The previous week, Congress passed a bill aimed at strengthening human rights and democracy in Hong Kong. China urged President Trump to veto to the bill – to no avail. Now, one week later, Trump has signed the bill into law, despite China’s treats of “harsh countermeasures”.

So far, Trump had hitherto held back criticism of China’s crackdown on the democracy movement in Hong Kong as he continues to negotiate with Beijing in the one-and-a-half-year trade war. It is the reason he had been reluctant to sign the bill at first. The decision made now is unlikely to increase the bilateral relations any time soon.

Nonetheless, Trump had no choice but to sign the bill. If he had vetoed it, Senate, as well as the House, would have overridden his veto via a two-thirds majority – leaving the President embarrassed and seemingly outnumbered by his own party. After all, Congress had voted on Hong Kong’s “Human Rights and Democracy Decree” despite fierce protests and threats from Beijing with only one vote against in the House of Representatives.

Inter alia, the law threatens economic sanctions that could deprive Hong Kong of its preferential treatment of US economic and trade policies with China. For this purpose, annual reports from the State Department to the Congress are planned as to whether Hong Kong is still sufficiently autonomous from China to further justify its preferential treatment. Civil rights will be given special consideration in the law. Moreover, the law provides for the President to impose sanctions on individuals held responsible for serious human rights violations in Hong Kong. President Trump summed up the bill as a plan for China and Hong Kong to “settle their differences amicably to achieve lasting peace and prosperity for all.”

A caveat remains, however, as the administration will treat parts of the laws differentiated, so it will not undermine the constitutional authority of Trump on foreign policy issues, according to the White House. Details and what this entailed have not been disclosed yet.

Beijing’s response has been rather direct. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi criticized the bill in favor of “tacitly violent criminals”. It was an open intervention in China’s internal affairs, intending to throw Hong Kong further into chaos or even destroying it.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang was equally critical and stated that “facts were neglected in the bill”, while also accusing Washington of interference and violation of international law.

A Beijing State Department spokesman criticized Washington for “blatantly supporting violent criminals who trampled on the rule of law and endangered the social order.” The United States’ actions, which he also labeled as a “conspiracy” were a testimony of America’s “hegemonic nature”. The Chinese government was unwavering in its resistance to interference by foreign forces in Hong Kong. “We advise the US not to act arbitrarily, otherwise China will take decisive action and all consequences must be borne by the US.”

Meanwhile, the Foreign Ministry in Beijing stated that Deputy Foreign Minister Le Yucheng had summoned US Ambassador Branstad to demand an immediate end to “such policies and further damage to bilateral relations”.

The protests in Hong Kong are increasingly exacerbating tensions between the US and China. Relations have been tensed for months due to the trade dispute. Both countries have penalized each other with tariffs worth billions of Dollars.

According to Trump the talks on a trade agreement were in the final stages. For now, Beijing will beg to differ.

L'articolo Trump Signs Hong Kong Bill While Tensions with China Increase proviene da InsideOver.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is moving quickly towards the launch of its amphibious landing ship or LHD (landing helicopter dock) Type 075, currently under construction in Shanghai by the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding Company (subsidiary of the China State Shipbuilding Corporation, CSSC). From various images taken of the new amphibious assault ship, initially published on the Chinese social media network Weibo and later on Twitter, it seems that the works are proceeding faster than initially planned and the launch could take place in the coming months. Compared to the satellite images from last June in which the Type 075 still appeared to be unfinished, in these recent shots the ship’s hull is complete and the works mainly concern two superstructures above the flight deck. Probably, similar to the British Queen Elizabeth and the Italian Trieste, the first LHD Type 075 will have twin islands, thus separating the ship’s control tower from that of the combat operations, both terrestrial and aerial.

The features of the Type 075

Once completed, the Type 075 should have a total displacement of between 31,000 and 40,000 tons, with an overall length of 250 metres and a maximum width of 30 metres. The most noteworthy feature, and a departure from past designs, seems to be that of the twin islands. This engineering characteristic, recently implemented in Europe, allows for more space on the ship’s flight deck. There it will be possible to accommodate five or six of the medium-to-large helicopters used by the Chinese armed forces, while the lifts, located in the stern and bow, will be able to access the hangars that will host further helicopters (the maximum capacity should be 30) and amphibious landing craft, which can be put to sea by a pump-action ramp. However, the ships of the Type 075 class could in future also be modified and transformed into light aircraft carriers, because the dimensions and characteristics of the flight deck and the hangars do not preclude the use of short take-off and vertical landing aircraft. At the moment, however, they do not seem to be developing any such jets to require the use of Type 075 as light aircraft carriers. On the other hand, this could not be ruled out in the short term, and it would bring the capacity of the PLAN closer to that of the US Navy, giving it more chance of exercising power plays around the South and East China Seas.

