La Repubblica Ellenica sta vivendo una fase di profonda trasformazione della propria dottrina di difesa, un cambiamento passato in secondo piano ma che potrebbe ben presto ridisegnare gli equilibri nel Mar Egeo e nel Mediterraneo orientale. Nell’aprile dello scorso anno Atene ha annunciato un ambizioso piano di investimenti per la modernizzazione delle Forze Armate, con particolare attenzione alla Marina e all’Aeronautica. 25 miliardi di euro saranno spesi in programmi d’armamento fino al 2036 con l’obiettivo di acquisire tecnologie all’avanguardia, rafforzare le capacità operative e sostenere lo sviluppo dell’industria nazionale della difesa. È un salto non solo quantitativo, ma qualitativo, che riflette sia la crescente complessità dello scenario regionale sia la necessità di colmare un divario tecnologico percepito rispetto agli attori vicini, leggi Repubblica di Turchia, l’atavico rivale. 

A novembre, questo nuovo percorso è stato inserito in una cornice dottrinale più chiara con la presentazione della nuova strategia di deterrenza multi-dominio (terra, mare, aria, cyberspazio e spazio) da parte del ministro della Difesa greco Nikos Dendias. Il cambiamento è radicale: la responsabilità primaria della difesa delle acque dell’Egeo non sarà più affidata alla flotta di superficie, tradizionale fulcro della postura militare greca, ma verrà trasferita e riposta nei sistemi missilistici a lungo raggio disseminati in varie isole. La logica è quella di creare una fitta rete di interdizione capace di colpire rapidamente e in profondità evidenziando la vulnerabilità dei mezzi navali e aumentando la capacità di risposta in caso di crisi.

Francia, Stati Uniti e Israele, in rispettivo ordine, sono le potenze che sono state individuate dai funzionari e dagli apparati ateniesi per sostenere lo sforzo di modernizzazione delle Forze Armate Elleniche. Il rapporto privilegiato tra Atene e Parigi è stato consolidato negli anni dalla vendita di diverse fregate Belharra, caccia Rafale e dalla stipula di un accordo di mutua difesa in procinto di rinnovo. L’Eliseo ha quindi ottenuto diversi successi industriali, accresciuto influenza e proiezione in un’area vitale del Mediterraneo e, soprattutto, ottenuto una leva per contenere la Turchia. Washington garantisce all’Aeronautica greca, ad oggi, il mantenimento di un vantaggio qualitativo decisivo grazie all’inclusione di Atene nel programma F-35 Lighthing II e alla contemporanea esclusione di Ankara. Gerusalemme si è gradualmente affermato quale attore in grado di fornire sistemi di difesa aerea, droni e soluzioni avanzate nel campo della sorveglianza e della guerra elettronica. In sintesi: la sinergia tra piattaforme francesi, tecnologia statunitense e know-how israeliano consentirà, nei calcoli degli strateghi ateniesi, alla Grecia di disporre di uno strumento militare moderno e credibile sul piano della deterrenza.

L’Italia partecipa ma con prudenza

Due piani cardine del processo di modernizzazione delle Forze armate prevedono: la creazione dello “Scudo di Achille”, fiore all’occhiello del programma di riamo nazionale dal valore di 2.8 miliardi di euro, un sistema di difesa integrato e multilivello in grado di contrastare diverse minacce (droni, aerei e missili); l’acquisto di quattro nuovi sottomarini. TKMS in Germania, Naval Group in Francia, Saab in Svezia, Fincantieri in Italia, Hyundai Heavy Industries e Hanwha Ocean in Corea del Sud sono i pretendenti pronti a sgomitare per aggiudicarsi la faraonica commessa. Atene deciderà a breve in base alla soddisfazione di tre fondamentali requisiti: la costruzione o la coproduzione in Grecia delle unità; la capacità d’integrazione dei sistemi d’arma nazionali; il rispetto della “clausola turca”.

L’Italia, come dimostrato dalla recente vendita di due fregate da parte di Fincantieri, pare voler partecipare allo sviluppo delle Forze Armate Elleniche, senza, tuttavia, alienarsi il consenso della Turchia. Roma si destreggia quindi in un acrobatico atteggiamento pragmatico evitando di schierarsi apertamente con una delle parti. Ma sarà sempre più difficile districarsi tra le sponde dell’Egeo. La formazione di sempre più rigidi blocchi regionali per l’equilibro di potere nel Mediterraneo orientale toglie margini di manovra alla Penisola.

Il cambio di atteggiamento che oggi spinge la Grecia verso una postura più assertiva germoglia dall’interazione di due fattori esterni: l’introversione americana e l’ascesa della Turchia. Il progressivo disimpegno degli Stati Uniti dal Mediterraneo, accompagnato da una concentrazione di risorse verso l’Indo-Pacifico, ha ridotto il livello di garanzia percepito dai partner regionali. Per un Paese come la Grecia, tuttora ancorato alla protezione americana, questo spostamento di risorse e attenzioni ha aperto una fase di incertezza. Atene si trova così costretta a investire maggiormente nella propria capacità di difesa, accettando costi economici, politici e sociali superiori rispetto al passato. Parallelamente la Repubblica di Turchia ha consolidato negli ultimi anni la propria influenza nell’agone internazionale grazie alle proprie capacità diplomatiche e militari, a un’industria bellica nazionale all’avanguardia e in rapida crescita e soprattutto a una chiara strategia commisurata ai mezzi. 

