With the announced resignation of CDU chair Kramp-Karrenbauer, the party will have to fill not one but two voids in the upcoming months. Firstly, a successor for Kramp-Karrenbauer needs to be found. The individual in question, however, will most likely also become the party’s next chancellor candidate for the general election in 2021, making the choice doubly important.

Who is Being Suggested to Replace Kramp-Karrenbauer?

Names have been circulating even before Kramp-Karrenbauer’s decision to leave her post. Old acquaintances, each with an individual approach towards politics have been suggested. Regardless of the party’s next chair, however, the CDU will need to return to its conservative origins in order to not to be the second people’s party in Germany that is falling apart. Neither of these subsequent candidates has yet commented on the rumors, but the positioning games are expected to begin next week, as Kramp-Karrenbauer has announced talks with “potential successors.”

First Potential Candidate: Markus Söder

There is Markus Söder, for one. Bavaria’s Minister-President has held the office since 2018. He has been sitting for the CSU in the Bavarian state parliament since 1994 (the CSU is the CDU’s sister party in the state of Bavaria and has traditionally been much more conservative than the CDU). Recently, Söder changed attitudes in the areas of environmental protection and sea rescue have raised questions. In addition, what Söder had previously called “asylum tourism” in 2018 he no longer wants to be associated with today—instead, he advocates for a cooperative European solution in the area of ​​sea rescue in the Mediterranean.This change is a testimony to Söder being an opportunist rather than having any consistent ideology or political beliefs.

Nevertheless, it remains doubtful that Söder will receive the necessary support within the party. In the history of the republic, only two CSU men (Stoiber and Strauß) ran for chancellor, and both had already been exceptional politicians at the time. While Söder has been a commendable Minister-President for Bavaria, it may be too early for him to step onto the national stage.

Second Potential Candidate: Armin Laschet

Then there is Armin Laschet, who has reportedly long sought to take the reins. What speaks in favor of North Rhine-Westphalia’s Minister-President, is that he heads the CDU’s state party with the most members, and thus he has vast support guaranteed. Laschet has, moreover, been a member of the CDU’s federal executive board since 2008. Since 2012, he has also been one of five deputy CDU federal leaders, which makes him someone with a high-profile within the party. One of Laschet’s strongest qualities has been his proclivity to mediate and overcome political gridlock via compromise, which could be an interesting strategy after the Merkel years—during which her opinion was usually delivered ex-cathedra. However, Laschet is also seen as a supporter of the Grand Coalition, which is an opinion that many members do not share.

Third Potential Candidate: Jens Spahn

Another possible candidate is Health Minister Jens Spahn. Spahn had already run for the party’s chair in 2018 but lagged behind Kramp-Karrenbauer and Friedrich Merz. Spahn has had recent political successes in his field and is pushing for digitalization in the health sector. Most recently, he failed with the push for a massive reform in the area of ​​organ donation, however. Spahn is seen as a conservative, but his profile seems pale in comparison to the other candidates.

Most Likely Candidate: Friedrich Merz

The favorite to replace Kramp-Karrenbauer, however, remains Friedrich Merz. Merz led the Union’s parliamentary group in the opposition from 2000 to 2002. After internal party quarrels with Angela Merkel, he left federal politics in 2009. In 2018, when Merkel announced she would no longer run as Chancellor, Merz returned to the political stage and joined Spahn and Kramp-Karrenbauer in the race for the party’s chair.

Despite the defeat, Merz has since repositioned himself politically, most likely because he was cognizant about Kramp-Karrenbauer’s weaknesses and eventual failure. Merz is another conservative party member—in the traditional sense—and has the support of a group within the CDU that calls itself “Werte Union,” ​​intending to correct the leftward course that occurred under Merkel.

Already during a 2018 speech, Merz said that he could “halve” the AfD’s voters, which suggests that he would bring the CDU back to its traditional values. Merz, a businessman, is also seen as an opponent of the Grand Coalition. Instead, he favors the traditional CDU/FDP coalition. In addition, Merz is also much more popular than its competitors, especially in eastern Germany.

