Many intriguing and unusual developments have been taking place in recent days and weeks in the Middle East. They reflect and contribute to the changing shape and geopolitical orientations of several countries around this whirlwind of a region.

Shifting alliances and the breaking of historical taboos, traditional affiliations and groupings are all taking place, all against the backdrop of the American election’s outcome and its ensuing uncertainties for forthcoming US foreign policy.

Here’s a rundown of major events that have taken place in the Middle East recently, and a look at how they could affect or even reshape future stability of this volatile region which seems to be under the spell of continuous turmoil.

The Killing of Iran’s Nuclear Program Chief Mohsen Fakhrizadeh

Many regional powers – most notably Turkey and Israel – have reacted with either caution by rearranging their cards and priorities in the region as Ankara appears to have done, or by flexing their military muscles by launching fresh missile attacks against Syria and what they claim to be Iranian military targets in Syria, or even more dangerously assassinating Iran’s top rocket and research man in Tehran Friday. This is an operation widely believed to bear the fingerprints of Israel’s Mossad.

How, when and where will Tehran retaliate to the assassination of the founder of Iran’s nuclear program and probably its top military scientist Dr. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh remains in question. Some pundits compare his significance to that of General Qassim Soleimani, killed in a sophisticated American operation along with his Iraqi counterpart Al Muhandes and a number of senior aides, when a US drone blasted their cars as they left Baghdad airport last December.

The main brain behind Tehran’s advanced rocket, missile and nuclear program, Fakhrizadeh was no ordinary figure for both the Iranians as well as their many adversaries, especially Israel and the United States. Fakhri Zadeh’s assassination during a gun battle with his armed bodyguards is inevitably not going to pass without a retaliatory operation somewhere. Germany was the first EU country to react to assassination by calling upon all parties for self restraint despite the gravity of the incident.

Initial Iranian Reactions to Fakhri Zadeh’s Murder

“The assassination of ‘Mohsen’ Fakhrizadeh was a cowardly act that bears the hallmark of the ‘Zionist’ entity”, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said in a comment on the incident. Whether Zarif’s remarks could indicate a simple tit-for-tat reprisal, or snowball into an all-out confrontation with Israel somehow and somewhere soon, remains a wild guess. Later, Iran’s supreme spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for “the severe punishment of perpetrators of this crime as well as those who stand behind them”. One day later, Iran’s Parliament unanimously endorsed increasing uranium enrichment  at key nuclear plants in the country to 20%.

However, the Iranian rocket attack against the American quarter of Ain Al Assad air base near Baghdad a few days after their open threat to vindicate General Soleimani’s assassination makes an Iranian response to the killing of Fakhrizadeh ever more likely and likely not too far away.

Syria’s equivalent scientists to the slain Iranian “rocket father” Fakhrizadeh were the nation’s top missile and rocket masterminds General Nabil Zgheib and Dr. Aziz Esber, Chairman of Research Centre in Mesyaf. They were also previously assassinated by what many believe were pro-Israeli agents. Zgheib was brutally murdered along with his wife and two sons in Damascus in 2012, while Esber was shot dead in his car as he left a local petrol station near Hama in 2018; the list of assassinations goes on and on.

Israel is Biggest Short-Term Beneficiaries of Current Chaos

While Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his intelligence chiefs might be raising their glasses to the success of their latest and highly precarious operation in Tehran it is arguably still too soon to celebrate. Netanyahu is undoubtedly encouraged by the audacious — some observers claim historical — normalization moves recently made by some Arab nations such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and the Sudan to normalize ties with Israel.

This was followed by the leak of the first ever visit to Saudi Arabia by an Israeli PM, as Benjamin Netanyahu himself, accompanied by Mossad intelligence chief Yossi Cohen  boarded a private jet and headed for Saudi Arabia last week.

The three-hours-long meeting with Saudi Crown Prince MBS (Mohammed Bin Salman) – whose father King Salman was reportedly kept out of the loop about Netanyahu’s secretive visit – was an encounter attended and reportedly brokered by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and signals a ground breaking development between the two sides.

Still, with the recent killing of Fakhrizadeh, pundits are also warning that such escalatory actions by Tel Aviv threaten to drag the Middle East towards the abyss of an all-out war that would have devastating both regional as well as international ramifications.

Turkish Economy in Ruins as Erdogan Faces EU’s Wrath

A covert war also seems to be unfolding between Ankara and the European Union over Turkish intransigence and continuing provocation against neighbors including some EU member nations and its infringement of international law as well as a number of bilateral treaties and understandings. The recent boarding of a German frigate and inspection of a Turkish cargo ship highlights the ongoing tension and Western dissatisfaction with President Recep Erdogan’s foreign policy and already dented image and bad human rights record.

