Recent developments in Libya are setting the ground for a renewed cycle of violence. While both sides are gradually fueling the tension, UN and international concerns are focused on the potential failure of the ongoing peace process.

Haftar Reacts Angrily to Turkey’s Libya Troop Extension

On the day marking the 69th anniversary of Libyan Independence, commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar stated that as long as Turkish Forces remain stationed in Libya, there will be no peace in the country. As predicted, Turkey’s Grand National Assembly recently approved a bill extending deployment of Turkish troops in Libya for another 18 months.

In his inflammatory remarks, Haftar stated that Ankara should withdraw its forces, otherwise the “Libyan people would by force drive out the colonizing force.” With these words, the Benghazi-based Libyan strongman indirectly passed an ultimatum to Turkey at a point where there is no chance that Ankara would back down. This highlights the fragility of the ongoing peace process.

Turkey Responds to Haftar’s Demand

Shortly after Haftar’s speech on Dec. 26 there has was a straightforward Turkish response. Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar landed in Tripoli accompanied by Turkey’s military leadership in an unscheduled visit to inspect the Turkish Forces based in the country. It was clear that at the same time Akar’s visit was intended to send a message to Haftar, emphasizing that Ankara is ready and committed to fully support Fayez al-Serraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA).

Prior to Akar’s visit, his Libyan counterpart Minister Salahaddin al-Namroush stated in a televised interview that the UN-recognized Tripoli GNA government would not let Haftar carry out another major offensive to capture the Libyan capital. He also said that the Libyan Army, under GNA command, has been following and respecting the ceasefire terms, however the armed forces would be standing by to effectively respond to any provocations from the Haftar-led LNA.

Even earlier, during an interview on Dec. 11, al-Namroush was even more critical of Haftar, calling the General a war criminal and ruling out any possibility of forming a political coalition where Haftar could play any role at all. Considering that al-Namroush will remain one of the key GNA players and his footprint -in both the political and military aspects of the process — is significant, we could assess that a new escalation between the two sides could be likely. Therefore it is understandable that while Haftar remains in the equation, some GNA key officials could hardly negotiate to reach a consensus; in this respect a realistic precondition for the successful completion of the peace process would be the withdrawal of either party, which is not expected to be easy or uneventful.

We should note that the completion of the process could be the successful organization and implementation of the Libyan elections, scheduled for December 2021.

What is UNSMIL Doing to End the Libyan Conflict?

While the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has publicly congratulated the Libyan people in several instances, the in-country situation still remains far from optimistic. The recent exchange of prisoners between the opposing sides and the successful organizing of municipal elections in Al-Zawiya Al-Gharbia and Ar-Rajban areas in the northwestern parts of the country, are definitely positive signs.

However, the current transitioning period of the mission, will be critical for the next steps on the process. The experienced diplomat Nickolay Mladenov — who was expected to succeed Ghassan Salamé as the Head of UNSMIL — recently turned down the position due to personal and family reasons. Mladenov has previously held key roles in the UN Mission in Iraq and in the Middle East Peace Process; additionally his appointment was expected to be welcomed by Turkey as the Bulgarian diplomat built strong ties with Turkey, while serving as the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria several years ago.

For the moment, Stephanie Williams will remain the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL, until a new decision is reached for the permanent placement of the Head of the Mission.

Many Challenges Lie Ahead

Despite the positive signs, mainly derived from the exchange of prisoners, there are many challenges ahead, with one of the most prominent threats being related to the oil industry of the country. The LNA’s recent raid in Awbari (or Ubari) underscores this reality. UNSMIL has also strongly condemned the efforts of armed groups to intimidate the National Oil Corporation (NOC) in Tripoli. With oil exports being one of the main sources of revenue for the Libyan economy, any disruption in this sector could trigger hostilities and further destabilize the country.

Occasional skirmishes during December also indicate that the ceasefire agreement is not being fully adhered to, and an incidental unfortunate event could easily lead to another vicious cycle of violence. Finally, the harsh rhetoric and the military build-up from both sides is another worrying sign.

Turkey’s overt action and deep involvement in Libya — not only through the deployment of military forces but also through a direct intervention in the shaping of the political context — is also a critical destabilizing factor. The most telling example of this political involvement was the recent surprise resignation of al-Serraj — which rather disappointed Ankara — only to be revoked shortly after its announcement.

