The European Council is meeting again from December 10 to 11 and tensions with Turkey will be at the top of the agenda. In particular, the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the European policy towards Turkey can be found at the top of the External Relations agenda of the summit.

EU leaders will discuss possible responses against Turkish provocative actions in the East Mediterranean region over the last few months, as per the conclusions of the previous European Council in October. Despite speculation about the potential EU reaction, what has been gathering even more attention lately is the ongoing escalation between France and Turkey.

Tensions between France and Turkey have not only come via traditional diplomatic means, but also on a personal level between Emmanuel Macron and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The harsh rhetoric lobbed between Erdogan and Macron and personal verbal attacks indicate that Ankara and Paris are bracing for a clash, with potential domestic and international impacts on the political and security landscape.

From les Gilets Jaunes to Erdogan’s Red Vests

In late October, Erdogan bluntly criticized the French President and urged Turkish people to boycott French products, as the tension between the two countries rises. Paris has protested Turkish unilateral actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and candidly taken the side of Athens with regards to the ongoing Greek-Turkish disputes.

At the same time Macron’s strategy to deter radical Islam within France through the closure of Islamist associations, prosecution of suspicious individuals, targeted home searches and constant monitoring of social media content has further angered the Turkish President and given him leverage for directing anger at France and Macron.

This time, Erdogan has been even more aggressive in his comments, calling Macron a dangerous burden for France and advising the French people to get rid of this “trouble” soon. Erdogan also stated that the Yellow Vests  — the famous Gilets Jaunes movement which is seeking economic reforms in France through popular protests — could promptly turn to “Red Vests”, implying that Ankara is able to mobilize thousands of Turkish and Turkish-supporting people within the French territory to cause significant disruption in the country via massive protests.

Once again Erdogan has played the neo-Ottoman card, emphasizing that the self-proclaimed Turkish position as a leading power in the Muslim world globally can be employed to shift the political balance and the security apparatus of other countries.

Macron’s Response and Competing Interests Overseas

The French President has chosen to be careful in his response, highlighting that the mutual respect should be a fundamental part of the relations between two countries. He totally condemned the use of personal insults against the head of a sovereign state.

Meanwhile, Macron’s reforms to underscore the secular character of the country are taking place in France, in a major state-coordinated effort to distinguish religion from politics. Macron has publicly endorsed and personally announced this campaign, being targeted by his critics — and especially by Turkey — for allegedly adopting a discriminatory policy against the Muslim community of France.

While Erdogan is threatening that Ankara could directly meddle into the domestic affairs of France, a much more tangible Turkish interference is possible in some traditional French strongholds across Africa. Despite the universal disapproval of the colonial legacy of the major powers of the past, one cannot question that Paris still holds a prominent role in the political, security and economic developments of the Economic Community of West African States – or ECOWAS.

Turkey has been gradually and methodically building up its presence and expanding its influence in several states of West Africa and the Sahel. As the political and security challenges in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are multiplying, France is consolidating its military operations accordingly; in the meantime Turkey is reshaping its role in the region, emerging as an alternative power to the French presence, which a considerable number of the nationals from the respective countries, occasionally blame for their long-term grievances.

An unpredictable — yet promising — strategy for Turkey would be to combine well-tested soft power methods such as sending humanitarian aid to countries in need across the region, with the deployment of unconventional means, like giving covert support to radical militias that undermine the French efforts for security.

While Ankara’s influence in the Sahel can by no means be compared to the Turkish footprint in Libya, Erdogan’s aspirations are limitless. It is clear he is willing to internationalize the Turkish-French standoff, spanning from the heart of Paris to the mainland of West Africa, where crucial French interests are at stake.