La trasformazione della postura strategica greca riflette quindi un nuovo bisogno di sicurezza nel proprio intorno geografico. La modernizzazione delle Forze Armate e la deterrenza multi-dominio rappresentano una risposta a un ambiente percepito come fortemente instabile, segnato dal minor coinvolgimento americano e dall’emergere della Turchia come potenza regionale. Tuttavia, questo cambio di rotta (re)introduce nuovi fattori di tensione che potrebbero rendere il futuro dell’Egeo, e per estensione del Mediterraneo, più incerto e delicato.

L'articolo La Grecia cambia postura sulla Difesa e agita le acque del Mediterraneo proviene da InsideOver.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met his Greek counterpart Nikos Dendias on Monday as tensions between Greece and Turkey continue to escalate. Pompeo stressed the importance of US relations with Greece and their shared values.

The seven-week standoff was spurred by the discovery of underwater resources, which was escalated after Turkey deployed the Oruç Reis research vessel to conduct seismic surveys in contested waters in the eastern Mediterranean.

Athens retaliated by placing its forces on high alert.

The US Can Help Solve the Greek-Turkish Dispute

Live-fire exercises by the Turkish navy off Cyprus have added to the hostility of overlapping claims to the waters. Furthermore, Ankara started drilling for oil and gas off Cyprus last year, saying it was acting to protect Cyprus’s Turkish-Cypriot community after the discovery of reserves by the Greek-Cypriot community.

The US is arguably the one nation that is best placed to resolve the Greek-Turkish dispute. Both Ankara and Athens are NATO members and considering the US is the leading nation in this alliance, Washington is able to use its unique position to its advantage. For example, NATO has recently hosted discussions between the two nations to try and end the border dispute.

Erdoğan Wants to Give Diplomacy a Chance

Tensions between Greece and Turkey have eased somewhat as a result of the Oruc Reis being recently recalled from the eastern Mediterranean. This was a result that was achieved thanks to joint pressure from the EU and the US which forced Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to return the vessel to its base on September 13 and give diplomacy a chance.

However, the US cannot resolve this crisis on its own and many European states that have been affected by the eastern Mediterranean dispute also have a role to play. In a joint statement, the seven EU Mediterranean states (Greece, Italy, France, Spain, Cyprus, Portugal and Malta) said the bloc would draw up a list of sanctions on Turkey at the end of September unless Ankara negotiates to resolve the dispute with Greece and Cyprus.

The EU Summit Could Reset EU-Turkish Relations

Erdoğan has responded by saying that an EU summit due to take place this week is an opportunity to reset relations between both sides, but he added that the bloc must produce specific proposals and a timetable to work on a road-map together. Therefore, if Brussels is serious about avoiding a diplomatic war with Ankara, it cannot depend upon the US to solve all of Europe’s problems on its own.

One advantage that Brussels has is that it appears that Pompeo is standing firmly behind his Greek ally. During his visit to the Greek city of Thessaloniki on Monday, the US Secretary of State said that his country’s bilateral relationship with Greece is “at an all-time high.”

Turkey’s Relations with the US are Set to Deteriorate

The same cannot be said of America’s relationship with Turkey. Much to Erdoğan’s irritation, Washington has dropped its neutral stance on Cyprus after the US and Cypriot governments signed an agreement to open a training center. Also, Pompeo confirmed that he would lift a 33-year arms embargo on Cyprus and improve Washington’s security cooperation with Nicosia.

The US Secretary of State’s policy decisions risk alienating Erdoğan further at a time when his country is strengthening its cooperation with Iran in the Middle East. Pompeo is right to take a firm stance toward Turkey. It is also likely that if the Turkish President does not change course then he risks facing sanctions from the EU and possibly being thrown out of NATO in the future. There must be consequences for Turkey’s actions.

All hopes for peace rest on the EU-Turkish summit this week. The US can only solve the Greek-Turkish crisis with the help of its allies, but relations between Washington and Ankara are only likely to deteriorate if Turkey continues to provoke its fellow NATO allies.

L'articolo Can the US help Resolve the Turkish-Greek Dispute? proviene da InsideOver.

German Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas visited Greece and Turkey on August 25 in an attempt to ease the growing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Maas’ visit came at a moment of constant frictions between the neighboring countries, as consecutive NAVTEX warnings (navigational warnings) issued by both sides are overlapping various mutual areas of the Aegean Sea.

‘NAVTEX Diplomacy’ and Turkish claims

A long-term dispute between Greece and Turkey, has been intensifying since late July, when Ankara issued a NAVTEX covering parts of the Greek continental shelf for seismic research activities. After Germany’s intervention this activity has been cancelled, however shortly after the Greek-Egyptian agreement in early August that established the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) maritime boundaries between the two countries, Turkey issued a new NAVTEX, reserving the right to explore the aforementioned area from Aug. 10 to 23.

