebel strongholds. Many of these rebel groups are backed and controlled by Turkey, considering that one of Ankara’s favorite means to achieve political ends, is to secure leverage through forces on the ground. Under those circumstances, Ankara has strongly opposed the Russian-backed offensive of the Syrian forces and threatened with another wide-scale Turkish operation in Idlib. This new escalation has allegedly cost the lives of seven Turkish soldiers, one civilian and 76 Syrian soldiers, according to Turkey.

Turning back to the Kyiv outcomes⁠—and under the light of the Syrian developments⁠—we can now understand why Erdogan has stressed out the issue of the annexation of Crimea once again, and apparently achieved the political and media attention he was seeking. Looking at the bigger picture, we can say that the statements about Crimea or the escalation in the Syrian front are not enough to put  Turkish-Russian relations at serious risk. The relations between Ankara and Kremlin have been sealed by two strategic partnerships, namely the TurkStream project and the S-400 deal. Erdogan is simply using such political maneuvers in order to consolidate and further enhance his gains in Turkey’s current open fronts or to pursue other objectives of his by way of a quid pro quo logic.

L'articolo Erdogan Visits Kyiv Amidst Turkish-Russian Tension Over Idlib Attacks proviene da InsideOver.

A common thread, or to be more precise a white metal common thread, links the three conflicts devastating North Africa and the Middle East: the one in Iraq and Syria, the one in Yemen and the one in Libya. And it has always been right before our eyes because the photos and videos that arrived from the three fronts were clear. There was always a recurring element that often paled into the background: the vehicles used by the terrorists and the militia groups fighting in all three theatres of war. There was one type in particular: the Toyota pick-up.

Everybody remembers the columns of these trucks flying the black flag of the Caliphate as the militias of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi bit by bit conquered Iraq and most of Syria. These scenes were for many months, if not years, some of the most well-known propaganda of the Islamic State. The columns of vehicles appeared like the ranks of some dark sacred army wishing to retrace the steps of the forces of the sultanates and caliphates that for centuries dominated the Muslim world. And they reappeared in the deserts of the Middle East and the Maghreb but this time they were motorised and they were terrorists.

The images went around the world but they demonstrated one thing in particular: there were hundreds (if not thousands) of Toyota vehicles, all of them the same, used by the Islamic State. The images from Syria and Iraq also began to be of interest to American intelligence. According to an Abc News investigation the US State Department had already asked the Japanese manufacturer for information on the trafficking in the trucks that swelled the Caliphate’s columns. Toyota said it was impossible to track the path of all the vehicles used in the world but it is clear that a matrix can be found by examining the large shipments of pick-ups acquired over the last few years. Something was there. And something came out. Investigations by various newspapers revealed shipments of Toyota pick-ups to crisis zones.

According to an investigation by Public Radio International 43 Toyota vehicles were sold by the State Department to rebels in the Free Syrian Army engaged in the war against Bashar al Assad. They were all part of the non-lethal aid delivered to the militia groups that inevitably fell into the hands of the jihadis who immediately gained the upper hand over the other rebels. Another investigation, again relating to Syria, conducted this time by the Australian Daily Telegraph shed light on hundreds of Toyota Hiluxes that disappeared from Sydney which anti-terrorism experts believe could have fallen into the hands of the Caliphate, perhaps exported by a high-level circle of foreign fighters.

These columns of Toyotas were however not only used in the propaganda images of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. They immediately appeared in another country in which the Caliphate took shape as well: Libya. Here the Islamist propaganda videos showed hundreds of pick-ups forming a sort of barbarian horde approaching the cities that were about to fall to the Islamic State. But it must be emphasised that the vehicles, which have been turned into fully-fledged armoured vehicles with weapons mounted on them and transformed into anti-aircraft batteries or artillery pieces, constantly appear in every image from the various fronts. If you look at the photos from Tripoli, at the front line following the advance by Khalifa Haftar, you can always see the same vehicles: always the same armoured pick-ups, armed to the teeth and used by all the combatants close to Fayez al Sarraj as well as some militia groups linked to the Marshal of Cyrenaica. In this case as well, InsideOver’s sources in Tripoli have spoken of shipments of Toyotas arriving from Qatar which are already armoured. An item of information that to brings to mind the report that circulated for several months on the internet that the Japanese car manufacturer made reference to trade in thousands of vehicles between the various gulf monarchies which were then resold by men from these states to the various groups and militias connected to them. This reaffirms the axis between Qatar and the Tripoli based government. Once again the common thread of iron and blood that links the Gulf monarchies with the war zones where the proxy war element is also strong.

Finally, Yemen. In the most forgotten, obscure and tragic war of the last few decades photos of the Toyota pickups have also appeared. And a preliminary remark should be made: photos from Yemen are rare, tend to come from the government or in any case militias not allied to the Houthi, and are almost always linked to the humanitarian tragedy. Photos from agencies that only describe the battlefields are very rare. But here too, where there is always a proxy war and the Gulf monarchies are always involved, one vehicle stands out and unites all the great North African and Middle Eastern conflicts. The Toyota trucks, which have now become a constant factor and have slipped out of the control of the Japanese manufacturer, reappeared. And in this case too they can be found amongst the militias linked to the government which in turn belongs to the great potentates of the Arabian peninsula, from Riyadh to Dubai and from Doha to Abu Dhabi. A constant element which, however, can tell us a lot about how things can be stopped and who should be stopped in order resolve these conflicts.

Translation from Italian by Dale Owens

L'articolo The Common Thread Linking Libya, Yemen and Syria proviene da InsideOver.