It is exactly five years since a coalition led by Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates intervened militarily in Yemen. But despite the number of casualties the prospect of peace has remained elusive. The war has worsened in what has been described by the UN as the world’s largest humanitarian catastrophe.

Now the War in Yemen Could Be Close to Ending

Now there are reports that Saudi Arabia is looking for a way out of the crisis after realizing that it is fighting a losing battle. What makes the conflict even more complicated is that it is part of a regional power struggle between Shia-ruled Iran and Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia who have been using proxy militia groups in Yemen to undermine each other.

Saudi Arabia and its allies have accused Iran of providing financial and military support to the Houthis, something Iran has denied. Among those factors often mentioned as having played a great role in organizing Iranian-backed proxy militia groups in Yemen was General Qasem Soleimani of Iran’s Quds force who was killed in a US drone strike this past January.

Arab Spring Origins of the Yemeni Conflict

The conflict in Yemen can be traced to the Arab spring that forced former President Abdullah Saleh to step down and hand over power to his deputy Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi in 2011. Because of the ensuing state of anarchy, Hadi was faced with a number of challenges, among them the high rate of unemployment, insecurity, corruption, food shortages and separatist movements.

The Houthis — who are mainly made up of Zaidi Shia Muslims — took advantage of the growing dissent against Hadi’s government to establish their control over Yemen’s Saada province. Sunni Muslims in the region who were concerned about the economic situation joined hands with the Houthis and together they took over the capital of Sanaa.

Saleh’s Attempt to Return to Power and Saudi Arabia’s Entrance into the Conflict

Former President Saleh in a bid to return to power entered in an agreement of convenience with his erstwhile rivals the Houthis to take over the entire country and depose Hadi. However this backfired when he was killed by the Houthis in December of 2017

Concerned about the deteriorating security situation, Saudi Arabia and eight other, mostly Sunni Arab countries intervened in Yemen on March 26, 2015, in a bid to defeat the Houthis. More broadly, they wished to stop the influence of Iran and to restore the leadership of Hadi who had fled to exile.

The coalition was backed by Western forces mainly those of US, UK and France who provided it with intelligence information and fuel. Initially Saudi Arabia estimated that the whole operation would last several weeks at most, but five years later the battle is still raging with the number of casualties increasing daily.

Yemen’s Catastrophic Death Toll and War Crimes

In 2019, The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (TACLED), an organization which uses real-time data analysis source on political violence and protests around the world, stated there were more than 100,000 deaths in Yemen since 2015, including over 12,000 civilians killed in direct attacks.

“The Saudi-led coalition and its allies remain responsible for the highest civilian fatalities from direct targeting , with over 8000 since 2015,” said the organization. “Around 67 % of all reported civilian fatalities during this period have been caused by coalition.” It also accused Houthis and their allies for being responsible for over 2,000 reported civilian fatalities from direct targeting since 2015.

During the same period, Human Rights Watch documented a total of 90 unlawful coalition airstrikes which hit homes, markets, hospitals, schools and mosques. One of them was the bombing of a wedding, killing 22 people, including 8 children in 2018. Another documented case, was that of a bomb that struck a school bus killing at least 26 children and wounding 19 more in the busy market of Dhahyan.

“The Saudi-led coalitions attack on a bus full of young boys adds to its already gruesome track record of killing civilians at weddings, funerals, hospitals and schools in Yemen,” said Mr Bill Van Esveld, Human Rights Watch senior children researcher. The organization also accused the Houthis of firing indiscriminately into Saudi Arabia, and using landmines that have killed and maimed civilians and disrupted their lives.

Saudi Arabia’s Invitation to Warring Parties to Come to the Negotiating Table

But in what could be an attempt by Saudi Arabia to exit the conflict, the Kingdom has invited members of the Houthis and the Yemeni recognied government to peace negotiations. This comes a month after Houthis took control of the capital Sanaa and deposed the internationally-recognized Hadi government.

According to the Wall Street Journal, Saudi ambassador to Yemen Mohamed al-Jaber said the proposal for talks to end the five year war remain on the table despite a flare up in violence. “We are committed to de-escalation,” al-Jaber said, adding that “we are ready to have cease fire in all Yemeni territory if they accept it.”

The Houthis have not yet responded to the invitation.

“The standing invitation to the Houthis to meet face to face for talks after provocative attacks this weekend suggests the Saudis desperately want to end the war in Yemen,” said Elana DeLozier, a Yemen expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Why Does Saudi Arabia Want to End the War Now?

