On Tuesday, March 3 public attention in the United States will be completely dominated by Super Tuesday. The day is in fact destined to represent a turning point in the primary elections to nominate the presidential candidates for the Democratic party.

Super Tuesday: a Key Day in American Politics

For over thirty years “Super Tuesdays” have been a fixture of America’s leading parties, representing the first wide-ranging national contest for candidates aiming to take part in the White House elections in November of the electoral year. Given that Donald Trump‘s nomination is taken for granted in the Republican party — which on that day will formally stage the caucuses and primaries in 11 States — all eyes today are set on the Democratic contest which will be battled out in fifteen primaries: voting in fourteen states of the Union and the choice of American residents living abroad.

Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont and Virginia will be voting to establish which of the Democratic candidates will prevail: February’s vote indicated the socialist-inspired Vermont senator Bernie Sanders as the man to beat. However centrist former Vice-president Joe Biden — winner in the recent South Carolina primary — is by no means out of the game, while the surprise drop out of young technocrat and former South Bend mayor Pete Buttigieg has relaunched billionaire former Mayor of New York Michael Bloomberg as a possible third wheel.

1,344 of the 3,979 Democratic National Convention delegates who will be voting for the White House candidate will be contended during the 3 March contests, in States ranging from the traditional blue strongholds of the east (Vermont, Virginia, Massachusets) and west (California) to the conservative states of the deep South which are mainly Trump’s electoral domain. Today is set to be one of the most decisive Super Tuesdays of all time. Rarely has a Super Tuesday fulfilled the function for which the parties implemented it over the last decades: to indicate ahead of time the dominant line in the nominations race in order to identify the party’s true front-runner. As polarization between the two predominant parties becomes more marked — and Biden and Sanders’ race heats up — Super Tuesday is becoming more decisive.

L'articolo What is Super Tuesday? proviene da InsideOver.

Austria’s unlikely coalition between the conservative Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, or ÖVP) and the Greens has been formed after weeks of hard-fought negotiations. Their respective party chairs Sebastian Kurz and Werner Kogler announced that the middle of the week would successfully conclude their discussions.

Why Are The Greens Teaming Up With The ÖVP?

Before the announcement, the Greens had previously accepted an invitation to the ÖVP’s congress, who will have to vote on the coalition agreement for what is certainly considered a favor. For the ÖVP, Kurz does not need any official approval from the party committees; thus, the first ÖVP-Green coalition in history is a formality at this stage. An official announcement of the agreement is expected on Thursday, and the new government could begin to operate as soon as January 7.

A government with the Greens also means a new beginning for the old and new Chancellor Kurz. From the beginning of the negotiations, both party leaderships had indicated their parties were coming from diametrically opposed school of thought politically.

Austria Will Have To Embrace Its Creative Side

Creative solutions will thus be necessary above all for the core issues of climate policy and migration. Kurz and Kogler announced that significant encumbrances had been overcome in the past few days. However, no details were provided. Nevertheless, there are indications that both parties will enjoy individual liberties in the environmental and security area.

ÖVP chair Kurz recently announced his vision for the coming years on Facebook would remain “lower taxes. End debt policy” and another of Kurz’s signature stances, namely to “fight illegal migration.” The latter will be the most difficult issues to come together on for the coalition. However, Kurz made it clear during the government negotiations: his party received the Austrian people’s support based on his policies; hence the ÖVP’s identity will not be changed in years to come.

Nonetheless, the question of how refugee policy will be facilitated going forward remains unanswered at this stage. The establishment of a new state asylum agency was decided under the previous government. From 2021 onward, the same agency is also due to provide refugee return and legal advice. However, the NGOs that have been performing this task so far have agreed on a shorter notice period for their contracts—leaving the new government with an immediate gap to bridge.

Healthcare Policy And The ÖVP

In the care and health sector, the ÖVP has already set priorities in the National Council election campaign by seeking to secure funding, ideally with some form of insurance. In particular, they have emphasized that home care should also be made more accessible. The Greens, on the other hand, have emphasized careers in the healthcare industry. Healthcare staff—often foreigners—should, therefore, be protected from exploitation and also have the opportunity to cost-effectively receive the right training for their job.

According to reports, the Greens are set to run the Department of Health and are thus likely to implement their agenda first. Besides the Department of Health, the Greens will run the Ministry of Infrastructure, the departments of Social Affairs, the judiciary, culture, and sport together with public service. Meanwhile, the ÖVP will control the departments of finance, home affairs, economy, and education as well as defense, economy, and the Foreign Ministry. Importantly, the final decision on who receives how much in the budget will remain with the Chancellor Party. Moreover, the international stage will continue to belong to the ÖVP: with Kurz in the leading role, but also with an ÖVP-led foreign ministry. The European agendas also remains with the ÖVP.

‘New Political Culture’

The new government will sound differently. Greens chair Kogler already indicated last Friday that the coalition would establish a “new political culture” after the ÖVP’s former coalition partner FPÖ had its fair share of controversies. What will be most interesting to see, however, is whether Kurz is about to expose himself as a political opportunist. When he entered the coalition with the far-right FPÖ, Kurz was heavily criticized, and against his better judgment, he decided to cooperate with the FPÖ to become Austria’s Chancellor.

For a coalition with the Greens now, the very same man Sebastian Kurz will have to either transform to accommodate the Greens partially leftist ideology without losing his core principles or simply embrace a role as a leader who is willing to sacrifice his convictions to remain in power.

L'articolo Austria’s New Odd Couple Government proviene da InsideOver.

For almost six years, Eastern Ukraine has known war. Locked in a seemingly unending cycle of conflict with separatist militias, Kiev’s battalions are battered and bruised – but still they fight on. A ceasefire was signed in 2015, but the breakaway forces, backed, it seems, by Russia, have continued their struggle. In total, some 13,000 have lost their lives. But now, after a period of relative calm, a fresh push for peace is being made.

