Una visita lampo, due ore appena, ma con la densità di un vertice che pesa più del suo calendario. Il 19 gennaio lo sceicco Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan è andato a Nuova Delhi e con Narendra Modi ha messo una firma da 3 miliardi di dollari sul gas naturale liquefatto: per dieci anni, mezzo milione di tonnellate l’anno da ADNOC Gas alla Hindustan Petroleum. L’India diventa il principale cliente di Abu Dhabi. Dettaglio commerciale? No: è la prova che nel Golfo la politica estera oggi passa dai contratti di fornitura, e che l’Asia è il mercato dove si decidono le nuove gerarchie energetiche.

La posta economica: scambi a 200 miliardi

I due leader hanno rilanciato un obiettivo ambizioso: raddoppiare gli scambi bilaterali a 200 miliardi di dollari in sei anni. La cornice è l’accordo commerciale del 2022, che ha trasformato l’intesa India–Emirati in un modello di cooperazione “a corsia veloce”. Qui la logica è semplice: l’India vuole energia garantita e investimenti; gli Emirati vogliono mercati stabili, domanda crescente e una sponda politica che non dipenda solo dall’Occidente.

Scenario economico: per Nuova Delhi, bloccare volumi e prezzi su un orizzonte decennale significa ridurre l’esposizione agli shock e guadagnare prevedibilità industriale. Per Abu Dhabi, significa ancorare una quota rilevante della produzione a un acquirente in espansione. Non è solo commercio: è costruzione di dipendenza “amica”, quella che ti protegge quando la geopolitica si mette di traverso.

Difesa: operazioni speciali e cybersicurezza

La parte più sensibile non è il gas, ma la parola “difesa”. India ed Emirati hanno annunciato l’intenzione di costruire una partnership strategica che tocca campi molto concreti: operazioni speciali, interoperabilità, cyberspazio, antiterrorismo. E siccome ogni frase in diplomazia è un bilancino, Nuova Delhi ha fatto dire al proprio capo della diplomazia, Vikram Misri, che questo non significa farsi trascinare nei conflitti della regione. Tradotto: vogliamo cooperare, ma senza diventare parte del problema.

Valutazione strategica militare: l’interoperabilità non è un concetto gentile, è un moltiplicatore operativo. Se due apparati imparano a parlarsi, a condividere procedure e a coordinare capacità, aumentano deterrenza e tempo di reazione. Ma c’è un prezzo: quando stringi i legami di sicurezza, l’ambiguità diminuisce. E in un Golfo che si polarizza a ondate, la chiarezza può diventare un bersaglio.

Il capitolo nucleare: cooperazione e reattori

Dentro l’intesa entra anche la cooperazione sul nucleare: sviluppo e attuazione di “grandi reattori” e sicurezza nucleare. È un passaggio che vale su due piani. Primo: prestigio e modernizzazione, perché il nucleare civile è un biglietto da visita di potenza tecnologica. Secondo: autonomia energetica nel lungo periodo, perché chi investe su più fonti riduce l’ansia da approvvigionamento. Per l’India, che cresce e consuma, è un tema strutturale. Per gli Emirati, è la prosecuzione della strategia: trasformare rendita energetica in infrastruttura di potere.

La partita con Pakistan, Arabia Saudita e Turchia

Il testo mette in scena anche l’altra partita: l’avvicinamento tra Arabia Saudita e Pakistan e la pressione turca per entrare in un patto di difesa che, con Islamabad, porta in dote anche la dimensione nucleare. In questa cornice, l’intesa India–Emirati viene letta a Nuova Delhi come un segnale “contro” il Pakistan. E infatti la stampa più schierata in India la racconta così: profondità strategica, risposta diplomatica, triangolazioni nel Golfo.

Qui entra il fattore industriale pakistano: l’uso della reputazione bellica come leva commerciale, con il caccia JF-17 prodotto con la Cina proposto come merce geopolitica. Il messaggio è chiaro: nel subcontinente la deterrenza non è solo missili e confini, è anche esportazione di armamenti e alleanze che comprano protezione.

La frattura nel Golfo: alleati insieme, rivali per influenza

C’è un ultimo livello, più silenzioso ma decisivo: Emirati e Arabia Saudita sono formalmente alleati nel Consiglio di Cooperazione del Golfo, ma competono sempre più spesso su teatri e clientele. In Yemen, Riad sostiene il governo riconosciuto; Abu Dhabi appoggia i separatisti del Sud, costruendo influenza lungo coste, porti e isole. In Sudan e in Libia, gli Emirati hanno scelto la strada dei “referenti forti” locali, per avere leve e corridoi. È una geopolitica da mercati emergenti: investire su uomini e territori come fossero asset.

Valutazione geopolitica e geoeconomica: l’accordo India–Emirati non è un fatto isolato, è un tassello della trasformazione del Golfo in piattaforma che guarda sempre più a Est. Se Washington appare meno capace o meno desiderosa di imporre disciplina regionale, ogni capitale si costruisce la propria rete di sicurezza. E quando l’energia si intreccia con la difesa, il commercio smette di essere neutrale: diventa schieramento, anche quando si dice il contrario.