The main criticism against Merz? His success. In 2018 he was criticized for being a millionaire and thus allegedly not being able to understand “the little man”—an old rhetorical trick of the socialist forces in Germany to demonize success. Whether the success stigma will be sufficient this time is doubtful, and if Merz plays his cards right he will not only be the person that revitalizes the CDU’s polls but also has the chance to make the CDU what it used to be and provide Germany with a genuine conservative force once again.

L'articolo Who Will Become the CDU’s Next Chair and Chancellor Candidate for 2021? proviene da InsideOver.

Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer will step down as the CDU’s chair and a potential candidate for the chancellorship in 2021. Kramp-Karrenbauer first communicated her decision to the CDU’s presidium on Monday before addressing the public. Nonetheless, she will continue to work and organize the transition towards the party’s next chancellor candidate and hand over the party chair in the summer.

Chancellor Angela Merkel will keep Kramp-Karrenbauer in her cabinet. At the CDU presidium’s meeting on Monday morning, the chancellor expressly spoke out for Kramp-Karrenbauer to remain the Defense Minister, before thanking her for her service as the party’s chair.

Criticism Of Kramp-Karrenbauer Over Thuringia Election

Kramp-Karrenbauer was sharply criticized for managing the crisis after the recent controversial Minister-President election in Thuringia. FDP politician Thomas Kemmerich was elected Prime Minister last Wednesday in the state parliament in Erfurt—and also by the CDU and the AfD, whose parliamentary group is led by the party’s extreme right leader Björn Höcke. Kemmerich was subsequently massively criticized for accepting the election’s results, which he would not have won without the AfD’s votes. He resigned the following day. In the aftermath, Kramp-Karrenbauer stated the Thuringia CDU had acted against the federal party’s directive, thus insinuating subordination and making herself look like a chair without power.

What Does Kramp-Karrenbauer’s Departure Mean For The AfD?

After the announced withdrawal of Kramp-Karrenbauer, the AfD sees opportunities for the two parties to come closer. AfD parliamentary group leader Alexander Gauland said on Monday: “It is completely nonsensical and unrealistic not to want to work with the AfD in the long run.” AfD chair Jörg Meuthen and deputy chair Beatrix von Storch demanded that Chancellor Merkel also resigns.

Kramp-Karrenbauer has been the federal chairman of the CDU since December 2018. Alongside herself, the candidate for chancellor of the Union was repeatedly in discussion with the North Rhine-Westphalian Minister-President Armin Laschet, ex-Union faction leader Friedrich Merz, CSU chair Markus Söder and Health Minister Jens Spahn. So far, none of them has declared the desire to take over the leadership in the summer and likely become the party’s next chancellor candidate. Minister-President and CDU Vice Armin Laschet, who has long been considered a possible candidate for the chancellorship and who leads the largest CDU state association, was not present during the meeting. Friedrich Merz recently gave up his position as Chairman of the Supervisory Board at Blackrock in order to have more time for political work and is favored by an influential, conservative wing within the CDU (“Werte Union”). One can assume that particularly Laschet and Merz are going to position themselves in the next few days.

Kramp-Karrenbauer Known For Weak Leadership

Kramp-Karrenbauer has long been accused of weak leadership within the party. At the Leipzig party conference in November, she openly offered a vote against her own position, to bring about the unity of the party. Thereupon she received long applause. The Thuringian situation then gave all of her internal party-political opponents an excuse to increase the pressure to which she ultimately succumbed.

Whoever becomes Kramp-Karrenbauer’s successor will have to address the party’s future position on the AfD and Die Linke, which should not be easy. There are members within the CDU who envision cooperating with parts of the AfD, while others categorically reject it. However, the strengthening of Germany’s Greens raises the question of whether or nor the CDU will still be able to govern in the future without a right-wing alliance with the AfD.

One result is already inevitable: The AfD is the big winner as it demonstrated that it has the power to cause a significant crisis while making its party look like the victim of anti-democrats in the process and potentially realigning the CDU’s future course.

L'articolo Germany’s CDU Chair Kramp-Karrenbauer Resigns proviene da InsideOver.

Just days after Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Berlin for a conference on Libya, German Chancellor Angela Merkel touched down in Istanbul to meet her Turkish counterpart. The aim of the visit was to discuss both bilateral relations and regional issues affecting Germany and Turkey.

