For the past two years now, of course, it’s been the global pandemic and all the seemingly endless emotional and economic turmoil it has churned up that has dominated the headlines and the airwaves, as well as our thoughts and worries. Never far behind that is our dawning awareness of just how much trouble we’re really in as a result of the planetary heating we’ve wreaked upon ourselves – in fact, if anything has managed to break through the grim daily litany of half-contextualized COVID factoids in these years, and truly imprint itself upon on collective consciousness, it’s the harrowing coverage of firestorms and floods, heatwaves and hurricanes, ever more constant, seemingly everywhere and nearly all of unprecedented intensity.

For most of us, that’s entirely enough mental noise to contend with. If you have any attention left to spare, however, and you haven’t yet tuned out everything not immediately germane to the pressing needs of everyday survival, you may have perceived the thing that’s been bubbling along beneath the surface of events this whole time – something maybe harder to discern than the parade of figures about case rates or wind speeds, novel variants and calving ice shelves, but no less consequential for that. It is the steady accretion of news items suggesting that we stand on the verge of yet another epochal technosocial transformation. The long-awaited and now perceptibly becoming actual advent of novel technologies like machine learning, so-called “artifical intelligence,” virtual reality and cryptocurrency certainly seems like it has the potential to remake everyday life just about everywhere, especially in combination with one another.

Do technologies make the world, though? Among those of us who spend our days thinking about this sort of thing, this is a vexed, long- and intensely debated question. Attempts to understand the social and political consequences of technological development have tended to cluster around two major schools of thought, positions that are called “technological determinism” on the one hand, and “social constructivism” on the other.

For many, technodeterminism might seem to be the more natural and obvious position: someone invents a given technology, it appears in the world, and the world straightforwardly changes in response. (Indeed, some technologies actually do work this way, and are so potent as catalysts of societal change that the language we use to describe them reflects this. We simply call them “the Pill,” “the Bomb” and so on.) And there are plenty of other examples of this happening, or seeming to, ready to hand – our collective history with the internal combustion engine, for one, which would surely appear to underwrite belief in a certain technodeterminism. The introduction of cars powered by internal combustion manifestly drove the structuration of urban form in every densely settled place on Earth, with only relatively minor differences in layout and organization of cities developed after its widespread adoption, wherever they should happen to be found. If you wanted to argue that given enough time, novel technologies do more or less directly change the world, you’d be hard pressed to find a better case study than that.

The converse position, social constructionism, is a little more nuanced. It argues that societies invest in and select for the development of technologies that reflect their existing values, and particularly their power dynamics. For example, consider humanoid robotics. There has tended to be far more interest in the development of humanoid systems and interfaces in Japan than there has been elsewhere on Earth. There could be any number of reasons why this is so, but it’s not unreasonable to assume that it might have something to do with the greater emphasis placed in Japanese society on the potential for shame, embarrassment or humiliation inhering in all interactions between human beings (and therefore the desirability of replacing as many of the humans we interact with on a daily basis as possible with unfeeling, unjudging synthetics). This would seem to bolster the contention that a technology can prosper and develop only where it finds culturally fertile ground.

In actuality, of course, things drop out somewhere between the two extremes. Where does this leave us, if we want to understand what the advent of cryptocurrency or machine learning or virtual reality might portend for us, and for the world we share? Instead of the crude binary of technodeterminism and social constructionism, what I’d like to propose is a soft constructionism, in which the hegemonic global culture we think of as “late capitalism” selects not so much which technologies we get in any absolute sense, but which versions of them thrive in our world.

Seen in this light, those technological choices will fare best which resonate most with the scarcity-based economics and deep-seated fear of the Other that already characterize our lives. Far from being “disruptive,” what they’re really offering is a continuation or extension of circumstances that are already familiar to us.

“Artificial intelligence” could mean just about anything. But what are the applications that actually receive investment? Of all the possibilities we might have been offered, the ones that are advancing most quickly appear to be those dedicated to police, surveillance and security functions — identifying exceptions from the statistical norm, tracking them through space and time, and placing bounds around their freedom of action. If you want a sense of the aesthetics driving this investment, to say nothing of the values, look no further than the lengthening list of ventures billionaire PayPal and Facebook investor Peter Thiel has named for figures from his Lord of the Rings fixation — the vendor of sinister “total information awareness” systems Palantir, the manufacturer of weaponized autonomous drones Anduril and so on.

Or consider virtual reality, that realm of putatively limitless imagination Mark Zuckerberg would be pleased if we described with the word “metaverse.” With a staggering impoverishment of sensibility, the verson on offer from Zuckerberg’s Meta not merely imposes an entirely artificial scarcity into a realm that might otherwise extend to the very horizons of the imagination, but turns that same expanse into a platform where cloyingly infantilized avatars doze through the self-same boring meetings they might have had on Zoom with dignity still more or less intact. It’s as if the entire universe and all of its wonders had been crafted by and for people with LinkedIn accounts.

And then there’s crypto. Crypto is a little different. It was always an ideological project – avowedly anarchocapitalist by design, offering no vision of society beyond a threadbare neo-Randian fantasy of contract relations undertaken between sovereign individuals — so perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised if it turns out to be awful. (If anything, given the long history of inventions that confound or undermine their original design intention, the surprise is that crypto appears to be enacting its awfulness so straightforwardly.) It nevertheless hurts a little to see the truly radical concept of a distributed autonomous organization, or “DAO,” originally intended to provide a trellis for endeavors assembling human and nonhuman partners, remade as mortifyingly tacky nightclub/bottle-service party for Supreme-stanning manchildren.

But surely these examples don’t represent the full potential of the technologies in question? As it happens, I come from an intellectual tradition insisting that any appearance of the word “potential” needs to be greeted with the greatest skepticism. There is no such thing as potential, in this view: there are merely states of a system that have historically been enacted, and those that have not yet been enacted. The only way to assess whether a system is capable of assuming a given state is to do the work of enacting it. This is why I tend to look askance at the more fervent enthusiasts for these technologies, making  breathless claims for their unlimited liberatory potential. In practice, the only realities that seem to be cropping out so far are markedly tawdry. And while it is certainly early days, and one should always be charitable, I think it’s fair to say that a pattern can already be discerned.