This week, Ukraine’s new president, Volodymyr Zelensky, will – for the first time – meet Vladimir Putin. Held in Paris, the talks will be mediated by France and Germany, and mark the first formal negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in over three years. 

Elected in April, Zelensky stormed the polls with a promise to bring the fighting to an end. A former actor – known best for his portrayal of a fictional president – has worked to bridge the gap with Moscow. Prisoners have been swapped and seized ships returned – and he is said to speak regularly with Putin on the phone. 

But for domestic critics, not least his predecessor Petro Poroshenko, Zelensky is straying dangerously close to over-concession. In October, sporadic street protests erupted when he signed the so-called Steinmeier Formula – a plan for peace endorsed by Moscow. Under the agreement – which isn’t yet binding – Ukraine’s eastern territories would hold elections under Kiev-approved legislation, after which the region would return to Ukrainian control.

It sounds like an equitable piece of diplomacy, but for Zelensky’s opponents, assent to Steinmeier is a woeful capitulation. Emboldened by the Ukrainian man’s ‘peace at any price’ promise, Putin will likely view elections in the Donbass – the eastern provinces’ collective name – as a chance to reassert Moscow’s regional hegemony. At the polls, locals will back pro-Russian parties seeking autonomy from Kiev, the Kremlin believes. 

With sympathetic rulers installed in the East, Putin will have a backdoor to Ukrainian foreign policy and lawmaking. Should the nation push for tighter NATO relations, for instance, the Donbass, under Moscow’s guidance, could invoke their veto. Coupled with the lifting of Western sanctions – a goodwill gesture for his commitment to peace – Putin’s Paris trip might be profitable indeed.

With the involvement of Ukraine’s French and German allies, however, Moscow should, in theory, be pressed to make their concessions. But in France’s Emmanuel Macron, Putin has a friendly ear. The talks’ host is an avowed advocate of closer Euro-Russian relations, going so far as to describe NATO, an alliance loathed by Moscow, as “brain dead”. 

Worried by Russia’s apparent warmongering in Ukraine, Macron’s EU counterparts are wary of getting too close to the Moscow man – but if settlement is reached over the Donbass, the way would be clear for a tightening of bonds. Seeking lucrative bilateral trade and investment opportunities with Russia, this would suit Macron nicely.

A close friend of his, Germany’s Angela Merkel, views Putin with more suspicion – but she too has reason to push for a speedy Ukrainian settlement. The Nordstream 2 project, an off-shore gas pipeline linking Germany to Russia, is on the cusp of completion. Routing fuel directly to Europe via the Baltic Sea, the pipeline is bad news for Zelensky, whose country is currently used in transit. The loss of income would weaken Ukraine’s already vulnerable economy, say international critics urging Merkel to scrap the scheme. A peace agreement with Russia would buy Berlin time to see the construction completed, she hopes.   

Harder to read is her American counterpart – the mercurial Mr Donald Trump. Zelensky launched a US-charm offensive this summer, desperate to win the president’s unwavering support. An official White House invite was the Ukrainian’s wish – a gesture that would’ve given many in Moscow pause for thought. But the offer never came. “I really hope you and President Putin get together and can solve your problem,” Trump said instead. His message was clear: Zelensky, you’re on your own.

In truth, it should have come as no surprise. Ukraine is dangerous political ground for the White House right now. Facing an impeachment investigation into his apparent threat to withhold military aid unless Kiev fulfils political objectives, Trump is wary of aligning too closely with Zelensky. The goal – an equitable peace deal on the Donbass – might be wholly right and proper, but the optics could play poorly in Washington.

And so Zelensky finds himself in an unenviable position. “Committed to seeking an end to the war in the Donbass, he is under strong pressure at home not to give in to Moscow’s bullying tactics,” said Bohdan Nahaylo of the Atlantic Council, a think tank. “At the same time, the Ukrainian leader will also have to watch his back and hope his country’s longtime allies remain reliable.” 

Regardless of the challenges, the inexperienced statesman must prevail. The window for settlement won’t remain open for long – and failure could carry a terrible cost. Like in Israel and Cyprus, a ‘frozen conflict’ might emerge: a bitter, military impasse, defined in all likelihood by the building of walls. Just last week, a senior Zelensky aide to revealed plans for a fortified frontier if the talks falter. If there is a chance to avoid that fate, it must be taken.  

L'articolo New Peace Talks Offer Hope To War-Torn Eastern Ukraine proviene da InsideOver.

The leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine met on Monday 9 December in Paris in a renewed effort to end the armed conflict that has been raging in Ukraine for the past five years.

This was the first meeting of the so-called Normandy Format since October 2016. Its previous iterations in 2014 and 2015 resulted in the Minsk peace agreements, which contributed to a considerable de-escalation of hostilities in Eastern Ukraine that has claimed the lives of 13,000 people and has caused the displacement of millions of others.

A major factor in the Normandy Format’s re-emergence was the election of the incumbent Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky last May, for whom the achievement of peace in the Donbass region constitutes a top priority.

After several hours of deliberations, sides agreed on “a full and comprehensive implementation of the ceasefire, strengthened by the implementation of all necessary ceasefire support measures, before the end of the year 2019”. The sides also announced their agreement on working towards holding local elections in Donbass over the next four months, a considerable step forward despite pending disagreements on the voting procedure.

Apart from progress made on prisoner exchanges, ceasefire and a political evolution, Zelensky said he and Vladimir Putin had prepared the outline of an agreement that would allow the transit of Russian natural gas to continue through the territory of Ukraine. The current natural gas transit contract expires on 31 December this year.

Despite positive developments, the meeting did not produce the breakthrough everyone was hoping for. At the closing press conference that started just before Monday midnight, the Ukrainian President and his Russian counterpart disagreed publicly over the political issues that remain in the way of resolving the conflict, namely the restoration of Kyiv’s control over its borders and the granting of wider autonomy to the separatist regions. Nevertheless, leaders insisted that talks were fruitful and would lead to swift and more substantial progress in the coming weeks and months. The next meeting in the Normandy format is scheduled to take place within four months

For the host Emmanuel Macron, this summit subscribes to his recent efforts to further promote France’s role on the global diplomatic scene and in particular to reanimate a wider rapprochement with Moscow. It is the latest episode of a series of initiatives that started with the last G7 Summit again held on French soil when he also attempted to spearhead an easing of tensions between the United States and Iran and continued with strong statements about NATO’s purpose and integrity.