Germany is Unlikely to Stand up to Turkey

Returning to the EU developments, it should be expected that France will escalate pressure against Turkey this week as we approach the European Council meeting. Paris will call for decisive action against Turkey, focusing on the unilateral unauthorized Turkish activity in the Eastern Mediterranean and hoping that the EU will finally impose some substantial sanctions on Ankara and will implement a stricter policy; however apart from Greece and Cyprus — the EU member states who are most affected by the Turkish recent actions in the Eastern Mediterranean — the rest of the European powers are not expected to make any essential changes to the stance they have adopted so far.

With regards to sanctions the most favorable plausible scenario for France, Greece and Cyprus would be an arms embargo on Turkey from the EU, a step that would immediately and drastically undermine the most important factor of the Turkish Foreign Policy: the capability and battle readiness of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Even though Germany has mentioned in the past that sanctions would be discussed if Ankara kept not complying with the EU calls, the possibility of a German agreement on substantial sanctions should be ruled out. On the contrary, as Germany is about to complete its six-month presidency of the EU Council, there will likely be a major effort — even if it prompts a public disagreement with France — to block any serious action against Turkey, underscoring the German approach since the tensions started in the Eastern Mediterranean in July.

L'articolo France and Turkey Brace for Clash Ahead of European Council Meeting proviene da InsideOver.

As the Greek, Cypriot and Turkish dispute on the status of the islands and the maritime boundaries among the three countries continues, EU Foreign Ministers held a Gymnich meeting on Friday August 28 to discuss possible sanctions against Turkey.

The meeting was an informal summit to discuss about potential action against Turkey, in case the negotiations between Ankara and the EU for a peaceful solution with Athens and Nicosia reach a dead end.

Borrell’s Statements on the Conclusions of the Meeting

Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security, provided a Press Conference shortly after the end of the meeting, summarizing the key points that were discussed among the participating Member States.

Firstly, Borrell made clear that the primary target of the participants is always the promotion of European interests, and in this respect, he expressed general solidarity with Cyprus and Greece. Also, Turkey has been advised to abstain from any unilateral action, so the appropriate climate for a productive dialogue could be achieved.

The EU High Representative carefully prepared his statements, avoiding any provoking announcements or direct threats towards Ankara. Borrell mainly focused on the mutual interests between the EU and Turkey and he highlighted that both parties should walk the “fine line” that would be beneficial for everyone involved.

In his brief statement he repeatedly mentioned the words dialogue and negotiations, indicating that first and foremost the EU is seeking deescalation through means of cooperation, and the scenario of imposing sanctions on Turkey should only be seen as a last resort.

Proposed Measures and Sanctions Against Turkey

If a compromise is not timely in a timely manner, then the European Union would be ready to expand a list with individuals and private entities, that are involved in the disputed Turkish drilling in Greek and Cypriot maritime zones. If these measures prove to be inadequate, then the European Council will possibly take further collective action which will be discussed on September 24 and 25.

Borrell clarified that the EU countermeasures would adopt an escalating and proportionate approach. For the time being only individuals, involved in the illegal drilling activities constitute the list of potential sanction targets. In later phases this could be also applied to vessels and shipping companies. The regime of economic sanctions and exclusion from corporate activities could also be extended to a ban for Turkish entities on using European ports, facilities, and technology.

The EU High Representative also stated that priority will be given to the dispute over the drilling activities across the Eastern Mediterranean and the presence of Turkish vessels within Greek or Cypriot maritime zones, as those issues entail a constant danger for the peace and security in the region.

It should be mentioned here that the EU officials seem ready to discuss additional issues with Turkey as part of the proposed negotiations at a later point, even though Greece has insisted that the talks should only focus on the disputes around the maritime rights, the continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the countries involved.

Lessons from the Past: Lukewarm EU Sanctions Against Turkey

The rising discord in the Aegean Sea since late July 2020, is not the only example of the regional Turkish aggressiveness in the recent past.

By July 2019, the European Union has repeatedly urged Turkey to cease immediately at least two illegal drilling operations west and northeast of Cyprus, but Ankara kept showing no intention of compliance. The unauthorized drilling activity has been taking place not only in the country’s internationally recognized and clearly defined EEZ but also in the immediate proximity of the Cypriot territorial waters – occasionally overlapping them.

