Mettersi a discutere con Volodymyr Zelensky è un’impresa assai ardua, per tre ragioni. La prima è che l’ex attore diventato presidente è molto molto abile dal punto di vista dialettico. La seconda è che da quattro anni e mezzo “l’Ucraina combatte per noi”, come recita il mitra della politica europea, e a uno che combatte per te non puoi certo dare contro. La terza, conseguente alle prime due, è che ogni dichiarazione di Zelensky può contare sulla “complicità” di quasi tutti i media occidentali (e in ogni caso di TUTTI quelli più importanti) e diffusi, che la riprendono e la rilanciano così com’è, come se fosse un dato di fatto.

È quanto sta succedendo con la polemica tra Zelensky e il presidente della Polonia, Karol Nawrocki, scoppiata dopo che l’ucraino ha deciso di assegnare a un’unità dell’esercito il nome onorifico di “Eroi dell’Upa” (ma tutta la vicenda è già stata ben spiegata da Roberto Vivaldelli). Alla notizia in arrivo dall’Ucraina, Nawocki ha deciso di ritirare l’onorificenza dell’Aquila Bianca, la più alta dell’ordinamento polacco, concessa dal suo predecessore, Andrzej Duda, a Zelensky. Zelensky ha reagito accusando Nawrocki di voler fare politica alle sua spalle (Nawrocki è stato eletto con l’appoggio del partito conservatore e nazionalista Diritto e Giustizia, mentre il premier Donald Tusk è, all’opposto, presidente del partito Coalizione civica) e, per spregio, ha rimandato a Varsavia l’onorificenza per posta. Poi lui e il capo dell’amministrazione presidenziale Kyrylo Budanov hanno accusato Nawrocki di ritirare l’onorificenza a Zelensky ma non a Caterina II di Russia, Mussolini e all’ex cancelliere tedesco Gerhard Schroeder.

Su quest’ultimo tema vale la pena di registrare la risposta del portavoce di Nzworcki: “Il Presidente Zelensky ha citato Benito Mussolini, Caterina II e Gerhard Schröder, ai quali non è stato revocato l’ordine. I primi due sono morti da tempo e la Polonia non revoca gli ordini postumi. L’ex Cancelliere tedesco, d’altro canto, non ha mai insultato la nazione polacca così apertamente come ha fatto il presidente ucraino, sebbene le sue azioni nell’interesse della Russia debbano essere condannate in quanto dannose per la Polonia e per l’Europa. Sotto Schröder, in Germania non sono stati eretti monumenti a Hitler o Himmler. Nessun reparto della Bundeswehr è stato intitolato a “eroi delle SS”. Inoltre, il presidente Zelensky, che ora si lamenta del fatto che Benito Mussolini, Caterina II e Gerhard Schröder non siano stati privati delle loro onorificenze, non si oppose al fatto di riceverle lui stesso tre anni fa. Oltre all’insulto di intitolare un’unità dell’esercito ucraino agli “eroi dell’UPA”, ne aggiunge un altro restituendo l’onorificenza con un corriere. In definitiva, il punto cruciale è l’insulto deliberato del leader ucraino a un popolo che si è rivelato il miglior amico dell’Ucraina negli ultimi quattro anni. Non si onorano gli assassini degli antenati di coloro che ti hanno teso una mano quando era una questione di vita o di morte. Quando qualcuno ti offre una mano, non la accetti con entusiasmo per poi insultare chi te l’ha offerta”.

Il punto vero della questione è che Nawrocki è uno storico che, prima di entrare in politica, è stato direttore del Museo della seconda guerra mondiale di Danzica e in seguito presidente dell’Istituto della memoria nazionale, incarico che, in Polonia, necessita dell’approvazione del Parlamento. In altre parole, sa perfettamente di che cosa si parla. Mentre Zelensky, che non a caso non entra mai nel merito della questione storica, sfrutta le tre condizioni di cui dicevamo all’inizio (infatti Nawrocki è stato immediatamente definito “un politico di estrema destra”, lui che da storico ha lavorato per portare allo scoperto i crimini sovietici) per nascondere, lui sì, una necessità di politica interna. Che adesso vediamo.

Partigiani e stragisti

L’Ukrains’ka povstans’ka armija (UPA) fu fondata nel 1942 avendo come riferimento politico Stepan Bandera e come capo militare Roman Šuchevyč. Per fare molto breve una storia lunga e intricata, successe questo: dopo l’invasione nazista dell’Ucraina, i militanti dell’usa si schierarono con la Wermacht e le SS nella speranza di combattere Stalin e i sovietici; poi, con il ritorno dell’Armata Rossa, combatterono anche le truppe di Stalin, nella speranza di ottenere l’indipendenza. Nel processo, si scontrarono anche contro l’Armata Nazionale, il principale movimento di resistenza polacco, che rivendicava come polacca la Volinia (regione peraltro divisa, prima per lunghissimo tempo e diventata quasi totalmente ucraina solo dopo la guerra, per decisione di Stalin). Per mantenere il controllo della Volinia, tra il 1943 e il 1945 l’UPA sterminò circa 100 mila civili di origine polacca, tra i quali molti ebrei.