Virtually everywhere, technologies are touted to us on the promise that they will permanently displace human subjectivity and bias, annihilate the painful limits imposed upon us by our embodiment and our mooring in the real world, liberate us to be the sparkling Nietzschean (or really Olympian) creatures of pure will we ought to have been all along. And yet in every instance we find that these ambitions are flouted, as the technologies that were supposed to enact them are captured and recuperated by existing concentrations of power. They will not spontaneously bring scarcity to an end, or capitalism, or oppression. Laminated into standing ways of doing, making and selling, the only thing they seem to be capable of spontaneously reproducing is more of the same. The bottom line is this: those of us who dream of different, more hopeful, freer futures, and who still believe that technologies like artificial intelligence, virtual reality or the blockchain have a place in building them, will have to do the hard, painstaking work of proving this to be the case. We have our work cut out for us.

L'articolo The technological revolution in the “late capitalism” era proviene da InsideOver.

Most of us have lived through the last wave of digital innovation, using personal computers, the internet and e-commerce, and smart phones. But the next wave of digital innovation is upon us, in part spurred on by COVID-19 shutdowns. This wave will not only build on existing devices and systems; it will incorporate emerging technologies such as 5G communications, sensors, robotics, and artificial intelligence.

This next digital economy will be significantly more connected (with many more types of things networked), more automated (as systems enable more work to be done by “machines”), and smarter (as algorithms help make sense of all this data).

Most of these technologies work together. 5G wireless, for example, is not only significantly faster than 4G, enabling enhanced mobile broadband, it also supports massive deployment of Internet of Things sensors in factories, farms, cities and other places. These millions of connected sensors generate data, and continual improvements in artificial intelligence will mean that this data can be acted on to make better decisions; for example to guide an autonomous vehicle, develop a new drug, or determine how well a machine is working. And faster computer chips enable 5G and AI, as well as autonomous systems like robots.

While the most recent technology wave was about using computers in offices and the internet for sales and communications, the current wave will affect many more industries and functions. Take agriculture for example. American farmers now operate sophisticated autonomous tractors, guided by precision GPS, and collecting massive amounts of data. And companies like Silicon Valley-based Farmers Business Network use algorithms based on data from farmers to help them optimize their operations. 3D printing and robots could significantly transform construction, making home buying much cheaper. Fintech startups are reshaping the banking industry, bringing financial services to anyone with a smart phone. Food service is being transformed by wireless or kiosk ordering and paying, with robotic food preparation and delivery (both to the table and the home). Companies like Amazon are experimenting with drones delivery. Manufacturing is becoming smarter, with the ability to more easily and cheaply make more customized and higher quality products.

Perhaps the most important question about these emerging technologies is whether they will be enough to turn around the productivity drought the United States (and Europe) has been in for the last 15 years. Labor productivity – the amount of output produced by each worker – is the single most important determinant of living standards. And even with the introduction of smart phones, cloud computing and broadband, recent productivity growth has been low.

Given the broad-based application of these new technologies, the prospects for a technology-led productivity turnaround are promising. If the technology lives up to its promise, and if government policy enables, rather than hinders, transformation, U.S. labor productivity growth could very well increase from around its recent rate of around 1 percent a year to perhaps 2 or even 2.5 percent a year. This may not sound like much, but just as higher interest rates generates a bigger retirement nest age after a few years of compounding, higher rates of productivity do the same.

This next technology wave could also impact the U.S. labor force. Many pundits and activists have advanced dystopian scenarios about the so-called end of work and the need for universal basic income to support an immiserated proletariat. This is nonsense. Productivity growth has never led to higher rates of joblessness and it won’t now for the simple reason that it generates lower price and higher wages, which in turn lead to demand for more production. And despite warnings that high-skilled occupations like doctors and lawyers could be replaced by AI, the reality is that this new technology wave is most likely to impact lower-wage jobs. While this could be hard for some workers in the short run, in the medium-term they will benefit significantly because while there will be the same number of jobs, a higher share will be middle- and upper-wage jobs.

Finally, these technologies are likely to continue the longer-term trend in the U.S. economy toward larger firms. Over the last two decades, the average firm in America has gotten larger as digital technologies enabled economies of scale (where larger firms can operate more cheaply than smaller ones). Technologies like AI and robotics will likely expand economies of scale, enabling larger, more efficient firms to take market share from smaller, less efficient firms. In addition, the economy could see a continued trend toward “platformization”, with digital platforms conducting more functions – such as finance, insurance, logistics and others. For example, there might be a handful of platforms providing fintech services, instead of 5,000 banks. Both should be good for consumers, and workers, as long as governments monitor platforms actions to ensure firms they are not behaving in anticompetitive ways.

These potential benefits – higher productivity, better jobs and more convenience – are not assured. Perhaps the biggest risk for the United States is that too many advocates are advancing dystopian narrative where these technologies are stealing our privacy, killing our jobs and discriminating against the vulnerable. Rather than promote the technology, they want organizations to reject it and governments to restrain it—just as the Lilliputians tied down Gulliver.  However, these fears are vastly overstated and can be more than adequately addressed with policies that balance protection and innovation (something the EU has failed to do).

As long as the United States continues to embrace change, welcome technological innovation, and not fall into the trap of paranoia toward “Big Tech” and emerging technologies it will likely see an economically bright 2020s.

L'articolo How will 5G and other enabling technologies change the American economy? proviene da InsideOver.

New technologies are steadily changing the way we work, travel, communicate and relate to each other. They also exert a major influence on the strategic autonomy of state actors – the ability to freely take decisions and actions in an interdependent world without foreign interference.
Europe has a great number of assets and a true potential in several strategic technologies: it has a very strong research and development activity in the quantum and green energy technological sectors, it is the home of 5G world industry leaders, the continent that is the most advanced in robotics and still a space world power. But despite these advantages, it remains dependent from the United States and increasingly from China for most of its critical digital infrastructures, be them data centers, cloud computing, information and communication platforms, or supercomputers, AI and autonomous systems, synthetic biology or submarine cables. There is an overall feeling that Europe is slower and less bold than its strategic competitors in this exponential, technological century.
To tap into its potential, protect its assets, and gain a true geopolitical influence, Europe needs a significant political push – and a revolution in mindset. 5G is a posterchild for this. Acknowledging the urgency of the situation, the new Commission made several steps in this direction. Despite these first good efforts, these efforts remain too little or too slow – in relative terms to the “warp speed” with which technology evolves.