“High on the agenda of the talks will be Turkey-EU (European Union) relations, Turkey’s EU accession process, updating of the Customs Union and visa liberalization within the context of Germany’s Presidency of the Council of the EU starting from July,” explained a January 23 press release from the Turkish Presidential Office.

Starting off with photo ops and symbolic rhetoric about bilateral cooperation at the inauguration of a joint German-Turkish university, the visit soon turned towards serious matters, particularly the issue of migration. 

Migration Tensions Are Building

In 2016 a deal was struck between the EU and Ankara to stop the flow of migrants within its borders for a price tag of $6.6 billion, but that has not panned out in the most amicable manner. In fact, last Thursday, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu blamed the EU for not holding up its end of the bargain. “Now it is 2020 and we still have not received the first €3 billion in its entirety,” Cavusoglu said.

Another part of the deal stated there would be a reexamination of Turkey’s potential accession into the EU and there seems to be no sign of that either. Making the issue even more complicated, the attitudes of Turkish citizens have also drastically changed since the uptick in suicide attacks in the country, for which many blamed refugees from Syria and elsewhere, giving rise to xenophobia. The situation has forced the government to find a solution to its migration problem. 

Ankara’s plan to protect its borders, however, has been rather unique and isolationist. Instead of integrating migrants into the mainstream, it has announced to relocate them into a safe zone in northern Syria. 

Erdogan’s Grand Migration Plan

“We plan to resettle 2 million people along the 30 kilometer deep safe zone which we will create in the area between the Euphrates River and the Iraqi border, including Manbij,” Erdogan said in October last year, around the same time as his forces launched an offensive against the Kurds in that area. “We will settle people in 50 towns with a population of 30,000 each and 140 villages with a population of 5,000 each,” Erdogan added.

The total project is estimated to eventually cost some $27 billion and would be completed with the help of the international community but the check is way bigger than what the EU promised or what the Turkish economy can reasonably support. While some have characterized Ankara’s ambitions as an attempt to change the region’s demographics, Merkel had starkly different comments during her visit. “I can imagine this would be the kind of humanitarian project for which we could provide German funds,” she was quoted as saying. 

Germany’s Domestic Political Considerations On Negotiating Migration With Turkey

Whether Merkel’s accommodating statement represents her actual opinions or is it a matter of political compulsion, the fact remains that Ankara seems to have gotten Berlin on board by hook or by crook. For quite some time, Erdogan has threatened to unleash migrants to Europe if his demands aren’t met, so much so that it has become his cynical trump card. 

On the other hand, Merkel is faced with a weak government that took months to forge a ‘grand’ coalition in Germany. It doesn’t help either that the largest opposition party in the Bundestag is Alternative für Deutschland, which is known for its xenophobic views and strong repulsion towards migrants, especially Muslims fleeing wars in the Middle East. At the same time, the UNHCR claims that the number of refugees entering Greece from Turkey has jumped lately. To top it all off, a recent YouGov poll found that over 30% of German voters prefer an early election.

While local issues obviously top the list in terms of citizens’ grievances, Germany has witnessed a mass change of attitude towards migration. After the 2015 refugee crisis when Berlin opened doors to those fleeing wars in the Middle East and faced backlash from smaller states, especially in the east, the EU has been forced to adopt a more conservative approach towards migration. A series of terrorist attacks have also occurred in the country and the EU since then that have put Merkel on her back foot and weakened her political position. It therefore comes nowhere as no surprise that Merkel has finally given in to the pressure from Erdogan, and more importantly, her internal political opponents. 

L'articolo Merkel Backs Turkish Refugee Resettlement Plan proviene da InsideOver.

Finding a news story in the international media about the Alternative for Germany (AfD) where the terms “far-right” or “extreme right-wing” are not applied to the party is a difficult task. Media outlets such as the BBC, CNN, ABC and CBC use these epithets and the same pattern can be found amongst newspapers such as The Washington Post, The New York Times and The Guardian, to name but a few. Also, Deutsche Welle, Germany’s state-owned international broadcaster, does so as well of course. Virtually every article about the AfD on its website describes it as “far-right” or “anti-immigrant”. The Left Party, the successor of the SED, the former East German Communist Party (1946-89), gets a free pass and is generally referred to simply by its name. Environmentalist groups or pro-open borders NGOs being described as “extreme” or “radical” by such news organisations would be a novelty indeed.