L'articolo Haftar Demands That Turks Leave Libya proviene da InsideOver.

Mainstream political science keeps misunderstanding Turkey’s moves in the international arena because every speech and action of Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan is being read through the wrong interpretive category, that of so-called “neo-Ottomanism” (Yeni Osmanlıcılık).

Conversely, Ankara’s contemporary foreign policy is much more complex and variegated than Western political analysts use to think and neo-Ottomanism – a term coined in the West and used only by Westerners – is the mere gear wheel of a much wider ideological system based on the perfect mixture of pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism and Turanism, which are further informed by national security doctrines such as the Blue Motherland (Mavi Vatan) and the Zero Problems with Neighbors policy (Komşularla Sıfır Sorun Politikası).

Turkey’s Eyes on the -Stans

Turkey’s agenda for post-Soviet Central Asia can’t be understood by resorting to the idea of neo-Ottomanism. In this pivotal region, from whose control depends the hegemony over the so-called Heartland, Turkey is weaponizing religion, ethnicity and culture by means of NGOs, international organisations, mass media, universities and culture centers by promoting pan-Turkism and Turanism simultaneously.

Everything suggests that the Justice and Development Party’s Turn to the East is working. The Ankara-based Turkic Council competed successfully with the Kremlin-driven Eurasian Economic Union during the first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, the -stans are being shaken up by an Islamic revival and their governments are more and more willing to open up their countries to new players, with Turkey being granted a prominent position.

In a few years Ankara has been able to dramatically expand the fields touched by the cooperation framework with the South Caucasus and the -stan countries, which are no longer limited to just trade and culture. Against the background of the increasingly high infrastructural interconnection, as shown by the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars rail line, Turkey is managing to interfere in a very sensitive domain: security.

Russia is No Longer the Only Player in Central Asia

In the post-Cold War there has been an epoch-making paradigm shift in Central Asia: no longer Russian-controlled, other players have been able to enter this region and build small spheres of influence. Russia tried (unsuccessfully) to avoid the opening of a new Great Game by resorting to the support of China, with which has set up a divide et impera policy based on a clear distribution of roles and competences: the former involved in military and security affairs, the latter involved in trade and investments.

But Chinese money didn’t prevent the West, the Gulf monarchies, Japan, Turkey and a number of other players from expanding in now-free Central Asia, and all of them gradually built their own spheres of influence.

As regards to Turkey, it is not a mere question of anti-Russian containment, there is something much more important at stake from Ankara’s perspective: the very existence of the pan-Turkic and Turanist dream. It is in this context, for instance, that political analysts have to read Ankara’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh war; it is a way to secure the South Caucasus, the gate with which to connect Anatolia to Central Asia.

Turkey’s Next Focus: Defense

Turkey’s Defense Minister Hulusi Akar travelled to Central Asia in the last week of October 2020. During his tour he landed Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan. In Nur-Sultan he was greeted by his counterpart with the brotherly expression “welcome to the fatherland from the motherland” and the atmosphere was shaped by common trust. The visit ended up with several results, such as the promise to keep developing bilateral ties, especially on defense and military cooperation. The same issues were raised in Bishkek and in Tashkent, but it is necessary to focus on what occurred in Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan, in Turkey’s vision, is, possibly, even more important than Kazakhstan and the other -stans because it is known to be the region’s soft belly. The results, accordingly, have been much more numerous than those achieved in the rest of the tour. Akar confirmed that it was agreed “to enhance relations in every field. This includes trade, economic, social, political and military relations”. The most considerable outcome is related to the latter field, because the two defense ministers signed a military agreement aimed at furthering bilateral cooperation on defense and security.

Why is it important to give the proper importance to these aforementioned events is easy to understand: security was, until yesterday, an exclusive domain of the Kremlin. From now on Russia will have to follow the developments occurring in post-Soviet Central Asia even more closely, because the greatest dangers don’t come from China and the United States, but from the often overlooked Turkey.

From Hungary to Mongolia

Turkey is managing to build a Turkish-centered international order in Eurasia via the provision of powerful ideological glues to globalisation-hit identity-seeking peoples. The strategy is well-designed as it targets simultaneously the lowest and the highest levels of the societies, with the former being influenced by the work of media, culture centres, NGOs and universities and with the latter being pressured by a changing public opinion and by the Turkish political assertiveness.

