The Eastern Mediterranean has witnessed a relative calm this year in contrast to last year’s dangerous escalation spiral that almost set off a geopolitical maelstrom involving parts of Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. But is the current calm just a temporary lull?  Has a stable balance of power been established to create a new equilibrium? Or, has escalation been continuing by other means and the geopolitical storm will break out again in 2022? Here are some of the key factors to consider when looking over the horizon to determine the state of Mediterranean maritime security in the near future.

The 2020 Eastern Mediterranean Crisis was a Turning Point Event

Back in August 2020, the most combustible naval stand-off between Greece and Turkey during the 21st century nearly ignited into open conflict when a Turkish warship and a Greek warship collided at the height of the tensions. Rallying to Greece’s side, France dispatched warships to the contested waters, eventually sending its flagship Charles de Gaulle nuclear aircraft carrier. Egypt conducted joint naval exercises with Greece while the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Ankara’s staunch antagonist along the Mediterranean’s southern rim, sent its F-16 fighter jets to conduct joint air force exercises with Greece in the air space above the conflict zone.  With France, Egypt, and the UAE already in open conflict with Turkey in Libya, international alarm bells sounded that any further escalation could lead to a Mediterranean-wide conflagration.  Although a NATO-brokered de-confliction process achieved a climbdown in tensions, neither side has been idle. Swiftly changing geopolitical currents in the region have created new strategic conditions whose implications need to be examined.

Greece’s New Strategic Depth

In the absence of a convincing security guarantee from its European partners, Greece has spent the last half decade skilfully developing its defence relations with Egypt and Israel, and then subsequently with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.  Athens’ efforts are paying off big.  Combined with engaging select EU members, notably France, Greece is building an effective deterrent capability outside European Union and NATO frameworks. Since the striking demonstration of Middle Eastern solidarity with Greece during its August 2020 naval confrontation with Turkey, Greece’s regional security partnerships have reached an even greater level of strategic cooperation.

The 15 September 2020 signing of the ‘Abraham Accords’ normalising relations between the UAE and Israel was a strategic boon for Greece by more deeply connecting its circle of security partnerships broadly aligned to offset the expansion of Turkey’s “coercive diplomacy” in the region. On 18 November 2020, Greece and the UAE signed a security pact that included an Article V-type mutual defence clause.  In 2021, the juggernaut of Greece’s military diplomacy has gathered even more steam. In January of this year,  Israel signed a $1.68 billion, 20-year agreement with Greece – the largest defence deal between the two countries – in which Israel’s private defence company Elbit Systems will establish and maintain an air combat training facility in Greece for the Hellenic Air Force.  Italy’s defence manufacturing giant Leonardo will supply the M-346 advanced jet trainers. The state-of-the-art air combat training academy builds upon Greece’s 2020 agreement with France to purchase at least 18 fourth generation Rafale fighter jets for $2.5 billion, all helping to close the gap in air combat capabilities between Turkey and Greece.  By late September 2021, Paris and Athens signed a new bilateral mutual defense pact between Paris and Athens, accompanied by Greece’s $5 billion purchase of three Belharra frigates and three Gowind corvettes from France.

These relationships provide Greece with much needed strategic depth – geographically, technically, and psychologically. Bolstered by the early stages of an economic recovery, Greece is no longer Europe’s troubled and dependent appendage on the Balkan peninsula, as many in the European Union attempted to portray Greece during the EU’s sovereign debt crisis.  Greece is realising itself as an Eastern Mediterranean power leveraging its strategic links to North Africa and the Middle East.  Greece’s new found strategic depth continues to expand with the Hellenic Republic’s deepening military relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which began its first bilateral military exercise with Greece, Eye of the Falcon 1, in March 2021. Demonstrating the power of its new regional status, Greece hosted the September 2021 “Hercules 21′ exercises – the first multilateral joint military exercise between Greece, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

Turkey’s Becomes a Blue Water Power

Greece’s recent efforts to gain strategic depth were prompted by Turkey’s impressive advances to become a blue water power. Turkey’s efforts to expand its power projection capabilities in the Mediterranean started two decades ago with Ankara’s $3 billion ‘National Warship’ program, known by its Turkish acronym MİLGEM, to expand Turkey’s capacity to deploy naval forces far from its coastal waters. In March 2012, a decade into the MİLGEM program, then Turkish Navy Commander Admiral Murat Bilgel declared Turkey’s naval objective was “to operate not only in the littorals but also on the high seas,” identifying the Turkish Navy’s goals for the coming decade as “enhancing sea denial, forward presence, and limited power projection capacity.”  Supported by the rapid growth of its domestic defence industry, Turkey successfully implemented its strategic agenda to establish forward bases in the Middle East and North Africa region.

The turning point in this policy came with Turkey’s 2020 military intervention to preserve the Government of National Accord then ruling western Libya.  Ankara’s first intervention far from its land borders and shoreline was an unqualified success and created an important strategic beachhead for Turkey in the central Mediterranean.  Turkey maintains an air power deployment at the re-captured al-Watiyah air base, located 27 km from the Tunisian border, and is reported to be developing a naval base in Libya’s coastal city of Misrata.  Its first Mediterranean forward basing beyond North Cyprus, Turkey’s outsized military presence in Libya is nothing short of a strategic breakthrough, enabling Turkey to move beyond the efforts to contain its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Libyan intervention also showcased the power of Turkey’s home-grown combat drone and electronic warfare technology that would be later used by Ankara to assist Azerbaijan in the Autumn 2020 Karabakh war that ended 30 years of stalemate against Armenia and changed the map of the South Caucasus.  Turkey’s continued advances in drone warfare technology are changing the face of warfare in the Mediterranean and could upend the military deterrence for which Greece has been striving, especially as Turkish-made, unmanned surface and underwater combat vessels come into service.  Changing the Mediterranean’s strategic equation in 2022 is Turkey’s soon-to-be-operational, light aircraft carrier the TCG Anadolu – a landing helicopter dock based on the Spanish Navy’s Juan Carlos I-class design. The TCG Anadolu will be able to carry a formidable arsenal Turkish combat drones to any location in the Mediterranean theatre. As an amphibious assault ship, it will be able to transport a 1,000 troop battalion along with 150 vehicles, including battle tanks, for a marine troop landing. A blue-water power projection vessel par excellence, the TCG Anadolu will considerably augment Turkey’s efforts to set the strategic agenda in the Mediterranean.