Unfortunately for him and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the progress recorded on Monday in Paris is not enough to recommend withdrawing economic sanctions against Russia in their debriefing to their fellow EU leaders during the upcoming European Council meeting on Thursday in Brussels. Monday’s discussions and their relatively unsatisfying outcome demonstrated once again the limits of any alliance, let alone an individual country, in addressing some of the world’s most complicated geopolitical issues.

L'articolo Normandy Summit Falls Short Of Ukrainian Expectations proviene da InsideOver.

As increasing media attention focuses on the current situation in Turkey and Syria as well as domestic American politics and the ongoing Trump-Ukraine situation, Canada’s upcoming federal election on October 21 has entered a new phase of intensity and bitterness. At a delayed rally held recently in Mississauga near Toronto, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who is running for re-election to a second term, wore a bulletproof vest and was surrounded by a tactical team and plainclothes officers due to unspecified threats against him. It’s an unprecedented step for a Canadian politician. Even recalling the fatal shooting of Corporal Nathan Cirillo and attempted storming of federal parliament by a lone gunman inspired by Islamic extremism in 2014, politics in Canada is generally fairly low-key compared to how politics plays out south of the border.

Nonetheless, Canadian politics has transitioned into a more American-style partisanship in the last few years, especially since Trudeau’s decisive victory in Canada’s 2015 election. In the lead up to this month’s election authorities say they have been tracking online posts advocating political violence and note that there has been an uptick in online commentary excusing or encouraging violence. Although many voters have been left unenthusiastic in what some are terming an election about nothing, it is clear that Canada’s political climate has become a little less polite this time around. Right-wing propaganda outlets like the Rebel have helped spark angry resentment and protest of Trudeau, while many left-wing parties and political figures have chosen to fully inhabit a place of childishly reactive and intense opposition to anything within a mile of the word conservative, especially on social issues which Canada’s centre and left parties falsely contend have already been settled by near-unanimous consensus among the Canadian public.

As can be seen from 338 Canada’s electoral projection map, the Conservatives and Liberals enjoy different pockets of support, with the Liberals enjoying strong backing in various urban centres and the Conservatives and NDP (democratic socialist party) getting strong support in various rural areas. Voters remain undecided in some cases and there is a good chance this race could go either way, but analysts agree the race is tight and it certainly could go to Andrew Scheer and the Conservatives, particularly in light of discovery that Trudeau engaged in blackface multiple times in the past. The resulting dip Trudeau experienced in the polls, as well as disappointment from his left-leaning supporters over his approval of a controversial pipeline project and a major scandal (the SNC-Lavalin Affair) involving resignation of Trudeau’s attorney general Jody Wilson-Raybould and him kicking her out of the Liberal party add to his political vulnerability.

As parties to the left of Trudeau like the NDP and Greens gain support, the Conservatives benefit. NDP leader Jagmeet Singh has been clear about his openness to form a coalition against the Conservatives should they win, showing that he understands the very real possibility that Trudeau’s time is up. For his part, Trudeau has been telling voters that Conservatives will cut all sorts of government services and be bad for working families, pointing to the example of Ontario Premier Doug Ford and cuts he’s made to the province of Ontario. Conservative fortunes have been incrementally rising and enthusiasm for Trudeau does appear to be on the wane among some of his less committed past voters. With underwhelming voter enthusiasm, participation may also be low, and it all bodes well for the Conservatives.

As Scheer has remarked, despite a late release of the party platform, the Conservative strategy is quite simple: to pitch himself and his party as the party of working Canadians to make life more affordable and “put more money in their pocket.” Scheer has also been speaking out against foreign aid, foreign direct investment in the energy sector and “corporate welfare” as a symptom of high government spending especially going to profitable companies as unnecessary deficit ballooning. Scheer’s savvy strategy is to present Trudeau as untrustworthy and a high-taxing, corrupt leader who is detached from the lives of ordinary Canadians. This is a politely Canadian riff on the “anti-establishment” tack which has been showing up as particularly effective in elections around the world in our current political moment.

The federal leaders’ debate on Oct. 7 was mainly a stage of adults bickering and undercutting each other constantly like grade-schoolers, but did result in slight surges of support for conservative defector Maxime Bernier’s People’s Party and the NDP.  Although the People’s Party has the potential to sap votes from the Conservatives, the bulk of Canada’s politics is on the centre and left, making it more likely that flagging support for Trudeau and the Liberals going to other left parties could result in a Conservative Victory next week.

L'articolo Trudeau Faces Tough Contest In Canada’s Upcoming Election proviene da InsideOver.

In May, the Ibiza scandal of then FPÖ chair and Vice-Chancellor Strache not only ended a coalition but the Austrian government. Days before the election this Sunday the affair seems forgotten and Sebastian Kurz is on the verge of becoming chancellor again.

Weeks of hard-fought, and for west European standards, at times, dirty campaigns are coming to a close. The parties’ top candidates have appeared on TV and print media almost daily to bring across their visions for a better version of Austria after an incident that shook Austria’s democracy to its core.

The scandal in May had the potential to cost Kurz much more than just his office. At the very least, a steady decline in popularity was likely, the end of his career not inconceivable. Yet, the former chancellor has managed to emerge strengthened, despite his prominent role in the Ibiza saga.

It was Kurz, who pushed for a coalition with the right-wing FPÖ and its controversial chair Strache in 2017 against considerable resistance. However, Kurz, after being deposed by parliament in May, seamlessly transformed from statesman to campaigner and portrayed himself as a victim of parliamentary anti-ÖVP forces, that ceased his tenure.