È come se i nostri partigiani avessero combattuto i fascisti e i nazisti e, nello stesso tempo, avessero ammazzato un sacco di italiani di origine straniera e un sacco di ebrei. Ci sbrigheremmo a considerarli eroi nazionali? Li copriremmo di onori e medaglie? Forse saremmo un poco più prudenti.

Ecco, questo Zelensky non se lo può permettere. Perché nello spettro politico ucraino, la componente fascio-nazionalista non ha mai potuto vantare risultati elettorali clamorosi (al contrario, sempre sotto il 4% dei voti) ma ha sempre goduto di un notevole potere di interdizione e di ricatto. Bandera e Šuchevyč, i capi dell’UPA (Bandera fu assassinato nel 1959 da Bohdan Stachynskyi, un ucraino al solo del KGB, e Šuchevyč si suicidò nel 1950 nei pressi di Leopoli per non farsi catturare dai sovietici), come figure da onorare senza se e senza ma, non li ha inventati lui bensì Viktor Yushchenko, il presidente (2005-2010) “democratico” (in contrapposizione al filo-russo Viktor Yanukovich) che fu protagonista della cosiddetta “rivoluzione arancione”. Fu Yushchenko, nel 2010, appena prima di lasciare la carica, a proclamare i due stragisti dell’UPA “eroi dell’Ucraina”. Ma come, il democratico che sfidava la Russia putiniana , il figlio di un insegnante che era sopravvissuto per miracolo ad Auschwitz, poi… ebbene sì. Con quel gesto, Yushchenko forse pagava qualche debito oltreoceano: sua moglie Kateryna Chumachenko era stata una funzionaria del Dipartimento di Stato Usa e aveva forti collegamenti con la diaspora ucraina negli Stati Uniti.

Da quel momento, il meccanismo è entrato in funzione a ogni snodo cruciale della storia ucraina. Per esempio durante le manifestazioni dell’Euromaidan, quando furono le formazioni dell’estrema destra (Svoboda, Bratstvo, Pravyj Sektor) a guidare gli scontri di piazza e a fare in modo che non venisse accettata la soluzione negoziata con Yanukovich, che per quanto disponeva (ritorno alla Costituzione del 2004, elezioni presidenziali anticipate, governo di transizione…) era una grande vittoria per gli europeisti. Tra l’altro, nella delegazione di tre persone che trattava con Yanukovich (assistita dai ministri degli Esteri di Francia, Germania e Polonia), c’era Oleh Tjahnybok, leader di Svoboda e già tra i fondatore del Partito social-nazionale ucraino. Di fatto un filo-nazista.

Altro esempio: dopo la cacciata di Yanukovich viene formato un governo provvisorio. Ecco che ritroviamo Andrij Parubij (poi ucciso a colpi di pistola a Leopoli nell’agosto del 2025), tra i fondatori di Svoboda, come segretario del Consiglio di sicurezza (e più avanti presidente del Parlamento). E i suoi colleghi di partito diventano: Oleksandr Sic vice-primo ministro, Ihor Svaika ministro dell’Agricoltura, Andriy Mokhnyk ministro dell’Ambiente, Oleh Makhnic’kyj procuratore generale. Non male per un partito abituato ai decimale ma che, evidentemente, aveva altri meriti.

Allo stesso modo, furono i militanti dei gruppi di estrema destra i primi ad accorrere nel Donbass, con i finanziamenti di oligarchi come Ihor Kolomojs’kyj, per formare battaglioni come il famoso Azov (poi inserito con tutti i crismi nelle forze armate regolari) e contrastare armi in pugno i progetti dei separatisti filo-russi. E ancora oggi uno dei personaggi più popolari in Ucraina è Andrij Bilec’kyj, che fu tra i fondatori del reggimento, oggi comanda una brigata ed è anche leader di Corpo nazionale, partito di fondamentalisti bianchi che, a conferma della regola, ha pochissimo seguito nonostante che il suo leader sia molto apprezzato.