Equilibrium of Escalation in 2022? Cyprus could be the Key

Greece’s deeper level of defense cooperation with its non-European partners also prompted Ankara to engage in serious diplomatic outreach to Egypt and Israel and then to the UAE and Saudi Arabia as a counter-balancing measure.  During 2021, Turkey has acted on its need to recalibrate its policy toward its Levantine and Gulf state neighbors to ease its isolation. This diplomatic opening creates the opportunity to increase commercial cooperation among the regional stakeholders that could act as a brake on renewed naval escalation in the future. While there is at least a temporary balance of power, such an opportunity should not be missed.

With its interlinked flashpoints, there is little reason to think that a stable equilibrium has been achieved in the Eastern Mediterranean. None of the underlying core issues has been resolved.  The most vulnerable point in the current security architecture is Cyprus.  A member of the European Union but not NATO, Cyprus was under military embargo by the United States until 2020 and consequently has insufficient naval capabilities to defend itself. Turkey maintains over 30,000 troops on the north side of the island and has established base for its combat drones in the self-declared Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. In 2021, Turkey upped its ante on the issue by formally declaring that North Cyprus should be internationally recognized as an independent state.  If a new cycle of naval escalation does break out in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2022, Cyprus is likely to be in the eye of the storm.

L'articolo Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Security in 2022 – Equilibrium or Escalation? proviene da InsideOver.

Following a brief period of stillness between Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, the tension is rising once again.

During the summer, the two countries reportedly reached the verge of military confrontation due to Turkish research activity in the Greek continental shelf. After the intervention of EU officials and diplomatic efforts spearheaded by Germany and the US, the two countries reached a stalemate and bilateral exploratory talks were due to take place.

However, since last week Turkish vessels have once again crossed Greek maritime boundaries and are currently conducting research and drilling activities in the proximity of the Greek islands.

Turkey is Gaining de Facto Control Over the Greek Continental Shelf

According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and specifically according to articles 77 and 81 therein, a coastal state exercises sovereign rights over its continental shelf, and any research or drilling activities by third parties may take place only after the clear and express consent of the coastal state.

Turkey is not abiding by UNCLOS provisions about the delimitation of the maritime boundaries between neighboring countries. Ankara has been proceeding with unilateral actions and interpreting international law as they see fit. Turkey has a considerably extended coastline, however due to the existence of numerous Greek islands near Turkish shores, Ankara’s rights over the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf are significantly reduced.

Thus Ankara is unilaterally rejecting the rights of the Greek islands in the Eastern Mediterranean, and proceeding in research and drilling activities as if access to the continental shelf in the area is determined by the Turkish mainland alone.

Turkey’s Actions are Against International Law

The Turkish approach can be by no means justified according to current international laws and conventions; however, Turkey is following a careful strategy and aiming to create a de facto situation of control over the extended region.

Last August Turkey conducted research in the Greek continental shelf and the only reaction from Athens was a discreet presence of the Hellenic Navy in the proximity of the Turkish vessels. The aforementioned vessels were conducting seismic research and directly violating Greek sovereign rights according to the UNCLOS, yet despite this Athens only reacted mildly. Once the research was completed the Turkish vessels withdrew and Greece falsely presented this development as a huge Greek success.

In fact, Turkey has concluded its first act, creating a de facto context for control and claiming rights in several parts of the Greek continental shelf, and Athens has hardly even reacted. Now we are witnessing the well-expected second part of this plan; Turkey has sent three ships, R/V Oruç Reis, Ataman and Cengizhan to the same area for further research activities.

This time the ultra deep-water drillship Kanuni is also accompanying the research vessels. Not only research but also drilling activities should be expected shortly in the region by Turkish ships. What we should also stress here is that this time the NAVTEX issued by the Antalya station, withholding the area for about 10 days, is referring to research activities in the Turkish continental shelf, emphasizing the Turkish achievement of de facto establishing its presence and supposed rights to areas which should actually be under Greek maritime jurisdiction.

The EU’s Muted Reaction and Greece’s Utter Diplomatic Failure

While Turkey is pushing forward its claims, Greece has avoided adopting a responsible stance. Further to the inefficient decision-making process domestically, Greece has utterly failed to appropriately address the issue via EU institutions.

Even though Athens has been supposedly pushing for EU support and a decisive response, there has been no progress at all in this direction. Albeit the Turkish moves in the Eastern Mediterranean have been put in the agenda of recent summits and meetings of the EU leaders, the adoption of actual restrictive measures to block the Turkish provocations are out of the question.

Athens has not been able to convince EU leaders to seriously consider the imposition of sanctions on Ankara, as the bilateral trade relations and political ties with Turkey of many prominent EU member states, and particularly Germany, are too deep to be interrupted.

In this sense the only Greek achievements have been some generic comments about possible consequences if Turkey takes further provocative steps; these statements have only been made to impress public opinion and have no actual impact on the international diplomatic scene or geopolitical reality.

The Question of 12 Nautical Miles and Turkey’s Likely Next Moves

As the Turkish research vessel Oruç Reis is en-route to its final destination, which is less than 8 nautical miles away from the Greek island of Kastelorizo, and Turkish top officials are openly talking about the division of the Aegean Sea according to the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, the political debate in Greece is escalating. Numerous sides are calling for the official extension of the Greek territorial waters in the Aegean Sea from six to 12 nautical miles.

The extension of the Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles is an unquestionable right of Greece according to UNCLOS; however, various Greek administrations have been consecutively hesitating to take this step, under threats and pressure from Ankara.

At this point, where Greek sovereign rights are constantly disputed, the extension of the Greek territorial waters seems to be the most appropriate solution, since it would crucially limit Turkish options for unilateral actions, and a potential violation of the Greek territorial rights from the Turkish side, an undeniably act of aggression, would definitely put Ankara in a very harsh position internationally.

The Greek government has wrongfully talked several times about so-called “red lines”, namely Turkish provocative actions that would not go unanswered. The continuous violations of those red lines and the incapacity of the Greek government to respond appropriately have eventually put in question the very credibility of Athens.

The best solution of extending boundaries might seem too simple for Greece at the moment, but it is seriously doubtful if this is going to happen. To the contrary, considering the current geopolitical balances and implications, the most probable scenario is that Turkey will keep pushing for further claims and keep successfully establishing de facto objectives at the expense of Greece.

L'articolo How Turkey is Stealthily Taking Over the Greek Continental Shelf proviene da InsideOver.

September 22, 2020 should go down as a landmark date not only for the energy sector in the Eastern Mediterranean but also for the fragile political landscape of the whole region. Six countries – Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Jordan, plus the Palestinian Authority – have signed a historical agreement which opens the road for tight cooperation in the gas sector. At the same time, the agreement has significant geopolitical implications for the ever-changing balances in the wider region.