The transformation has been highly successful. All polls indicate an ÖVP win, leaving the country with one remaining question: who will become the ÖVP’s junior partner and Kurz’s kingmaker? Kurz’s ÖVP (35%) remains comfortably ahead of the SPÖ (20%) and his former coalition partner FPÖ (21%).

The figures, as well as the election campaigns, suggest an ÖVP-FPÖ revival. Kurz has repeatedly stated how well the former government worked and has not been shy in mentioning its achievements either. It is a carbon copy of new FPÖ chair Hofer’s suggestive remarks, who, as Austria’s only top politician, has openly declared his preference – a renewed partnership with the ÖVP.

An incumbrance remains former Minister of the Interior Herbert Kickl. Kurz ousted Kickl in the scandal’s immediate aftermath due to “conflicts of interests”. However, Kickl, as well as Hofer, have stated their desire for Kickl to return to his previous position. Kickl himself went one step further and named the latter a coalition requirement.

Meanwhile, Kurz continues to rule out Kickl’s comeback and has prominent support from Austria’s president Alexander Van der Bellen, who has publicly stated he will not accept Kickl as Minister of the Interior.

The SPÖ and its chair, Pamela Rendi-Wagner has expressed interest in a coalition with Kurz also. Her interest may come as a surprise, considering the SPÖ triggered the motion of no confidence against Kurz and subsequently ended the former government.

Moreover, the SPÖ chair has utilised almost all her TV appearances – some of which featured Kurz as well – to conduct a character assassination of the former chancellor, accusing him of powerplays detrimental to the country chastising Kurz for his partnership with the right-wing FPÖ.

However, Rendi-Wagner is not undisputed within her party, and the purely politically motivated move to vote Kurz out of office never provided the SPÖ nor Rendi-Wagner with much-needed popularity, as the polls display.

A subpar result on Sunday could put her on the hot seat. Hence, she is in desperation mode and thus willing to entertain coalition negotiations, as an SPÖ government participation can only be facilitated as the ÖVP’s junior partner. The attacks on Kurz can thus be seen as a political acting job to appease the SPÖ base.

These circumstances put Kurz in a remarkable position and provide him with significant leverage, courtesy of FPÖ and SPÖ. Rendi-Wagner’s desperation makes it much easier for Kurz to negotiate with the FPÖ as he will be coming from a position of strength, which allows him to play both parties against each other. With one inevitable result: Kurz will be the winner regardless.

The irony of the Ibiza saga cannot go unnoticed. What could have been a career-ender for Kurz, will likely make him and his party more powerful, more dominant in setting the agenda than in the previous coalition – regardless of his new partner – while Rendi-Wagner, who should have been the primary beneficiary, may face political exile if her party’s result on Sunday turned out to be a disappointment.

L'articolo Has Sebastian Kurz Already Won Austria’s Upcoming Election? proviene da InsideOver.

Many Americans were shocked at the results of the 2016 presidential election. This included President-elect Donald Trump. But perhaps the most befuddled Americans were the pollsters and data collectors who used their results to repeatedly say that Hilary Clinton was all but ensured to become the first female American president.

Americans are fascinated, and increasingly reliant, on the stories that poll results purport to tell. Unfortunately, the stories they tell can often be misleading, at best – or just fiction, at worst.

The first known poll dates back to the 1824 presidential election. That particular poll was conducted in “taverns, militia offices and at public meetings” and then published in the Harrisburg Pennsylvanian on 24 July 1824. The results showed Andrew Jackson leading John Quincy Adams in the race for president. With Jackson going on to win the election, this new methodology of taking polls became popular. 

By the 20th century, little had changed. That is until 1936 when George Gallup created modern polling. During that year’s presidential campaign, Gallup’s main competitor, industry leader The Literary Digest used a 2.3 million postcard campaign to predict the 1936 presidential contest between Republican Alf Landon and Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt. Ignoring the Republican bias of this postcard polling, The Literary Digest predicted that Alf Landon was destined to be elected president in 1936.

Gallup selected a smaller but more demographically representative sample of citizens. As a result of this broader selection of people Gallup’s poll showed a different result. By 1937, both Alf Landon and The Literary Digest would become just a footnote in history. George Gallup’s methodology of surveying public opinion through broader and smaller samples became the industry norm as well as the industry leader for decades.

The ensuing years have seen an increasing reliance on polling results. Journalists, television news, businesses, politicians and special interest groups are just some that now rely on polling to shape their practices. Polls have shaped product marketing, news stories, movie and television narratives, elections from high schools to presidents and guide the legalisation of long illegal recreational drugs like marijuana.

The modern leader in polling today is considered to be the non-profit Pew Research Center. In 2012, Pew made themselves subject to a poll. What they found was that “fewer than one in 10 Americans contacted for a Pew survey bothered to respond.” 

A good question to ask is are polls therefore reliable gauges of the American consensus?

There are two primary types of polling, “scientific” and “unscientific.” Scientific polls can accurately reflect and describe public opinion (Gallup, Pew Research) whereas unscientific polls simply report what people reply (Buzzfeed, Facebook). This is not to say that polls on the internet can’t be scientific. However, it’s important to note that, according to Pew Research, only about 10% of Americans use the internet.

For example, if you consider current polling in the race for the Democratic presidential nomination. Polling aggregator Real Clear Politics provides a lengthy and robust look at various pollsters and their results (scientific). That site shows Joe Biden having a sizable if decreasing, lead. Conversely, if you look at a recent poll by news aggregator Daily Kos, it shows Elizabeth Warren with a commanding lead over all candidates (unscientific).

Currently, Biden’s lead sits at +/- 9% over the second-place Warren. That percentage difference accounts for the 10% internet usage difference. As time becomes more of a cherished resource, Americans have become more reliant on the information that polls provide. This could then have someone wondering which polls to believe. Without doing a cursory look at the data, and methodology inherent in the poll, they can be egregiously misleading.

But if you take a brief pause and look into the poll results, there are a series of questions worth considering. Just thinking about five basic questions can help you have a clearer understanding of the poll you are looking at:  

Who did the poll?