South Caucasus and Central Asia are the core of Turkey’s masterplan for Eurasia, but the borders of this world-overturning vision are not restricted to the Turkish-speaking word. Stressing the importance played by the fact of having common ancestral origins, that is to come from the ancient and magic lands of Turan, Ankara has established a strategic partnership with Hungary and it is increasing its exposition in Mongolia and within Russia itself.

The ‘Cultural and Spiritual Integration’ of Turkic Peoples

The pan-Turkic and Turanist network was enlarged in 2018 by the establishment of the Diyanet-funded and intelligence-linked endeavor World Turks Qurultai, another organization whose aim is to make the Turanian and Turkic peoples closer.

Russia should worry about the fact that some Turkic-inhabited republics have joined the body, like Yakutia and Tuva. Indeed, the World Turks Qurultai works for the “cultural and spiritual integration” of Turkic peoples and it wouldn’t be an unexpected outcome the appearance of separatist movements and feelings in the above-mentioned Russian republics.

If it’s true that Russia seems about to experience a new season of internal ethnic conflicts, then Turkey is very likely to play a key-role in it – if it ever happens -, since its entities are believed to be behind the resurgence of separatism and radicalization from North Caucasus to Siberia. The same scenario is likely to occur in Central Asia, where the growing radicalization of Muslim youth is widely attributable to the presence of foreign-funded culture centers, religious schools, and mosques, essentially backed by Turkey and the Persian Gulf oil monarchies. The more the civil society and the intellectual intellighenzia are tied to Turkey, the harder will be – for the Kremlin – to keep the -stans in the Russian world (Russkiy Mir).

What is ‘Turanism?’

The Turanism is a school of thought born out of the mind of Turkish and Hungarian thinkers in late 19th century to counter the powerful influence exerted at the time by pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism in Central Europe and the Balkans. These were the two ideologies that contributed the most to redraw the geography of the Old Continent in that epoque of great nationalist ferment.

Hungary’s and Ottoman Turkey’s Turanist aimed at avoiding the fall of their multi-ethnic empires via the building of a trans-continental and multi-national alliance made up by those States inhabited by the peoples from Turan, that is the region of Central Asia from which Turks, Magyars, Tatars, Finns, Karelians, Lapps, and a number of other peoples are believed to come from. It did not work.

However, Viktor Orban and Erdogan got to make it live again in the 21th century and, as proven by their achievements throughout Eurasia, they are having quite a success. Turanism, in short, is turning out to be a force to be reckoned with as it is contributing significantly to fracturing the post-Soviet space and, to a greater extent, to catalyze the multipolar transition.

L'articolo In the Name of Turan: Turkey’s Grand Strategy to Conquer Eurasia proviene da InsideOver.

The Turkish Research Vessel Oruç Reis returned to the port of Antalya, on September 13, ending more than a month of seismic research activity across the Mediterranean and within the Greek maritime zones.

Even though the rationale behind this move has not yet been fully defined, several commentators rushed to assess that this could be a decisive step for the much-anticipated deescalation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Oruç Reis Returns to Antalya

The Multi-Purpose Research Vessel Oruç Reis, is one of the landmark research ships owned by the Turkish General Directorate Of Mineral Research And Explorations. Over the last few months, the controversial research activity of the vessel has monopolized the attention in the Greek, Turkish and international media.

Tension started rising on July 21, when the Antalya Navtex Station issued a warning for seismic research, covering a part of the Greek continental shelf; an area where Turkey unilaterally is not recognizing any Greek sovereign rights at all. The planned activities have been cancelled after behind-the-scenes negotiations among Germany, Greece and Turkey, temporarily slowing the regional friction.

However shortly after the Greek-Egyptian deal over the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the two countries, Ankara replied with a new NAVTEX and Oruç Reis entered the Greek Maritime Zones on August 10, 2020. With consecutive NAVTEX warnings the Turkish vessel has been conducting research in the aforementioned area for just over a month, officially ending its activity on September 13.

All this time Oruç Reis was accompanied by the ships Cengiz Han and Ataman of the Turkish Navy. When the crisis started in August, Greek officials wrongfully focused on trying to persuade the public that the Turkish vessel was just sailing in the Greek zones, rather than actually conducting research. This purposeless move aimed to manage the domestic political reaction in Greece and enhance the international standing of the country.