5G – the critical infrastructure of the digital decade

5G — the new generation of standard for cellular networks — has kickstarted a new “smartphone cycle”. The shift of cellular communication networks from the 4th to the 5th and then 6th generation (5G and 6G) of cellular network standards will have a major impact on our societies. For 5G alone, the industry association GSMA forecasts that it will contribute to roughly 5% of gross world product growth over the next 15 years and experts from the World Economic Forum estimate it may reduce energy consumption across industrial sectors by 15%. 5G and 6G networks will be a game changer for the competitiveness of European industries, as it will be the fundament of the fully digital world in which the pandemic made us all suddenly enter in. It will be the backbone of healthcare, energy management, modern industry, supply chains, consumer & distribution businesses, and the military. The disruptive character of 5G makes it a strategic asset that Europe cannot afford to not control.

But Europe is late in the game—and was too late to enter it. The first cities covered by 5G in April 2019 were in the United States and in South Korea. Numbers from November 2020 are clear: China has already 175 million 5G subscribers, and Western Europe only 6. Europe has indeed taken much longer than China, the US or Korea to kickstart 5G deployment, therefore slowing down the understanding of new use cases or industrial applications.

Major lessons can be learned from 5G, and more generally from the growing dependance of Europe in critical technologies. Even if handhelds are just part of the 5G ecosystem that also includes equipment makers and chipmakers, the situation is easy to assess: 20 years ago, Nokia was a world leader, and the main character of Matrix used its 8110 model. Today Apple, Samsung and Chinese producers dominate the market. Even if the recent political pushback made it much harder for Huawei to sell its equipment in Europe, its global market share is now at par with those of Ericsson and Nokia, with a R&D budget that is estimated to be double than the one of its 2 rivals combined, making the outlook challenging for the Europeans. In the segment of chipsets, the third, often overlooked segment of 5G, the US dominance is massive, with Qualcomm and Broadcom the main player, only challenged by Samsung. Europe has almost disappeared from this part.

What lessons can be learned for Europe’s technological leadership

The first strategic lesson of 5G showed how urgent it is for European leaders to work on a coordinated digital agenda and to achieve the Digital Single Market. The fragmentation of the telecommunication market has led to countries banning the 5G from Huawei, while some were welcoming it. It also prevents European start-ups and researchers to properly innovate and scale-up their solutions. The European market is home to around 35 mobile operators (and even more than 120 if you count virtual operators). Only 4 operate in the US and 3 in China, therefore creating the scale and market potential needed for sustaining strong investments in the sector. The European fragmentation leads to lower margins and lower overall investment power therefore making equipment makers more prone to a price war, thus favoring equipment makers with an aggressive pricing policy like Huawei.
This fragmentation is not only the consequence of national strategies in telecom, but also of EU competition policies that can be seen as increasingly unfit for the 21st century: the concept of relevant markets needs to include global competition and not anymore national markets, and the view that harsh competition is benefitting the consumer could also be erroneous as investment capabilities of European Telco’s will be lower on the long term, thus harming the capacity to invest in new technologies. This fragmentation creates short-term gain for the consumers, but a long-term major loss for society with fewer jobs, less coverage, less ROI in capex, less digitalization for future looking industries and supply chains.
The third consequence is the naivety with which 5G has been considered in terms of data privacy: it is only after a strong political push in particular from the US that European governments woke up to the strategic importance of 5G, both in terms of foundational infrastructure of our digital societies, and as a gamechanger in the digitalization of industry – and in both cases, to the criticality of networks to preserve the privacy – for consumers – and confidentiality – when it comes to government or industrial data. Owning a network, in particular a 5G network, where data and computing capabilities are distributed at the core and at the edge, can be a powerful tool to gather intelligence on citizen behaviors, organizations and industrial secrets.
Fourth, playing the long game and having a public hand that thinks strategically is essential: most EU Member States have a system of auctions by which operators pay billions to buy 5G frequencies, which in the case of 3G and 4G became a cash machine for national budgets, but crippled operator’s investment capabilities. Learning from these lessons, Europeans didn’t fall so much into that trap for 5G even if Germany had more than 400 rounds of auctions for a whopping 6 billion into the state coffers – coffers that didn’t really needed that additional cash, but that will squeeze Telco’s ability to invest and make technological leaps. Moreover, money should be focused on technological breakthroughs, not just on standardization. In hindsight, the 5G Action Plan from the Commission in 2016 focused too much on standards and too little on tech. 10 years ago, it would have been impossible to set a detailed plans encompassing the many technologies used today in 5G (Beamforming, Network Functional Virtualization, Multiple-Input Multiple-Output); however, what could have been done was pushing the limits and aiming for reduction of interferences by half, doubling the network coverage of a single cell, developing European standards for computing or cloud on the edge, or even working on linking 5G with space connections in less dense regions. We will launch some of these at the Joint European Disruptive Initiative (JEDI), with the goal to achieve breakthrough and therefore potential major competitive advantages for Europe.

Money matters. But even more, foresight and the capacity to nurture disruptive technologies

When political leaders speak of the sovereignty imperative, let us not forget that the latter is above all political and not simply a budgetary issue. Too often when it comes to technology matters, announcements of Member States and of the EU reflect an obsession with money and spending, where instead we need a clear strategy and impactful results. Since 1984, a colossal amount of 200 billion euros was spent through eight consecutive European research programs: did Europe manage in these 35 years to become a technological leader with similar breakthroughs as the American Darpa did with only 50 billion euros over 60 years? Have these huge spending created world leaders in Artificial Intelligence, energy storage, biotechnology or even IT? Horizon Europe, the 9th European R&D program is set at 76 billion euros for 2021-2028 but still lacks clear priorities, agility and precise measures of success. It needs clear KPIs, agility, priorities and a focus on tangible impact. And above all, it requires boldness: 5G hadn’t been clearly deployed properly in the United States in February 2019, but its administration claimed that it wanted “5G, and even 6G, technology in the United States as soon as possible”. Today, we Europeans need to be just as adventurous and audacious to build the Next Big Thing. 