From a Quasi-Formal Forum to a Full-Blown International Organization

The first efforts around the establishment of the EastMed Gas Forum go way back. In autumn 2018 the leaders of Cyprus, Egypt and Greece met in the Greek island of Crete and held talks about the consolidation of cooperation among gas-producing countries. This meeting predominantly aimed to achieve efficient coordination among Mediterranean states which are involved in the process of gas production and distribution, in order to gradually maximize the potential gains for all the sides involved.

This promising idea has received a more official format a couple of months later, when in January 2019, the “Natural Gas Forum in the Eastern Mediterranean” took place in Cairo with the participation of all the 6+1 parties that signed the charter of the Organization on September 22, 2020. Since January 2019 the Forum has been gradually moving to the establishment of a concrete international body, and the strategic initiative has been officially completed and reached its final form through the virtual ceremony which took place yesterday.

High-Ranking Virtual Conference

The following Ministers of Energy-related sectors participated in the virtual conference: Natassa Pilidou (Cyprus), Tarek al-Mala (Egypt), Kostis Hatziadakis (Greece), Yuval Steinitz (Israel), Hala Zawati (Jordan), alongside the Italian Undersecretary of the Ministry of Economic Development (MISE) Alessandra Todde and the Palestinian Ambassador in Egypt, Diab al-Louh.

According to the joint statements issued by the participants shortly after the completion of the works, the organization will function as a factor of peace and stability in the region, bringing closer the gas producers, the suppliers and the consumers. The ultimate goal of this joint initiative is to establish a robust and viable territorial gas market in the Eastern Mediterranean, which will crucially benefit the people of the region in the long-term.

It should be noted that France has expressed its interest in becoming a member of the organization, while the EU and the US will probably engage with the initiative under an observer status.

Gaza Field and Status of Israeli-Palestinian Relations

The Gaza Marine field was discovered in the late 1990s approximately 35 km offshore Gaza Strip. In 2000 the UK British Gas company bought the rights of the field for research and exploration and in 2016 the field came under the possession of Royal Dutch Shell, when the latest acquired the BG Group.

The project has been into a stalemate for almost 2 decades due to the unique political and security challenges in the area and disagreement over the exploitation rights of the field between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In 2018 the Gaza Marine gas field has been bought by the Palestine Investment Fund, a sovereign fund which invests in strategic projects, with ultimate purpose to strengthen the struggling Palestinian economy. Since 2003 the public shareholding fund is functioning under the guidance of the Palestinian Authority, seeking to participate in initiatives across vital industry sectors that could serve the interests of the Palestinian people.

The acquisition of the Gaza Marine gas field by the PIF and the participation of the Palestinian Authority in the official establishment of the EastMed Gas Forum signify an optimistic outlook regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations. It is not only the participation of the PA in an international body where cooperation with Israel is de facto achieved through the mutual economic benefits that both parties would seek via the exploitation of the gas reserves.

Such a potential major project in the Gaza Strip which could bring prosperity in the area and could potentially limit the influence of the radical Hamas organization in the region or possibly force Hamas to adopt a more moderate stance towards Israel and the PA, in order to establish a viable work environment for the people living in Gaza.

Turkey’s Exclusion and Possible Counter-reaction

The establishment of the EastMed Gas Forum comes at a critical moment for the stability in the region. Turkey has been unilaterally conducting seismic research and drilling in the declared Cypriot fields over the past year without any authorization from the Cypriot administration. Since last July, Ankara has also been raising tension over disputes with Greece, regarding the maritime zones of the Greek islands.

The very establishment of the EastMed Gas Forum organization sends a political message to Turkey. The exclusion of Ankara from the EastMed Gas group highlights the fact that the unilateral and aggressive decision-making in the region will not be welcomed by any of the neighboring countries.

We know that President Recep Erdogan hates being isolated, and he has never been actually isolated in the past, regardless of what some commentators are persistently claiming. However, this latest move leaves officially Turkey out of a club, where Ankara could be playing an major role under different circumstances. In this respect, Turkey has been lately trying to find common ground with Egypt. Either through seeking rapprochement in the Libyan conflict or through proposals for declaring their respective exclusive economic zones with much more luring terms than Cairo has done with Nicosia or Athens.

Apparently the last plan is fundamentally based upon the Turkish “Blue Homeland Doctrine” according to which the maritime rights of Greece and Cyprus are severely degraded. Nevertheless it is rather improbable to see a cooperation between Cairo and Ankara any time soon, or at least under the current political status quo. Turkey’s harsh criticism against the al-Sisi administration alongside the fierce support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt foreclose any impetus for a political reconciliation between the two counties.

Cause for Concern

This assumption leads us to a concerning conclusion. In the event that Turkey ends up being at odds with the seven of the EastMed Gas Forum then we can be expecting unconventional reactions from Ankara. After all, the recent signing of the charter should not be seen as only an energy deal but also as a political agreement.

And in this special occasion, the ideal method for Turkey to counter-react would be to utilize the relations with Hamas. This includes ties that have been built over the years through the essential assistance from Turkey in support of the Palestinian cause.

If such a scenario is to materialize, then we should expect Ankara to decisively attempt destroying any potential of cooperation in the Gaza Strip, as we have described earlier. And a Turkish boost to Hamas in order political objectives to be achieved through local tensions could bring catastrophic results to the wider theater of the Eastern Mediterranean, threatening the now visible regional peace and stability that’s been sought after for such a long time.

L'articolo The Prospects and Challenges of the EastMed Gas Forum proviene da InsideOver.

The EU Med Group, widely known as MED7, met in Ajaccio, Corsica on Saturday, September 10. The alliance consists of seven Mediterranean countries which are member states of the European Union, namely Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain.

The most critical issues the top of the meeting’s agenda were the current developments in the Mediterranean, predominantly the Migrant Crisis and unilateral Turkish actions against Greece and Cyprus.

France, Greece and Cyprus; a Strong Alliance Directly Condemning Turkey’s Actions

French President Emmanuel Macron, the official host of the meeting has been the one to open the joint press conference of the seven country leaders. Macron initially talked about the worrying issue of the uncontrolled migrant flows from Libya stating that the problem should be immediately dealt with.

The French President grabbed the opportunity and attacked Turkey, stressing that Ankara should adhere to the 2016 Turkey-EU deal over the refugee crisis and stop acting unilaterally. He also emphasized the important need for absolute respect towards the arms embargo on Libya, commenting that there have been some discrepancies from Europe so far, indirectly criticizing the stance of Germany.

Regarding the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, Macron used clear and decisive language, delivering an unambiguous message of solidarity to Greece and Cyprus and talking about illegal drilling and unilateral provocations from the Turkish side. He stated that Europe is seeking a bona fide dialogue, but the Turkish reactions so far, are making this initiative rather difficult.