Once the news about the Turkish planned return of the Oruç Reis to the port of Antalya was publicized, the Greek Government swiftly welcomed it.

A Doubtful Gesture of Goodwill and the Greek Reaction

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis held a Press Conference on September 13, as a part of the well-known Thessaloniki Helexpo Forum in Northern Greece. The Greek PM made numerous important announcements for the Greek Defense and Foreign Policy; the strong French-Greek  partnership in the fields of Defense and Security has been officially confirmed with the Prime Minster announcing that the Mirage-2000 aircraft will be gradually replaced by the novel Rafale Jets by 2022.

He further stated that the Greek Defense expenditure has been reduced during the years of the long financial crisis that hit the country and steps will be taken to reverse this situation, however Athens is not willing to enter an arms race with its neighbors, repeating major mistakes of the past.

The exodus of Oruç Reis has been perceived in Greece as a positive first step and Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced that he is ready to start a dialogue with President Erdogan, given that no further provocative moves will take place. The Greek Prime Minister clarified that if Turkey shows signs of cooperation, Athens will be the first to enter the negotiation process.

Turkey’s Statements

However, the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu clarified in an interview for the Turkish NTV media network, that the ship would be only taken for maintenance, implying that a potential return of Oruç Reis in the Greek continental shelf is possible. In another interview for the Anadolu Agency, the Turkish Defence Minister, Hulusi Akar, highlighted that the return of the research vessel by no means indicates that Ankara is willing to give up its rights in the area.

The above statements suggest that there is a quite different approach between Greece and Turkey in the level of top officials. On the one hand, Athens is struggling to find a sign of good will from Turkey and publicly points out such a development, while the Turkish officials are seeking to denounce any Greek deescalating announcements and further impede the context of negotiations.

Also Ankara has undoubtedly established a notable success with the presence of Oruç Reis in the Greek Continental Shelf for over a month; indeed, Ankara managed to create a de facto situation by directly questioning the Greek sovereign rights in the region and the lukewarm Greek reaction certainly leaves an open window for similar Turkish action in the near future.

Greek President Visiting Kastelorizo Amid Harsh Turkish Criticism

In the meantime, Greek President Katerina Sakellaropoulou recently paid an official visit to the Greek island of Kasteorizo on Sunday, September 13; Kastelorizo is located only a couple of miles away from the Turkish mainland.

The Greek President was there to celebrate the 77^th anniversary of the liberation of the island. The Kastelorizo complex has been in the epicenter of the Greek-Turkish tension of the last few months, and Hulusi Akar ceased the opportunity to unjustly criticize the Greek President’s move. Akar, publicly asked why Kastelorizo has been specifically chosen for this celebration and not any of the other Greek islands, apparently ignoring the fact that it was only this islet that has been liberated by the Hellenic Navy and the Allied Forces on September 13, 1943.

In a controversial action the Turkish Defense Minister visited the small Turkish town of Kas in Antalya Province, while the Greek President was on Kastelorizo. Kas is directly neighboring the small Greek island and Akar was accompanied by all the senior officials of the Turkish military leadership.

The latest developments show that even though the Greek side is seeking to set the ground for bilateral negotiations with its neighbors, Ankara is not willing to back down and will probably keep acting provocatively until the ideal point for the pushing through Turkish claims is reached.

L'articolo Should Greece be Celebrating the Departure of the Turkish Ship Oruç Reis? proviene da InsideOver.

The Turkish and Qatari Defense Ministers recently visited Tripoli to meet the head of the Government of National Accord, Fayez al-Sarraj. Specifically, Hulusi Akar and Khalid Bin-Muhammad al-Atiyyah discussed what kind of support Doha and Ankara could provide to the Tripoli-based government. The discussion was held with the Libyan leader and other key figures of the GNA administration.

After examining the trilateral military cooperation agreement that was eventually signed, we can understand more about the long-term Turkish plans increasing their influence in North Africa.

Main Objectives of the Meeting

Akar was accompanied by Turkish Chief of General Staff Yaşar Güler. Both played a crucial role in the outcome of the meeting. Libyan Deputy Defense Minister Saladin En-Nemrush also took part in the meetings and provided insights into the current readiness of GNA forces in terms of structure, personnel, equipment, and operational capabilities. The defense ministers of the supporting countries agreed to provide the GNA forces with cross-functional support, from logistics and military equipment to operational planning and training through expat military advisors.

