Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russian Minster of Defense Sergei Shoigu were expected to meet their Turkish counterparts in Istanbul on June 14. In a surprising statement, on the day of the planned meeting, it was announced that the visit of the Russian Ministers would be postponed to a later date without any further details from either side. This unexpected development raised concerns around a potential escalation between the two sides, with regards to their proxy military operations abroad.

What Was the Agenda of the Meeting?

The Libyan and the Syrian conflicts were ostensibly at the top of the planned meeting’s agenda, and probably disagreements over those two issues have been the very reasons behind the cancellation.

In Syria, Idlib remains the last stronghold of the anti-government forces, with a solid presence of jihadist groups, some of which had previously established a modus vivendi with Turkey, in an anti-Assad consensus. At the moment, a coalition of al-Qaeda and former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) subgroups is in the making. Al-Jihad Coordination, Jamaat Ansar al-Islam, Hurras al-Din, al-Muqatileen al-Ansar Brigade, and Jabhat Ansar al-Din are also coordinating to bolster their operational capabilities.

This development puts even more pressure on Ankara, which has now been caught between the Kremlin-Damascus axis on the one hand, and the regional ambitions of the jihadist groups on the other. Turkey has tried to enhance its footprint in Idlib through fragile and opportunistic deals with anti-government forces, but the confrontation between Ankara and Moscow in early 2020 proved that the Turkish aspirations were unrealistic.

On the other hand, Turkey has managed to counterbalance the situation in Libya and turn the conflict in favor of Government of National Accord (GNA) leader Fayez al-Sarraj. Considering the latest military successes of the GNA forces, the Kremlin has been seeking to win time for the Libyan National Army (LNA) and General Khalifa Haftar. Even though Russia has consistently highlighted their intention to put an end to the long-term conflict without explicitly favoring any of the opposing sides, the Kremlin has been assisting the LNA and has been seeking to limit the extensive influence of the UN-recognized and Turkish-backed GNA.

After recapturing critical LNA bases and infrastructure, GNA forces are now pushing towards Sirte. Sirte, a port city between Tripoli and Benghazi and Muammar’s Ghaddafi hometown, was briefly captured by ISIS when the terrorist group was on its rise back in 2015; since then, the area has changed hands between GNA and LNA forces, and at the moment it constitutes a point of strategic significance for Haftar. A potential fall of Sirte could be a catalyst for the ultimate LNA defeat. A possible — even temporary — ceasefire and easing on the GNA’s pressure on Sirte was certainly among the Russian priorities during the scheduled meeting.

Implications Behind the Postponement

Turkish claims over Libya seem to have been the key factor for the cancellation. As Turkey strives to make the best of the latest tactical gains across the Libyan territory and turn the current situation to a strategic victory, easing the pressure on LNA might be perceived by Turkish officials as an unacceptable misstep. Capturing Sirte is the immediate objective for Ankara. Meanwhile, the Kremlin assesses any potential negotiation while Sirte is under siege as a no-go. At the same time, Ankara is considering officially setting up military bases in Western Libya. Such a development would expand further the Turkish footprint in North Africa, another thorn not only for the Kremlin, but also for Cairo.

Libya presents a case, where vital interests of several players are at stake. Turkey has invested in its strong and influential position in the country, as a critical means to boost its energy and security policy in the Mediterranean. The Turkish-Libyan maritime pact has long been an issue of international dispute and criticism, however if Ankara consolidates its presence in Libya, then the scenario of applying the controversial Turkish energy agenda at the expense of Greece is much more plausible.

The Kremlin’s POV

The Kremlin does not approve of Sarraj having dominance, as this would almost vanish the Russian influence in the country; the most favorable scenario for the Kremlin at the moment would be a Libyan state where the power would be equally shared among the current major players of the conflict, securing the long-term Russian interests in the country, as per the current alliances. At the same time, the Egyptian al-Sisi government is the most worried party about the Libyan developments, since a potential Sarraj victory could be seen as a time-bomb along Egypt’s country’s border. Sarraj’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood could trigger unprecedented political developments in Egypt and al-Sisi’s options would be significantly constrained, if the GNA gains control of all of Libya.

All the aforementioned factors have created an uncertain context, blocking the progress of the negotiations between Russia and Turkey. In addition there was another incident that has affected the situation which has not been deeply examined. On June 14, the day that Cavusoglu and Akar were due to meet their Russian counterparts, an interesting statement was made by the Russian Ambassador to Greece Andrey Maslov. According to the state-owned Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation (ERT), Maslov mentioned in an interview last Sunday, that the Greek islands undoubtedly have Exclusive Economic Zone and their rights cannot be disputed according to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Turkey has resolutely rejected this claim, as Ankara is not a signatory of the convention. Furthermore, Erdogan is trying to push his very own agenda in the eastern Mediterranean, vaguely interpreting international law to serve Turkish objectives. This statement by the Russian ambassador should be added to the ongoing Russian-Turkish fallout.