Under any circumstances, Paragraph 6* of the MED7 Joint Declaration would be strictly applied, and this is something Macron has emphasized, even though the context of Paragraph 6 with regards to the EU response towards Turkey still remains somehow generic. The French President concluded that a coordinated European effort is deemed necessary on other critical issues within the Mediterranean territory, like Lebanon and Syria.

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis followed Emmanuel Macron. Mitsotakis opened his speech with the recent events in the Moria camp in the Greek island of Lesbos. The Greek PM thanked the other European countries for their essential support on this developing crisis and underlined that the immigration challenges, are correctly treated as a common European problem.

Mitsotakis also condemned the constant violation of Greek-Cypriot rights from Turkey and referred to the illegal occupation of the northern part of Cyprus since 1974. He called Ankara to abstain from further provocative and unilateral actions in the Mediterranean, and he recalled that President Macron has characterized the region as Mare Nostrum, Our Sea, implicating that the European South should be the key player in this region of vital importance. The Greek PM said that European support for Greece and Cyprus should not be just an act of solidarity but a self-conscious action to protect the strategic interests of the European Union.

An Appeal to Turkey

There has been another appeal to Turkey to negotiate in good will, otherwise Greece would take the dispute to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The Greek PM closed his speech announcing that he is looking forward to the next MED7 meeting in Greece and specifically on the island of Crete, Mitsotakis’ place of origin.

Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades mentioned that the weight of the immigration crisis is disproportionate for Cyprus, which is a front-line country. He harshly criticized Turkey for using the asylum seekers, as a tool of geopolitical pressure, and said that a new EU asylum deal to control the migrant flows is deemed necessary.

Anastasiades talked about reckless Turkish actions that pose a risk for the wider area, and complained about Ankara’s continuous war rhetoric. He also called the other countries to assist in ending the Turkish illegal exploration and drilling operations in Greek and Cypriot maritime zones. The violation of the international law and of the sovereign rights of two EU member states are not only threatening the reliability of the European Union but also the integrity and security of the continent as a whole. Anastasiades aligned with the comments of the Greek PM, and reaffirmed that if the dialogue with Ankara is not fruitful, the Hague should definitely be an option, but also harsh sanctions against Turkey should always be on the table.

Italy and Malta; Solidarity and Dialogue

Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, praised the importance of the southern countries of Europe in dealing with the EU challenges. Talking about the immigration challenges, he confirmed that the South should stop simply dealing with the results and start acting proactively. Coordination with third countries -countries of origin and transit countries- is deemed necessary to reduce the flows in European territory, while the elimination of the migrant smugglers should always be on the top of the agenda.

Regarding the Greek-Turkish dispute, Conte expressed his absolute solidarity towards Greece and Cyprus, condemning unilateral actions by Turkey, and mentioning that he fully trusts the German Presidency of the EU Council and the actions of the European Council, which could lead to swift deescalation.

The Prime Minister of Malta Robert Abela clarified that cooperation between neighboring and friendly countries is of critical importance, expressing his full solidarity to Greece. Even though the neutral status of Malta is clearly defined in the country’s constitution, Abela stressed that international law and sovereign rights must not be challenged under any circumstances.

The Maltese Prime Minister emphasized the importance of peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean is important and said he is really optimistic for the results that the MED7 coordination could bring. Finally he referred to the refugee crisis, which is directly affecting his country, stating that the emergency could only be managed through the establishment of peace in Libya, and the prompt reconstruction of a viable economy for the country.

Spain and Portugal; Deescalation the Only Way Ahead

The Prime Minister of Portugal António Costa initially discussed the COVID-19 European and global geopolitical challenges. He expressed his solidarity to Cyprus and Greece and made a special reference to the important role of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Joseph Borel, and the President of the European Council, Charles Michel. Costa repeatedly stated that a solution should be sought through negotiations and multilateral dialogue.

The Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, focused on the immigration crisis, expressing his solidarity for the Moria incident and calling for responsible actions from the EU, adequate border control, and a dual approach that could ensure the security and well-being of the European people, always with respect on the human rights and the humanitarian values. In the Eastern Mediterranean front, Sánchez highlighted that dialogue should be the only way forward and de-escalation has to be the top priority for Europe, through a process dictated by the European interests, and led by the European institutions.

Conclusions and the Turkish Reaction

After examining the statements of the seven leaders, we understand that the MED7 could easily agree on a mutual policy towards the common problem of the migrant flows, but in the case of the Easter Mediterranean and the Greek, Cypriot and Turkish dispute the things are different. On the one hand Cyprus, France and Greece adopt a straightforward stance, seeming ready to confront the Turkish provocations, while the remaining four leaders have chosen a much more moderate attitude.

In the meantime Turkish President Recep Erdogan has found a unique way to protest again the MED7 conclusions. Shortly after the end of the Joint Press Conference, he posted an old video from the time he was Mayor of Istanbul, through his personal Twitter account. In the video the Turkish President is saying that “a wolf-pack is about to attack us, but they cannot eat us; we are too great for them” referring to his Kemalist opponents back in the day.

Adapting the statements to the current circumstances, Erdogan is indicating President Macron and the rest of the European leaders that took part in the summit.

*Paragraph 6 of the MED7 Joint Declaration

We reiterate our full support and solidarity with Cyprus and Greece in the face of the repeated infringements on their sovereignty and sovereign rights, as well as confrontational actions by Turkey. We call upon all the countries in the region to abide by international law, in particular international law of the sea, and encourage all parties to resolve their disputes through dialogue and negotiation. In this respect, we welcome the mediation efforts of the HR/VP and Germany in order to achieve a resumption of the dialogue between Greece and Turkey on the maritime zone issue. In addition, we welcome the invitation by the Government of Cyprus to negotiate with Turkey, noting that delimitation of exclusive economic zones and continental shelf should be addressed through dialogue and negotiation in good faith, in full respect of international law and in accordance with the principle of good neighbourly relations. In line with recent European Council and EU Council conclusions, we regret that Turkey has not responded to the repeated calls by the European Union to end its unilateral and illegal activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. We reaffirm our determination to use all adequate means at the disposal of the European Union in response to these confrontational actions. In line with the latest Informal Meeting of EU Foreign Ministers (Gymnich), we agree to speed up work on the additional listings based on the proposals tabled so far, with a view to its rapid adoption. We maintain that in absence of progress in engaging Turkey into a dialogue and unless it ends its unilateral activities, the EU is ready to develop a list of further restrictive measures that could be discussed at the European Council on 24-25 September 2020.

L'articolo Conclusions from the MED7 Meeting in Corsica proviene da InsideOver.