We fondly believe in Europe’s capabilities: in this century where innovation shapes our societies, the continent can become the power that puts science and technology at the service of the people, of the planet, and of economic prosperity. But this requires that politicians and citizens regain control of their administrations which have bureaucratized research and be highly strategic in shaping the world of tomorrow – like for 5G –  instead of fighting the battles of yesterday. Only then can Europe truly become the Europe of concrete and impactful projects envisioned by Jean Monnet, and not that of empty speeches. In the 1950s, common policies on coal and steel were able to consolidate economic prosperity, between six European countries including Italy; today, the digital infrastructure and services like 5G and cloud can be one of the new common grounds between European economies, democracies, and societies. 

L'articolo 5G: a strategic case for Europe’s role in the 21st century proviene da InsideOver.

France, United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy and Romania recently captured the limelight when they adopted security measures for the installation of 5G technology. The potential of these new generation mobile telecommunication networks appears substantial with the additional growth of automatic applications based on data collection. However, the traditional race towards upgrading has come to a halt. For two years now the United States has been exposing the risks which Chinese companies represent, notably Huawei or ZTE, for new generation mobile networks. According to Washington, Chinese technology in 5G networks could provide Beiing with the opportunity to capture information. Washington denounces the potential collection of data on the part of Chinese companies which not only represents a danger in itself, but also due to the added risk represented by the operations of global databases.

Many European countries, France and the United Kingdom first and foremost, but Italy as well, have taken the US warnings seriously and created a security and authorization system to evaluate the risks represented by Chinese suppliers of new generation mobile networks before deciding whether to authorize them. In general, their position is not one of complete closure, but of strong control. In this regard we should recall for example the stance taken by Copasir who heeded the US waning. We should also cite the instance of France who has excluded Huawei from certain geographical areas considered sensitive due to the high number of military bases or national security bodies (Toulon, Brest, Paris).

We have, however, also witnessed a countermove on behalf of Chinese suppliers. Huawei is investing 200 million Euros to set up a 5G component factory near Strasbourg in France so as to justify a production on European territory which would meet European standards and thereby earn access to the market from within. In Italy also, in March, Huawei unveiled its Cyber Security Transparency Center in order to convey an image of reliability.

The issue of data collection, which is at the heart of the 5G debate, but above all the possibility of creating vast databases which can subsequently be used through a variety of applications means Europe faces a series of difficult choices.

Currently the flow of Europe’s data is captured and then processed by major American platforms, known as GAFAM, and therefore ends up deposited in data centres located within the American territory. The mass of applications we use daily feed a transatlantic flow of information which already causes a series of problems: since 2013 the action by Max Schrems before the European courts has led to the regime which regulates this data transfer to be reviewed, also in the name of respect for the rights of European citizens by American authorities. In 2020, following further developments in the “Schrems case” the primary data transfer agreement between the EU and the United States, the so-called privacy shield, was declared invalid. We can already identify how a number of US regulations, for example laws combating terrorism, can undermine the protection of the rights of European citizens who could find their data being used directly by US administrations. But besides this problem, which appears particularly tricky in terms of political sovereignty and rights, we should remember that European citizens rely heavily on US digital applications which collect and stock data for commercial purposes. Web giants have created a true data industry with a complete collection of individual’s data in order to increase profits, a model where the ultimate objective is to enhance marketing abilities and therefore sales.

Such a scenario could appear confounding. It portrays a world where some companies accumulate such power as to be cause for worry on the consequences it can have on sovereignty, and therefore on the rule of law, to the extent of giving the impression of being a threat to States and their power. The assumption of a “Chinese” 5G threat however introduces yet another variant: that of companies directly linked to the Beijing political regime and which would be able to transfer the data used not for the optimization of commercial intents as in the classic example of the GAFAM, but with the purpose of a political dominance. This would mean a global rendering of the already existing “social control” by Chinese technologies, not to mention the Orwellian possibilities looming in the field of automated spying through AI technologies. The “classic” scenario of 5G mistrust however conceals another global issue: that of data sovereignty and the protection of rights in a digital context, a topic which was also addressed in the recent European regulation of artificial intelligence.

We need to make a fundamental distinction. The collection of data on the part of big tech US companies represents a substantial problem. However, it remains within the bounds of private entities trying to increase their profits. With China, there is the suspicion that there might be a much more direct relation between the technological system based on data and political power, which represents a greater degree of danger. From this point of view, although the concerns remain extremely sensitive, there is a clear difference between the EU’s position with respect to the US and to China, with the latter raising more concerns.

We can also note how the Biden administration is pressing for a further upsurge in the technological competition with China, even beyond the strict definition of “5G”. A topical issue is that of semiconductors, an essential technology, in which China currently finds itself in an inferior position, lagging behind other Asian manufacturers (Taiwan and South Korea), but also with respect to the key roles played by US and European technologies. Both the American decision to invest in further production capacity on US territory and the embargoes against Beijing are causing China to become watchful.

There are other kinds of technology, such as quantum computing or software development, also for AI, where we can see how the US is pushing to maintain its advantage to preserve the technological divide with China. In the 5G domain as well, the software segment is becoming increasingly important and therefore could make the embargo against Chinese technology even more relative.

In essence, 5G today does not appear as a problem ‘in itself’, but as the expression of a technological puzzle which uncovers what is at stake in each compartment. The problem is that of being present and carrying out innovation in every technological area, a global vision which is not so obvious for the European Union which is used to operating in a much more consolidated transatlantic market. It is therefore necessary for us find the right equilibrium between the development of our own technologies and the ability to negotiate and to raise the level of requests to the US, also in the name of a convergence of rights and democracy. The contest is far from simple, yet we should highlight the promising work done by the European Commission in ramping up its industrial politics, increasing investments and defining a pioneering regulation of the digital sphere.

L'articolo Europe’s route to 5G proviene da InsideOver.

The development of 5G should not be associated with innovation alone, but also the development of humanity, which ought to be the main purpose of technical innovation

The ethics of technology affect human action in its development through artefacts, structures and infrastructures. What does an interpretation of this type entail with respect to a technological network like 5G and pervasive digitisation?

The significance of all this helps us to understand Langdon Winner, who provocatively asked whether technological artefacts have a political function in a famous study (see L. Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics? in Daedalus 1-109 (1980), 121-136).