The long-term objectives of this strategic partnership include the complete restructuring of the quasi-organized GNA forces to build them into an appropriately structured and fully operational army. One of the largest challenges of the Libyan framework is related to the numerous autonomous military subgroups belonging to different local tribes and clans.

All these separate armed elements will be streamlined and structured in a unique entity that will set the base for the Libyan Armed Forces under the current GNA. This was the primary purpose of the agreement, which sets the strengthening of al-Sarraj-affiliated forces as one of its main conditions. Ankara and Doha are expected to play a key role in achieving this goal, as outlined in the recent deal.

Long-Term Turkish Plans

Shortly after the deal, Turkish President Recep Erdogan mentioned that Turkey is willing to officially deploy Turkish forces to Tripoli, if the GNA asks for it. So far Ankara has been supporting the Sarraj forces in a rather informal context, considering the standing ban on foreign military involvement in the Libyan conflict. A recent key fact that has probably gone unnoticed was the transfer of approximately 190 cadets to Turkey who survived a massive assault from Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) forces last July. All 190 surviving cadets have moved to Turkey to complete their studies.

Examining the Libyan-Turkish-Qatari deal we can clearly see that Erdogan is seeking to tighten his grip on Libya, so that if and when the GNA forces take control of the country, Ankara will have already secured a de facto devoted ally and another military base in the Mediterranean.

Erdogan’s plan will be materialized through a long process, where several different moves need to be made, one step at a time. Following the memoranda of understanding and the maritime deal with the GNA in the previous months, the latest trilateral deal indicates that Ankara is looking into engaging in the essential infrastructure of the state, which will potentially emerge once the civil war is over.

Turkey is actually looking to build one of the key institutions — the armed forces — in the part of Libya under the rule of the GNA, in a similar way that they helped the Azerbaijani army to be built back up in 1993. Taking advantage of the long and bitter Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Ankara stepped in, providing the necessary military assistance and guidance to the newly-sovereign Baku. Since then, Azerbaijan has been politically and militarily dependent on Turkey to a great extent. The same scenario is now taking place in Libya, where Ankara is gradually compiling the necessary political capital to be utilized under the right circumstances at a later date.

The Role of Qatar

Doha has been taking steps to boost the Qatari armed forces since 2015. Further to the mandatory military conscription applying to all the country nationals, a Turkish military base was also established back in 2015. It’s a base that has been building up year by year to eventually turn into a robust force under the Qatar-Turkey Combined Joint Force Command. It combines elements of army, navy and air force. The Turkish presence, alongside the deployed US forces in Al Udeid Air Base are two factors that have significantly contributed to the operational capabilities and deterrence capacity of the Qatari military.

Following the 2017 Qatari exodus from the Gulf Cooperation Council, Doha has been somewhat isolated in the region. Therefore it is completely reasonable for Qatar to seek expansion of its international standing and influence, through new alliances. This is especially true when Turkey, a long-term and trusted ally, is setting the scene.

However the planned Qatari military participation in the Libyan conflict by providing army experts and consultants, according to the deal, is rather questionable for a country who is partly relying its domestic defense on foreign deployed forces. Looking further into the latest pact, we can see that the Qatari involvement in the trilateral deal will come mainly in terms of financial assistance and material support. If Turkish military involvement has tipped the balance in favor of Sarraj, then the Qatari economy should be seen as the vital leverage to further push the power of these mutual Turkish and GNA claims at this crucial point of the battle.

The strong political and security ties that Ankara has built with Doha are now being utilized in a moment when the Turkish economy is stagnating. Turkey has used its close diplomatic relations with Qatar — one of the richest Gulf states — to secure further funding for the Libya front. Considering the currently grim position of the Turkish economy, the latest Qatari involvement in Libya and the ensuing tripartite agreement comes as a life-saving boost for Turkish plans in North Africa.

L'articolo Turkey’s Strategic Plan for Libya proviene da InsideOver.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance is known around the world for its commitment and perseverance to ensure peace and stability in regions where hostilities increase on a daily basis. NATO is a force to be reckoned with. However, the organization is slowly losing momentum.