The Eastern Mediterranean crisis between Turkey and Greece is putting a strain on relations between the entire EU and Turkey.

Saber Rattling Intensifies

Saber rattling is intensifying on both sides. Warships have already been deployed and Turkey has openly threatened war. Now, a new chapter has been added to the strained relations, as Ankara continues to disregard the rules of international diplomacy.

Turkey: Recognizing Diplomat Would be “Inappropriate”

Now a renewed upsurge in the ongoing conflict is looming between the EU and Turkey. Ankara is said to have not recognized the diplomatic accreditation of a military attaché who was assigned to work at the EU embassy in Turkey. The diplomat was sent at the urging of the EU, as Brussels considers the appointment of the military attaché to be necessary due to Turkey’s increasing importance in security policy.

On the other hand, Ankara stated that accreditation would be “inappropriate” in view of the current tensions and threats of sanctions from several member countries and that it would meet with incomprehension among the Turkish population. A solution does not seem to be in sight at the moment.

EU Slams Turkey’s Geopolitical Actions

Relations between Ankara and Brussels are currently tense, not only because of the ongoing human rights violations on the Bosphorus. The EU also criticizes Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for fueling the war in Libya by smuggling dangerous weapons and triggering a new migration crisis.

In addition, Turkey is escalating the eastern Mediterranean situation in the dispute over gas reserves with Greece from Brussels’ point of view. Since the discovery of rich gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean, there has been heated dispute over their exploitation. Both Greece and Turkey lay claim to the sea areas concerned.

Relations between the two NATO members are, therefore, extremely tense. Both sides have sent warships into the region.

How Hard Will the EU Push Back Against Turkey?

The conflict between Ankara and Brussels escalated further almost weekly, primarily due to the aforementioned conflict with Greece. In view of the German EU Council Presidency, a lot will depend on how much and whether Berlin can and wants to pressure Ankara.

Chancellor Angela Merkel recently spoke to both Turkey and Greece. How confused the situation is, however, can also be seen in the choice of words. Nikos Dendias, Greece’s foreign minister, recently called Turkey a “troublemaker” and “destabilizing factor in the region”.

Greece: Turkey Has to Stop “Provocations” and Negotiate

Meanwhile Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said that Turkey had to stop the “provocations” and show itself ready for talks. However, one condition for Greece to start talks is that all Turkish warships withdraw from the region.

The answer from Ankara came promptly. Erdogan made it clear that he was ready to enforce his will also militarily. It’s still just saber-rattling, and Erdogan is unlikely to risk a military conflict, but the words fit into a number of anti-European remarks Erdogan has already made. The latter includes statements such as that Greece and its European supporters – by which Erdogan primarily means France that Greece supported and openly opposed Turkey – were “greedy for money” and “incompetent”.

Greece Rejects NATO Mediation Offer

It is thus not a surprise that Greece has rejected a NATO mediation offer despite the fact that the fronts have hardened, and even though both Greece and Turkey are members. However, a NATO spokeswoman announced that a meeting between delegates from both sides had in fact taken place last Thursday at NATO headquarters.

The latter may be a start, but given the volatility of the situation, the fact that this meeting was held at a low diplomatic level is not a good sign. Ankara’s rejection of the EU diplomat shows once again how Turkey willfully opposes its allies and even disregards diplomatic decorum out of self-interest and neo-Ottoman fantasies.

L'articolo Turkey Rejects EU Diplomat as Tensions with Greece Rise proviene da InsideOver.

Tensions between French President Emmanuel Macron and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have been escalating since June following an incident involving a French frigate near the coast of Libya. The ship was there to enforce a NATO arms embargo and tried to search a cargo ship. However, it was targeted by Turkish naval vessels which escorted the ship away, according to Paris. Ankara said the cargo ship was carrying humanitarian aid.

The situation has only gotten worse since the incident, as Macron has sent warships to the Aegean Sea in case Erdoğan does not withdraw his naval forces from the Eastern Mediterranean.

Greece is also planning to double its western territorial waters with Italy to 12 nautical miles, a right provided under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, an agreement which Turkey has not signed up to.

Erdoğan Calls Macron ‘Greedy and Incompetent’

EU member states agreed on a list of sanctions against the Turkish Government in case they fail to deescalate tensions in the region. Considering France is one of the loudest advocates for sanctions against Turkey, Erdoğan responded by calling Macron “greedy and incompetent.”

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said on Saturday said that the EU’s actions could even spark a war.

Brussels has responded by saying that it will implement further measures if Ankara does not comply with the first set of sanctions.

Macron is Worsening Tensions with Turkey

Macron is failing to reduce tensions between himself and the Turkish leader, which is why Germany would like to mediate the Turkish-Greek dispute over the Mediterranean. If the French leader is not careful, he could lose the wider strategic battle that he has been pursuing with Erdoğan since June.

The French President has the capacity to regain the initiative from his Turkish counterpart, but that largely depends upon his success in ending tensions in Libya.

Last week, Macron invited Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj of Libya’s UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) to visit Paris.

Can Macron Restore Peace to Libya?

Sarraj accepted France’s invitation because it represents a chance to implement a new ceasefire alongside fresh elections. It is also a chance for Libya to resume its oil production.

Yet Macron’s initiative faces two obstacles. Any settlement in Libya depends upon Sarraj receiving Erdoğan’s approval and support.

The Turkish President has the upper hand in the Libyan conflict and he would like to occupy the strategic city of Sirte that provides the Turks with a gateway to the ports of Sidra, Ras Lanuf, Marsa al-Brega and Zuwetina, where three gas conduits and 11 oil pipelines reach the Mediterranean coast.

Considering the Turkish leader has nothing but disdain toward Macron, why would he support a peace initiative led by his French rival?

Erdoğan Has Outflanked Macron in the Middle East

Also, other key players like Russia would need to be involved in the discussions. Due to a lack of US involvement in the Libyan conflict, Moscow and Ankara have emerged as the main rivals for control over the war-torn country. Russia is also interested in controlling Sirte and that is why the Libyan war cannot end until Russian President Vladimir Putin and Erdoğan have resolved their differences over Sirte.

If Macron, who has been a vocal critic of Sarraj’s GNA, can also persuade the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar to support a ceasefire, it would provide France with a huge strategic advantage over both Turkey and Russia.

Nonetheless, Macron faces other strategic battles with Erdoğan beyond Libya. The French President visited Lebanon this week to show that he is interested in pursuing political reform there, but French attempts to influence Middle Eastern politics will be met by resistance from Turkey, Russia and Iran. The Russian-Iranian-Turkish triumvirate is working closely to squeeze US influence out of Syria and without wider NATO support, Macron cannot hope to take on this triumvirate on his own.