Winner showed that machines, structures and systems of modern material culture can be accurately judged not only in terms of their contribution to efficiency and productivity, or their beneficial or harmful side effects on the environment, but also by the ways they embody specific forms of power and authority. He offered some examples illustrating this political and social effect of technology. One of these deserves special attention. In his analysis of the construction of a series of overpasses built between the 1920s and 1970s on New York State roads leading to Long Island, it emerges that there was a precise political purpose behind them. Non-standard bridges, lower than in the rest of the country, would allow access to the beaches only to the white middle class, who owned cars, and not to all the other ethnic minorities who usually travelled by bus. Winner concluded that this and other examples of architecture and urban planning showed with glaring clarity that every technical device and every technological artifact is a way of building a form of order in the world.

Today, with the digital changes being introduced with 5G set to make ubiquitous computing possible in real time, we need to realise how prophetic Winner’s forecasts were. It is no longer a question of verifying or denying constitutional rights by building bridges made of concrete but by using algorithms, data profiling and access to communications.

Less than a hundred years ago communications relied physically on reinforced concrete. Today they are softer but no less effective and need to be understood.

Algorithms decide who can communicate with whom and using what data. These are the highways of today

The ethical issues here become radical. We have to develop technology while managing its social impact. However, the world of technology today is described by the category of innovation.

Innovation indicates a gradual advance or change that offers a progressive increase in capacity and potential. Not all progress is good or an improvement or brings only benefits.

To be able to speak of innovation as beneficial and guide it towards the common good, we need to qualify it in ways capable of describing how and which features of progress contribute to the good of individuals and society. For this purpose the category of “development” is used.

Human development should be understood as an end and not a means. It modifies progress by defining priorities and criteria. So speaking of development means not placing technical capacity at the centre of our attention but keeping people at the centre of our concerns and as the end that justifies progress.

For technology and our future we need a form of development that I would briefly describe as gentle. This is ethical and ethical choices are those that favour gentle development.

L'articolo Infrastructure as embodiments of power: gentle development proviene da InsideOver.

In 2018, heads of six US intelligence committees shared their reservations over the use of China-based ZTE or Huawei equipment in telecommunication networks and warned US residents against using devices made by these companies.

Moving Against China on the Technology Playing Field

Almost immediately after that, Australia, UK, New Zealand and Canada barred the Chinese companies — especially Huawei and ZTE from participating in the development of 5G infrastructure. Meanwhile, France, UK, Germany and Japan announced they were reviewing the involvement of Chinese firms in their telecommunication network as well.

Their argument for separating supply chains — especially technology — is rooted in the influence of Chinese government on companies based out of the mainland. Take Huawei for example. An investigation into the company’s record revealed it has received around $75 billion from the Chinese government. In addition to tax breaks and subsidies, China’s government has repeatedly forced poorer countries in Asia and Africa to allow Huawei to build their critical telecommunication and surveillance infrastructure. 

In 2009, the Chinese government loaned Pakistan around $124 million with zero interest to purchase surveillance system technology from China. The loan came with one condition: the job to set up the system would be done by Huawei with no competitive bidding.

Huawei’s Worldwide Reach

As per some estimates, Huawei has supplied and installed surveillance and telecommunication infrastructure in more than 40 countries around the world. And Chinese firms like Huawei are not independent as the definition of the word goes, the government can at any time demand access to company servers for intelligence gathering. The line between what is private and what is public in China is blurry. 

And this lies at the heart of the splintering technosphere in the world, with China on one side and Western countries on the other. Countries like the US, Australia and others fear that if firms like ZTE or Huawei are allowed to install 5G infrastructure, they will inadvertently give away a lot of political leverage to China which can hijack telecommunications infrastructure. 

The Breakup of the Globalized World

The power struggle between the US and China is causing an unfortunate shift away from globalization which hitherto was being governed by the ideas of free trade, open borders and a common set to globally-accepted rules and procedures to settle disputes or partner on initiatives. 

It isn’t as if the western world doesn’t have skeletons in its closet. Wiki Leaks, Edward Snowden and Cambridge Analytica are some of the names that show how the US and its allies have used technological superiority to spy on countries around the world and its own people.

Some of the revelations and leaks showed US’ National Security Agency (NSA), in collaboration with New Zealand, Canada, United States, United Kingdom and Australia spied on millions of emails and calls in Brazil, infiltrated internal communications of Qatar-based news agency Al Jazeera, intercepted millions of calls and messages in Spain, compromised Israel’s defense system and even spied on former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 

The startling revelations regarding the ‘Five Eyes’ network used by the governments of New Zealand, Canada, United States, United Kingdom and Australia to spy on governments, companies and people in power shocked the world. 

China in the Spotlight

But as China comes under the spotlight with its push to increase influence in the global techno sphere, the conversation is now shifting towards splitting the global internet into two parallel systems. 

The only casualty of multiple techno spheres will be developing countries especially those who do not have the requisite economic or technological prowess to stand up to these fast-emerging blocs. They will have no choice but to succumb to the pressures from either of them and get pulled into one of the two techno spheres where they will have to be at the mercy of one or the other. 

Finally, the greatest loss will be to the world as a whole which will only see itself being divided up into different technological ecosystems and power blocs.

L'articolo Global Technology Dominance at the Crosshairs of US-China Rivalry proviene da InsideOver.

The Chinese network supplier Huawei has been banned from the 5G network in Great Britain. The ban applies from the end of the year. Even parts that have already been installed must be removed.

With the UK banning the Chinese network supplier from real-time mobile 5G, Huawei is experiencing its most significant setback in Europe to date. The step by the UK government was announced by Digital Minister Oliver Dowden on Tuesday in Parliament in London. The decision will come into effect from the end of the year. As a result, network operators will be prohibited from purchasing 5G components from Huawei. In cases in which providers have already partially equipped their networks with Huawei, the government grants a period until 2027 by when all components need to be removed.

The Chinese company Huawei is internationally recognized as a leading 5G provider. In Europe, there are two regional rivals, Ericsson and Nokia, which also offer network equipment.

The United States has continuously accused Huawei of cooperating closely with the Chinese government, while the company has continuously denied these accusations. The measures taken by the government now, are coming after Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s government had already severely restricted Huawei’s deployment in 5G expansion at the beginning of the year, but it did not wholly cease its operations. The UK, meanwhile, may not be the last European country that issues a ban. Currently, a ban on Huawei is also being discussed in Germany.

Huawei criticized the ban in the UK, stating that the British government did not base its “disappointing change of course” on Huawei’s misconduct, but on “the unjustified sanctions imposed by the US government” – the latter recently imposed stringent trade restrictions on Huawei.