Macron: NATO is Experiencing ‘Brain-Death’

French President Emmanuel Macron said last year that NATO is experiencing “brain-death.” one might question what the French President meant when he said those words. Macron was criticizing the participation of the United States by saying that the bloc could no longer depend on the Trump Administration for protection. He also voiced his views regarding the protection of Europe unilaterally saying that it should be done by European powers themselves.

2020: NATO’s Problems are Far From Over

Fast-forward to this year and the organization is yet again facing problems of unity and cooperation. At the heart of the latest issue is the European Union’s naval mission Operation IRINI which monitors the arms embargo on Libya through vessels deployed in the Mediterranean Sea. The warring sides in Libya; that of Libyan National Army General Khalifa Haftar and Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj’s U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord are not showing any signs of ceasing fire. Earlier last month on June 10, a Tanzanian flagged ship was spotted by a Greek vessel called Spetsai and Greece accused Turkey of using it to transport weapons to the Fayez al-Sarraj government in Tripoli.

Cirkin vs. Courbet

This was just part one of what happened later on the same day when the Tanzanian-flagged ship Cirkin’encountered the French frigate Courbet. France lodged an official complaint to NATO saying that the Turkish ships were hostile when asked about what the Cirkin was carrying. Turkey has denied the accusations, saying the encounter was friendly. Following the incident in the Mediterranean, France decided on July 1 to withdraw from NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian. The very next day, France’s minister for armed forces, Florence Parly said at the EU’s Security and Defense Subcommittee hearing that, “I have been supported by many of my European counterparts and I thank them. We are supposed to be an alliance. An ally who conscientiously violates the rules that the alliance is supposed to enforce and tries to threaten those who interrogate him is not acceptable.”

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu in return replied by saying: “Our expectation from France at the moment is for it to apologize in a clear fashion, without ifs or buts, for not providing the correct information.” Turkey’s Defense Minister Hulusi Akar also branded the French accusations as “completely unrealistic.” The EU’s top diplomat Joseph Borrell was in the Turkish capital on 6th July to discuss issues regarding the Sea Guardian mission, Syria and other bilateral topics. The Turkish FM once again warned the EU on the occasion that Ankara will retaliate if the bloc decides to impose new sanctions on Turkey.

NATO Needs to Get its Ship in Order

NATO’s problems and disagreements aren’t new but if complications continue to persist, infighting could reach a tipping point. Turkey has its own concerns with the EU. Under the 2016 migration deal, it hasn’t received the promised aid for refugees coming from Syria. This has worsened tensions between the two sides. Furthermore, the EU accession process is also another area of concern where France is against Turkey’s inclusion to the bloc. The Turkish concerns are appropriate but it won’t help if both sides continue the cold war over Libya. While the French side says it will return to the Sea Guardian mission, it has asked for a few requests to be accepted. Notably, that Turkey respects the embargo, a categorical rejection of Turkey’s use of NATO codes, initiation of de-confliction measures and improved cooperation between the EU and NATO.

Turkey is the Wild Card

But to what extent will Turkey cooperate with NATO and France? Turkey has repeatedly stated that tensions with the EU and France in particular could be resolved through dialogue and by guiding all stakeholders in a politically correct manner. If actions from both sides are taken in terms of reconciliation and compliance, then only will this problematic scenario reach its desired end.

This event shows the deepening divide between NATO members who have personal statements and interests in the organization. The communication between members is weak as many of them support opposing sides in ongoing military conflicts across the globe. For instance, France sides with Libya’s Haftar while Turkey has given its backing to the internationally-recognized government of Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

France’s growing worry over NATO support could take a turn for the worse as only 8 out of 30 NATO members sided with French claims which accused Turkey. The UK and the US refrained from siding with the French since London considers Turkey as a crucial partner post-Brexit and the relationship between the Americans and the Turks is at a commendable point where both are on the same side in Libya. Boris Johnson was also reported to have said that he does not give “much credibility” to France’s views.

L'articolo NATO Tensions and the ‘Brain-Death’ of the Strategic Alliance proviene da InsideOver.

According to a recent story from Bloomberg, Turkey has asked for US Patriot missiles to be deployed in the Turkish border with northern Syria. This request has been made on the grounds that several Turkish servicemen have been killed over the last weeks in the region, and Patriots could work as a deterrence measure to potential airstrikes from the Syrian or Russian Air force. Official US sources, on the base of anonymity, have allegedly confirmed the request.