This move has triggered unparalleled tensions between Greece and Turkey, and incidents that could suddenly lead to significant escalation and possibly a full-scale confrontation have taken place ever since. As the time-frame of the initial NAVTEX has been approaching its end, Turkey came back with another navigational warning, issued by the Antalya NAVTEX Station, extending the area bounded for seismic research by the Turkish vessel Oruc Reis until Aug 27.

In response the Greek side issued another NAVTEX warning out of Irakleio station warning of a joint Navy and Air Force exercise due to take place between August 24 to 27, in parts of the area that Turkey has already bounded for seismic research. The Antalya Station replied with a new NAVTEX declaring that the Greek navigational warning is null and void, since it was issued by an unauthorized station and the Turkish seismic research would proceed as planned. Apparently this “NAVTEX diplomacy” is being used by each side, as a way to establish a context of the respective sovereign rights in the area. Turkey is seeking to create a de facto situation of grey zones in the Aegean Sea, and is seeming to steadily moving towards this goal.

Heiko Maas in Athens and High Greek Expectations

Heiko Maas held talks with the Leader of the Official Opposition, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Greek Prime Minister respectively during his time in Athens. The meeting between the German Foreign Minister and the Greek top officials took place in a spirit of cooperation and mutual trust.

Nikolaos Dendias, Maas’ Greek counterpart, highlighted that Turkey doesn’t have any sincere intention to negotiate and work alongside Greece to ensure the stability of the region; to the contrary Ankara is always seeking to provoke in order to push further claims and threaten Greek sovereignty. Dendias emphasized that EU under the German Presidency will certainly be a guarantor of the European rights, suggesting that the Turkish unilateral actions should be concerning not only Greece, but the European Union as a whole.

Once again there has been a Greek call for sanctions against Turkey, seeking a proactive approach, similar to the one which was adopted against Belarus; our opinion is that EU, spearheaded by Germany, has no real intention of implementing any sanctions on Turkey at all.

The Greek Foreign Minister also made clear that Greece is willing by all means to protect its sovereign rights against further Turkish provocations; however the recent events following the Oruc Reis’ activity in the sensitive area of the Eastern Mediterranean, has proved that Athens is hesitating to overtake decisive actions even when Ankara puts the Greek sovereignty in question.

An overall assessment of the comments made by the Greek side, indicates that Athens is heavily relying on a coordinated European reaction against Turkey, which is objectively a rather unlikely scenario.

Maas in Ankara and the Inflammatory Response from Cavusoglu

Following his brief visit to Athens, Maas moved to Ankara to hold further talks with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Cavusoglu. During a mutual press conference, shortly after the meeting, Cavusoglu has adopted a much more aggressive approach compared to his Greek counterpart.

After initially thanking Germany for Berlin’s key role in the deescalation process regarding the Greek-Turkish dispute, he mentioned that Athens has been quite arrogant lately, “spoiled” by the long-term EU support, and clarified that no negotiations between the two neighboring countries would proceed, if Greece was to set any preconditions.

He also openly disputed the EEZ rights of the Greek islands and “advised” the Greek government to stop acting recklessly, warning that there will be no further toleration and Ankara will do whatever it takes to protect the Turkish rights and territorial integrity.

Berlin Unlikely to Change its Mild Approach to Turkey

Maas commented during and after his consecutive visits, that at this moment, deescalation is deemed absolutely necessary and constitutes a top priority. There should be a coordinated effort for dialogue between the two opposing parties, and Germany will rigorously assist towards achieving this goal.

It is interesting that Berlin chose to adopt an approach of equal distances, even though Greece is an EU member and the claims of the Greek side are in compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. On the other hand Turkey is reluctant to adhere to the Greek positions, or even negotiate in a context of mutual understanding. Ankara is following a unilateral policy characterized by hostility against the other side; yet Germany turns a blind eye on the Turkish aggressiveness.

The German stance can clearly understood if we look into the strong political and economic ties between Berlin and Ankara. The massive Turkish population in Germany, a significant portion of which is looking favorably at President Erdogan, consists a considerable political capital. Also with Germany establishing its position as a top importer country for Turkey over the last decade and considering the intense financial relations between the two countries, we easily comprehend that the potential implementation of economic sanctions on Ankara would indirectly hurt even Berlin itself.

In this context, it is highly unlikely to see any strict measures against Turkey approved by Germany in the near or long-term. This claim is further supported when we briefly look into another recent visit of Maas, to Libya. Maas reportedly visited the war-torn country to support the ongoing peace negotiations, and his visit coincided with a tripartite agreement between Turkey, Qatar, and the Government of National Accord for military cooperation. Even though this deal will actually lead to further deterioration of the current situation and trigger additional tensions, Maas abstained from commenting, once again ignoring deliberately a Turkish wrongdoing and showing the continuing trend heading forward.

L'articolo Heiko Maas Visits Athens and Ankara, as ‘NAVTEX Diplomacy’ Continues proviene da InsideOver.