This uneasy relationship is likely to take an even sharper nosedive following the harsh sentences passed by Erdogan’s judges against 337 people, including high-ranking army officers and pilots who were sentenced to life imprisonment last week, after being “indicted” in connection with the failed 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan. Many pundits believe the whole coup saga might have actually been orchestrated in order to enable Erdogan to get rid of all his opponents and rivals in one fell swoop.

Can Erdogan Mend Fences with Saudi Arabia – and if So, at What Cost?

Despite the Saudi ruler King Salman’s surprise phone call to Erdogan on the eve of the G20 summit hosted by Saudi Arabia last week — and the friendly exchanges publicized by both leaders and their state-run media — both nations remain at odds vis-à-vis numerous issues. These obstacles include the blockade on Qatar, support of radical and terrorist groups such as Muslim Brotherhood, hegemony over the Muslim world, relations with Egypt and the conflicts in Libya and Syria to name just a few stumbling blocks.

It remains to be seen how international human rights groups and Western nations will react to such unprecedented vendetta verdicts made by the Turkish courts, which are highly influenced by Erdogan’s strict control.

Deepening Turkish economic hardships were recently reflected in Erdogan’s sacking of his Governor of the Central Bank which in turn led to the resignation of his brother in law and Finance Minister Barat Al Bayrak. The resignation followed a 400% devaluation of the Turkish Lira currency over the past few years and decreased foreign investments aggravated by a sharp decline in foreign currencies national reserves over the past few months.

Meanwhile, the European Parliament agreed last week to impose sanctions on Turkey that cover oil and gas exploration in the Mediterranean as well as prominent individuals close to Erdogan. Those sanctions will have to be approved by EU leaders at their meeting due in little over two weeks. Some experts argue that these sanctions are not only a reflection of European policy but are also in line with the new American policy towards Turkey.

What are Washington’s Options in the Region?

Many observers highlight the likelihood that the Trump Administration will have to take some controversial steps and make some precarious regional decisions in the remaining few weeks before the inauguration of president-elect Joe Biden some seven weeks away. Should President Donald Trump fulfil his ever-changing promise to withdraw US troops from hotbeds of the Middle East and Afghanistan?

Some analysts argue that in Iraq for example, the United States came up with Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kazemi in order to prevent Iraq from heading east to China, abort the Iraqi-Chinese agreement failed and to prevent Baghdad from taking its default position in the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” Washington, they maintain, has instructed both France and Britain to keep their forces in Iraq, and is adamant that they should hold up the strategic goal of securing their share of Iraqi oil.

Syria remains another challenging obstacle where the United States wants first and foremost the to ensure that Iran withdraws whatever forces it has there, as well as to  guarantee some kind of autonomy for its Kurdish proxy militia the SDF, before any such withdrawals. Trump’s sudden decision last October to leave Syrian Kurds in the open to fend off for themselves against the overwhelmingly advancing Turkish war machine has had a devastating impact on any remaining trust between Kurds and Trump.

In Lebanon, Washington’s main objective is to protect its closest ally Israel from Hezbollah’s massive rocket arsenal, believed to run into well over 100,000 missiles of varying caliber, range and capacity, in case a conflict breaks out with Israel. American sanctions against Hezbollah — along with strangling the Lebanese economy and encouraging riots and anti-government demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins have all failed to bring Washington’s adversaries to their knees. Even the suspicious catastrophic explosion that wiped out much of Beirut’s once thriving sea port and scenic sea front, appears to have backfired; the political vacuum and musical chairs game continues, the economic dilemma and the rift between the warring parties widens with no hope of resolution in the offing.

Middle East Peace Looks More Distant Than Ever

Regardless of what the US and its regional allies wish for — and despite some on and off glimpses of hope every now and then, the future does not look promising. The COVID-19 pandemic has been spiking in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and many other countries in the region as a result of a second wave of the virus. This has further exhausted ailing economies and exacerbated problems and challenges facing Middle Eastern peoples and governments alike.

With conflicts that have ravaged many Asian as well as African Arab nations such as Libya, Yemen and Syria raging on with no political settlements in sight, and a chronic political as well as economic turmoil hitting hard in Lebanon, talk both behind most the closed as well as in public is emphasizing the seriousness of what is to come, on various fronts, sectors and levels.

As another year of doom and gloom is closing its last chapter, and with Christmas and the New Year’s just a stone’s throw away, more and more people of the Middle East are turning their heads upwards and raising their hands to the sky and the Creator, having lost all faith in earthly solutions.