The first step towards large-scale amphibious landings?

The initial step will be to launch the first Type 075, which will allow China to modernise and improve their fleet of amphibious landing ships, currently comprised of the smaller Type 071. The plan seems to be to complete the construction of three new LHDs, and put them into active service, then to increase efforts in the following five-year period to try to reach a total of between six and nine Type 075. The Beijing government’s clear objective was recently stated in its defence white paper published in July, which stressed the need to equip their armed forces to a level sufficient to protect China’s political-economic interests. In this context the LHD are vital because they facilitate aerial and logistic support operations, as well as allow helicopters to take off to combat submarines. The main use, however, of this type of ship is to guarantee being able to carry out amphibious landings.

China’s strategy seems to be focussed on precisely this because, at present, as pointed out in the 2019 Pentagon report on Chinese military capabilities, Beijing’s armed forces would not be able to carry out landings of any size. According to this report, the shipyards’ efforts would be aimed at allowing the Navy to carry out landings of limited scope, perhaps in the small islands of the South China Sea. In future, when nine or ten LHD will be in use, the target could become more ambitious and a large-scale landing could be organised and implemented in Taiwan. The possibility of a military operation against the Taipei government has never been denied by Beijing – in fact, in the recent white paper they underlined the chance of direct intervention if the idea of “a single China” should be put under threat. Even the reorganisation of the Chinese Marine Corps, due to triple its manpower in the coming years, is an indication of Beijing’s willingness to equip itself with forces that can support government foreign policy.

Active support for Beijing’s policies

Comparison with US forces is unrealistic, but with the new Type 075 China is moving closer to a guarantee of being able to use its Navy for large-scale amphibious operations. Additionally, with the speed of the construction of the LHD in Shanghai, China is once again demonstrating its willingness to shorten timelines in order to have the military capacity needed to support President Xi Jinping’s foreign policy, which aims to have “total” control of the Asia Pacific region. This could already be possible in the next few years, especially if Shanghai’s shipyards could be configured to build more Type 075s simultaneously. If so, the signal to the world would be clear and unmistakeable.

L'articolo China Ready For The Launch Of Its New Amphibious Assault Ship proviene da InsideOver.

Protests in Hong Kong continued for the tenth week as activists staged a sit-in at the airport, forcing a cancellation of all flights from the city for two days. Demonstrations began peacefully, but as police started using tear gas in a train station Sunday evening, word spread among the protestors which in turn caused more to rally to their cause. At one point on Tuesday, they apprehended a 23-year-old man known only as Xu who they claimed was a Chinese spy. 

Airport Chaos

The situation deteriorated further when paramedics tried to reach Xu, who fell unconscious. The group of protestors who held him were determined not to give him up and continued to physically assault him before they relented to allow him to be moved. It was the first outward sign of division within the activist movement as many of the younger protestors who arrived at the airport appeared to favor more violent tactics. Previously, Hong Kong protestors were viewed internationally as peaceful and oppressed by Chinese triad gangs and city police who often resorted to brutal tactics to deter protesting. 

After Xu was seized by a more violent faction, people took pictures and celebrated the way they abused Xu. When paramedics pushed a stretcher through to get Xu out of the area, the protestors blocked this too. As an admission of just how far the violent protestors took things, some activists distributed a flyer on the Telegram messaging network and LIHKG, an online message board, which condemned the violent actions at the airport.

“We must admit last night’s actions at HKIA were far too impulsive,” the flyer said. “We have resolved to bravely face up to our own shortcomings. We sincerely apologize to the citizens who have always supported us.” 

In another apologetic step, several demonstrators held up a sign at the airport on Wednesday which expressed their apologies for the chaos. “We were desperate and we made imperfect decisions,” the sign read. 

Eye for an Eye

Protestors have begun sporting eye patches over their right eyes after an unnamed woman was injured at a demonstration on Sunday. A photo of her began circulating online which showed her bleeding from a clear injury to her eye. She is currently hospitalized and might lose her eyeball which appeared to have ruptured. While the cause was undetermined, protestors believe she was hit with a bean bag round. 