The easiest and most basic question. Was it an academic institution, a polling firm, political campaign or some other entity or person? Any poll worth examining will notate who did the poll. If that basic information isn’t transparent or is actively withheld, it’s safe to say it’s not a reliable poll. 

Who paid for the poll? 

Polls are conducted for very specific reasons. With that in mind, they’re also not free to execute. Knowing who paid for it can help tell you what these pollsters and polls are considering to be important. Businesses’ may take a poll to test a new marketing campaign, a special interest group may want to take the temperature of the public on a topic or a politician may want to better understand where they stand in the run-up to election day.

However, with both politicians or special interest polls, knowing who paid for the poll will help determine what the objective of the poll was. A political candidate or special interest group may frame questions in such a way as to bias the answers.

For example, a poll asking Americans to cut foreign aid spending from the budget may first result in a hair raising negative reaction because Americans believe foreign aid to be over 26% of the budget. A closer look reveals something different. According to Oxfam, foreign aid accounts for less than 1% of the American budget. In this hypothetical poll, if more accurate information was involved in the polling preamble, it may yield a different result. 

How many people were interviewed?

As George Gallup proved in 1936, more is not necessarily better with polling. A poll’s purpose is to provide estimated outcomes and if all things are equal, the more people interviewed the smaller the margin of error. Although, in America, and elsewhere in the world, things are never equal. Considering that, it’s safe to say that a smaller more diverse representation will furnish more accurate, or representative, data. 

How were the people chosen?

Using a random, or probability sample is the foundation of scientific polling. This foundation states that when provided the opportunity to select people in a target population it would then ensure the results would more properly reflect that population if randomly gathered.

In other words, selecting people at random will result in more representative information (presuming there is no bias in the phrasing of the questions). This is the reason that 1,600 American adults can reflect the opinions of  327 million Americans with only a limited margin of error.

What region and what group does it represent?

This is critical in political polls. In the lead up to big elections, where roughly 60% of Americans vote. In the less substantial primaries or pre-election polls, only about  25% show up to vote. Since it’s these less substantial polls that can influence a vote in the larger, more impactful, elections it’s imperative to know from what sample the poll is drawn from.

That is to say that polling results derived from only veterinarians in Texas will not, in any way, reflect the view of all Americans because not all Americans are veterinarians. To lessen any confusion, misrepresentation or fabrication, especially in political polls, look for wording like “registered voters”, “likely voters” or “among veterinarians” (or applicable group). Such distinctions are important to understanding all polling but are particularly critical for political polls.

For better or worse, over the past 195 years, polling has embedded itself into American life. As time becomes more valuable and attention spans become shorter, Americans are relying on polls to help them in their decision making. Pausing to consider basic questions can help better understand what exactly the information is showing.

Polling is no longer just informative, it has proven, culminating in the election of Donald Trump in 2016, that it can have profound sociological and political consequences. Bestowing one person, group or entity with such influence and power should give pause.

In and of themselves, polls are informative tools and at their very best, they are transparent with their data and would reflective of the population or constituency they are serving.

However, at their very worst, polls will be misunderstood and misinterpreted and their inherent margin of error could lead to catastrophic influence in many aspects of American life.  

L'articolo The American Way: The Story of Polling proviene da InsideOver.

The elections in Saxony and Brandenburg were the latest success stories of Germany’s far-right party, the AfD. And the question amongst politicians remains: how to deal with this phenomenon, that seemingly overcomes a long-standing law in German politics: there is no life on the CDU’s right.

Despite Germany’s history, the country has had the occasional guest appearance of right-wing extremist groups in parliament. The Republicans, DVU or the NPD, all attempted to become part of the political discourse. They failed miserably. Daily political life exposed their inadequacies almost immediately. The AfD has altered this track record.

When the AfD was founded in 2013, it was considered an alternative for voters who felt alienated by Chancellor Merkel’s dogmatic way of policymaking.

Economic liberalism and above all by the fight against the Euro were on top of the party’s agenda. The potential was omnipresent, had the CDU under Merkel left centre-right and transformed into a centre-left party. With a rise in popularity, the party gained traction amongst rather dubious individuals also. As a result, the party’s founder, Professor Lucke, lost a power struggle with the populist right within his party in 2015. Paradigm shifts away from Euro-scepticism and Greece bailouts towards integration, Islam and refugees followed.

With unexpected success – despite having moved even further to the right since its foundation. But the increasing radicalization of the party and its positions has not been a detriment. Quite the contrary. In 2014, for the first time, the AFD succeeded in becoming a member of a supraregional parliament in the European elections. Since then, the AfD has managed to enter all sixteen state parliament and established itself on the federal level also; becoming the largest opposition party in the Bundestagswahl of 2017 with 12.6%. Before the election success in east Germany, the party reached 11% at the European Elections.

The party’s gains since 2013 have been attributed to the mobilisation of former non-voters as well as protest voters, disappointed and disenfranchised by governing parties, particularly CDU and FDP as well as, to a lesser extent, the SPD and The Left. In recent elections, however, political scientists have observed the emergence of regular voters, who identify themselves with the AfD’s ideology of refugee immigration being a danger for the cultural homogeneity of society.

However, the AfD remains a schizophrenic party. Classical Conservativism, economic-liberalism and Christian-fundamentalist forces and the one side, mainly located in western Germany as well as on the federal level, which is being supplemented by nationalism, homophobic, anti-feminist, anti-Semitic and historical revisionist positions, as well as the occasional Neo-Nazism support – mainly, but not limited to, east Germany.

Particularly the east German AfD has been infiltrated by extremism. Here, its members openly fraternise with right-wing extremist groups and neo-Nazis. The latest example is Brandenburg’s AfD chair Andreas Kalbitz, who, in the past, had been cultivating memberships in neo-Nazi groups. Not a stigma in the AfD, nor east Germany. One week ago, he led the AfD into the Brandenburg state parliament.