What Is Ankara’s Strategy in This Case?

Hulusi Akar, the Turkish Defence Minister, stated on 20 February 2020, during an interview with CNN Turk that some of the threats posed in the region, by Syria — or Russia — could be efficiently dealt with after the deployment of the Patriot system. Akar clarified that there is no suggestion whatsoever for the assignment of US troops in the area, a rather obvious conclusion one could say, given the US policy towards Syria and the Turkey-US thorny relations, in the recent past. The Turkish Defense Minister also mentioned that talks between Ankara and Washington about the acquisition of the Patriot system were still ongoing, a highly unlikely scenario under the current circumstances, as will be further explained shortly.

The Patriot statements should not take us by surprise at all, as President Erdogan himself has brought up the issue at least three times after the S-400 agreement. This aligns with the typical — and productive — Turkish strategy of never excluding any of the big players from the table and always trying to achieve a modus vivendi even with diametrically opposing powers. Erdogan seems to be using the Patriot and S-400 cards interchangeably, in order to create the appropriate leverage towards US and Russia. The way the story has been presented by Bloomberg and reproduced by the Turkish state-run News Agency, Anadolu, indicates that Turkey is probably trying to create a context of unpredictability about Erdogan’s next moves and hint at the idea of a rapprochement with the US and the Western block. To this end, Akar in his interview has emphasized the idea that an allied country could provide the Patriot batteries to Turkey as a coordinated effort to protect a NATO member from an external threat.

The T‐LORAMIDS Program: a Long, Complex Story

Still the question must arise: how exactly did Turkey get itself in this current situation? The T-LORAMIDS or (Long-Range Air-and Missile-Defense System) program has been a key aspect of the Turkish strategic defense. Ankara has shifted sides several times since the program was launched. Chinese HQ‐9 SAM have been initially selected back in 2013, considering the efficiency, the cost and the engagement of the Turkish industry in the production and other phases of the project, a critical factor for Ankara. The plan had to be cancelled, though, in 2015, with official sources quoting technical difficulties; the US and European reaction to Turkey deploying such a sophisticated strategic weapon from China should be actually considered as the primary reason.

Another T-LORAMIDS program started in 2016 with the US Raytheon Patriot and Russian Almaz-Antey S-400, being among the bidders. A Turkey-Russia agreement had been signed by mid-2017, for the deployment of four S-400 batteries within the Turkish territory. This deal has provoked most of the NATO allies, and especially the US, who have vigorously opposed this deal since its very beginning. Defence Minister Hulusi Akar has confirmed that since May, 2019 Turkish personnel has been sent to Russia to receive training on the new missile system. Additionally, Erdogan stated in May, 2019 that a joint project for procurement and production of the enhanced S-500 system, was among the top priorities for Ankara and Moscow. The first two S-400 batteries have been delivered to Turkey in July and September 2019 respectively. According to Akar, the weapon will be fully operational by April 2020.

The Patriot system has been offered twice to Turkey, in the context of the T-LORAMIDS programme in 2013 and in 2017 respectively; both times it has been rejected. However, Ankara has been trying to keep open channels with Raytheon and the US defense industry and has suggested in several occasions that a revised offer regarding the Patriot system would be considered.

Talks about the potential sale to Turkey of 20 M903 Launching Stations and four Engagement Control Stations alongside AN/MPQ-65 radar sets have been taking place in December 2018 within the US State Department; however, such a deal did not move forward, due to the acquisition of the S-400 system from Russia. Since then, President Erdogan has repeated his intention to discuss an updated Patriot deal on February and November, 2019, but so far, the US side has made clear that the concurrent use of the S-400 and specific NATO strategic weapons is out of the question; therefore the planned S-400 deployment in April should be a no-go for any Turkish proposals from a US perspective.

Conclusion: Erdogan’s Gambit

The latest developments indicate that Turkey is not looking at these missile systems simply as a strategic weapon that could significantly affect the defense capabilities of the country; instead, Erdogan is using the attention drawn and the debate over these weapons as a geopolitical tool, a means to balance between the East and the West and to put pressure on each side according to the Turkish strategic interests. At this point, it would be interesting to wait for the US reaction, even though Ankara should not anticipate a very accommodating stance from Washington. The current circumstances seem far from ideal for the Turkish side, as the Turkish President has probably already played most of his cards and there is no room for further maneuvers in this power struggle with Russia.