The Gulf Kingdom is believed to have felt even been more isolated after its allies in the conflict such United Arab Emirates scaled down their military presence last year to avoid further losses. A Western official familiar with the Kingdom’s policy in Yemen told the Middle East Monitor that “Like the UAE, the Saudis want to say this war is over for us, but the situation on the ground is difficult. “

Thomas Juneau, an associate professor at Ottawa University in Canada informed the paper further that, “Riyadh wants to reduce the costs of its intervention in Yemen after it has realized that it cannot afford the war’s financial and military costs.”

Amid the growing number of war casualties, Yemen is now faced with the coronavirus pandemic which could result in even more deaths because of the fragile security situation and the weak health system. The country has 3,500 medical facilities but only half are still functioning. This means that much of the country’s population of around 20 million have no access to adequate healthcare .

L'articolo Has Saudi Arabia Surrendered in Yemen? proviene da InsideOver.

Sultan Qaboos bin Said, the ruler of Oman, passed away Jan. 10. Oman is a country that barely registers when one thinks of the Middle East, but for good reasons. Under Qaboos’ leadership, Oman was transformed into an exemplary Middle Eastern state in practically all areas of development, including education, health, and economy. Moreover, Qaboos leveraged his nation’s diplomatic power and proximity to regional conflict zones to broker peace. While neighboring states seemed to invite discord, Oman sought stability. Qaboos’ named his cousin, Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, as his successor to the throne.

Following in Qaboos’ Footsteps

After assuming the mantle of sultan, Haitham vowed to “follow the same line as the late sultan, and the principles that he asserted for the foreign policy of our country, of peaceful coexistence among nations and people, and good neighborly behavior of non-interference in the affairs of others,” according to a Foreign Affairs report. 

Haitham is no stranger to Oman – he served in the Foreign Ministry and as Heritage and Culture Minister. His appointment also does not come as a shock as he was widely believed to be the first choice as successor. 

“He is described by those who have met him as quiet, steady, and a good listener,” Nikita Lalwani, Josh Rubin, and Sam Winter-Levy reported for Foreign Affairs. 

In the past, the 65-year-old Haitham studied at the University of Oxford’s Foreign Service Programme. In addition to numerous Omani honours, he also received the Order of King Abdulaziz from Saudi Arabia, the Grand Decoration of Honour for Services to the Republic of Austria, and the Honorary Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order from Britain. 

Curing an Oil Dependency

While Haitham by all accounts may be as well-liked as his predecessor, likability alone will not solve an oil crisis on the horizon. As is the case with most Middle Eastern states, Oman depends heavily on oil revenues. Haitham attempted to preempt the inevitable outcome of running out of oil while he served in the Foreign Ministry. If any faults can be found in the new ruler, it is his failure to carve out new sources of revenue for his nation. 

Oil accounts for 70 to 85 percent of Oman’s revenues, according to Foreign Policy. A plan outlined by Qaboos, dubbed Vision 2020, was designed to diversify Oman’s economy, but now that the target year has arrived, the plan was extended to 2040. Haitham will have to grapple with creating a path for the future and thus far, no details have made clear what that might entail.

Despite the love of their late sultan, Omanis joined in the Arab Spring protests of 2011 to rally against corruption and unemployment. Qaboos responded by creating more government positions, which largely came through the Royal Oman Police. 

Borrowing a page from the Saudi playbook, Oman instituted an “Omanization” programme designed to curtail migrant workers taking jobs that would otherwise go to Omani citizens. This has arguably hurt private companies more than it has helped citizens. Expats are still prevalent in the workforce, with more than 40 percent of the population being migrants. Often companies will either create unproductive positions for Omanis or simply reduce their foreign worker count and leave the positions unfilled.

While Haitham has inherited a significant economic problem, his predecessor proved even the most difficult and institutionalised problems can be overcome. Qaboos pushed for greater gender equality by giving females the right to vote in 2002, putting women in government posts, and overseeing an employment revolution in which women enjoy equality in opportunities and pay. 

More broadly, Qaboos oversaw the rise of life expectancy from 50 years to 77. When he took the throne, the state had only 10 km of paved road and three schools. Now it boasts 29,000 km of paved roads and education can be considered among the best in the world with 96 percent adult literacy thanks to the establishing of 1,500 schools. 

Diplomatically, Oman helped broker peace between Israel and Egypt, and it mediated talks between the US and Iran during the presidency of Barack Obama, which led to the Iranian nuclear deal. 

Its relationship with the US, in particular, is storied, dating back to the first American president, George Washington. Oman was also the first Arab state to dispatch diplomats to America.