But the extreme right’s poster child remains Thuringia’s Björn Höcke. Höcke has made a habit of making statements linked to Neo-Nazism and is known for his proclivity play down Germany’s role in World War II – to put it mildly. It has gone so far, that other party members have tried to expel Höcke. With no success. Next month, he will be Thuringia’s top candidate and is likely to be responsible for yet another AfD election success.

Kalbitz as well as Höcke are leading figures within the party and represent a group named “Der Flügel” (The Wing). It accounts for 40% of all AfD members in east Germany.

The Saxony and Brandenburg election results raised the question of how much longer the AfD is willing to be an opposition and protest party. So far, the political dictum for all German parties has been to isolate the AfD. However, for the party to become a conceivable option to CDU and SPD, the extreme elements within the AfD would have to transform or disappear. The status quo nor the recent success indicate that the AfD is seeking to transform anytime soon.

Historically, newly founded parties only survived if they succeeded in repelling their radical elements or keeping them at an infinitesimal level.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Greens had former members of communist splinter groups in their party. As a result, other parties chastised the Green and were unwilling to even consider cooperation. Over the years, this influence was gradually marginalized. It allowed the Greens to enter a coalition with the SPD in 1998. The Greens had emancipated themselves and arrived, at the time, at the apogee of their power.

The SED, which is now The Left, conducted a similar transformation. A Communist platform in the early phase, which was classified as extremist by the constitutional protection, has lost its influence in the party. Although individual members continue to maintain contact with anti-constitutional groups in the opinion of Germany’s intelligence service, they are not the mainstream of a party long since arrived in Germany and has held government positions on a state level.

However, there is an important distinction between these two examples and today’s AfD: ideology. Due to its history, Germany had almost been impervious to right-wing rhetoric and even conservative elements can deliberately be interpreted as 1940s propaganda. Meanwhile, the extreme left and the idea of a Marxist Utopia, has always had its market.

While an AfD coalition with neo-Nazi elements is rightfully out of the question, even a strong right-leaning conservative approach may be insufficient for the party to redeem itself.

Which raises the question: will there ever be a future for the party besides an opposition force? The answer lies in the other parties’ modus operandi. If the CDU does not reverse its course once Merkel ceased to be chancellor and if a coalition with the Greens is suddenly en vogue due to the climate hysteria, the chances of an AfD becoming stronger than the major parties in east Germany is conceivable. But in a parliamentary system based on majorities, the AfD would face the same conundrum again: finding a partner.

On the federal level, the party is likely to increase its support as well, but likely never to the extent of its eastern branch – unless it says au revoir to its radical elements and becomes a viable alternative for conservatives and former CDU voters.

Until then the AfD will remain a party with strong voter support but out of power. And while this paradigm shift is unlikely to occur while the party continuous to receive this much support, Germany will face a political Groundhog Day at every election: major parties lose support, the AfD gains. Outrage. Calls for a new strategy against the AfD.

L'articolo Unsuccessful Despite Being Successful – Who are Germany’s AfD? proviene da InsideOver.

This Sunday, the German states of Saxony and Brandenburg are due to elect their respective parliaments for the next five years. It is a landmark election with implications for the rest of the republic, and particularly the grand coalition in Berlin.

In Saxony, the CDU has been the quasi-hegemon for almost three decades. Almost the same applies to the SPD in Brandenburg. The rules had been set. And elections had been decided before any vote was cast.

Since 2014, however, the political landscape has changed. The hard-right populist AfD (“Alternative for Germany”) began to establish itself and introduced a momentum toward the erosion of the old order. It should have been a warning, a red flag for all other parties. It was not. And the fallout will be felt particularly this weekend.

Much has been made of the role that the grand coalition has played in the rise of German populism. And relevant data does indeed indicate that the immigration policy has played a crucial role in all of it. It is only one side of the coin, however.

Eastern Germany is a different place. It is not only displayed in the rift between east Germans and west Germans that continues to exist but in disenfranchisement, many people seem to feel. As a result, they have turned their backs on politics long ago.

In 2014, less than half of eligible voters participated in the election. High unemployment and, in certain areas, rudimental infrastructure have also played a role in making it a fertile ground for extremism – which is illustrated by the fact that these were the only states that ever championed fascist parties in their parliaments. Those parties usually disappeared as quickly as they appeared, due to lack of structure and a real devotion for utter incompetence. And while the other parties were appalled, they never considered them to be a serious competitor.

The AfD, however, is different. Not necessarily in its ideology, but in terms of populist cachet – its grand strategy. The result is a continuous rise in popularity. Even a win this Sunday is not inconceivable. Yet, the AfD will not govern in any of these states, as all other parties have dismissed the idea of any form of cooperation. Meanwhile, the SPD is fighting for survival and the CDU tries to save face, hoping to maintain power in Saxony. It is an election that is due to shake up German politics – yet again.

The latest polls indicate significant changes in Saxony’s state parliament compared to 2014. The previous election was won dominantly by the CDU, which received 39.4% of the votes. The Left, a party that continues to champion communist elements in its core, received a respectable 18.9%. Third was the SPD with 12.4%. The AfD was able to secure its first-ever appearance in Saxony’s parliament, with 9.7% of votes cast – a strong debut. Emerging on the scene and receiving almost double digits is far from being a regular occurrence in Germany.

The forecast paints, as could have been anticipated, a very different picture this week. The CDU faces significant losses, and could fall below 30%. The SPD finds itself in a more peculiar position. Germany’s oldest party has continued a historically downwards trend and is starring at single digits – currently 7%. It is, by now, a fight for survival, as Germany’s parliaments apply a 5% stipulation. Parties receiving less than 5% must not participate. The big winner will once again be the AfD. Currently projected at 24%, the party likely to more than double its previous result. Exceeding Greens (11%) and the liberal FDP – currently at 5% – and also fighting for parliamentary relevance. The Left remains strong at 16%.