In a security assessment by British authorities, it was argued that these tightened sanctions could force Huawei to go with alternative production processes, which could endanger security and affect delivery capability.

Huawei is doing well economically. In the first half of the year, sales increased by 13.1 per cent to €57 billion, the company stated. With the expulsion, the British government risks breaking an election promise: In December, the conservative party had promised the British nationwide access to broadband technology.

The British network operators Vodafone and BT had warned that exclusion from Huawei could cost them billions and delay the network expansion significantly. However, it is conceivable that network operators exaggerated the effects. In any case, they are forced to modernize their networks. The third provider in the British mobile phone market O2 does not use Huawei, allowing for a potential competitive advantage.

With the Huawei decision, the British government is distancing itself from its long-term partner China. The conservative government under former Prime Minister David Cameron, in particular, had enchanted China as a partner. Chinese companies accepted the invitation: billions have flowed from China to British companies in recent years. Inter alia, the manufacturer of the London taxis LEVC is owned by Chinese nationals, as well as the catering chain Pizza Express and the London Metal Exchange. Moreover, China Huaneng Group is building what is possibly the largest battery factory in Europe in south-west England, and the Chinese energy group CGN is playing a pivotal role in the planned nuclear power plant Hinkley Point.

However, Chinese involvement in the energy sector, in particular, caused unease in Great Britain to the extent that Prime Minister Boris Johnson was increasingly criticized from within his party.

Relations with Beijing are also strained by the dispute over China’s security law in the former British crown colony of Hong Kong and the UK’s decision to offer citizenships to the people from Hong Kong.

L'articolo The UK Bans Huawei proviene da InsideOver.

It came as no surprise, and has certainly been anticipated in the pages of this publication, that the British government decided to prohibit telecom providers from buying new equipment for 5G networks from Huawei Technologies. It is undoubtedly a U-turn for the United Kingdom, which as recently as January announced that the Chinese company would be allowed to be involved in the infrastructure of the fifth-generation technology standard for cellular networks. The government gave reassurances at the time that it was able to manage the risks of Huawei’s presence in 5G.

The UK’s Reversal and Ban on Huawei

This Tuesday, however, the UK government announced that purchases from Huawei would be illegal starting from the end of this year, and telecommunication companies would have until the end of 2027 to remove existing Huawei equipment from their 5G networks.

This decision comes with its own costs. The British Minister for Digital Issues, Oliver Dowden, said that the law, expected to be passed in the fall, would delay the development of 5G in the UK by two to three years and cost up to $ 2.5 billion, as estimated by a report from the Wall Street Journal. The Journal adds that the United Kingdom is thinking of banning the purchase of Huawei equipment from the country’s fiber optic network as well. It is reported that Huawei intends to make a full review of the business it has in the UK. With this latest decision, the United Kingdom joins the other member countries of the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance, with the exception of Canada, that have made similar moves.

Why Did Boris Johnson Decide to Block Huawei in the End?

There are three main reasons that pushed Prime Minister Boris Johnson in this direction. First and foremost, it was his own party that pushed him for months to take a harder stance towards China and Huawei, which is a Chinese state enterprise in all but name. This move is part of a broader strategy to make the UK less dependent on China, and should come as a welcome surprise to European bureaucrats who warned that should the UK leave the EU, it would be powerless in front of the Asian giant.

Apparently, the British government has more courage to take on China than many EU countries, including Germany, which remain skeptical about making a similar move. This decision, for many conservative lawmakers, was not enough, as they are arguing for a shorter phaseout period with Huawei and a total expulsion of the Chinese company from the United Kingdom.

Various Key Factors Influenced UK’s Decision

Secondly, according to reporting from the Journal, the decision was preceded by a review from the UK’s National Cyber Security Center, which was made as a result of the sanctions announced by the US. President Donald Trump took credit after the announcement made by the Johnson government, adding that it was his leadership and actions that convinced Johnson to act. The US President had emphasized several times that his country will not be able to do business with any country allowing Huawei into their 5G networks, citing security concerns. The report by the National Cyber Security Center seems to prove what Trump said. The only reason that they added a longer phase out period was due to concerns that a shorter period would lead to coverage blackout for customers.

Lastly, China’s behavior with the coronavirus, its aggression towards Hong Kong, as well as China’s pursuit to territorial claims in the South China Sea, appear to have been the tipping point. Hong Kong especially is considered a sensitive matter in the United Kingdom, as it is not an abstract issue, but a clear violation of an agreement on Hong Kong’s autonomy and a defilement of the region’s democracy. The concern is that Taiwan may be China’s next target. It would have been reckless and weak to have continued with business as usual on London’s part.

Building a Coalition to Counter China

This decision can be seen as simply one more piece in the grander scheme of the West building a coalition of the willing to take on China. US sanctions on Huawei, the positioning of warships and aircraft carriers on the region for exercise purposes, EU’s more aggressive rhetoric, UK’s recent move all point to the creation of a united front going forward. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel opposed banning Huawei, however most inside her party and across the political spectrum expect her to be tougher on China. Since she will not be seeking reelection, it remains to be seen how Germany’s stance will change once her successor within the Party and in Government has been elected.

The US under Trump is expected to continue its pressure on Germany. Since France has planned restrictions with regards to where operators can use Huawei’s 5G equipment, particularly keeping it away from military and other sensitive areas. Italy’s political forces — especially the opposition parties — have intensified their criticism towards China, so logic points to the conclusion that Germany may soon follow suit.

Assessing China’s Reaction

On the other hand, China’s reaction until now has been within expectations. Its relationship with the UK will be strained further. In addition to banning Huawei, the British government has offered a path to UK citizenship for nearly 3 million citizens from Hong Kong. The Chinese ambassador in the United Kingdom voiced his government’s disappointment and pointed out that the decision has “undermined the trust between the two governments”. He said that Huawei is a company independent on the Chinese government. However, this was clearly contradicted by his later claims that “Huawei merely symbolizes how you treat China”. This response is nothing else but another evidence that validates what is a fact known for decades – that the Chinese communist party and Chinese companies are one and the same. His threat included also the fact that other Chinese firms will follow the decision closely.

The Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman spoke of collusion between the US and the UK and warned that this decision will come at a cost. The Chinese state backed Global Times said in an editorial that it is “necessary for China to retaliate”, otherwise it will be seen as weakness on China’s part, thus, according to them, retaliation should be “public and painful”.