Violence and intimidation

AfD stands accused of stirring up hatred but, on closer inspection, the party is very often the victim of hatred and indeed violence itself. According to information acquired by Bundestag member Martin Hess from the German Federal Government and reported in Die Junge Freiheit, AfD was the main victim of political violence and intimidation in Germany in the third quarter of 2019. The period saw 52 attacks against the offices or facilities of political parties and 26 of these were carried out against AfD; of the 278 attacks on representatives and members of political parties 127 of them were carried out against AfD members, with 113 of them being classified as having an extreme left-wing political motivation; and of the 905 election posters damaged or destroyed 406 belonged to AfD. Behind the statistics lie some unsettling events: politicians attacked on the street, cars being smashed up and set on fire, threats, offices ransacked and a house daubed with paint and graffiti describing the owner as a “Nazi Pig”.

Parliamentary personae non-gratae

According to AfD Parliamentarian René Springer in an interview with the Swiss weekly newspaper Die Weltwoche in April 2019, AfD members are shunned in the Bundestag. When Parliamentary joint leader Alice Weidel sat down to eat in the Bundestag restaurant other parliamentarians at the adjacent table stood up and walked out whilst the Left Party and SPD members simply refuse to speak to their AfD counterparts. Social ostracism is accompanied by institutional mischief. According to parliamentary rules of procedure, each parliamentary group is entitled to a seat on the Praesidium of the Bundestag but has to gain a majority of votes for its candidate.

Since October 2017 four AfD candidates have been rejected by the members of the other parliamentary groups in an unprecedented campaign to block a party that gained almost 13% of the vote in the 2017 general election and is now represented in all 16 of Germany’s regional Parliaments.

A threat to the constitutional order?

The German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) has intervened in respect of the AfD question. It announced in January 2019 that the AfD would be treated as a “Prüffall” (“test case”), meaning that there were indications of extremism within its membership. Junge Alternative (Young Alternative), the party’s youth organisation and der Flügel (the Wing), a national-conservative group led by the controversial leader of the Thuringian party, Björn Höcke, would, however, be treated as “Verdachtsfälle”, a more serious measure meaning that intelligence can be used to gather information about the two groups.

The Administrative Court of Cologne did however subsequently hold that the BfV must not use the term “Prüffall” in public as it would unfairly stigmatise AfD. The BfV has itself been at the centre of controversy in recent years. The former head of the agency, Hans-Georg Maaßen, publicly called into question media claims, backed by Merkel, that Germans had “hunted down” foreigners during the Chemnitz disturbances of 2018. Maaßen was subsequently moved to a different position and was eventually placed in early retirement after a controversial farewell speech.

Political programme

Does the AfD deserve such vitriol? A sober and rational analysis of the party’s Political Programme, however, indicates a patriotic centre-right party seeking to protect German state sovereignty, promote direct democracy on the model of Switzerland, bolster federalism, streamline the state and remove party political influence in the arts and culture.

The Programme does call, inter alia, for the defence of the Judeo-Christian and humanist culture of the West, measures to reverse Germany’s demographic decline, the safeguarding of the traditional family, the prohibition of gender and ethnic quotas, stricter controls on mosques and Imams, and also opposes government energy policy and some of the claims of the environmentalist movement. What the AfD is trying to do is shift the Overton Window by raising the legitimate and reasonable concerns of sections of the population that want a wider choice of political options than has been on offer from the established political parties in recent years. Such proposals are not “fascist”, “Nazi” or totalitarian. The Programme makes no mention of the Führer principle, the abolition of elections and political parties, the destruction of trade unions, the gagging of the press, the need for Lebensraum in the East or Aryan racial supremacy. True, there have been some unsavoury comments by individuals. One member who described Claus von Stauffenberg, the army officer who attempted to assassinate Hitler in July 1944, as a “coward” and a “traitor” was thrown out of the party. The party leadership is also seeking to expel another member over alleged antisemitism.