The event added fuel to the fire and provided activists with a heroic symbol of their plight. Even as they held a sign apologizing for their behavior at the airport, they still wore eyepatches, white with a red dot to represent blood. This reminder of the violent means which the police used, perhaps incited the crowd to turn violent as a response. The momentum was not exactly letting up before her eye became a symbol, but it sure will not now. 

Still, there was a period of introspection following the violence at the airport. Some protestors were clearly not in favor of the violent shift among the movement which might cause them to limit their involvement at future events. A code of conduct for the movement was proposed online which calls for protestors to “protect and fully cooperate with emergency personnel.” Furthermore, it urges restraint if a mole is suspected in order to avoid another situation that happened with Xu. 

Military Movement 

Mainland Chinese authorities called the protest “near terrorism” following the airport riot and Beijing has begun to move military forces into place. Inside the Shenzhen Bay Sports Centre, troop transports amassed in preparation for a possible invasion of Hong Kong. While the government claimed the practice exercises had nothing to do with events in Hong Kong, the location and timing is too coincidental. The People’s Liberation Army has a garrison of roughly 10,000 already stationed in the city which could deploy alongside a force from the mainland. 

Doing so would likely receive international condemnation as Hong Kong has widespread economic and political support. Within the United States, one senator already proposed several actions for Washington to take in retaliation of a possible attack on Hong Kong. Senator Tom Cotton recommended an end for student visas, revocation of visas for Chinese party leaders and their families, and the suspension of trade discussions, among other measures. 

“If Beijing cracked down on Hong Kong, it would require a fundamental reassessment of our relations with their country,” Cotton said during a radio interview. “The risk to life if Beijing were to crack down in Hong Kong is severe.”

Naturally, the Tiananmen Square Massacre is recalled during the Hong Kong protests. Beijing used its power then to solidify its hold on China and, according to Cotton, to steal American jobs while threatening its security. The US cannot stand by and let another such attack happen, especially without repercussions. As China builds its military across the bay, it signals its intentions to bring order, by force if necessary. Now it is up to the protestors to determine if they can return to more peaceful methods. 

L'articolo Hong Kong Protestors Turn Violent at Airport Demonstration proviene da InsideOver.

Following US President Donald Trump’s announcement of more tariffs on Chinese products, Beijing took the rare measure of devaluing its currency. The yuan slipped to 7.0136 on Friday after falling to 7.0039 on Thursday. This week marked the first time since 2008 that the Chinese yuan crossed the threshold of seven per dollar, an event that inspired global markets to slide downward. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) sets a midpoint each day before the markets open and allow the currency to be traded against the dollar within two percent of that specified value.

Since the beginning of the trade war between Beijing and Washington, the yuan has fallen 11 percent compared to the dollar, although it is still up 3.7 percent since 2008. As it is the second-largest economy in the world and holds nearly 25-percent of the US national debt, any action from China on the value of its currency is sure to come under intense scrutiny. This week, however, the effect was magnified in light of the ongoing trade war. Consequently, the US Treasury Department labeled China a “currency manipulator.” How these two events – the devaluation and subsequent accusation of currency manipulation – impact global trade remains to be seen, but there are some likely scenarios which may play out.

Devalued

China’s currency is traditionally strictly managed as are all aspects of the Chinese economy including foreign investment and trade. Historically, the yuan is also a very stable currency and seldomly experiences great fluctuations. This week’s devaluation of a less than two-tenths of a yuan caused minor pandemonium, a sign of its rarity. The PBOC undoubtably decided to let the yuan slide due to the prolonged trade war and in doing so, will likely influence its trading partners.

Firstly, the currency devaluation was interpreted by other governments as a sign that the US-China trade war will not end anytime soon. Therefore, other nations have rushed to protect their own economies, mainly by lowering interest rates. Banks in India, New Zealand, and Thailand all took this action on Wednesday.

Secondly, a weaker yuan makes Chinese exports more attractive for its trade partners. Trump has often accused Beijing of intentionally keeping the currency weak to the dollar in order to gain an unfair economic advantage, but many economists have argued that it has actually been priced properly in recent years and, given the current trade war, should start to weaken.