On August 6, Greece and Egypt signed an historical deal in an unexpected move, demarcating their maritime boundaries, and essentially declaring their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). Several geopolitical factors across the Eastern Mediterranean and the Libyan front have contributed to this development, which could trigger a new round of tension in the region.

A Late But Important Step for Athens

Surprisingly, Greece has been one of the few countries to remain particularly idle in the initial demarcation of the EEZ. In a region where significant energy reserves have been confirmed, Greece has previously omitted to take the necessary steps in order to proceed to exploration and drilling in the respective area in contrast to numerous other countries nearby like Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon and Israel.

Now, the current Greek administration has taken remarkable action in a field that has been lifeless for decades. Last June Greece came to an agreement with Italy with regards to the maritime boundaries in the Ionian Sea and now Athens has signed a very important deal with Cairo. It should be noted here that in the case of Italy the negotiations have started in 1977 and in the case of Egypt in 2004.

Specific terms of each deal seem to be unfavorable for Greece: for instance in the latest one, 56 to 44 percent of territory was apportioned in favor of Egypt instead of following the equidistant principle. However, the current Greek government is seeking out to gain political capital through these moves, emphasizing that a necessary step for the Greek economy and the international standing of the country has been finally taken after such a long delay.

Geopolitical Gains for Both Sides

The Greek-Egyptian deal comes at a moment when both countries have a lot to gain from this development. On the one hand Greece manages to de facto override the so-called Turkish-Libyan MoU, as the coordinates of the deal are covering a major part of the area established in the questionable pact between Ankara and Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA). Once the deal and the resulting map have been officially published and adopted by the United Nations, then Athens will have also cancelled de jure the Turkish claims.

At the same time, Egypt creates an unwanted situation for both Turkey and the GNA; we should consider here that the ongoing Libyan conflict has gradually developed into a proxy war between Ankara and Cairo, therefore any action that could worsen the Turkish position and standing in the region. This is definitely welcomed by Egyptian President Sisi. The domestic politics of Egypt are also relevant to this decision, considering that several elements of the Egyptian opposition are firmly supported by Turkey. The Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni Muslim organization with expanded popular support from a part of the Egyptian population, poses a significant internal threat for President Sisi; it is well known that the Brotherhood receives considerable financial, logistical and political support from Turksih President Erdogan. Since the Turkish support is a key factor for the power of the Brotherhood in Egypt, every blow to Ankara’s prestige is a push towards the stability and prevalence of Sisi’s regime.

Turkey’s Angry Reaction

Turkey responded fiercely, shortly after the announcement of the deal. Erdogan stated after Friday prayers that Greece acted in a deceptive way and the that the deal is worthless. The Turkish President also claimed that he backed down after the recent provocative actions in the Aegean Sea as a gesture of good will and just because of the German intervention. He also suggested that new drilling activity will soon start in the suggested area, while Turkish vessels are once again sailing within the Cypriot EEZ now. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has also used similar rhetoric, describing the deal null and void, with Turkish Press encouraging these claims.

Finally, just after the announcement by the Greek-Egyptian side, the Antalya Navtex Station issued a NAVTEX advising that a region between the Greek islands of Kastelorizo and Rhodes will be used for a Turkish gunnery exercise on August 10 and 11. The Navigational Telex has alerted the Hellenic Armed Forces and has prompted the Hellenic Navy to closely monitor the area.

There Are Potential Issues with the Deal

The agreement with Egypt is being promoted by the Greek administration and most of the major country media as a huge national success. Even though the deal could be perceived as a smart move to essentially cancel the Turkish-GNA MoU, and finally boost the Greek presence in the eastern Mediterranean, the terms and specifics of the agreement raise some substantial concerns.

One is that the deal excludes the area east of the Meridian after 28° East; even though there have been disagreements between Cairo and Athens, and reportedly those disagreements have blocked the two parties from reaching a deal all this time, the main point of concern has been the island complex of Kastelorizo. But surprisingly Athens has also decided to leave out a part of Rhodes, a major Greek island westwards, in the proximity of Turkey.

Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias stated that this move would leave space for further negotiations in the future among Greece, Egypt, Cyprus and ideally Turkey. However the Greek move could be interpreted as a way to achieve a desired balance for the Greek Government. It is a way of cancelling the already disputed Turkish-Libyan MoU, gaining political capital in-country, but at the same time avoiding the area that has been the main friction point with Ankara and therefore indicating that there is the intention to cooperate and work on a possible bilateral agreement with the “troubling neighbor”.

Unintentionally Empowering Turkey?

In potential future talks, this latest move from Athens has actually provided Ankara with an additional negotiating card, since leaving parts of the islands out of the EEZ agreement actually aligns with the Turkish allegation that islands are entitled to limited EEZ rights. Taking this line of thought thought further and keeping in mind the unofficial trilateral meeting among Greece, Turkey and Germany prior to the aimless tension incident of late July, one could say that a pretext for a Greek-Turkish deal could be unofficially already on the table of negotiations, with the surrounding tension being probably used just to manipulate the domestic audiences of each country. The developments to follow in the next weeks and months will confirm or disprove this claim.