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A few days after Russian president Vladimir Putin’s phone call to his Syrian counterpart Bashar al Assad, a high-level Russian delegation headed by Minister of Defence Sergei Shoygu arrived in the Syrian capital Damascus and held a long meeting with president Assad. The meeting was attended by senior defense and security officials including the Syrian Minister of Defense Maj. General Ali Abdullah Ayyoub and National Security Chief General Ali Mamlouk. What is behind those two bilateral developments and what were the main topics discussed at the Damascus meeting?

Shoygu Went to Damascus ‘on President Putin’s Instructions’

The linkage between Putin’s phone call to Assad and the quickly-arranged visit by Shoygu is strong and clear, and the Russian minister is reported to have flown to Damascus “on President Putin’s instructions” and was delivering a “message from Putin to Assad”, similar to previous visits he had made to Syria such as the last one in March, 2019. But this time around, much has changed in terms of geopolitical as well as the military situation on the ground before the current truce agreement was reached between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and Putin last month in Moscow.

The Truth Lies Between the Headlines and the Reality on the Ground

While the headline for the telephone conversation held between presidents Putin and Assad on March 20 was that this was a call by the Russian leader to congratulate his Syrian counterpart on the occasion of the Muslim holiday of Israa (Ascension) and Mi’raj (Descension) — a holy Muslim event — the two leaders are believed to have discussed military and humanitarian aspects of the situation in Idlib in some detail, including implementation methods and challenges to the Moscow deal between Erdogan and Putin. In particular they were interested in jump-starting the stalled Constitutional Committee as well as Russian assistance to Syria against the coronavirus pandemic.

A giant Russian vessel carrying some 200 ambulance vehicles and essential medical aid was seen two days ago crossing the Bosphorus Strait heading for the Syrian port of Tartous. Russia signed a long-term lease agreement with Syria regarding the strategic port of Tartous and pledged a $500 million investment plan there. Russia already maintains a naval base in Tartous, and the 49-year lease agreement that was signed in April, 2019, was later ratified by Syria’s parliament and endorsed afterwards by Assad.

At the top of the agenda discussed by the visiting Russian delegation in Damascus with the Syrian President Monday, was the issue of implementing Russian-Turkish agreements regarding the so-called “de-escalation zone” in Idlib, and arrangements for the reopening of the strategic M4 highway between Aleppo and the Mediterranean city of Latakia. The route crosses several towns and villages still controlled by pro-Turkish rebel forces, and its reopening plan is categorically rejected by the more radical Nusra terror group and other extremist militias who have dug trenches across the highway in certain areas to render it unusable for traffic, and threatened to attack any force that tries to implement the M4 plan.

Covid-19: An Added Challenge but Also a Battle-Stopper

The Russian delegation is also believed to have discussed bilateral military cooperation between Moscow and Damascus, as well as Russian relief supplies for what the Defense Ministry in order to counteract what it referred to as the “Syrian people suffering from Western sanctions.” Shoygu’s visit took place only one day after Damascus reported the first case of Covid-19 in Syria; now the official figure of confirmed cases is 5. All cases have come from abroad. A partial curfew has been imposed between 6 pm and 6 am, among other lockdown measures taken by the Syrian government to fend off against the pandemic that has rocked the world over the past couple of months, with catastrophic human and economic impact.

The new Covid-19 threat is reported to have triggered discussions among Russia observers regarding the types of challenges an extended outbreak might create. Mention was also made pertaining to the possibility of such a development impacting the geography of deployments and freedom of movement of the Russian military as well as protocols of contact between Russian servicemen and their Syrian, Turkish and Iranian peers. Discussions also centered on the dynamics and humanitarian challenges in Idlib in light of the pandemic. Some observers predicted that Turkey will even shut down its border to refugees for fear of further spread of the novel coronavirus pandemic, and do so without Western criticism, since many nations have done exactly that in order to protect their own populations.

The “war” against the coronavirus pandemic has sarcastically stopped, at least tentatively, many wars in its path, such as Yemen, Libya and Syria. Russian Defense Ministry officials have reiterated that “in Tartous and other places that have a presence of Russian troops, all the necessary precautions are being taken regarding Covid-19 threat. No potentially contaminated serviceman will be allowed back into Russia.” Shoygu, meanwhile, mentioned Moscow’s willingness to provide assistance to jump-start Syria’s economic recovery “with the help of Russian specialists.”

Given the fact that Putin has invested a great deal in the ongoing truce in Idlib — despite Erdogan’s recurrent failure to disarm or control some radical and terrorist groups there as terrorists destroyed two Turkish armoured vehicles in Idlib earlier this week — recent top-level Russian-Syrian collaboration and the ensuing high-rank visit to Damascus appears to have been designed to provide reciprocal assurances to all involved on the Syrian theater.

No party is expected— or even allowed — to torpedo the current Idlib deal, and every side should pull their own weight to make the ceasefire stand firm, in anticipation of what many observers believe is an imminent and big next move. All indications point to the focus being first towards Idlib and areas east of the Euphrates next.

L'articolo What’s Behind Putin’s Call to Assad proviene da InsideOver.