Perhaps most importantly for Beijing, the currency devaluation will help offset the negative effects of tariffs. Because goods from China will now in theory be slightly cheaper, the 25-percent tariffs begin to lose their effect. As the currency slides lower, so does the amount levied against imported products. With cheaper products, the dollar has more buying power in China, making Chinese products once again attractive to US importers, even with the tariffs. This puts pressure on American manufacturers to cut their prices in order to win business which would otherwise go to Beijing.

Manipulation

Almost immediately after the PBOC began devaluing the yuan, the US Treasury Department designated it as a currency manipulator for the first time in nearly 30 years.

“This is a major violation which will greatly weaken China over time,” Trump tweeted. According to a Treasury Department statement, it is currently working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to resolve the issue, and it presumably hopes to see some sort of punishment against Beijing.

A former head of the China IMF thinks that this is unlikely to happen, however, and that the US is in the wrong.

“This is an extraordinary action of hostility against a major trading partner, with little economic basis and again driven mostly by presidential whims,” said Eswar Prasad, who is also a Cornell University economist.

The labeling of China as currency manipulator could pave the way for further action from the US government. During his campaign for president, Trump often accused China of manipulating its currency and now he finally has that officially declared by his government and can use it as leverage for securing more sanctions or protectionist strategies for US goods. The label also gives Trump something he can bargain with by telling Beijing diplomats that he will get the classification removed if they make economic concessions on their end.

Just the Beginning

This week was possibly just the beginning of China’s new strategy on its currency. It could continue to let it slide, possibly approaching even 8 yuan per dollar. According to the PBOC, the drop was due to “trade protectionism” and given the unending nature of the trade war, its foreseeable that more protectionism might be necessary in the coming weeks and months ahead. The US stock market just experienced its worst week of the year, a sign that global trade issues are beginning to sting. While Trump came into office with a rather strong economy from his predecessor and experienced even more growth under his tenure, economists have been warning about another possible recession. China might be the tipping point towards that eventuality.

L'articolo China Labeled a Currency Manipulator for Devaluing Yuan proviene da InsideOver.

When Polish authorities arrested a Huawei employee for espionage in December, under heavy US pressure, Central and Eastern Europe’s relationship with China flitted – albeit briefly – onto the world’s news screens.

But when reporters honed in on the story, it soon turned out to be about how little Poland and the CEE region actually matter in the emerging geopolitics of Sino-EU relations.

“Any geopolitical ambitions China may have in CEE would be no more than securing friendly passage into the economic and political heart of a wider Europe rather than winning over lesser consequential parts of it,” Bob Savic, Senior Research Fellow at the Global Policy Institute in London, said.

Poland was publicly admonished by Beijing and then ridiculed in the Chinese press as a country with nothing worth stealing.

But Beijing’s ire represents a new phase in a relationship that seemed to be going places in 2012, when the then Chinese premier Wen Jiabao announced the start of the so-called ‘16+1’ initiative, a strategy for encouraging trade between China and Eastern Europe. The goal he set out was to hit $100 billion in mutual trade between China and 11 EU member states in the CEE and SouthEastern Europe (SEE) and five aspiring ones by 2015. At $90 billion it was almost there in 2018, but with most of it going one way, some CEE countries are now starting to ask if it was worth it after all.

Beijing looking at Berlin, not Warsaw

Germany remains Beijing’s principle target, both politically and economically, and Berlin’s decision on what to do about Chinese telco Huawei’s involvement in its 5G new generation internet rollout is far more important to Beijing than anything that happens in Warsaw, Prague or Belgrade.

The Polish government has in turn grown frustrated by lack of progress in economic cooperation with China. A large trade deficit and barriers to access to the Chinese market have become key issues and Minister of Internal Affairs Joachim Brudziński said recently that a ban on Huawei equipment in the Polish market is under consideration.

“Polish officials deny any connection between the detention and statements on Huawei’s position in the Polish market. But the coincidence in the timing of the events looks hardly accidental,” says Łukasz Sarek, a researcher and China market analyst in Warsaw.

“The 16+1 format was considered as a China-led bloc with the EU and western powers excluded and lackluster progress on economic issues would be partially offset by political benefits,” he says.

Meanwhile, Poland and Hungary and the others believed in return they could leverage their position within the EU and use the Chinese card to press Brussels and Berlin for concessions.

“But China’s offer is less attractive than that provided by the EU,” Sarek goes on. “And cooperation with China comes with risks such as the increased activities of Chinese intelligence, pro-Chinese lobbyists, Chinese companies penetrating critical industries and murky Chinese business operations,” Sarek says.