Il punto vero: un’alleanza misurata in forniture

Il gas naturale liquefatto è il perno visibile, la difesa è la porta che si apre, il nucleare è la scommessa di status. Ma la sostanza è una sola: India ed Emirati stanno provando a convertire scambi e investimenti in architettura strategica. In un’area dove i blocchi si formano e si disfano, la forza non è solo avere amici: è scegliere dipendenze sostenibili e renderle reciprocamente convenienti. Quando ci riesci, non hai solo un contratto. Hai un pezzo di futuro sotto controllo.

L'articolo India–Emirati: l’energia apre la porta, la difesa entra in casa proviene da InsideOver.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has appointed Faisal Mekded as his country’s new Foreign Minister, replacing Walid al-Moallem who died almost a week ago, according to Al-Jazeera. 

Mekded has some big shoes to fill as al-Moallem was an adept and stalwart supporter of Assad’s regime. The former foreign minister held his job throughout the last decade, and survived several reshuffles before he died at the age of 79.

The Syrian Government did not specify the cause of al-Moallem’s death, but his health was understood to have been deteriorating for some time.

Mekded is an Experienced Politician

The 66-year-old Mekded also possesses significant political experience. He started his career at the Syrian Foreign Ministry in 1994 and has been deputy foreign minister since 2006.

He shadowed Moallem at most conferences and meetings, and stepped in to make statements when the latter’s health began to deteriorate.

Syria’s new Foreign Minister has an enormous task ahead of him regarding improving his country’s stature in the world. The Syrian Government remains isolated internationally, despite recent attempts to normalize ties with Gulf countries.

Yet the good news for Mekded is that both the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain rebuilt their relationships with Syria while Moallem served as the nation’s foreign minister. The UAE reopened its embassy in Damascus in 2018, followed by Bahrain.

Cooperative Opportunities Abound for Mekded

In March, the Syrian President and Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan spoke on the phone in March for the first time since the Syrian civil war began in 2011.

As Daniel L. Byman argues for the Brookings Institute, the likelihood is that Syria will remain weak in the near- and mid-term, and probably for another decade. The country is exhausted by civil war and riven by ethnic and communal divisions, its military is paralyzed, and domestic stability will remain the dominant military concern.

The Assad regime does not control the entire country due to interference from foreign powers such as Russia and Iran. These rival states could support warlords or rebel groups against the government to prolong the civil war.

If Mekded is serious about improving Syria’s presence on the regional stage, he should look beyond depending upon Iran for stability. The new Foreign Minister can achieve this aim by uniting Sunnis, Alawites, and others under a common banner: the desire to gradually reduce Tehran’s influence and increase Syria’s self-sufficiency.

Other nations such as Egypt and the UAE may look to strengthen their relationship with Syria as well if Mekded manages to achieve this aim.

Mekded is Unlikely to Improve Syria’s International Reputation

Neighboring states like Jordan fear continued instability in Syria, and Germany’s politicians are facing domestic pressure due to the presence of Syrian refugees in their country. Mekded could bring up the refugee crisis in negotiations, demanding more aid for them should they return, and also pressure for humane treatment for any who return.

Despite this, none of these developments would return Syria to its pre-war status, but they would allow Damascus to increase its autonomy should Mekded choose to adopt these ideas.

Mekded’s Likely Trajectory Going Forward: More of the Same

But considering Mekded has served as Moallem’s deputy for the last decade, the reality is that he will continue with the latter’s legacy. During an interview with the RIA Novosti state news agency in 2018, Mekded revealed that he did not believe that both Russia and Iran were violating Syria’s sovereignty, and that he wanted nations which are opposed to terrorism to remain in the country. Syrian citizens should therefore expect more of the same from their new Foreign Minister.

A new ministerial appointment is always an opportunity for a preexisting government to change its approach to a specific policy, but given Mekded’s track record and loyalty to Moallem and his policies in office, he will probably do nothing to improve Syria’s position on the global stage.

Nonetheless, there are many opportunities Syria can take advantage of, and time will tell whether the new Foreign Minister will exploit them.

L'articolo What Impact Will Syria’s New Foreign Minister Have? proviene da InsideOver.

An unusual phone call at a critical time in the region was made on Friday by one of the United Arab Emirates most influential leaders Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed to Syrian President Bashar al Assad. MBZ is Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE’s armed forces. The call surprised many political observers and millions of Syrian alike.

The Long Silence

The two leaders, once thought to be good friends and longtime acquaintances have not spoken for some nine years of the Syrian conflict, mainly due to huge support provided by the UAE’s strong man MBZ to fanatic and rebel groups that have been fighting in Syria in a frustrating effort to topple Assad’s government.

The UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have played pivotal roles at various phases of the war in Syria. They have lent financial, military, intelligence and logistical support to terror groups operating in Syria, and actively contributed to the bloodshed of hundreds of thousands of Syrians as well as the destruction of much of the Syrian economy and infrastructure. Therefore, Friday’s phone conversation between Assad and MBZ denotes significant political and economic implications and messages, given the conflicting agendas and affiliations of the aforementioned parties in Syria and further beyond.

What Led to the Call, Erdogan or Coronavirus?

The timing of this developments could prove as significant as its occurrence, coming only a few days after a senior Russian delegation left Damascus where final touches were agreed with the Syrian leader regarding the implementation of the truce deal struck by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan last month in Moscow. The deal was regarding Idlib, where Russia and Turkey have been supporting opposite parties. The phone call by the UAE’s strongest man comes one and a half years after reopening the United Arab Emirates embassy in Damascus which had been closed down, along with the majority of Gulf, Arab and Western missions in Damascus, at the outset of the Syrian conflict in 2011.

Now that the military aspect of the conflict in Syria appears to be quickly coming to an end, with the Syrian army retaking all major cities and towns except for Idlib and parts located east of the Euphrates, many Gulf and other Arab countries are seeking a resumption of political ties with Syria and its triumphant leader Assad.

Abu Dhabi’s Relations With Damascus

Bin Zayed’s Friday phone call has had some quick ramifications that signal a thaw in the thick ice that has marked relations between Abu Dhabi and Damascus for nine years, and a new page between the two nations might well have been opened. One day after the call, the UAE was reported to have released some US $3 billion of Syrian funds frozen for seven years in its banks. The official Emirati news agency WAM said Assad and Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan discussed efforts to contain the coronavirus outbreak and reviewed preventive measures to fight it. But it is becoming clear that what was discussed and agreed between the two leaders was much wider than only the pandemic issue.

Many observers have written about the significance of this daring step taken by one of the USA’s top and most powerful regional allies in the Gulf, underlining the fact that such a move could not have been made with Washington’s tacit approval much less instructions. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are staunch adversaries of both Iran and Turkey in the Gulf and Arab region, and MBZ’s endeavor towards Assad is difficult to disassociate from Abu Dhabi and Riyadh’s vicious campaigns to halt and thwart Erdogan’s expansionist schemes in Syria, Libya, the Gulf region and beyond.

More Implications of Bin Zayed’s Move Towards Assad

Has the Crown Prince chosen, or was advised to seize, a sensitive timing for his overture towards Damascus, that would minimize the possibility of being turned down by Assad? The fact remains that millions of Syrians are extremely against any normalization of diplomatic ties with ANY country that has taken part in the war against Syria, and stand firm against the return of their country to the Arab League whom they accuse  of being a catalyst part of the conspiracy to destroy Syria both militarily and economically. However, the UAE could provide Syria with much-needed substantive economic and health support in its efforts against the Coronavirus pandemic.

MBZ, believed to be the United Arab Emirates’ day-to-day ruler, is reported to have told President Assad during the conversation that “Syria and the UAE need to place the humanitarian solidarity over political issues during this common challenge that we all are facing.” The crown prince of the affluently oil-rich Abu Dhabi also affirmed that Syria “will not be left alone during these delicate and critical circumstances,” as was reported by both Syrian and Emirati official media channels. Syria’s official presidential Twitter account also confirmed that the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince stressed that the UAE will support the “Syrian people during these exceptional times.”

Syria’s Struggle With Coronavirus

Years of unabated conflict, exacerbated by stringent US-led sanctions against Damascus, have decimated much of the health system infrastructure in Syria. Yesterday, Syria confirmed 4 new Covid-19 infections raising the total to nine cases. Syria also recorded one death of a woman soon after being rushed to a hospital Sunday, with the woman thus becoming the first officially recognized fatality of the pandemic in Syria.

The government has imposed a virtual lockdown across Syria in a desperate effort to fend off and contain the potential spread of the Coronavirus that has become the government’s toughest challenge. The Syrian Defense Ministry issued two resolutions Saturday regarding reserve army officers and soldiers. All reserve officers who have served for more than three years, as well as those reservists of lesser military ranks who have served a total of seven years, will all be discharged now.

The UAE has officially closed down Orient TV network, the prime Arabic language anti-Assad media outlet run by a Syrian opposition businessman based in Dubai. The move, coupled with the release of billions of frozen Syrian assets in UAE banks and the pledge made by MBZ during his phone conversation with president Assad, are strong indications of a major U-turn by some Gulf and Arab nations towards Syria’s Assad.  With the Hajj to the Holy city of Mecca, Saudi Arabia, being canceled and the shrine being shut down to millions of pilgrims this year due to coronavirus, the Arabian political “pilgrimage” back to Damascus appears to have already commenced.

L'articolo UAE’s First High-level Contact with Assad: More than a Phone Call, Less than Normalization proviene da InsideOver.