Alexander Gauland

The Saxon born journalist and historian, Alexander Gauland, had been a lifelong member of the CDU until in 2012 he and other conservative-minded members known as the Berlin Circle were told they had no future in the upper echelons of the party. This led them to set up the AfD in 2013. The CDU/CSU’s drift to the left opened up a gap on the right and they have filled it. In his book, Anleitung zum Konservativsein (Guide to Being Conservative) written some ten years earlier, Gauland bemoaned this leftwards shift. He argued that concepts such as Heimat (homeland), Leitkultur (leading or guiding culture) family, tradition and art had been discarded by the party. He lauded the English conservative thinker, Edmund Burke, as his model: a man of “moderation” and the “middle ground” who favoured organic and moderate reform to conserve what is worth conserving.

Gauland has himself admitted that AfD’s rise can in part be ascribed to the failings of the established parties, above all their unwillingness to address issues falling outside the narrow corridor of respectable opinion. AfD has on the other hand always been prepared to discuss openly and critically the difficulties of the Euro, the bailout of Greece, Merkel’s open-door migrant policy, migrant crime, Islam, multiculturalism, environmentalist hysteria and the threats to German identity posed by globalisation and globalism. The party brings a refreshing candour to political debate. This is surely the key to its rise.

The Brunswick party conference

Gauland has called AfD a “gäriger Haufen” (a group or a crowd in the process of fermentation) and, as we have seen, the party is not, as some would have us believe, a bunch of football hooligans brandishing the black, white and red flag of imperial Germany. At the federal party conference held in Brunswick in November 2019 co-chair Jörg Meuthen stated in his keynote speech that the party must now become “capable and willing to govern” and must be a “patriotic respectable middle-class party”. So far, of course, voices within the CDU/CSU calling for coalitions with AfD have been isolated but as the SPD swings to the left and the CDU/CSU runs adrift these voices may well begin to multiply.

L'articolo Is the Demonisation of Alternative for Germany (AfD) Justified? proviene da InsideOver.

At the AfD’s convention, the party’s direction was supposed to get redefined. However, an anticipated coup by the hard-right did not occur. Instead, the party may have laid the foundation to become a viable government option in the future.

Party co-founder and former CDU member Alexander Gauland stepped down as one of the party’s chairs during the convention. However, not before handpicking his predecessor Tino Chrupalla, who now, together with Jörg Meuthen will lead the federal AfD. Chrupalla had several opponents and thus won with only 54 percent of the vote. Meuthen, who is also a Member of the European Parliament, received a better result than expected at just under 70 percent.

After the party has been established in all German states and remains the biggest opposition party in the federal parliament, both men communicated the next steps: the AfD needs to become a governing party and more professional.

The conundrum with this goal? All other parties continue to categorically exclude any cooperation with the AfD, never mind a coalition. The fact that the nationalist group within the AfD “Der Flügel” continues to gain momentum, makes government participation anytime soon not more conceivable.

Neither Meuthen nor Chrupalla belongs to the Flügel, however, particularly Chrupalla has continuously used a rather dubious language that carries certain connotations, e.g. “Mischvolk” (mixed race) or “Umvolkung” (ethnic replacement) when referring to Germany’s immigration policies. His calling card has been his biography. Chrupalla is East German, geographically the party’s stronghold and, due to his previous profession as a painter, has the makings to become a highly relatable person for the working class.

In terms of his vision, Chrupalla remained vague, stating only a simple message: “We now have the task of bringing our country back on a better path. Our beautiful Germany deserves a different policy. ” How this path will be reached and what a different policy would look like was not addressed.

Prior to the convention, rumors continued to circulate that either Germany’s most controversial politician and Flügel leader Björn Höcke could seek to join the leadership team and thereby push the AfD into the same direction on the federal, the party has embarked on in the eastern states, including borderline neo-nazism.

In the end, Höcke decided to not compete for any federal office. The Flügel’s influence was omnipresent, nonetheless. Moderate elements of the party (e.g. Kay Gottschalk, Georg Pazderski) and thus main critics of Höcke and the Flügel’s other face, Andreas Kalbitz, lost their deputy positions during the convention.