Prima facie, one conclusion can be drawn immediately: a continuation of the CDU/SPD majority coalition of 2014 will not be facilitated. Which, in turn, makes the formation of a new government rather complex. Minister-President Kretschmer (CDU) has not made it easier by stating his proclivity to not cooperate with the AfD, nor will he be head of a minority government by his own account. With this self-imposed restriction, Kretschmer’s options are restricted. His dilemma increases even further if the SPD was to fall under 5%. It could force him to govern in a three-party coalition, most likely The Left and Greens, which brings its own issues. All parties are diametrically opposed in their ideology and their political visions for the state. On the one hand is the conservative CDU, on the other, environmentalist and quasi-Marxism. It is not the foundations that solid governments are built upon.

Meanwhile, circumstances in Brandenburg are equally problematic, yet fairly different. In 2014 the SPD was the big winner (32%), in front of CDU (23%) and The Left (18.6%). AfD and Greens received 12.2% and 6.2% respectively. A coalition was formed between SPD and The Left, led by Minister-President Woidke (SPD).

For Sunday, the latest polls indicate a close race between AfD (22%), SPD (22%), CDU (18%), The Left (15%) and Greens (12%). The current government – just as in Saxony – may lose its majority. It opens the door for interesting constellations. One of those is a socialist triumvirate between SPD, The Left and Greens, as practised in the states of Bremen and Thuringia. Arithmetically, three-way constellations with the AfD would be possible also. However, for the above-stated reason, parties in Brandenburg will not engage in talks, either. It leaves the CDU with yet another conundrum as, without AfD participation, a “bourgeois-conservative” government cannot be formed.

All of it raises the question, why would no one even consider a coalition with the AfD, when it is obvious that the party has the necessary votes? Coalitions have been ruled out previous to elections before, only to then confirm an agreement post-election. The AfD detestation, however, is more than lip-service. It is a political dictum. And not without a reason. Particularly the party’s eastern German fractions have openly been fraternising with elements of Nazism and other hate groups. In fact, several party members have been associated with fascist organisations. These are elements that no astute politician seeks to become a part of. It would be career suicide and highly detrimental to Germany’s reputation.

Besides Saxony and Brandenburg, these elections will have an impact on the grand coalition in Berlin also. In recent months, CDU chair Kramp-Karrenbauer has lost almost all of her “starter’s bonus” due to atrocious decision making and rather ill-advised remarks that have people questioning her competence. If the CDU in Saxony and Brandenburg witnessed subpar results, Kramp-Karrenbauer would be held accountable. A cliché post-election loss press conference, in which a party chair vows to become the people’s champion, evaluate everything and everybody, might be insufficient this time. For Kramp-Karrenbauer, this election could cease her aspirations of becoming the party’s next chancellor candidate and thereby initiating yet another internal power vacuum and struggle.

For the SPD, another catastrophic result in Saxony as well as potentially not being able to govern in Brandenburg would equate to a disaster. Failing to satisfy the 5% stipulation in Sachsen can be deemed political bankruptcy. Either of these occurrences has the potential to become the final nail in the grand coalition’s coffin. The SPD has been facing a severe upwards trend in almost all German states, but also on the Federal level in recent years. Rumours regarding an early grand coalition exit have been circulating for a while, as the partnership is deemed to be the reason for the party’s demise. However, one should not expect an immediate departure post-election. The party is currently led by an interim chair, Schäfer-Gümbel, who does not have the power nor the support to execute a decision of this magnitude. Circumstances are likely to change in December, however, when a new chair will be confirmed. The majority of the candidates have been opposing the grand coalition and this week’s elections can certainly become a coherent argument in favour of ceasing the project.

Saxony and Brandenburg are in a political dilemma. While parties rightfully refuse to cooperate with the AfD, it has initiated a vicious circle. These elections are particularly peculiar, as establishing a coalition will be severely difficult. Depending on the results, the CDU might be forced to govern with the hard left. If this was to occur, more conservative voters may feel alienated and the AfD could gain even more traction in years to come. For the meantime, however, the SPD’s goal remains survival, while the CDU tries to hold on to its power. It has become the modus operandi for both parties, but it cannot be sustainable. Whatever happens on Saxony and Brandenburg on Sunday, all of Germany will feel it.

L'articolo State Elections in Germany: New Scenarios, Same Old Issues and a Political Stress Test proviene da InsideOver.

The bad performance of the current president of Argentina, Macri, in the open primaries raises many doubts about the future of Argentina. Mostly about its economy and the relationship with foreign investors.

Argentina’s debt from the default in 2001 was only entirely settled in 2016. Although 100% of it has been paid, the prolonged restriction of access to international credit markets has made a mark on the Argentinian economy. After all, without the access to outside credit, Argentina’s economy didn’t have the monetary means necessary to finance development.

New debt ($56 billion loan from IMF) can also become a problem if Argentina will return to any financial policies implemented pre-Macri.

The current direction of enacted economic policies in Argentina has produced both quantitative and qualitative positive outcomes.

The sharpest turn for the better has been observed through the increase of labour wages in Argentina. Just at the start of Macri’s term, at the beginning of 2016, the average wage in Argentina was 17,500 pesos (in the private sector). In April of 2019, the average wage in Argentina had risen to 40,911 pesos per month. An almost 3 times rise in average wages is an important achievement, because of its power to contribute to better lives of consumers and to increase living standards.

Inflow of foreign investments has grown by 373.1% or $8.902B in 3 years. This rise in FDI net inflows shows just how much impact some simple legal changes and a welcoming environment can make to inflows of foreign capital. Foreign direct investments not only contribute to the gross domestic product numbers, but also bring know-how and create jobs. These positive impacts are very much needed for Argentina, which has been coping with record unemployment numbers.

President Macri has raised interest rates to lure foreign investments. The increase in interest rates was also initiated to get rid both of a high unemployment rate, and growing inflation numbers. The raised interest rates were supposed to take care of 3 problems through one action.

Higher interest rates have been successful in increasing sales of Argentina’s bonds. They have been less successful in reducing high unemployment and growing inflation.