The Turkish President seems to be winning a strategic battle with Macron, whether that is in Greece or the rest of the Middle East. Macron has made tensions over the Mediterranean worse and he cannot afford to risk war with Turkey, which the latter has proposed in response to EU sanctions.

There is still a chance Macron could score a win in helping Libya, but by and large, he cannot defeat Turkey and should take steps to deescalate his confrontation with Ankara.

L'articolo Is Macron Losing His Strategic Battle with Erdogan? proviene da InsideOver.

The well-known by now Turkish research vessel Oruc Reis has been sailing across the Greek Continental Shelf since the August 10. The ship is accompanied by vessels of the Turkish Navy, in an area that Turkey is reportedly exploring until August 23, as announced through a controversial NAVTEX.

The Turkish Claim

The current situation indicates that the ship is unlawfully conducting research in an area that falls within the Greek Continental Shelf as defined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, even through Turkey unilaterally rejects this fact.

Turkey is claiming that the islands should not have the same rights as the land territory, denying the provisions of the UN Convention. The Greek side is internally trying to downplay the developing situation, as the major Greek Media are reporting that the Turkish research vessel is not actually conducting research activities, an assumption that is probably inaccurate.

Regardless of the actual activity of the ship, the very purpose of the Turkish presence in the suggested area, in the proximity of the recently declared Greek-Egyptian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), is not the research per se, but the establishment of a fait accompli; Ankara is aiming to gradually establish the perception that the presence of Turkish vessels in this area is something normal and should come unquestioned. Apparently, Athens is fully aware of the Turkish intentions.

Greek Moves

Since the start of the crisis the Greek Armed Forces have been alarmed, and the Hellenic Navy is closely monitoring the route of Oruc Reis. The up-to-date developments clearly show, that albeit the robust military presence in the area, Athens wants to avoid by all means a military confrontation. At the same time Greece is trying to enhance its position and gain leverage in the expense of Turkey, through diplomatic channels and regional alliances, holding talks with countries with aligning interests in the Mediterranean.

France

France and Greece have undoubtedly tightened their relations in the most senior level over the last year. In terms of foreign policy it seems that Athens has found a major player in the European and international scene that would be mutually benefited by adopting a containment strategy towards Turkey.

It is not only the Turkish objectives in the Mediterranean that pose an obstacle to the vital interests of the French oil company, Total. The Turkish engagement in Libya should be perceived as a worrying involvement of third country in a place, where the French factor has been traditionally pulling the strings. The Turkish support to the Government of National Accord and the lifeline provided to Fayez al-Sarraj by President Erdogan, has been interpreted as a major setback for the French financial and security interests in the Sahel.

On the top of that, shortly after the horrifying Beirut blast, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Lebanon in an attempt to counterbalance the official visit of President Macron in the country. Cavusoglu promised Turkish citizenship to the Lebanese Turkmens and stated that significant Turkish aid would be provided to the fragmented country. These sings of Turkish expansion in Lebanon are constituting another unwelcome development for the French foreign policy.

In this context, the French-Greek aligning interests have been well-presented through the French involvement of French forces in the ongoing Mediterranean crisis. After a call between the Greek Prime Minister the French President on August 12, Emmanuel Macron announced through his Twitter account that the French military presence in Eastern Mediterranean would be boosted. In a clearly political message, President Macron tweeted this announcement in Greek. The following day, on August 13, the frigate ‘Lafayette’ and two Rafale fighter jets have been deployed the eastern Mediterranean and participated in a joint military exercise with the Hellenic Armed Forces.

Israel

At the same time Athens has also turned for support to Israel. Once again the energy security landscape of the area has set the foundation for an unofficial alliance between Cyprus, Egypt and Israel; an alliance where Greece would greatly fit indeed. Considering that the Turkish claims and political objectives consist a destabilizing framework for the aforementioned countries, the current situation in the Mediterranean has been a great opportunity for Greece to boost its ties with Israel.

In this context, the Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias, has carried out an urgent visit to Jerusalem, where he met with the Israeli Prime Minster, Benjamin Netanyahu. Dendias’ visit has been a confirmation of the Israeli support to Greece in this developing incident with Turkey, something that has already been evident through tweets of the Israeli Embassy in Greece, and the son of the Israeli PM Yair Netanyahu.

Besides the mutual interests in the Mediterranean, one should also note Turkey’s emerging role as the self-declared protector of the Muslim world, has prompted political friction between Ankara and Tel Aviv over the Palestinian dispute. The rigid stance of Turkey in support of Palestine has provoked Israel several times in the past, while specific statements of high-ranking Turkish officials, and even by President Erdogan himself, have triggered a furious reaction from the side of Israel.

As another crisis is in the making, Greece is investing in regional alliances to counterbalance Turkey’s aggressive policy. The success and efficiency of this strategy has yet to be seen.

L'articolo Greece Seeks New Alliances as Another Crisis Brews in the Mediterranean proviene da InsideOver.

On July 21, 2020 Antalya NAVTEX (Navigational Text Message) Station issued a Navigational Warning, effective between July 21 and August 2 for seismic survey being done by R/V ORUÇ REİS, ATAMAN and CENGİZ. The survey encompasses a wide area offshore the island of Kastelorizo, and covers several parts of the Greek Continental Shelf. As tension in the Eastern Mediterranean is rising, the international community is standing by and expecting further moves from each side.

A Pre-Announced Provocation from Turkey

The Turkish NAVTEX warning and the scheduled deployment of seismic research vessels in the Greek Continental Shelf is nothing new at all and should not be surprising to Athens. Turkish President Recep Erdogan himself already pre-announced the move almost eight months ago. Specifically, Erdogan announced at the time that Turkey was planning to start drilling activities near Greek islands.

This claim was reinforced by the controversial Turkish-Libyan Memorandum of Understanding, and Ankara has declared that the drilling plans would proceed by August-September 2020. The lukewarm Greek — and international — reaction to the Turkish-Libyan MoU encouraged Ankara to go ahead with these plans. According to the Turkish approach the Greek islands have limited — if any — Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) rights. Furthermore, the Aegean is an open sea where Turkey has expanded influence due to its vast continental territory, as opposed to the small Greek islands. This claim cannot be backed under any circumstances by international law and the Conventions on the Law of the Sea, however Ankara keeps pushing these claims, while Greece is hardly responding and the international community stands by. There is nothing truly unexpected in the current Turkish moves, and Athens should be well-aware by now that the Turkish President never makes a statement or warning without the intention to act accordingly.