How Can China Retaliate?

There are several ways in which China can strike back. It can increase trade tariffs, since there is no trade deal between the countries, yet. A possibility is making it more difficult for British products to reach Chinese consumers. It could resort to harassment techniques like cyber-attacks, IP thefts and the other usual practices it has done over the decades. However, the United Kingdom should be prepared and remain unswerving in its decision.

The logical next step is a united front that includes the United States, The United Kingdom, Europe, Australia, and even Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and all freedom-loving countries that are threatened by China’s aggressive behaviors. Many security experts believe recent decisions are pointing in this direction. The UK, the EU and the US can work together in strengthening Western providers, can become less dependent on Chinese products and companies, as seen during the covid-19 emergencies. Nokia, Ericsson, AT & T are some of the companies that have made progress, either in getting 5G technology patents or have started building the infrastructure.

Through his ambassadors in Europe Trump is looking to build a wide coalition with the aim of mutual defense against Chinese aggression. Ambassador Robert O’Brien came to Europe this week to discuss issues ranging from China, to 5G, Russia, Middle East and COVID response in several meetings in Paris with his counterparts from the UK, Germany, France and Italy.

As said many times before, it is very clear this is a new cold war being fought with modern weapons. The West’s weakest point rests in its internal divisions and petty rivalries.

L'articolo The United Kingdom’s 5G Decision – Taking a Stand Against China proviene da InsideOver.

Chinese state-owned telecom giant Huawei is facing another setback in its struggle to keep its international business afloat. The UK, which had resisted calls by the US to ban Huawei from deploying its 5G network infrastructure, has now decided to remove the company from its 5G networks, as the British newspapers the Sunday Times and Daily Telegraph reported.

UK Finally Caves on Huawei

Since Washington embarked on its anti-Chinese technology campaign based on national security allegations, the Trump administration has had difficulty convincing its counterparts in London. Particularly since the two are part of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing pact, the US has been keen to welcome the UK aboard its Chinese boycott.

However, in January, British officials said Huawei would not be completely banned and could remain on as a network equipment supplier. A few months later, Washington leveraged more restrictions on foreign companies using American equipment to produce chips for Huawei and the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) began an expedited review of the situation.

Although official plans have yet to be unveiled by Prime Minister Boris Johnson, his government is preparing to cancel the purchase of new Huawei equipment and remove all existing network gear, as the Daily Telegraph reported.

China Reacts

China’s ambassador to the UK Liu Xiaoming, threatened unspecified consequences and damage to London’s reputation if it proceeds with the ban, as Deutsche Welle reported.

“The China business community are all watching how you handle Huawei. If you get rid of Huawei it sends out a very bad message to other Chinese businesses,” Liu said.

The move to revoke market access to Huawei and ZTE coincides with London’s staunch support of Hong Kong following the passage of Beijing’s new national security bill. The UK revealed it would create a path to full British citizenship for Hong Kongers who hold British National passports.

Liu condemned the move in what she called a “gross interference in China’s internal affairs.”

India Jumps Aboard Bandwagon

Huawei’s latest troubles don’t end with the UK. India is also considering a ban, according to CNBC. Like the UK, India’s ban would make a reversal as the company was given permission to participate in a 5G trial rollout in December. Along with Huawei, the state is also banning Chinese state-owned ZTE on the same national security grounds.

India has also banned Chinese app including popular social networks TikTok and WeChat. New Delhi is presently engaged in a border dispute with Beijing, further complicating the political distance between the two states. If any state has more reason to distrust China than the US, it is perhaps India.

“The China-India … dispute, compounded with the economic stress caused due to the (coronavirus) pandemic, has likely forced the government thinking to adopt a strategy similar to U.S. to potentially retaliate in a way where it would hurt China the most,” said Neil Shah, research director at Counterpoint Research.

Germany is China’s Lone Beacon of Light

With Washington’s maximum pressure campaign against Huawei and ZTE claiming more victories, few US allies are left to purchase Chinese telecom equipment. Beyond the general list of allied states, the American plan to cripple Huawei and ZTE has resonated in other states as well over fears of US sanctions.

However, France and Germany have yet to ban the companies. The French cybersecurity agency ANSSI said while there won’t be a total ban coming from Paris, it would recommend that telecom operators build their 5G networks with products from other companies.

On the other hand, German-based Deutsche Telekom has embraced Huawei, as Reuters reported. It has entered into contracts for 5G networks, cloud services, and even a television component. The contract, signed before the May 2019 restrictions by the US went into place, is one of the few remaining international deals of significance Huawei has maintained, as POLITICO reported.

Huawei described Deutsche Telekom as a “preferred customer,” but the truth is that it remains one of the only customers left. According to Deutsche Telekom, an outright ban on foreign companies “would reduce its flexibility.” How long France and Germany, both key US allies, can continue to withstand the Trump administration’s pressure remains to be seen, however.

Few Can Hold Out Against US Pressure

Thus far, the company’s deal in Germany has survived on German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s fear that cancelling it would harm German companies operating in China. Merkel’s time in office is expiring though and her successor may feel differently. Although extricating Chinese technology suppliers would certainly delay 5G rollout plans, it would not make Germany the first to face such delays.

Outside of China, most states are lagging behind initial forecasts for 5G implementation. Other suppliers like Ericsson and Nokia have ramped up efforts and taken on some of the contracts Huawei and ZTE were forced from. By 2021, alternatives should be easy to come by if states like Germany are willing to risk the political and economic repercussions.

At some point, however, US pressure will find its way to Berlin, especially if President Donald Trump secures another election victory in November. At that point, Berlin’s equation would change to the point that placating the Trump administration may carry less downsides than irritating Beijing.

For Huawei, and to a lesser extent ZTE, there is not much to be hopeful for in the future. The UK, one of America’s staunchest allies, had resisted calls to abandon Chinese technology for over a year. In acquiescing, London has proven that no one resist US pressure forever, particularly when national security claims are leveraged.

“Chairman Xi’s spy web isn’t going to like this, but good for the British government,” said US Sen. Ben Sasse, R–Neb., a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “Shared security interests are a major part of our special relationship with the Brits, and the Chinese Communist Party’s tech puppet should not be allowed to sit on our closest ally’s networks.”