In short, Qaboos handed his successor a prosperous nation, even considering its oil dependence. Haitham, if he makes good on his word to follow the footsteps of his predecessor, will have an easier time than most of his regional neighbors. Continuing Oman’s tradition of peace and diplomacy will allow Haitham to focus his attention on overcoming economic problems, a luxury few are afforded in the current geopolitical climate.

L'articolo Oman’s Throne Passes to Haitham Following Death of Qaboos proviene da InsideOver.

The Arab Spring of 2011 ushered in a wave of hope throughout North Africa and the Middle East. However, in many cases, such hope quickly turned to disappointment or despair. Governmental concessions ended up doing little to fundamentally alter life in nations such as Jordan, Morocco and Kuwait (not to mention Saudi Arabia and Oman), while more substantial uprisings in Egypt, Syria and Libya ultimately descended into protracted crises which even today haven’t resolved themselves.

There is, however, reason to be optimistic again. In recent months, the Arab world has witnessed another surge of protests and political disobedience. So far, none of these have been as dramatic or destructive as anything witnessed in 2011, yet this is precisely why they’re more encouraging and potentially more constructive. By coming less than a decade after the first Arab Spring they reveal that the events of 2011 weren’t some isolated anomaly or outburst, but rather part of an emerging culture of protest in the Middle East. And because they’ve been more moderate than their predecessors, they have more of a chance of achieving incremental and enduring political reform in the region, rather than inviting harsh crackdowns from jealous governments.

Most recently, Lebanon and Iraq have captured headlines as the most eye-catching examples of this new Arab Spring. On October 17, Lebanon “erupted” in protests over the government’s plans to introduce a tax on VoIP (voice-over-internet-protocol) messaging services such as WhatsApp and FaceTime. While plans for a levy of $0.20 per daily use of such services was the trigger for demonstrations in Beirut and elsewhere, these were soon fed by generalised grievances surrounding government corruption and economic mismanagement. By October 21, the government in Hariri had announced reforms, hoping to placate tens of thousands of demonstrators by cancelling the proposed ‘WhatsApp Tax’ and also cutting the salaries of officials by 50%.

As for Iraq, the most recent swell of protests began on October 1, although public discontent had been simmering since July 2018, when demonstrators assembled in Basra to challenge the government’s failure to provide basic services and jobs. This October, similar protests kicked off again in various towns across the country, with riot police being deployed in Baghdad and at least nine people being killed in the first two days of protest. Since then, more than 250 people have been lost their lives on the streets of Iraq, reportedly by Iraqi police and security forces, which have denied any role in the deaths. This is a very heavy toll to pay, yet the government has announced some social reforms, including land redistributions, military enlistment, increased welfare support for vulnerable families, and new market complexes to tackle youth unemployment.

Lebanon and Iraq are both united by their frustration with government corruption, as well as with stagnating economies. What’s interesting about other protests elsewhere in the Arab world is that they’re also defined by the same themes, indicating that a contagion factor is at play in the region, as there was during the original Arab Spring. In Algeria, protests have been raging since February, led mostly by exasperation with corruption. It’s also corruption that protesters have been decrying in Sudan, where demonstrations began in December after the government cut subsidies that lowered the price of fuel and bread. And in addition to a struggling economy and rising prices, it’s also corruption that has played a significant role in Iran, which has been witnessing demonstrations and general strikes since 2017.

In other words, discontentment with how countries in the Arab world are governed is spreading throughout the region, bringing new converts with each passing month and creating a growing movement for lasting democratic and economic reform. What’s significant about this is that this new wave of protest is arguably more focused and reformist than those that have proceeded it, and it’s in this context that it’s useful to highlight the concessions protesters have won from governments. In Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria and Sudan the authorities have responded to demonstrations with a variety of reforms, resignations or policy changes, but at the same time, protests have largely continued. That’s because demonstrators have witnessed first-hand proof of the real power they hold over governments, and rather than stop with single victories, it’s now much more likely that they’ll respond to each new or continuing grievance with protests.

Put differently, the more people in the Middle East protest, the more likely they are to protest again in the future. This is potentially dangerous and destabilising for the Arab world, but given the popularity of the current protests and their relative peacefulness, it’s probable that they’ll now result more in piecemeal yet valuable reforms than in social and political breakdown (as in Libya and Syria). And in the end, this better for the Middle East, and the wider world in general.

L'articolo Lebanon and Iraq Protests Define New Arab Spring proviene da InsideOver.