It displays the continuing dichotomy within the party. Moderates such as Meuthen, who try to position the party for future government positions continue to struggle with the far-right elements the highly popular Flügel offers. A quasi civil war was expected, even Meuthen could have been voted out in favor of a radical replacement (one of the candidates, though not a member of the Flügel is a well-known Holocaust denier).

However, a rebellion did not occur. This leads to the question of whether or not the party has found a consensus that would, perhaps, result in toning down the rhetoric. It would allow the party to eventually position itself as a viable coalition option of the future.

Here, the CDU remains the logical partner and given the current constellation ins Germany, where a hard-left alliance cannot be stopped unilaterally, the AfD has the chance to become an inevitable quantity for the CDU if it manages to emancipate itself from its radical elements.

L'articolo Germany’s Far-Right AfD Elects new Leadership proviene da InsideOver.

Thirty years ago, the Berlin Wall that had divided Germany for 28 years fell. In the minds of many Germans, however, the Wall remains an integral part as it continues to symbolise the story of two peoples – to this day.

While the claim may sound egregious, the minds of many West Germans reveal the truth. The basis of this claim? Countless conversations with West German individuals of all generation, ages and intellectual capacity. Full disclaimer: Yes, I am also West German.

When talking amongst each other, i.e. West Germans with West Germans, one quickly agrees: Those over there are different, not like us. And indeed, I too belong to those who claim that they can identify an East German without having to see their address.

For our hypothesises, we tend to present exhibits A, B, C and D: the dialect (an immediate tell), the appearance (atrociously superficial, but still mostly accurate), a notorious proclivity to complain and above all, the worldview.

While the first two points can be attributed to West German arrogance, they are also pretty much irrelevant in daily life. The view of the world, the ideology, however, is an attribute that carries implications for the entire republic. Most recently, this was observed in the East German state elections in Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia when apparent right-wing forces – with fascist tendencies – gained a momentum that had not occurred since the time of the Third Reich.

Our reactions to it? We are usually semi-outraged, and rightly so. Nevertheless, within a short period, a certain level of acceptance arises. Not because we appreciate the election results, but because we simply do not expect anything else to occur in the East. After all, the SED’s successor party PDS, which is now called The Left, has been a pillar of East German politics for decades. In 2019, the torch has been passed on to neo-Nazism.

The East has always been open to political extremism. No matter whether it was Communism, Socialism or Nazism, all find a happy constituency in the ‘Neuen Ländern’ (new states). Totalitarian ideologies remain deeply embedded in the East. So much so only 49.2 per cent of East Germans do NOT consider the GDR to have been a ‘Unrechtsstaat’ (unjust state). Needless to say, that most of us realise the degree of unjustness the GDR represented (80.9).

Do not fool yourself with those images and clips of individuals fleeing from the GDR or crying tears of joys the night the border opened. It is only one side of the truth. The other one is that a significant number of individuals felt comfortable in their totalitarian state, which the survey mentioned above, thirty years later, confirms. It is a staggering example of why our mindsets are so opposed. Few things illustrate this better than our respective understanding of the past, present and future.

However, as so often the case, people are inclined to make excuses for circumstances. Here, the excuses are supposed to justify a proclivity towards extremism and revisionist history. We are told East Germans remain deprived, due to a weaker infrastructure, lack of significant companies in the regions and correlating higher unemployment.

Indeed, no company in East Germany is registered at the German stock exchange (DAX), and the Gross Domestic Product in the new states at €356.3 billion is nowhere near €2907 billion the rest of the republic generates.

However, the unemployment rate in the East stands at 6.1 per cent, while the West remains slightly better at 4.6 per cent. In 2011, unemployment in the East reached 12.4 per cent. Thus, it was cut in half within the last eight years, which, by all accounts, is quite remarkable, given the Third World attributes the East likes to claim for itself. Nonetheless, extremism continues to increase. The alleged lack of job offers can never be a justification for the latter. Moreover, here is a contrarian idea: it is 2019, pack your bags and move to a region where suitable work is available.

Mind you; some people do relocate. Unfortunately, these are mainly young and/or talented people, who either start working or, due to the lack of reputable universities outside of Dresden, become students in the West. Less successful, disgruntled individuals stay behind and often feel forgotten by the West.