L'articolo Middle East Confidential proviene da InsideOver.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have shared a mutual dislike for one another since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but despite the rhetoric from both sides, there have only been a handful of violent incidences between the two over the past three decades. Although Tehran funds and trains the world’s largest network of proxy militias, it has mostly avoided targeting Riyadh. 

New Low for Saudi-Iranian Relations

However on Sept. 28, the Saudi government announced it recently detained 10 people on terror charges, alleging three were trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. They further claimed that another seven of the individuals were working in partnership with the group. The allegation that Iran-linked terrorists infiltrated Saudi Arabia’s border would mark a significant new lowering of relations between Riyadh and Tehran if true.

The State Security Presidency, Riyadh’s national security agency, said that in addition to apprehending 10 suspects, it also discovered nine improvised explosive devices alongside five kilograms of gunpowder, as the Wall Street Journal reported. Other bomb-making materials such as chemicals, fuses, and electronics, and assault rifles were retrieved from a house and farm that were maintained as a cache for the alleged perpetrators.

Brazen Attempt Could Become New Pattern

Saudi Arabia’s revelation that it foiled a possible terror plot within its borders matches what is shaping up to be a new pattern of behavior from Iran. In September, Bahrain also announced it had stopped an Iran-backed terror plot that was designed to target diplomats and foreigners, the Washington Post reported.

Iran is not typically so brazen, especially against Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, both of which are located directly across the Persian Gulf from its shores. Although neither could be considered friendly toward Tehran’s regime, the recent modus operandi of Iran has typically been to act through militias spread across the region, not arm a small group of potential actors.

Furthermore, Iran has frequently opted for other tactics to send economically focused messages. Take the 2019 drone attack on a Saudi Aramco facility, for example, or the numerous attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. Through attacks like these, Iran has been able to protest the US sanctions that have crippled its economy by targeting US allies in the region.

When it wants to attack Saudi Arabia, Iran has a convenient option in Yemen. The Yemen Civil War has been prolonged as Riyadh and Tehran use it as a sandbox to openly attack one another. Also, from Yemen, Iran can arm Houthi militants who launch missiles into Saudi Arabia.

Resisting The Urge To Retaliate

With these options available to Iran, it has eschewed the kind of plot that the Saudi government now accuses it of planning. The State Security Presidency said it broke up the “terror cell,” which was using a farm and home as its hideouts. Three of the alleged terrorists were trained in Iran in 2017. Even if that was the case, the early training might not have been initially intended for a terrorist mission in Saudi Arabia. 

Instead, the alleged terrorists could have been repurposed shortly after the assassination of Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani, who was assassinated via American drone strike in January. Since that time, Iran has vowed to retaliate, but for the most part, has restrained from doing so. Although it did attack a US military base in Iraq, no soldiers were killed and it was largely seen as a weak response in comparison to the US aggression.

Tehran was widely viewed as biding its time until after the US election. If it could possibly have a new president to make a deal with in January, why risk provoking Washington? However, recent American-led ambitions in Middle East designed to bring Arab states closer to Israel have reawakened Iran’s anger. The UAE and Bahrain recently forged alliances with Israel, Iran’s sworn nemesis, and Saudi Arabia rumored to be the next Arab state to fall in line with the Trump administration’s goals.

Iran Calls Charges a ‘Complete Fabrication’

Taking that possibility into consideration, a Tehran-backed terror cell in Saudi Arabia begins to make sense. Perhaps Iran was planning a preemptive strike, or a retaliatory attack should Riyadh cut a deal with Israel. 

Either way, Iran vehemently denied the accusations on Tuesday.

“The repetitive and worthless accusations of the Saudi rulers are not the way for Riyadh to achieve its goals, and our recommendation is that Saudi Arabia choose the path of honesty and wisdom instead of worthless scenarios,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh.

The Saudi claims are a “complete fabrication,” he said, countering that the Saudi monarchy is using Iran to “deflect public opinion and a method to cover up their own failed efforts.”

The latest twist in the Saudi–Iranian saga followed a rare speech at the UN General Assembly by Saudi King Salman. He devoted a large portion of his prerecorded speech to criticizing Tehran and blaming it for causing mayhem in the region.

“Our experience with the Iranian regime has taught us that partial solutions and appeasement did not stop its threats to international peace and security,” Salman said. 

Riyadh has yet to publicly reveal its evidence in the case against the 10 alleged terrorists, nor has it revealed how it became aware of their activities. As in the case of the Saudi Aramco drone strike, Riyadh is expected to take the high road and avoid retaliation. However, that doesn’t change the fact that Iran appears to be ramping up its efforts to cause trouble in the region, if Riyadh is to be believed. 