In fact, he adds, China has gained more influence in western European countries such as Italy, Portugal than in the CEE region.

“After Brexit Beijing’s main partners in the EU are Berlin, Brussels and Paris. Chinese leadership does not want to endanger relations by being too active with the creation of a pro-Chinese bloc within the EU.”

Lack of spring in Prague’s step

It is similar in the Czech Republic. There have been a number of Chinese acquisitions in the country worth around 1 billion euros. Even some Czech businesses have been relatively successful in China, such as the traditional Czech car maker (owned now by German VW) Skoda and financial company Home Credit.

However, as in Poland, there has been a similar realization that attempts to profit from improving relations with China are largely futile. The Chinese acquisition spree in the Czech Republic was conducted by a single entity – the CEFC – and was driven by debt-financing. In 2018, the company’s chairman, Ye Jianming, was arrested in China.

The National Cyber Security Center issued a warning in December against Huawei and ZTE products based on the legal and political conditions in China that require those firms to cooperate with intelligence services. Huawei had already been precluded from competing in a tender to build a tax portal.

“The common denominator for both Poland and the Czech Republic is the perception that they have few economic results to show for six-plus years of attempts to develop ‘pragmatic cooperation’ with Beijing under the umbrellas of the 16+1 platform and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” Alicja Bachulska, who works as a Chinese politics analyst at the Asia Research Centre, War Studies University in Warsaw, said.

China gets what China wants

“The Chinese Communist Party ensures State Owned Enterprises and private strategic industries make foreign investments that support the country’s economy, foreign policy, and internal security,” Nicholas Eftimiades, a lecturer at Penn State Harrisburg School of Public Affairs, says.

“This policy was made clear by Xi Jinping. Major Chinese investments in Europe, as was the case with Greece, are designed to be economically profitable and support China’s foreign policy aims. This goal is ensured by the internal Communist Party Committee required in all large private companies and State Owned Industries. This is quite a different concept from the West where private investment practices and government goals and objectives can be at odds with each other.”

Beijing wants political support over its human rights record and abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet, conflicts on South China Sea, growing rivalry with US, Taiwan status, reshaping and reforming international institutions (UN Security Council and various agencies, IMF, World Bank, WTO), Arctic and Antarctic status.

But Chinese investment is less than 1% of overall foreign direct investment (FDI) in the CEE region, and more than 90% of Chinese FDI into the EU goes to Western Europe.

In the developed world, China attempts to gain access to top-notch technologies and brands; in the developing world access to raw materials and infrastructure building projects. Central Europe stands somewhere in between the two, with unclear potential and a little-known environment.

Most of China’s relations with individual CEE states tend to be lower-ranked partnerships, such as “friendly cooperative relationships” with Bulgaria and Romania, a “friendly cooperative partnership” with Hungary. China ascribes slightly higher level relations with the Czech Republic in the form of a “strategic partnership” and higher still with Poland, Hungary and Serbia entitled as a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”

EU and 16+1: are they compatible?

A prosperous, united and strong Europe is in China’s best interest, the Chinese envoy to the EU said recently. Zhang Ming, in an interview with The Financial Times had been asked if China was trying to use the “16+1” mechanism to divide the EU.

Not everyone is convinced. EU Commissioner Johannes Hahn last year warned of the danger that Balkan states risked becoming “Trojan horses” for Chinese influence.

And others are even more blunt in their assessment. “One of the reasons why China is engaged with Eastern European countries is to break up the EU,” says Marcin Przychodniak, an analyst at Asia-Pacific program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw.

“If you define the EU as a loose, a la carte, political club then 16+1 is not necessarily against the bloc, but if you define it the way the EU defines itself as a closely integrated club with specific standards, rules and policies then the 16+1 system is not compatible with the EE,” Vuk Vuksanovic, a Ph.D. researcher in International Relations at the London School of Economics, says.

China, furthermore, prefers to pursue projects based on direct agreements with governments and these tend to include provisions on credit lines with state guarantees of repayment and selection of Chinese contractors, which use Chinese materials and labour. Construction projects in the EU require public calls for tenders and China’s use of credit lines to finance the projects is also troubling, being neither an investment nor a grant, as EU rules stipulate.

For CEE countries whose EU funding will slowly be ending after 15 years, high Chinese interest rates on loans and ongoing access to EU structural funds may push Warsaw and Prague back into Brussels love nest.