The latter remains one of the main issues we have always had with the East: the lack of gratitude and appreciation. For almost three decades, West Germans have built the East that was, due to its former rule of socialism, in shambles when the reunification occurred by paying compulsory taxes (‘Solidaritätszuschlag’) and countless stimulus programs. With the result that many places in the East now look more enticing than West German cities.

The older generation of West Germans particularly resents this default setting of self-loathing. You know, those people, who grew up during or soon after totalitarian barbarism caused our whole country to collapse. While people in the GDR were guaranteed work, childcare etc., West Germans were rebuilding their country – without constant complaints.

Even after three decades, we remain two peoples and differ drastically. One of the only assessments both of us will likely agree upon. The nicknames we have given one another are a testimony of it. For the East, we remain ‘Besserwessis’, western-know-it-alls. For us, they have always been ‘Jammerossis’, whining/moaning easterners.

L'articolo A West German Perspective on the Continuous Division Between East and West proviene da InsideOver.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has presided over her country’s politics for almost fifteen years after winning the 2005 election. Her chancellorship has been dominated by the 2008 financial crisis, the eurozone crisis, Trump’s tariffs and Brexit. Often hailed as the de facto leader of Europe and the world’s most powerful woman, voters portrayed her as a source of stability and prosperity.

But her authority was severely damaged following Europe’s 2015 migrant crisis and the subsequent arrival of one million migrants. Her decision left Germany deeply polarised and triggered the rise of Alternative for Germany (AfD).

Her party, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), has suffered in the polls since. Merkel declared that ‘things can’t go on the way they are’ following disastrous regional election results last year in Hesse and Bavaria for the CDU and its Bavarian-only sister party. The Chancellor stated that she would not seek a fourth election and that she will resign her position in 2021.

Her decision to leave had no impact on the CDU’s performance in this year’s European elections. In Saxony and Brandenburg, the AfD beat Merkel’s party into second place and gained an 11 per cent vote share throughout Germany. This was only 2 per cent less than their vote share during the 2017 federal elections.

Throughout most of those international crises listed above, Merkel became renowned for her pragmatism and decisiveness. But the migrant crisis will tarnish her legacy. Her chancellorship will be remembered as the moment the far-right re-emerged in Germany, thereby shattering the post-war consensus that has defined German politics since 1945.

The recent Thuringia election proves how difficult governing Germany will become in the future. During the 2019 European elections, the AfD came second place to the CDU. But in this month’s state election there, they more than doubled their support and won 23.5 per cent of the vote. This is up from 10.6 per cent in 2014. However, the AfD were still defeated by the Left Party on Sunday.

Even though the populists’ support continues to grow, none of Germany’s mainstream parties intend to govern alongside them. Thuringia’s election has only strengthened the power base of Björn Höcke, the AfD’s leader in the state. He is renowned for questioning Germany’s role in the Holocaust. Following his electoral success, he said: “The people of Thuringia have voted for a Turnaround 2.0.”

Thuringia may only be a small state in Germany, but the far-right’s success here is significant due to Mr. Höcke’s controversial language. The AfD have now made governing the state difficult as the traditional parties refuse to form a coalition with them. The only way they can govern is by forming a stable majority consisting of the Left and conservatives, although this has been ruled out by the CDU.

Merkel was no doubt relieved when the CDU and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) retained power in Saxony and Brandenburg respectively following elections in those two states last September, but the AfD made substantial gains. They gained a 27.8 per cent vote share in Saxony and 23.5 per cent of the vote in Brandenburg. Andreas Kalbitz, the party’s leader in Brandenburg, said the results showed “the AfD is here to stay.”

The rise of radical politics has had an impact on the SDP too. They must decide whether remaining in coalition with the CDU is a worthwhile position as the Greens, AfD and other parties tear apart their vote share. They may even shift further to the left themselves to prevent populist parties from tarnishing their electoral performances.

The Chancellor still has time to transform her party’s position and she has until 2021 to improve the CDU’s fortunes. The problem is that German politics has become so polarised because of the 2015 migrant crisis. Merkel’s legacy will be that Europe’s largest economy has become increasingly difficult to govern.

L'articolo Will the Rise of the AfD Throughout Germany be Merkel’s Legacy? proviene da InsideOver.