In response the European Council decided to proceed with a number of restrictive measures against Turkey; among others, the negotiations on the Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement stopped, blocking an important step for Turkish aviation, since a possible agreement could bring billions of euros as revenue for the Turkish air transports, enhance the connectivity between Turkey and major European destinations, and significantly decrease the price of the air tickets.

Financial assistance to Turkey for 2020 would also be decreased while the European Investment Bank was advised to limit its loaning in-country activities. In addition an asset freeze and a travel ban have been imposed on two individuals that were directly involved in the unlawful drilling process.

Turkey Has Violated the Sovereign Rights of an EU Member State

As mentioned above, Turkey has openly violated the sovereign rights of an EU member state, and constantly ignored the European calls to stop the provocations and join the negotiating table. The European Institutions decided to response in a very mild way, that barely affected Ankara.

The sanctions imposed in 2019 showcased that Europe had no real intention to send a decisive message in order to block the Turkish aggressive agenda, and the whole process has been actually aiming to mitigate the political reactions of certain member states.

European Institutions have proved that sanctions can work as a great means of pressure in the field of international politics. For instance back in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, the EU adopted a set of aggressive sanctions against Moscow, from targeting hundreds of key individuals through asset freezing and travel bans, to significantly restricting the bilateral trade relations in numerous sectors, that have been vital for the Russian economy.

This action led to the rapid deprecation of the rubble and a significant financial crisis across the Russian Federation. It should be highlighted that Ukraine is not an EU member state.

The example of the 2019 measures combined with the current EU rhetoric towards Turkey clearly indicate that the sanctions under discussion will not be too harsh and Ankara would easily handle them.

We will have a more solid picture by late September once the Special European Council has been completed; if a solution has not been reached by then, the most probable scenario is that Turkey will keep pushing its current claims without changing anything in their practices, and the response from the European Union will be nothing more than a symbolic one.

L'articolo Is the EU About to Sanction Turkey? proviene da InsideOver.

For the first time in its history, the EU has committed itself to joint debts to fund the €750 billion coronavirus aid recovery package. Three hundred ninety billion euros of it will be paid in grants, which is less than suggested by Germany, France and the EU Commission, but arguably still sufficient to merit the label epochal. However, the summit was a struggle and it may have changed the EU’s future.

Transfer Union

The compromise made is a paradigm shift in two ways. The capital that the EU Commission is supposed to acquire on the financial markets is more than ever before. It also marks the begin of the – at the very least – partial transfer union. Partially as, unlike the corona or euro bonds discussed at the beginning of the crisis, individual states are now not liable for everyone’s debts. Liability is instead limited to the share of payments into the EU budget. In addition, only €390 billion of the total amount are to be paid as grants that do not have to be repaid. The remaining €360 billion will be distributed as loans that will be repaid by the recipient states themselves over a period of 38 years.

Two issues arise here. First, a lot can happen in 38 years. If one only took the previous decade, it is fair to assume that new crises are inevitable. It hence seems somewhat inconceivable that the total of these loans will ever be repaid in full by every recipient state. And with a Commission no national government appears to be afraid of, skipping out on the tab is not unrealistic. Second, history has taught one that newly introduced EU measures often set a precedent and hence become part of the repertoire. Joint fiscal responses to a crisis, thus open the door widely for future grants in lieu of loans.

New Self-Confidence From the Frugal Four

Besides the newly introduced fiscal modus operandi, the summit has also sharply increased the self-confidence of certain member states. Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, the frugal four, have discovered the art of the deal for themselves and indeed their power within the union. The summit has proven that cooperation between them allows for own agendas to be realised – even if these agenda are in opposition to Franco-German plans. The Nordic-Alpine coalition has the potential to change the dynamic in Europe in the long term while putting its fiscal-conservative, liberal and free-trade-oriented stamp on it.