In its basic form, Philips curve tells that there is a trade-off between unemployment and CPI (consumer price index). In the short run, higher unemployment leads to lower inflation, and vice versa. However, Argentina’s case seems to defy conventional economic theory: the higher interest rates did not manage to lower inflation, but the growing inflation did not contribute to lower unemployment. This situation leads to the conclusion that Argentina could have a problem with structural unemployment.

President Macri also emphasized austerity in his election campaign, and implemented some austerity-focused policies. These include reducing the number of ministries and contributions to social security. They have contributed to decreased government spending, but they have been unable to stave off the peso crisis.

Positive qualitative outcomes of the current president’s presidency include growing foreign investor confidence, fluctuating, but stable consumer confidence, and dismantled capital controls.

The current president of Argentina also worked to remove legal import barriers. The easing of legal procedures included standard information now only having to be submitted once, instead of separate submissions to all import-related agencies. Although this reduction in legal procedures only applies to large importing companies, it still is a step in the right direction. Moreover, 60 days have beet added to the deadline of customs document submission.

The removal of administrative barriers (paperwork for receiving dollars for pesos), and many forex-related restrictions, have been the actions taken to end currency controls in Argentina.

After M.Macri took office in 2016, the CCI of Argentina stayed stable until November of 2017. In December of 2017, the index experienced a sharp drop of 15.12%. However, after this sharp drop, the index rose quickly from May 2018 to May 2019. Although the CCI of Argentina fluctuated through Macri’s term, it has stayed mostly stable, and shown quick growth.

Dismantlement of capital controls was brought to life through the removal of import limits. Capital controls were also dismantled by ending the holding period (120 days) for repatriation of funds from Argentina (for foreign investors).

The positive qualitative outcomes achieved through the presidency of the member of the PRO show that Argentina has been put on path of freer trade and a better state for consumers.

But a closer look shows that these outcomes have been achieved only through the removal of older policies. The removal of previously instated policies has been a move which paid off. Yet, if own ideas were added from the side of Mauricio Macri, the positive qualitative outcomes could have been even better.

Without a doubt, there are many areas in the current state of Argentina’s economy that need improvement. The problematic areas include dependency on commodity prices and particularly, soybeans as a cash crop; and peso’s fall in value.

Lower commodities demand (and then prices), created weaker growth in Argentina. The decrease in demand for soybeans has been recognized by many as one of the most important factors in the start of Argentina’s economic downturn.

The return to a managed peso, and the subsequent devaluation of it, has prompted Argentina’s government to turn to IMF for support. Argentina got a $56 billion loan for the stabilisation of the peso–dollar exchange rate. The loan will also contribute to countering the depreciation of peso.

This move by Macri has been met with a very negative response from the Argentinian society. Protests followed, and the remembrance of the disastrous ending of a collaboration of IMF and Argentina in 2001 reignited old memories.

The International Monetary Fund’s and Argentina’s relationship is certainly complex and complicated. It’s the relationship which made Argentina default on its foreign debt, and contributed to growing poverty. The dissatisfaction of society with the outcomes of the relationship with IMF made itself known through the elections of two Justicialist (Peronist) presidents– Mr. and Mrs. Kirchners.

Argentina has also have been one of the countries censured by IMF after failing to provide reliable statistics on its economy.

Turning for help to the International Monetary Fund, at the first sing of hardship, shows just how easily the Argentinian economy can become destabilized by internal influences. The lack of other mechanisms for financial support during difficult times is a concerning problem.

Macri’s promise to reduce social spending didn’t materialize in his term. The promise to reduce social spending, which was raised by Kirchner, actually manifested itself in raised welfare benefits. After the recent defeat in primaries, Macri announced income tax cuts and increases in welfare subsidies.

Although not directly related to welfare spending, the temporary (90 days) freeze on petrol prices is in a way a welfare benefit. However, this decision also shows how the Argentinian government still prefers to take away from businesses, in order to please the consumers. Since petrol stations in Argentina are privately owned, this means that the freeze of petrol prices could lead to lower incomes of petrol station owners.

How would the most likely opponent of Macri (Fernandez) impact the Argentina’s economy and investors?

If Fernandez with his running mate, Kirchner, will get elected on October’s elections, it will mean a turn to moderate Peronist policies.

Poverty rates have only been minimally improved through the term of M.Macri. If Fernandez will get elected as a president of Argentina, his 4 year term could be marked with actions to decrease poverty and the number of people receiving welfare.

Relations with foreign investors will likely suffer the most damage if Fernandez will get elected in October (or November). His running mate, Kirchner, and her 8 year presidential term, has been marked with a decline in the positive treatment of foreign investors and their capital. Macri had to reverse many of Kirchner’s policies, including import limits and the holding period for repatriation of funds from Argentina.

Since Fernandez’s views on investor relations and foreign capital in Argentina are more pragmatic, it is only rational to expect a return to a milder version of anti-foreign capital environment.

If Fernandez will be able to assert his moderate Peronist position, then a more positive scenario could develop. Alberto Fernandez has criticised the former president Kristina Kirchner in the past. A more moderate position and the ability to see faults in the previous isolationist policies, could mean that the Argentina’s economy wouldn’t return to more extreme economic policies.

Support for free trade has been the main, and the most needed, step for a creating a strong and stable Argentina and its economy. The removal of taxes on exports and the decline of protectionist policies have been the strongest contribution to a more powerful economy of Argentina.

Yet, the support for free trade didn’t last long. President Macri later reimposed agricultural export taxes.

After the announcement of the victory of Fernandez in Argentina’s presidential primaries, Merval index lost 31% of its value in one day. Argentina’s largest companies saw their share values decrease.

This steep loss shows that Argentina’s economy is far from stable. Just the news from primary elections have the power to bring uncertainty into the markets. This means that Argentina’s economy experienced far less movement into stability and resilience from negative news, than it could be expected with the 4 year term of an austerity proponent. Unsolved past problems and inevitable future challenges can’t create a certain future.

L'articolo Why Argentina’s Economic Future Looks Uncertain proviene da InsideOver.