L'articolo The Landmark Greek-Egyptian Deal and the Turkish Factor proviene da InsideOver.

After sealing an agreement with Italy on June 9 that ended a decades-long pending issue over the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) between Greece and Italy, Athens next seemed to be turning its attention to the Aegean front. Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias had a quite busy week with official visits to Paris, Jerusalem and Cairo. The last stop of the Greek Minister was expected to be the most crucial one, however the outcomes have been rather disappointing.

Setting Expectations Too High

Following the June 9 deal with Italy, a peculiar sentiment of success was being carefully cultivated by the Greek media. Even though the agreement between the two countries is of historical importance and a remarkable step forward for the Greek-Italian maritime boundaries and their bilateral relations, the Greek media have tried to make a comparison with the ever-escalating Greek-Turkish dispute in the Aegean Sea.

Despite the fact that there is no geographical link between the two areas, there has been a coordinated effort from specific sources in Athens to highlight that the agreement is supposedly a warning to Ankara and could drastically limit the Turkish provocations and demands in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Obviously, the Greek-Italian deal is totally irrelevant to the Turkish claims in the Aegean and the only reason behind the attempt of the aforementioned Greek sources to make this connection, has been to serve internal political interests. At the same time, in order to further consolidate and enhance this narrative, many circles have been indicating that the upcoming visit of the Greek Foreign Minister to Cairo would bring similar results, securing the delimitation of the maritime boundaries between Greece and Egypt. This would be indeed a strategic move that could change the balance between Athens and Ankara, establishing that Greece is ready to fully practice her rights under International Law, sidelining the Turkish unfounded pressures.

The Significance of a Potential Greek-Egyptian Agreement

As opposed to the Greek-Italian agreement, a potential EEZ demarcation between Athens and Cairo would have a considerable geostrategic impact in the wider region. First and foremost, Greece would make clear her will to expand her rights eastwards, always according to the provisions of the International Law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This would be an actual and clear message to Ankara, that is so far implementing a power projection policy and trying to create de facto events across the Mediterranean through an opportunistic and provocative foreign policy backed by military means.

There have been points of discord between Greece and Egypt that have allegedly blocked the negotiations from moving forward so far. The main disagreement involves the small Greek island of Kastelorizo, and the accompanying islets Ro and Stroggyli. Both lie in the Greek East border in the rear proximity of the Turkish south coast of Antalya. Cairo has been disputing the EEZ rights of those small islands and this has reasonably been a no-go for the Greek policy, since such a compromise could “legitimize” some of the Turkish claims. From the Greek side, there have been reports about a potential partial agreement between the two countries, where the areas of dispute would be left aside in order to be further discussed in the future.

Even a partial, and seemingly easy, agreement with Egypt with regards to the maritime boundaries would be a timely response to Ankara, with further geopolitical connotations. The wider area where Athens and Cairo could establish a part of their Exclusive Economic Zones, is certainly overlapping the corridor that Turkey and GNA have designated as Turkish and Libyan Continental shelf, according to the Maritime Boundary Treaty between Ankara and Tripoli which was signed in late 2019. This Treaty hardly recognizes any EEZ rights for the Greek islands, ignoring international treaties and conventions. To the contrary, a potential agreement between Greece and Egypt would be much more robust, considering that it would be drafted in a transparent framework according to the International Law and also it would be signed by two sovereign states, as opposed to the pact between Turkey and the Government of National Accord.

A Tasteless Meeting and Separate Focal Points for Both Sides

Dendias met President al-Sisi and the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sameh Shoukry in Cairo on June 18. The agenda of the meeting utterly failed to meer the Greek expectations, as the issues around the Exclusive Economic Zones have hardly been discussed. In his official statement the Greek Minister mentioned that the EEZ talks have resumed, without providing any further information, a clear indication that we should not be expecting any significant developments in this field soon. Egyptian media covering the meeting have also barely mentioned any progress on this subject matter. We should stress here, that any moves from the Greek side are time-critical, considering that Turkey has already disclosed their plans of starting drilling activities in the Turkish-Libyan self-declared continental shelf by September, an action that will bring the Turkish drilling vessels, and probably accompanying Turkish naval forces, in the immediate proximity or even within the Greek territorial waters.

On the other hand, discussions over the Libyan conflict are a top priority issue for the Egyptian leadership and basically monopolized the meeting. The Greek Minister greeted the Egyptian initiative for a ceasefire in Libya, in accordance with the Cairo declaration of June 6. The Cairo declaration has caused mixed reactions among the International Community, as many major actors have been skeptical towards the Egyptian proposal, the impartiality of which is under question. So far the UN-led process and the Berlin conference have been the main points of reference around the Libya peace efforts.