These are difficult times for the European Union project. The United Kingdom has already voted to leave the collective, while across partner nations there are clear signs the far-right are on the rise, growing stronger and bolder.

At the start of May 2019 – in the run up to European Union elections to be held between May 23 and May 26 – an Ipsos poll in France placed Marine Le Pen’s far-right Rassemblement National (RN or National Rally) ahead of President Macron’s La République en Marche (REM).

But, it is not just in France that the populists are in the ascendency. In the UK, Nigel Farage‘s new anti-EU Brexit Party is also ahead in the polls. In Germany, theAlternative für Deutschland (AfD) party, formed only six years ago, is now the largest opposition grouping in the Bundestag, while the Freedom Party of Austria is in a power-sharing coalition government with Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz’ Austrian People’s Party.

Known as the ‘alt-right’ – a contraction of ‘alternative and right’ – there are common threads running through these groupings. A shared populism, driven by their anti-immigration, anti-establishment, Eurosceptics appeal to large numbers of their electorate. Policies, attracting ordinary citizens who have come to feel powerless and profoundly disenchanted with their powerful, wealthy political elites. Many, ground down by years of austerity, outraged by terrorist attacks on their sovereign nations, and feeling forgotten, have started to look for ways of showing this unhappiness, and far-right parties have become a vehicle for those who feel politically alienated.

With European Elections set for the end of May (to include an indecisive UK), Matteo Salvini, Deputy Prime Minister of Italy, leader of Lega, and architect of his nation’s anti-immigration policy, has been actively reaching out to other like-minded right-wing groups across the union. Already, six parties, including AfD, have joined, as Salvini openly attempts to form a Eurosceptic, anti-immigration bloc to contest the election as a cohesive unit.

“The advantage of such groupings in the European Parliament,” Erwan Fouéré, Associate Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Studies told InsideOver, “Would be to gain more positions of power, based on their numerical strength; for example, Rapporteurs or Chairpersons of influential committees.”

Mr Salvini has also signed up to American Steve Bannon’s Brussels-based right-wing think-tank: The Movement.

Bannon, former White House strategist in Donald Trump’s administration, and founding member of the far-right Breitbart news, is now turning his sights on Europe.

Registered by Mischaël Modrikamen, leader of Belgium’s People’s Party, on January 17, 2018, The Movement has also attracted support from Italy’s Giorgia Meloni leader of Fratelli d’Italia, and Luigi di Maio who heads the Five Star Movement, coalition partner to Salvini’s League in the Italian government. Positive comments have also come from Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders of the Dutch Party for Freedom and Hungary’s anti-immigration Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

As with Salvini, Bannon is trying to bring Europe’s far-right together under one umbrella organisation. To these ends, he has also secured a monastery in the mountains above Anagni – a town in the province of Frosinone, Central Italy – with the intention of building an academy for future far-right leaders. In February 2019, Bannon appointed Eduardo Bolsonaro (son of Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro) as his representative in South America – perhaps suggesting a more global role for his organisation.

But while Bannon might think he has reinvented himself as “Saint Benedict of Nursia”, his efforts have not found unanimous backing from all of Europe’s populists.

Marine Le Pen has sought to soothe the fears of her fellow right-wing by assuring them that Bannon would not lead populist efforts to “Save the real Europe,” noting that he is “American not European.”

Likewise, Alexander Gauland of the anti-immigrant right wing AfD, is not persuaded at all by Mr Bannon’s plans. He also cites his lack of European credentials as a significant difficulty.

Aside from the machinations of a few power-brokers, European or American, how influential could any far-right Eurosceptic alliance become in the European Parliament beyond the May elections?

“The policies espoused by some of these groups are so anathema to the European integration process, and to the fundamental values on which it is based, I would doubt their chances of gaining traction in the forthcoming elections,” Mr Fouéré told me candidly.”But if they do, it would signify a dangerous trend of nationalist, anti-European sentiment.”

In an age of divisions, the far-right have touched a popular seam of discontent – out there – in Europe and beyond, and, as a result, are gathering momentum. As Britain’s decision to leave the European Union has shown, there are no longer any political certainties and all bets are off.

L'articolo Populists Unite: Anti-EU Parties Continue Growing proviene da InsideOver.