The Rule of Law

Prior to the summit, the EU Commission and many countries in Northern Europe had demanded that money from the EU budget and therefore also from the recovery plan ought to be paid if recipient states uphold the rule of law, a mechanism aimed primarily at Hungary and Poland. However, it was evident that the rule of law was only a second or third priority, even for the northerners. And while the heads of state and government agreed on the rule of law mechanism, it remains almost unenforceable and thus only a symbolic gesture. Sanctions are only possible if a qualified majority of the EU member states agree, which, at this stage, seems inconceivable. Moreover, even if a majority to enforce the mechanism was found, depriving Hungary and Poland of funds may violate EU law. The summit compromise hence hampered every opportunity to force Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Poland’s Jarosław Kaczynski to adhere to the fundamental European values. The corona package thus comes with a hefty price tag: the failure of the rule of law in Europe’s prestige project.

The Future of the EU

However, it is not only the rule of law that will suffer. To finance the aid package, the EU budget for the next seven years will be far less future-oriented than the Commission would have preferred: Investments in science, cybersecurity or health have been scratched. These cuts can conceivably have very negative long-term consequences for Europe if the money is only sufficient for the traditional areas of agriculture and structural policy.

All in all, the compromise was necessary for Europe’s stability and subsequent recovery. However, the way it has been facilitated raises several new questions particularly in regard to future crises. With a transfer union in the making, any new crisis has now become an opportunity for division — particularly if member states start failing to repay their debts. It is thus a compromise that raises more questions with regard to the EU’s future than it provides answers.

L'articolo Lessons From the EU Summit proviene da InsideOver.

The European Council has just finished the longest meeting that it has had since the Nice, France gathering in 2000 and agreed upon a €750 billion recovery package. The package consists of grants and loans to counter the economic impact that the coronavirus has inflicted on the bloc since March.

European Council (EC) President Charles Michel described it as a “pivotal” moment for Europe and this sum represents the largest joint borrowing the EU has ever undertaken so far. The deal focuses on a €390 billion program to member states hardest hit by the virus such as Italy and Spain. An extra €360 billion in low-interest loans will alsombe available to EU states.

The ‘Frugal Four’ Opposed Grants for Spain and Italy

The agreement followed 90 hours of talks that started on Friday, during which tempers were frayed. The “frugal four” (Sweden, Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands) alongside Finland had opposed extending €500 billion in grants.

At one stage, French President Emmanuel Macron accused the frugal four of placing the European project in danger.

The €390 billion sum was recommended as a compromise, and the frugal countries were won over by the guarantee of rebates on their EU budget contributions.

Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, despite being the biggest opponent of the original package, welcomed the deal.

This agreement will no doubt provide both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte with relief as they were the biggest proponents of the package from the beginning. Merkel argued throughout the last five days that “exceptional situations also require exceptional efforts.” Italian borrowing costs are also set to fall to March levels as the stimulus cheers markets.

The Deal Will Only Provide Short-Term Relief

Nonetheless, this stimulus will only provide the eurozone with short-term relief. Now that the EU has been provided with a recovery fund, the bloc’s greatest challenges lie ahead. The economic impact of the coronavirus has tested the single currency’s survival in a way not witnessed since the 2008 recession. If European leaders are serious about preventing a pandemic or any other external threat from threatening European unity again, they must deal with the bloc’s existential problems that the coronavirus exposed.

This was the first European Council meeting without Britain at the table. In December, a UK-EU trade deal should be completed, but if that process fails, the UK will quit the EU without a deal. This outcome would be far worse for the EU as Germany exports 800,000 cars to Britain every year, which equals 14 percent of all vehicles it makes domestically. German car imports would be levied by a 10 percent tax under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.

Brexit Remains a Problem

The IMF suggests Ireland would suffer an output loss of four percent in the event of a no-deal Brexit. Therefore, EU diplomats should focus all their energy on preventing a no-deal scenario if they want to stimulate economic growth.