The Turkish-Egyptian Standoff in Libya

Cairo is particularly worried about the latest developments in the Libyan front. The heavy Turkish involvement in the conflict has turned the balance in favor of the GNA forces, obliging the Libyan National Army to strategically withdraw westwards, after facing several tactical defeats and losing key military bases. The Libyan-Egyptian border spans a territory of over 1,000 kilometres. Now, Cairo is not only facing the limited, yet ongoing, insurgency in the Northern Sinai, but also risks the infiltration of terrorist cells from Eastern Libya. Such a development would further destabilize the country, and also create an asymmetrical threat when combined with the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the political life of Egypt. We should note here that both GNA and Turkey are strong supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and a potential spillover of the Libyan conflict in Egypt could possibly trigger a chain reaction in the country, with an unpredictable impact on the political and security apparatus.

In this context al-Sisi stated on June 20 that Egypt holds a legitimate right to military intervene in Libya, setting any further GNA progress towards the strategic city of Sirte, as a red line. At the same time, Turkey is determined to keep pushing its aggressive agenda in the Mediterranean, as it forms a vital part of the Turkish energy and regional security strategy. Therefore, we should only anticipate that Ankara will continue getting more and more involved in Libya. On the other hand, the Egyptian reaction will heavily rely upon the stance of Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar’s additional backers, namely Russia, KSA and UAE, as rising skepticism is being noticed from the side of Moscow and the aforementioned Gulf states towards the LNA comamnder. Given al-Sisi’s statements and intentions we highly doubt that Egypt would be willing to get involved in a wide-scale operation in Libya without any back-up from the rest of the major players.

L'articolo Maritime Boundaries and the Libyan Conflict proviene da InsideOver.

Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikos Dendias welcomed his Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud to Athens last week. It’s the second time the two ministers have met in less than a month. According to Dendias, the two countries are working together as two responsible guarantors of regional stability. This is a rather ill-advised statement, considering that the scope of the current Greek diplomacy and foreign policy does not qualify for such a role and simultaneously considering that Riyadh’s international attitude proves that the kingdom is more of a cause of regional tension than it is a responsible power that promotes peace and stability.

The Greek-Saudi Patriot Missile Deal

Besides their aligning interests in the Libyan front, as both countries are supporting Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the LNA, the specific reason for the Greek-Saudi meeting and the issue on the top of the agenda was the so-called Patriot deal. A drone attack against Saudi Arabia’s state-owned Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities took place in September 2019. Considering the impact on the main pillar of the Saudi economy—the energy industry—Riyadh sought to enhance air defense capabilities both domestically and through international partnerships. Their priority is to stop potential attacks from the Iran-backed Houthi rebels or any other affiliated groups.

The Greek government responded promptly to the Saudi call and has agreed to provide Patriot Surface to Air missiles (SAMs) from the arsenal of the Hellenic Airforce. At this point, it would be worth looking more into the rationale of the deal, as one might reasonably wonder why the Saudis had to take this missile system from Greece rather than directly from the United States.

Why Does Riyadh Want To Buy Patriot Systems From Athens And Not Washington?

Riyadh has traditionally secured major deals with the US defense industry. Considering the economic wealth and importance of the kingdom, these deals could be interpreted as a significant diplomatic means that ensured the stable and prosper bilateral relations between the two countries and the continuous US support for KSA in terms of defense and security. So, what is the point in having Greece deploying the missiles instead of a direct deal between Riyadh and Washington?

If US-Saudi economic relations can be understood as a foreign policy tool, this is where the latest agreement with Greece also fits in. After the recent visit of the Greek PM to the White House, Athens has been advised to satisfy the Saudi request in order to support the ongoing US confrontation with Iran. The long-lasting dispute between the two major players in the Middle East—Riyadh and Tehran—could stop being perceived as a regional clash through proxy actors in neighboring countries like Yemen and Lebanon, while the participation of an EU country in the air defense system of Saudi Arabia with personnel on the ground boosts the narrative of a multinational anti-Iran force standing up to Iranian aggression. It also sets the ground for other US-affiliated countries to join. But what could be the consequences of such a move for Greece?

Greek-Saudi Deal Is A Dubious Move Amidst Greek-Turkish Escalation

In order to understand the size of the force, the SAM batteries to be deployed to Riyadh account for almost 16 percent of the—probably—most sophisticated Hellenic SAM air defense system available. Combined with the specialized personnel that accompany the system—over 100 servicemen—that will be transferred to Saudi Arabia to support the mission, it is obvious that there is a severe impact on Greek capabilities and readiness, especially when taking into account the current escalation between Ankara and Athens and the continuous Turkish breaches of Hellenic airspace.

Even though the aforementioned numbers have not been confirmed by governmental officials yet, it is highly likely that they are accurate. After a—rather insufficient and unsuitable, as usual—criticism from the opposition parties, sources of the Hellenic Government have tried to downplay the consequences of this agreement, suggesting that a Patriot battery has been inactive until recently so the agreement with Riyadh would make no difference to Greek defense capabilities. Even if this claim is accurate, it is totally unacceptable for the current administration to admit that a critical weapons system has been out of service for an unspecified period of time, and it is equally unreasonable to suggest that when eventually it has been put back into service, it would shortly be shipped to Saudi Arabia in order to support operations irrelevant to the Greek interests. There are some rumors about a technical update from the US on the remaining Patriot systems in Greece on beneficial terms in return for the deal with KSA, but—while possible—those rumors are too generic and still remain unconfirmed.