L'articolo Ankara Requests Patriot Support On Syrian Border proviene da InsideOver.

The latest statements of Turkish Defense Minister, Hulusi Akar, have fueled further the already increased tension between Greece and Turkey. Akar, during his visit to one of the major players of the Turkish Defense Industry, missile producer Roketsan, publicly stated that Greece “illegally” maintains armed forces in sixteen islands in the Aegean Sea. He stressed out that Athens should stop ignoring international treaties and demilitarize the aforementioned areas. He also referred to the developments in Libya pointing that the Turkish controversial moves in the region are fully compliant with international law and Greece should reconsider its stance and start behaving as a trustworthy neighbor. With regards to Cyprus, he repeated that Ankara has been doing and will continue to take all the appropriate measures to protect the Turkish-Cypriot community of the island and the rights of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the de facto state established in the north of the island after the Turkish invasion in 1974, which is internationally recognized only by Turkey.

The rationale behind the Turkish claims

But where are these Turkish demands for demilitarization coming from? Akar is referring to a series of treaties among Greece, Turkey and other countries, that have been signed during the 20th century and which dictate the status of the Aegean islands. The Greek islands in the Aegean Sea according to these treaties could be categorized as below:

Samothrace and Lemnos Islands in the Northern Aegean

According to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the islands of Samothrace and Lemnos should be demilitarized, and this is one of the main pillars of the Turkish -unfounded- argument. Unfounded because the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, has replaced the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty for the aforementioned islands and fully restored the rights of Greece to station armed forces there. Turkey has approved the Montreux Convention, and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, has explicitly accepted all the provisions of the Convention both home and abroad.

Ikaria, Chios, Lesvos and Samos Islands

With regard to these islands, Article 13 of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne clarifies that Greece should not establish “naval base and fortification” in their territory. Indeed, Greece has been following these instructions ever since, establishing a military presence in these islands within the limitations of the Treaty. Additionally, there is another provision referring to those islands, advising that Greek and Turkish military aircraft should avoid flying over these areas. Here we should address a serious contradiction of the Turkish accusations, since the Turkish Air Force has been breaching the Greek airspace, with fighter jets flying over these islands, on a regular basis over the last decades. This is a quite interesting fact, the implications of which could be further examined in another article in the near future.

Dodecanese – Islands of Southeastern Aegean

Those islands in the Southeastern part of the Aegean Sea, have been under Italian occupation since 1912, and have been granted to Greece with the Treaty of Paris in 1947. According to this treaty, those islands should be demilitarized and in this context, Greece has officially stationed only National Guard units in those locations, in compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). On top of that, particularly for the case of Dodecanese, the status of Turkey is deemed as res inter alios acta, considering that Greece and Italy are the two contracting parties in the treaty, therefore any Turkish objections for the past and current status of the islands are simply irrelevant.

It is apparent that the Turkish claims cannot be backed by international treaties or any interpretation of the International Law; however, using the alleged demilitarization argument, is not a new tactic for Ankara. Every time Turkey crosses the lines, causing international criticism over a dispute with Greece, the same rhetoric is being adopted in an effort to provoke Athens, boost the morale of the Turkish public and disorientate the international community. It is notable that similar comments have been made again by Akar, less than a year ago.

The Greek Reaction

The Greek Side has promptly responded to the provocative statements of the Turkish Minister, with an official press release from the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Turkish stance has been described as hypocritic, considering that Ankara is continuously questioning the territorial integrity of the neighboring countries and regularly ignores the International Law, or interprets it according to the Turkish interests; there has also been a special reference to the violation of the UN-imposed arms embargo in Libya. Concluding, the Greek response highlighted the significance of the legitimate right to self-defense; a right that every sovereign state has and the Turkish side seems to be persistently ignoring, according to the Greek statement.

The implications of this announcement are even more interesting when combined with the assertions made by the newly-appointed Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff a couple of days ago. General Konstantinos Floros, during the Change of Command Ceremony on January 21, stated that Greece is currently going through a turbulent and challenging period, with regards to the ongoing geopolitical developments within and around the country. According to the Greek General, the most appropriate way to maintain stability and peace in the region is to be constantly well-prepared for war.

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