The coronavirus has also increased the prospect of other countries leaving the EU, too. The Daily Express reports on one survey which suggests that 50 percent of Italians support an “Italexit,” or Italy’s exit from the EU, whilst 27 percent of Italians prefer to remain within the bloc. Earlier this year, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen had to apologize for the way the bloc treated Italy at the start of the pandemic. It is unlikely that Italians will forget this when it comes to the polls, and COVID-19 has increased the prospect of an anti-EU coalition government being formed in Italy in the future.

Will There Be More EU Integration in the Future?

Milton Friedman and Martin Feldstein warned in 1999 that the eurozone cannot succeed without a political union. The coronavirus may make EU leaders realize that there is a greater need for political integration to prevent this situation from happening again, but it is looking doubtful all nations will agree, particularly Poland which is about to enter its own battle with Brussels over the imposition of gay marriage.

The markets may be celebrating the outcome of this European Council meeting, but technically the party is already over. How the EU evolves now will be the ultimate test of its survival.

L'articolo Why Eurozone Recovery Depends on More Than a €750 billion Stimulus proviene da InsideOver.

Following the EU leaders’ decision last July, Charles Michel will take over as President of the European Council on 1 December 2019. The former prime minister of Belgium will be the third person to hold the office since it was created by the Lisbon Treaty exactly one decade ago and the second Belgian to do so following the inaugural holder of the European Council’s presidency, Herman Van Rompuy.

The selection of the then Belgian premier to serve as the first Council president was intended to reassure smaller EU member states that their interests would be protected and not dominated by the union’s bigger countries (Germany, France and the United Kingdom).

Michel’s election follows the same logic: Belgium remains a smaller member state close to France and Germany, while his appointment satisfies the demand to give one of the EU’s top jobs to the liberal political family, whose influence in the Council has been significantly increased since the emergence of Emmanuel Macron. Michel is also a well known figure on the EU stage and can communicate in different languages with heads of state and government.

Persistence and endurance have been the main characteristics of Charles Michel’s career up to this point. The son of Louis Michel, former Belgian foreign minister and European commissioner, young Charles won a seat at the federal parliament at the age of 23, before becoming minister for the regional government of Wallonia at the age of 25 and federal minister for development by the age of 32. He remained in this post for three years until he became leader of the francophone liberal party, the Reformist Movement.

His rise to his country’s highest office in 2014 was somewhat coincidental. Representing the only francophone party in a four-party coalition that also included the Flemish liberals (VLD), the Flemish centre-right party (CD&V) and the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), Michel was offered the premiership when CD&V chose the right to nominate Belgium’s European commissioner instead.

Michel’s first government lasted longer than any of his opponents or supporters had expected and in spite of serious challenges faced along the way, such as the terrorist attacks in Brussels in March 2016 or the regional government of Wallonia threatening to deny its approval of the EU’s trade deal with Canada in October 2016.

Having mastered the Belgian art of compromise through his dealing with the complexities of Belgian politics, Michel seems like a natural choice for the European Council’s presidency. Nevertheless, when there is no consensus on the rules of the game, things can end up in a stalemate even for a seasoned Belgian politician.

Michel’s frail government coalition collapsed at the end of last year, when the conservative N-VA party withdrew its previous consent to the signature of the UN Global Compact for Migration. That may be a bad omen as tensions in the European Council over migration policy or the EU’s long-term budget are not foreseen to be resolved in the immediate future. As it was demonstrated by his compatriot Herman Van Rompuy, a big part of a Council president’s success depends on knowing the limits of his powers.

Michel’s friendly and natural style and his reputation as a serious politician make him well-suited for the demands of his new position. Being a staunch believer in the EU project might seem like a prerequisite for the role, but in the current political environment that could also prove to be a weakness as Michel might struggle to win the trust of those national leaders who are more sceptical of the EU. At the end of the day, even he will have to keep in mind that not everyone can think like a Belgian.