Two-Fold Impact On Greek-Iranian Relations

At the same time, this move will certainly deteriorate the long-term bilateral relations between Athens and Tehran. Iran has traditionally been an important partner to Greece, with significant commercial and cultural ties having long been established between the two countries. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in a diplomatic blunder was urged to declare support for the US administration after Soleimani’s killing. This move has been heavily criticized, considering that all the other EU leaders have tried to be as neutral as possible in order to contribute to the de-escalation of the tension and not provoke Tehran further; not surprisingly the Greek reaction has pushed Iran to officially lodge a demarche through diplomatic channels. Among others matters, the statement mentioned any facilitation from a third country to US Forces deployed and ordered to operate against the Islamic Republic would be perceived as a hostile act.

Even if the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, alongside the major in-country media outlets, tried to downgrade the incident, indicating that the Greek-Iranian relations remain well-tempered, Athens is now making a controversial deal with one of Tehran’s worst enemies. Criticism within Greece has focused on the impact of this development on the commercial ties between the two countries, with many voices mistakenly suggesting that Iran is still one of the major oil providers for Greece, although there has been a tremendous downturn on Iranian oil imports to Greece since Trump started abandoning JCPOA. Of course, we don’t doubt that Tehran is an important trade partner for Athens and the last moves would have a negative impact, but the most vital and concerning aspect for Greece has been once again internally neglected.

This is the impact on the internal security of the state and the perception of the terrorist threat in Greece. A statement from the Greek PM would hardly trigger a violent reaction from Tehran, however, a substantial engagement of Greek forces on Saudi ground might be a step too far for the Iranian leadership. We have previously discussed how insufficient Greek infrastructure is, in controlling Middle East-originated individuals entering the country; we have also explained the heightened risk ensuing from this situation, from a security perspective, explaining that the perpetrators of some of the most high profile attacks in European metropolitan cities have entered Europe through Greece.

The risk perception could remain manageable as long as Greece is adopting a responsible neutral and balanced stance in the region. But the surprising decision of the Patriot deployment to Saudi Arabia might well provoke an unprecedented Iranian reaction. We have seen several times in the past that the triggering of dormant proxy cells in third countries as a means of Iranian retaliation is a possibility even if Tehran hardly ever takes the credit for such actions—at least officially. Athens should have already secured the appropriate countermeasures before proceeding to such controversial diplomatic maneuvers. At this point, we seriously doubt if any countermeasures were taken.

L'articolo Controversial Greek-Saudi Weapons Deal Moves Forward proviene da InsideOver.

On a surprise move, Khalifa Haftar has visited Athens on Thursday 17 January, late evening.The next morning General Haftar met the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikos Dendias, before heading to the Hellenic Parliament, to meet Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis. The upcoming talks in Berlin have been at the top of the agenda between the Libyan strongman and Mr. Mitsotakis. Albeit the wide and enthusiastic coverage the visit has received from Greek media, there has been no official joint statement by General Haftar and the Greek side, once the talks have been completed.

Mr. Dendias has tried to highlight the key points of the meeting in an interview he gave on Friday night, 17 January, to the Greek state-owned broadcaster ERT. According to the Greek Minister, Athens would pursue – by all means – the establishment of an unconditional and open-ended ceasefire and at the same time the cancellation of the two Memoranda of Understanding between GNA and Turkey. Mr. Haftar is allegedly totally agreeing with the Greek pledges for the cancellation of the MoUs, a claim that makes absolute sense, considering that LNA wants to limit any Turkish involvement in the Libyan front. Mr. Dendias could not confirm if and to what extent General Haftar will put on the table the cancellation of MoUs, as a necessary condition for the smooth progress of the negotiations, during the Berlin summit tomorrow. It has also been stressed out that Greece is not seeing the current situation in the eastern Mediterranean as a zero-sum game between Ankara and Athens, and the ideal solution should guarantee benefits for all the sides involved.

At the same time Greek PM, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, stated that the absence of Greece in the Berlin summit is a sad fact and Germany has overlooked the crucial role of Greece, as a factor of stability in the region. Mr. Mitsotakis clarified that Greece was willing to veto any decision with regards to the Libyan crisis, that would not reject the validity of the two MoUs between Tripoli and Ankara. A statement that has been probably a part of the Government’s communication policy, considering that even if Athens tries to veto any decision about Libya in the level of EU foreign ministers, the impact on the outcome of the process would be minimal. Besides, we highly doubt that Greece could proceed to vetoing any such plans, in the first place.

Back to Haftar’s presence in Athens, we should look at the timing and the implications of the visit. Greece has been struggling to establish herself as an equal negotiating party on the Libyan process, especially after the Turkish latest moves, that impact directly the Greek vital national interests. Athens failure to secure a position in the table of negotiations in Berlin had a significant political backlash for the government, which had to be turned around the soonest.