L'articolo Saudi Arabia Arrests 10, Taking Down Alleged Iran-Linked Terrorist Cell proviene da InsideOver.

In a surprise move by Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’s government has imposed a total ban on importing goods and a freeze on bilateral trade exchanges with Turkey. Although the real reason behind this Saudi step is totally clear, it also reflects a high degree of dissatisfaction with a major regional trade partner and is bound to have some serious economic as well as political ramifications on Turkey’s ailing economy and on President Recep Erdogan‘s internal posture.

Saudi Arabia and Turkey have often described their economic ties and trade exchanges as being strong and steadfast, as reflected by the magnitude of their $8 billion USD annual trade relationship. This is bolstered by huge bilateral investments and the sheer numbers of Saudi tourists who flock to Turkish resorts every year, as well as the large Turkish workforce operating on some key Saudi projects. Leaders of both nations often exchange visits and a number of economic and trade agreements were signed during King Salman of Saudi Arabia’s visit to Turkey in April 2016, and Erdogan’s visit to Riyadh in July 2017.

What Happened Since 2017 That Led to the Saudi Ban?

A number of incidents took place over the past few years that have influenced relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, both politically as well as economically. Most notable of those incidents were the failed coup attempt against Erdogan in 2016 – Ankara accused some Arab Gulf regimes, mainly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, of supporting the coup attempt.

Then came the brutal assassination of Saudi journalist turned dissident and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi General Consulate in Istanbul on October 2, 2018 by agents of the Saudi government.

Ankara’s siding with and crucial support of Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s arch enemy and key Arab rival and GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) member, Qatar, under a stifling embargo from its “sisterly” nations since June 2017, has added fuel to the raging fire of regional rivalry between Turkey on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other.

Both Riyadh and Ankara have cherished the role of leading the so-called “moderate” Islamic world for decades; a rivalry that has reached new and unprecedented levels under Erdogan and Saudi Crown Prince MBS’s firm grip on power in recent years. Both nations are deeply involved in a number of ongoing regional crises, conflicts and wars, from Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya to Yemen and beyond.

How Significant is Trade Between Turkey and Saudi Arabia?

At its golden era in 2012, the trade balance between Ankara and Riyadh stood at $8 billion USD per year, however it started to decrease over the following years. Before the Saudi ban, it was believed to stand at $6 billion a year; still an indication of the large bilateral trade between the two countries. Saudi imports from Turkey totaled $3.5 billion, while its exports to Ankara stood at $2.5 billion, bringing the overall trade balance between them over the past eight years to over $50 billion. Turkey and Saudi Arabia have often expressed their aspiration to bring their bilateral trade size over the next few years to $10 billion a year, however that was before everything was brought to a sudden halt by Riyadh’s latest move.

While only 11 Saudi companies existed on Turkish soil in 2011, recent studies estimated that some 1,000 Saudi companies operate in Turkey where they have invested some $6 billion in an array of solo projects as well as some joint ventures. The sharp rise in Saudi as well as Gulf nations’ investments in Turkey came only after Ankara had amended its laws in 2012 allowing foreign investors to own their own projects in Turkey. (As Syria’s ambassador to Turkey, I was part of the intense negotiations between Arab ambassadors and Turkish authorities on this issue at the time).

Key Sectors of Saudi Investment in Turkey

One quarter of Saudi companies in Turkey, 249 in all, focus their investment in the thriving real estate sector where they have invested over $11 billion so far. Saudi Arabia retreated last year from the 12^th to 17^th place on the list of foreign capital investors in Turkey. It was not all Ankara’s fault; the decline was a result of Saudi Arabia’s own economic hardships exacerbated by the colossal cost of its war efforts in Yemen, for the fifth year running, and elsewhere.

Tourism is another sector where Saudis have invested heavily in Turkey over the past eight years, with over 650,000 Saudi tourists flocking into Turkey last year alone. However, the number of Saudi tourists who visited Turkey in 2018 was 35% higher than that of last year, despite the fact that many Saudis seem to have fallen in love with Turkey and have chosen to settle there, mainly in Istanbul, Trabzon, Antalya, Bursa and elsewhere.

On the other side, some 100.000 Turks work and live in Saudi Arabia which is the sixth most common destination for Turkish expats. They are spread over variety of projects, ventures, and activities including construction, restaurants, fashion, hotels and medical care. How much will they be affected by the recent Saudi ban and its ramifications remains to be seen. The only definite outcome so far, is that Saudi-Turkish ties appear to be taking an economic nosedive that is bound to affect bilateral and regional politics at least for the foreseeable future.

L'articolo Economic and Political Ramifications of the Saudi Ban on Turkish Imports proviene da InsideOver.

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