L'articolo Charles Michel And The Belgian Art Of Compromise proviene da InsideOver.

On Saturday, the Letwin amendment– passed by 322 MPs to 306- forced ministers to seek an extension to the Article 50 period to 31 January 2020 under the Benn Act. Boris Johnson then sent a request to the European Council President Donald Tusk in an unsigned letter late on Saturday night. He has also sent a separate note to Tusk, in which he urged the EU not to grant an extension.

Sir Oliver Letwin said his amendment was an ‘insurance policy’ to prevent the UK ‘crashing out’ of the EU without a deal on 31 October. By proposing this amendment, Letwin has only increased the chances of a no-deal Brexit, which is ironic because this is an outcome he and so many other MPs are keen to avoid. The Duchy of Lancaster, Michael Gove, has insisted that Britain is prepared for no-deal.

There are two ways the European Council can reject the Prime Minister’s request for a Brexit extension: an EU member state vetoes one or the Council unanimously agrees to prevent an extension. Since Matteo Salvini was ejected from the Italian Government and a left-wing coalition consisting of the Democratic Party and the Five Star Movement was formed, the UK has lost a potential ally in Italy. They could have rejected an extension if Salvini was still in power.

Politics Home reports that Gove was among three senior ministers to hold meetings with the Hungarian foreign minister, Peter Szijjarto, at the beginning of the month. Szijjarto was caught leaving the Cabinet Office around the same time Boris chaired an emergency Cabinet meeting, which sparked speculation that Hungary could veto a Brexit extension for the British Prime Minister.

Even French President Emmanuel Macron, one of the most enthusiastic supporters for the European project, has stated that a delay to Britain’s EU exit is ‘in no one’s interest’, which could mean France may also veto an extension. He has also said in the past that a no-deal Brexit would be ‘Britain’s fault.’ This shows that he will attempt to punish the UK for voting to leave the EU if the opportunity emerged. Furthermore, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker refused to grant an extension after EU leaders agreed to Boris’s new deal on Thursday. A decision on the matter is not likely to be made by European leaders until a summit held as late as 29 October. 

Therefore, on Tuesday MPs have no choice but to vote for Boris’s deal. It is the best chance of ensuring Britain leaves the EU on 31 October with an orderly exit. A YouGov poll shows two-thirds of Leave voters want Parliament to accept the deal.

This deal ensures Northern Ireland remains in the UK’s Customs Union and the Irish backstop has been replaced by a Northern Ireland protocol that enables Stormont’s Assembly to vote against the EU’s regulatory orbit for goods to allow its border with the Republic of Ireland to remain open. This vote will take place every four years.

On 1 January 2021, the UK can start negotiations to implement new trade deals. By this point, Donald Trump may have lost the 2020 General Election, but considering the US is one of Britain’s biggest markets, the chance of a trade deal is still there. Because Boris’s deal prevents a hard border, Nancy Pelosi cannot then argue Brexit risks damaging the Good Friday Agreement, thereby ensuring there is cross-party support in both Houses of Congress for a UK-US trade deal.

The new deal also enables Britain to decide whether it wants to abide by the EU’s regulatory power over nation states in the areas of social and environmental policy, tax, competition and state aid. Although this country will still have to pay a £33 billion divorce payment, once the UK has left the EU, Boris’s deal will take back control of this country’s money, borders and laws.

From the beginning, most MPs have done all they can to prevent a no-deal Brexit. Even with a deal, they have aimed to delay leaving the EU further by approving of the Letwin amendment. There is still a chance the deal could be voted through on Tuesday, but the possibility of no-deal remains if the European Council refuses to grant an extension. If our politicians want a deal, Boris’s is the only one they are going to get.

L'articolo Why Boris’s Brexit Deal Should Win Parliamentary Approval On Tuesday proviene da InsideOver.