Greece Heightens Combat Readiness

Shortly after the Turkish NAVTEX warning was issued, the Hellenic Armed Forces were mobilized and the combat readiness level was raised in several units across the country. The Greek reaction aims to make clear to Turkey that unless Ankara abandons the plans for research and drilling within the Greek Continental Shelf, then the Hellenic Armed Forces are ready to engage with any Turkish vessels in the area.

The scope of the Greek deployment of the forces indicate that the Greek side is potentially getting ready for more than a short-term incident somewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean or among one of the Aegean Islands. The Greek mobilization is also taking place on the north land border of the country in the river Evros area, and other sensitive locations countrywide, while the most effective operational units are already standing by to be deployed.

Greece and Cyprus Issue Anti-NAVTEX Message

At the same time Greece and Cyprus have issued an anti-NAVTEX in the same area where Turkey had already covered in its warning. As per the Turkish response, the Greek-Cypriot action has been totally ignored by the Turkish Authorities, which stated that the anti-NAVTEX was issued by an unauthorized station and the July 21, 2020 navigational warning by the Antalya Station is still valid and effective.

Even though the Greek administration is carefully monitoring all the Turkish moves and the Hellenic Armed Forces are ready to react to any Turkish provocation, there is a strategic miscalculation happening on the Greek side. Athens is standing by and waiting to respond depending on the Turkish  moves; essentially Ankara is currently dominating the situation and shaping the possible developments, with Greece simply getting ready to act in the most appropriate way and react according to the Turkish course of action. In military terms, Ankara currently holds the initiative and could dictate the direction of the events, at least in the initial stages of a potential engagement.

Decisive Military Response and Proposed Economic Sanctions

Under the current circumstances, Athens should be considering implementing a balanced force projection strategy alongside the necessary diplomatic means. The Hellenic Navy should make clear that a decisive strike against the Turkish Forces will certainly take place in the likely scenario that the research vessels are accompanied by Turkish frigates. Being completely covered by international law, Greece has every right to protect its sovereignty by any means.

Ankara has repeatedly shown that when in a dispute, its moves are always adjusted depending on the tolerance of the other parties involved; and it should be noted that Turkey adopts this approach consistently regardless of the nature of the dispute, from a religious-political disagreement — see the recent example of the decision to turn the Hagia Sophia into a mosque — to a wide-scale military operation, like the major offensive in Idlib, Syria and the subsequent ceasefire deal.

The Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis stated shortly after the Turkish incitement that the European Union would have no other choice but to impose economic sanctions on Ankara if the Turkish drilling plans go ahead. This was a rather ill-advised statement, considering that the sanctions on Turkey over a dispute between the two sides — or three when including Cyprus — have been negligible and barely affected the Turkish decision-making process. In the meantime, a representative of the US Department of State asserted yesterday — responding to journalists’ questions around the issue — that Turkey should cease any activities in “disputed waters.” Even though this statement has been received by major Greek media as an affirmation that Washington is backing Greece, the term “disputed waters” indicates that the US is indirectly accepting the Turkish claims, considering that the area which prompted the tension in the region is clearly and undoubtedly part of the Greek continental shelf.

At the moment that this article is being written, Turkish research vessels are moored offshore at Antalya. We can expect to see rapid developments in the days that follow. During this time, Greece needs to move fast and decisively, comprehending that at the current stage that the sole utilization of soft power tactics and diplomatic channels could lead the country to major and unprecedented territorial and strategic losses.

L'articolo Turkey Issues Provocative Warning as Tension Rises in the Eastern Mediterranean proviene da InsideOver.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance is known around the world for its commitment and perseverance to ensure peace and stability in regions where hostilities increase on a daily basis. NATO is a force to be reckoned with. However, the organization is slowly losing momentum.

Macron: NATO is Experiencing ‘Brain-Death’

French President Emmanuel Macron said last year that NATO is experiencing “brain-death.” one might question what the French President meant when he said those words. Macron was criticizing the participation of the United States by saying that the bloc could no longer depend on the Trump Administration for protection. He also voiced his views regarding the protection of Europe unilaterally saying that it should be done by European powers themselves.

2020: NATO’s Problems are Far From Over

Fast-forward to this year and the organization is yet again facing problems of unity and cooperation. At the heart of the latest issue is the European Union’s naval mission Operation IRINI which monitors the arms embargo on Libya through vessels deployed in the Mediterranean Sea. The warring sides in Libya; that of Libyan National Army General Khalifa Haftar and Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj’s U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord are not showing any signs of ceasing fire. Earlier last month on June 10, a Tanzanian flagged ship was spotted by a Greek vessel called Spetsai and Greece accused Turkey of using it to transport weapons to the Fayez al-Sarraj government in Tripoli.

Cirkin vs. Courbet

This was just part one of what happened later on the same day when the Tanzanian-flagged ship Cirkin’encountered the French frigate Courbet. France lodged an official complaint to NATO saying that the Turkish ships were hostile when asked about what the Cirkin was carrying. Turkey has denied the accusations, saying the encounter was friendly. Following the incident in the Mediterranean, France decided on July 1 to withdraw from NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian. The very next day, France’s minister for armed forces, Florence Parly said at the EU’s Security and Defense Subcommittee hearing that, “I have been supported by many of my European counterparts and I thank them. We are supposed to be an alliance. An ally who conscientiously violates the rules that the alliance is supposed to enforce and tries to threaten those who interrogate him is not acceptable.”

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu in return replied by saying: “Our expectation from France at the moment is for it to apologize in a clear fashion, without ifs or buts, for not providing the correct information.” Turkey’s Defense Minister Hulusi Akar also branded the French accusations as “completely unrealistic.” The EU’s top diplomat Joseph Borrell was in the Turkish capital on 6th July to discuss issues regarding the Sea Guardian mission, Syria and other bilateral topics. The Turkish FM once again warned the EU on the occasion that Ankara will retaliate if the bloc decides to impose new sanctions on Turkey.

NATO Needs to Get its Ship in Order

NATO’s problems and disagreements aren’t new but if complications continue to persist, infighting could reach a tipping point. Turkey has its own concerns with the EU. Under the 2016 migration deal, it hasn’t received the promised aid for refugees coming from Syria. This has worsened tensions between the two sides. Furthermore, the EU accession process is also another area of concern where France is against Turkey’s inclusion to the bloc. The Turkish concerns are appropriate but it won’t help if both sides continue the cold war over Libya. While the French side says it will return to the Sea Guardian mission, it has asked for a few requests to be accepted. Notably, that Turkey respects the embargo, a categorical rejection of Turkey’s use of NATO codes, initiation of de-confliction measures and improved cooperation between the EU and NATO.