L'articolo UK Changes Stance, Bans Huawei from 5G Work proviene da InsideOver.

In February, US Attorney General William Barr argued China’s robust buildup of 5G communications networks and technology is one of America’s greatest national security threats. That conclusion came as little surprise for industry experts and intelligence analysts who have honed in on the implications of the new technology. The common takeaway from them is that 5G is here, the US is losing the race to China, and as a result, America might not be prepared for modern-day warfare.

What is 5G?

Put simply, 5G is the next phase of wireless networks. Every four or five years, technology companies rollout new protocols that enable faster data speeds — up to 100 times faster once fully implemented. In the case of 5G, the gap between it and its predecessor, 4G, is longer than that of the previous generation.

While 4G was standardized in 2008 by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 4G-enabled devices didn’t hit markets until a few years later. The first 4G iPhone, for example, didn’t arrive until 2012. Although tech companies coordinate with the ITU to develop standards, thus ensuring devices from different manufactures are compatible with each other and a wide range of operators, creating chips to enable the technology is another mission entirely.

All About the Chips

Manufacturers must design or outsource the design for the computer chips, produce them in sufficient quantities, and ensure they don’t drain battery life too fast. That last point is the largest barrier to the speedy deployment of new network protocols like 5G — the first chips of any generation are power hungry. It’s for this reason that Apple often delays its adoption of new network technology for a year or two after Android smartphone producers.

5G brings another benefit in addition to faster data speeds — it allows a greater number of devices to connect at one time. This is crucial for the new Internet of Things (IoT) industry. Everything from microwaves to doorbells and automobiles is connected to the internet these days. 5G allows a greater number of devices to connect because it boasts a higher bandwidth than its predecessor. This can be equated to driving down a two-lane road versus a four-lane highway.

Latency, the amount of time it takes for a device to connect to a cellphone tower and receive a response, is vastly improved. The practical implications for the technology open doors to use cases previously unthought of, such as a jet engine manufacturer that implemented 5G to detect production errors.

As a result, mobile networks will be less congested, thereby enabling stronger coverage for consumers. However, the benefits of 5G are also their weaknesses which present challenges that governments must overcome.

Security Risks

The more devices that connect to the internet, the more opportunities hackers have to force their way into a network, the Brookings Institute reported. Also, due to the nature of 5G technology, networks are different from a hardware standpoint. While previous network protocols featured a centralised hub through which traffic was routed, 5G is built on software routing that is spread across the network.

The over-reliance on software to manage 5G networks presents vulnerabilities that didn’t exist or were minimized with previous iterations of wireless technology.

“In a world of interconnected networks, devices, and applications, every activity is a potential attack vector. This vulnerability is only heightened by the nature of 5G and its highly desirable attributes,” Tom Wheeler, former chairman of the US Federal Communications Commission, and David Simpson, former chief of the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, wrote for Brookings.

A lack of cybersecurity investment by US businesses and a “cumbersome” FCC process to establish new rules hindered attempts to  be proactive about locking down new 5G technology.

Private hackers are only one concern. The greater threat is state and state-backed cyber warfare. China, North Korea, Iran, and Russia have all made successful attempts to infiltrate US networks. The threat is serious enough that the Pentagon, no longer content with playing defence against hackers, authorised US Cyber Command to go on the offensive against foreign governments. Cyber Command has largely focused on disabling communications systems and eliminating cyber warfare capabilities of adversaries.

5G Turns Political

“We have evidence that Huawei has the capability secretly to access sensitive and personal information in systems it maintains and sells around the world,” said US National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien in February.

The allegation was the latest in a year-long battle between the US government and Chinese tech conglomerate Huawei. Specifically, the Trump administration accused the business of building backdoors into their network equipment. Together, Huawei and China-based ZTE have built 40% of the world’s 5G network infrastructure.

American officials decided to ban Huawei and ZTE, citing national security, barring American businesses from using them to build their 5G networks with Chinese equipment. In May, he extended the order for another year. Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have also engaged in a concerted campaign to compel allies to ban the companies in their states under threat of reducing intelligence cooperation.

“Our economic future is at stake,” Barr said in February. “The risk of losing the 5G struggle with China should vastly outweigh other considerations.”

For America, the 5G war with China is a race to own the technology and dominate the industry to lock out Beijing, but the US is presently losing. American companies simply don’t offer the technology that Huawei does, and certainly not at its low prices. Instead, US networks have to look to European-based Ericsson and Nokia, both of which have picked up substantially more contracts following international backlash against Huawei.

To be clear, allegations against Huawei and ZTE have thus far been unfounded. Technology experts have never uncovered supposed backdoors. However, with US–China relations broken down and recent Beijing-backed cyber espionage attempts, the Trump administration is unlikely to relent.

Beijing’s Hacking Highlight’s US Trust Issues 

On May 13, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security alerted healthcare companies that China is attempting to hack COVID-19 research data. 

“These actors have been observed attempting to identify and illicitly obtain valuable intellectual property (IP) and public health data related to vaccines, treatments, and testing from networks and personnel affiliated with COVID-19-related research,” the agencies wrote. “The potential theft of this information jeopardizes the delivery of secure, effective, and efficient treatment options.”

Beijing’s actions do little to inspire confidence in Washington and will only hurt its tech companies seeking to export their 5G technology. Even if Huawei and ZTE are innocent, their government is not and that has transformed 5G networks into a political issue.

Finally, as a Barr said, 5G network deployment represents the first time America has lagged behind on the global stage. That realisation, that China has access to faster, more reliable networks before the US, hurts perhaps more than threats of cyber warfare because US President Donald Trump’s motto is “make America great again.”

5G Delayed

All of these factors mean that 5G networks and equipment will be delayed in the US. While some operators have branded their latest offerings as “5G,” the truth is that they are usually downscaled version. True 5G uses a technology known as “millimetre wave,” but access to this coverage is highly limited.

Instead operators are making smaller improvements and simply labeling it as 5G. AT&T, for example, has even rebranded a subsegment of its 4G network to call it “5GE.”

For a true network progression to 5G in the US, the political issues between Washington and Beijing need to be resolved or American companies must begin developing their own infrastructure solutions. Even then, the new security risks of 5G mean that companies and consumers must take greater precautions as they connect their devices to the new generation networks.

L'articolo Why Has 5G Become a Political Issue proviene da InsideOver.