Sea-change in the EU

Meanwhile, China’s relationship with the EU encountered a number of setbacks in 2018, the latest being the tightening of foreign direct investments by the European Commission. In December Germany made it even harder by establishing new rules against foreign acquisitions of German companies in technology.

Overall Chinese investment volumes in Europe last year fell by 46% to reach $31.2 billion (€27.3 billion). Roughly one-third of that money flowed to Germany where the Chinese invested $10.7 billion, marking a 22 percent decline.

Serbia and Hungary remain Beijing’s gateway

But China still seems to have a foothold in Hungary and Serbia.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said recently that China was in pole position while the CEE region would become the “engine” driving Europe’s economy in the next 5-10 years. He said China should not be handled with any ideological prejudices. “It should be accepted that we are different and manage our countries differently,” he said, adding that the point was “not to pass judgement but promote mutual interests.”

Meanwhile, Beijing has engaged in a number of massive projects in the Balkans, although the most high-profile one, the Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway, has failed to materialize so far.

“It would not be immodest or wrong to call Serbia China’s main partner in Europe,” according to Minister for Construction Zorana Mihajlovic.

He declined to mention the small fact that China exports $1 billion in goods to Serbia, whereas Serbia exports $1 million of goods to China.

L'articolo Is China losing Eastern Europe? proviene da InsideOver.

Despite being the second largest economy in the world, deep contradictions continue to persist in modern China.

While city skylines are being decked out with new, futuristic-looking buildings, a part of the country’s population still cannot afford the sunshine.

They are the urban underclass, the group that contributed, in a large part, to the country’s tremendous economic growth over the past decade. Yet still, they struggle to find their own place in the new China.

“Rat Tribe” is the neologism created to refer to the people who live below ground level. Many are low income migrant workers, coming from the underdeveloped areas of the country, attracted by the opportunities and promises of the big cities.

In Beijing, the cost of renting a flat can be prohibitive. Thus, living underground becomes financially acceptable, at least in the beginning, until they save enough to afford better options.

For some of them it’s the only choice: their average income being only a few hundred dollars a month. For others, the alternative would be living outside the city in the surrounding suburbs, such as the Sixth Ring of Beijing. But this also means more expenses and time dedicated to transportation in the overcrowded metro, every day.

In order to save time and money, they give up safety and health, living in the dark and dank spaces, measuring approximately 7 to 9 square meters. Bathrooms, most often are common spaces shared with other underground residents.

The term “tribe”, anyways, can be misleading. Relationships with neighbors are almost non-existent. “Everyone here lives on his own” says Wilma, a 27-year-old woman living underground. “From my point of view, it’s a sort of protection. Being friendly to neighbors means having to deal with their requests, sooner or later; and this means more hassle”. Therefore, at the end of the day, she quietly returns to her room, avoiding eye-contact with neighbors.

Her story is peculiar. Wilma was born and raised in Beijing, where her parents also live. But her relationship with them isn’t very good. A few years ago, she found a boyfriend and left their house to go live with him. Soon after, he was arrested. She lent him money to cover his legal expenses, using up most of the savings she had. She is now unemployed and had to relocate to a more affordable place.

This phenomenon originated in the 60s, in the years of tensions with the Soviet Union. Fearing a forthcoming strike, Chairman Mao ordered the construction of 85 square kilometers of underground shelters. The war never came, and for some time those shelters remained empty and unused.

During the 70s, the economic reform made money appealing once again, and many Chinese moved to the cities in search of better opportunities. The underground shelters were then inhabited by rural migrants, who didn’t possess the urban household registration, and as a result, couldn’t access many public services in the cities.

Nowadays, the underground dwellings (地下室, dixiashi) are mainly the result of rampant overdevelopment. They are built as car parks, then divided into small rooms, and subsequently rented out to maximize the profits.

Recently, the government declared these dwellings illegal, but, similar to many other aspects of China, the phenomenon still exists in a grey zone.

It is hard to tell how many people still live below ground level in Beijing. According to an evaluation from a few years ago, there were approximately a few hundred thousand. This number might now be drastically reduced as many underground dwellings were evacuated by law enforcements at the end of 2017.

In recent years, Beijing has undergone profound mutations aimed to transform it into a modern, top-notch city. It is not clear, though, where these people will go after the last dixiashi is evacuated.

It seems like, in the new Beijing, there isn’t a place for them to stay.

L'articolo The rat tribe of Beijing proviene da InsideOver.