Turkey is the Wild Card

But to what extent will Turkey cooperate with NATO and France? Turkey has repeatedly stated that tensions with the EU and France in particular could be resolved through dialogue and by guiding all stakeholders in a politically correct manner. If actions from both sides are taken in terms of reconciliation and compliance, then only will this problematic scenario reach its desired end.

This event shows the deepening divide between NATO members who have personal statements and interests in the organization. The communication between members is weak as many of them support opposing sides in ongoing military conflicts across the globe. For instance, France sides with Libya’s Haftar while Turkey has given its backing to the internationally-recognized government of Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

France’s growing worry over NATO support could take a turn for the worse as only 8 out of 30 NATO members sided with French claims which accused Turkey. The UK and the US refrained from siding with the French since London considers Turkey as a crucial partner post-Brexit and the relationship between the Americans and the Turks is at a commendable point where both are on the same side in Libya. Boris Johnson was also reported to have said that he does not give “much credibility” to France’s views.

L'articolo NATO Tensions and the ‘Brain-Death’ of the Strategic Alliance proviene da InsideOver.

On June 10 the commercial vessel CIRKIN was sailing across the Mediterranean towards the port of Misurata in northwestern Libya. CIRKIN was reportedly carrying military equipment for the Libyan army under the command of the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and was being accompanied by three Turkish frigates. When forces from the European Council’s Operation IRINI approached the vessel for inspection, the Turkish convoy rejected the request and kept navigating as per their initial route.

The incident has prompted controversy among EU officials, as it raised concerns around the actual efficacy and enforcement capability of Operation IRINI.

What is Operation IRINI?

IRINI (Greek word for peace) is a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation in the Mediterranean which was launched by the European Council in the aftermath of the Berlin Conference on Libya in late January 2020. It came out of the conference where steps to end the Libyan conflict were discussed.

The predominant mission of IRINI is to ensure that the UN-imposed arms embargo in Libya is being implemented. This is achieved through the utilization of Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) and inspections of suspicious vessels in the wider region off the Libyan coasts. Secondary tasks include monitoring illicit exports of petroleum products from Libya, building and training the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy and constraining the human smuggling and trafficking networks in the region. The operation officially started on March 31, 2020 and is set to be completed by March 31, 2021, subject to further extension.

The deployed assets of the mission are three aircraft, provided by Luxembourg, Poland and Germany respectively and one frigate provided by Greece. The aircraft are mostly utilized for surveillance, reconnaissance, search-and-rescue and transport missions. The Greek frigate HS SPETSAI is the most crucial deployed asset of IRINI; it carries a single Sikorsky S-70B Aegean Hawk helicopter, which alongside SPETSAI, was involved in the aforementioned June 10 incident. We should highlight here that the number and the operational capabilities of the deployed assets are far from adequate, considering the vast area of operations they are covering and the scope of IRINI’s overall mission.

The Worrisome June 10 Incident

In the early morning of June 10, the Tanzanian-flagged vessel CIRKIN was sailing across IRINI’s area of operations. CIRKIN is a RORO ( Roll-on/roll-off, ship that carries wheeled cargo and vehicles) cargo ship and had set sail from Turkey on June 7, with destination the Libyan port of Misurata. The commercial vessel has been escorted by three ships of the Turkish navy and since its departure it has raised the alarm for a potential violation of the Libyan arms embargo. IRINI officials were monitoring the route of the ship and sought to approach it for an inspection once it entered the area of responsibility of the EU mission.

On June 10, in coordination with the Italian Commander, based in Rome, the Sikorsky S-70B Aegean Hawk helicopter launched from HS SPETSAI and approached CIRKIN. The helicopter crew requested over the radio that CIRKIN cooperate and allow the IRINI personnel on-board for an inspection. However, the reply came from one of the accompanying Turkish frigates, informing the helicopter crew that CIRKIN would not be inspected and that the ship was under the protection of the Republic of Turkey.

Back in Rome, IRINI Headquarters were immediately made aware of the sequence of the events; the command of Operation IRINI ordered the personnel in the area to comply with the Turkish request and HS SPETSAI was directed to monitor the route of the Turkish ships, following the convoy from a safe distance. CIRKIN reached the port of Misurata by June 11. Having completed its mission, as of June 13, the vessel is currently sailing back to Turkey, with final destination at the port of Samsun in the Black Sea.

The Lukewarm EU and NATO Reaction

The incident has raised substantial concerns across the Operation IRINI officials. Even though it has gained wide publicity in Greece, there has been an attempt to downgrade its significance. Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis held a video conference with President of the European Council Charles Michel and the European Commission Vice President -and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. Despite the fact that the Turkish provocations, and particularly the latest incident in the Mediterranean, would presumably be part of the agenda of the top officials to discussm there were no relevant statements following the meeting. To the contrary, the only issues that have been reportedly discussed, moved around the long-term financial goals of the EU and the Recovery Fund as a response to COVID-19.

At the same time there are ongoing talks as to how NATO could contribute to the capabilities of IRINI through NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian. Sea Guardian is a NATO naval operation in the Mediterranean, with a mission to “maintain maritime situational awareness, deter and counter terrorism and enhance capacity building.” There are no indications if these considerations are taking place due to the June 10 incident, however because of this event there is no doubt that the operational limitations and inefficiencies of IRINI were highlighted publicly.

What is Turkey Trying to Achieve?

Once again Turkey is using the typical power projection tactics, with which we are all familiar by now. Ankara has been always aware that an arms embargo is implemented in Libya, however Turkish military material never stopped being shipped to the Libyan shores in support of the GNA forces. In fact, this very Turkish participation, through the delivery of light and heavy weaponry, military vehicles and sophisticated drones, has eventually helped tip the balance of the conflict in favor of the GNA and its leader Fayez al-Serraj. Furthemore, this has been happening overtly all along as Turkey is openly bragging about these developments through its state media.

The latest incident was a direct incitement towards the EU; by ignoring the role and mission of Operation IRINI and by sending military equipment to Libya with a Turkish navy escort, Turkey is once again flexing its muscles in front of the EU. Yet here we are with most EU major players facing Ankara as an equal partner, stressing the essential Turkish role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and providing financial aid to the country instead of seeking to push it into compliance with the EU instructions by threatening to impose sanctions.

A last point we should consider is that the incident took place a few days after the Greek HS SPETSAI joined the operation. For the first months of the Operation, the FS JEAN BART of the French Navy was deployed without any similar incident. Therefore, we can assume that Ankara chose the June 10 timing on purpose, in order to send another provocative message to Athens. As the tension in Libya keeps rising, so does the Turkish aggressiveness in the Mediterranean, prompting serious concerns among Greek leadership.

L'articolo Operation IRINI Efficacy in Question, as Turkey Ignores the Libyan Arms Embargo proviene da InsideOver.