Mr. Dendias has visited Libya and met with General Haftar in late December 2019 and expressed the Greek support to the LNA efforts. The two parties have agreed to hold another meeting in Athens, and the current timing could not be better for Greece. The absence of a joint statement and the limited comments from the Greek side about what has been discussed, indicates that little progress has been made in terms of promoting the Greek demands against the Turkish provocations in the region. On the other hand, the Greek major media -most of them friendly to the current administration- have presented the event, as an unprecedented Greek success that could constraint the EU and Turkish options and the only possible outcome from the Sunday negotiations would be the most favorable one for Greece. Briefly Haftar’s meeting has been sold to the Greek public, as a game –  changing development, speculating that Haftar is planning to decisively promote the Greek positions in Berlin. Apparently this approach is ignoring the fact that Haftar forces are waging war for almost six years in Libya, and the top priority for the General is to consolidate his power all over the country and secure his very survival.

Assessing the current power balance in-country and the ongoing international developments related to Libya, we believe that Haftar’s role will be considerably upgraded, opening the road to the General to eventually control the country. The Greek side is relying on this scenario to capitalize on the potential gains, assuming that things will play out well for the Libyan General. However, we should always consider that several regional powers have also supported Haftar, including Egypt, UAE and allegedly Israel. These powers have provided much more substantial support long before Greece and will certainly seek to use the potential Haftar’s prevalence in their best interest.

L'articolo Implications of Haftar’s Visit in Greece proviene da InsideOver.

The participating countries are entering the final stretch for the Berlin Conference on the Libyan Civil War. The German initiative to host a conference, aiming to limit the long-lasting violence and unrest in Libya has been scheduled for this Sunday, 19 January 2020. Fifteen parties could participate in the conference, after being invited by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the German Minister of Foreign affairs, Heiko Maas.

In addition to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (United States, Russian Federation, People’s Republic of China, France, and the United Kingdom), requests to attend have been sent to Italy, Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, UAE and Republic of Congo. Representatives from the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, and the Arab League will also take part in the process.

Turkey; not really “internationally isolated”

Turkey has been engaging in some notable political manoeuvring over the last few months, with regards to Libya. Erdogan has been openly expressing his support for the Tripoli government and Fayez al-Sarraj, not only through diplomatic channels but also by providing substantial support on the ground. The talks around Turkish military equipment shipped to Tripoli amidst an active arms embargo and the deployment of Turkish troops to Libya have prompted wide controversy, fueling international criticism. Yet here is Turkey, being one of the main players in the peace negotiations in Berlin.

To the contrary of what Greek sources, and especially the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikos Dendias, are trying to convince the public, Turkey is not internationally marginalized at all. Despite the provocative Turkish actions in the Mediterranean, that have been occasionally condemned by the EU and the States, Ankara is utilizing an ingenious, albeit risky, foreign policy using a well-balanced combination of political and military means.

The cooperation with Sarraj and – according to Tayyip Erdogan – the deployment of Turkish forces in Libya has created a situation on the ground, where Turkey is a de facto key actor, in all the processes around the Libyan Crisis. Considering the limited territory under Sarraj’s control and Haftar’s backing from Russia, Egypt and the Gulf countries, it is under question if the Turkish involvement could eventually tip the balance in favor of GNA in the case of a decisive escalation; in fact, it is dubious if Turkey was planning to engage in full battle against LNA, in the first place. According to a recent statement from the Turkish Vice President, Fuat Oktay, the large-scale deployment of Turkish Armed Forces in Libya, could be avoided, should the crisis deescalate. In a closer look, this could be just a Turkish well-played waggle, in order political leverage to be achieved in Libya through force projection; so far it has played out quite well for Ankara.

Greece; missing the point once again

Moving to the developments in Greece, things are rather discouraging for Hellenic Diplomacy and the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both Greek Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Militiadis Varvitsiotis and Government Spokesman Stelios Petsas stated in the previous days that Athens has been persistently pushing for the country’s participation in the Berlin Conference; as it turns out the Greek efforts have been far from fruitful. In the latest statement issued by Berlin, the Memorandum of Understanding, or at least the bilateral agreements over the maritime borders, between Turkey and Libya -the very reason that Greece had to participate- would not be discussed in the Conference and is not deemed relevant to the current peace talks. In this respect, all the EU countries that are not essentially involved in the Libyan Crisis would be represented by the EU delegate, according to the German side.

The German approach is candidly downgrading Athens’ international standing, especially when considering that Greek vital interests are at stake, depending on the developments in the Libyan front. The current situation should be primarily attributed to the failure of the Greek diplomacy to secure a position in the Conference, and secondarily to the unfair judgment of the German Chancellor. The situation is just as disappointing within Greece.

All the opposition parties have missed the point once again and seem unable to understand how important this matter for the country is. Such a critical issue has been treated as an opportunity to criticize the government and eventually has turned into a pointless political debate between the ruling party and the opposition. It’s about time for the Greek side -including parties all across the political spectrum- to carefully reconsider their approach to foreign policy issues and adopt a more responsible and unified stance. For now, all eyes are on Berlin; the decisions to be taken on Sunday, will have a significant impact not only in war-tormented Libya but also in the wider region, definitely including Athens and Ankara.

L'articolo Heading Towards the Berlin Conference proviene da InsideOver.