Si potrebbe andare avanti a lungo ma basterà dire che Zelensky non sta facendo nulla di nuovo. Governare l’Ucraina contro l’estrema destra fascista e in qualche caso filo-nazista, che frutta con abilità i sentimenti che spaziano dallo spirito di patria al nazionalismo più becero, non si può. Possiamo piuttosto chiederci perché il presidente abbia sentito la necessità di fare un passo simile proprio adesso. Questo vuol dire addentrarsi in meccanismi di potere che sono oscuri e riservati per definizione. Poiché , polemizzando con Nawrocki, Zelensky ha trovato modo di tirare in ballo le forze armate ucraine, possiamo ipotizzare che glorificare ancora una volta l’UPA per onorare i suoi combattenti sia un modo per dare soddisfazione ai generali che tengono botta al fronte e che formano la parte più intransigente dell’attuale sistema di potere. Jacopo Boccalini ha già raccontato in queste pagine le linee di faglia che corrono tra gli alti gradi e dividono i “vecchi” generali dagli ufficiali delle nuove leve, che si ispirano a tattiche più moderne e vorrebbero condurre una guerra diversa. Forse il richiamo all’unità in nome della storia nazionale serviva proprio a questo, in un momento in cui l’Ucraina raccoglie molti successi nella guerra aerea e incontra molte difficoltà sul terreno. Laddove, appunto, la differenza la fanno gli umani e non le macchine.

L'articolo Zelensky, l’UPA e la polemica con la Polonia: niente di nuovo, senza l’ultradestra a Kiev non si governa proviene da InsideOver.

Un vero e proprio “divide et impera” nucleare: dopo che la Francia di Emmanuel Macron ha alzato la posta sulla possibilità di offrire all’Europa una capacità di deterrenza atomica fondata sull’arsenale di Parigi e nove Paesi, da ultima la Norvegia, hanno annunciato il loro interessamento per questa prospettiva, gli Usa spingono per potenziare la loro presenza in termini di armi di distruzione di massa nel Vecchio Continente. Una presa di posizione coerente con la nuova, aggressiva National Security Strategy di Donald Trump, la cui amministrazione è la più interventista del post-Guerra Fredda, che fa della supremazia nucleare americana un perno della difesa della leadership statunitense nei teatri di riferimento.

In tal senso, in un clima di competizione attivo con i rivali di Washington, con la guerra in Ucraina che non cessa e con la distensione con la Russia che non prende piede, e mentre il riarmo europeo è agli inizi, gli Usa starebbero, secondo funzionari consultati dal Financial Times, lavorando per estendere ad altri Paesi, oltre ai sei già aderenti, la rete di accordi che permettono alla superpotenza d’oltre Atlantico di schierare le proprie forze nucleari in Europa. La Polonia, in particolare, dopo essersi detta favorevole al confronto con la Francia per il “nuclear sharing”, è interessata alla possibilità, e l’ex partito di governo Diritto e Giustizia, che esprime il capo dello Stato Karol Nawrocki, per bocca dell’ex presidente Andrzej Duda ha chiesto a Washington di aprire all’ingresso nel cielo polacco dei caccia F-35 e degli altri vettori aerei del deterrente statunitense.

La Francia e le sue 300 testate

Italia, Belgio, Regno Unito, Turchia, Olanda e Germania aderiscono oggi al programma di condivisione nucleare degli Usa. Trump evidentemente ha accelerato dopo che l’iniziativa francese ha iniziato ad avere successo: nella visione di Macron, nota Defense News, l’accordo di deterrenza “promette di collegare le minacce esistenziali agli alleati europei a una risposta nucleare francese, anche se gli Stati Uniti dovessero ritirarsi. Tutti i poteri decisionali e il controllo sulle armi nucleari resteranno a Parigi. La Francia, di fatto, agirebbe come potenza protettrice dell’Europa”. Stati come la Germania hanno firmato protocolli d’intesa con Parigi, la cui visione si basa sulla cosiddetta teoria del controvalore. Per la Francia, infatti, non serve un arsenale da migliaia di testate ma uno sufficientemente grande da rendere possibile la reazione al primo attacco di una potenza rivale, si pensi alla Russia, in maniera tale da rendere sconsigliabile qualsiasi attacco. L’idea è di fornire la garanzia delle circa 300 testate francesi all’intera Europa.

Nove adesioni non sono poche: e gli Usa, se confermato quanto riportato dal FT, stanno provando a riaffermare la propria primazia in Europa: “Le recenti decisioni dell’amministrazione Trump di annullare il previsto dispiegamento di importanti sistemi d’arma in Europa e di annunciare il ritiro di truppe, nell’ambito di una strategia volta a spostare maggiori risorse militari in Asia e in altre regioni, hanno allarmato alcuni alleati della Nato”, nota il Financial Times. La spinta atomica va in direzione opposta e mostra l’assertività dell’amministrazione Trump nel puntare su un rilancio della presenza militare americana. Inoltre, il potere simbolico della Bomba è tale da presentare una spinta al rilancio dell’arma nucleare come un proxy della volontà statunitense di non mollare alcuna zona d’influenza. America First in azione, dunque, mentre si prova a sedurre l’Europa sulla deterrenza e a sfidare l’iniziativa di Macron che un futuro presidente francese (anche se fosse Jordan Bardella, sovranista non trumpista) difficilmente rottamerà e potrebbe consolidare con crescente capitale politico. Il concetto è sempre quello: dividere l’Europa per poter mantenere negli Usa il boccino del comando. E con che mezzo farlo se non con l’arma per antonomasia e il suo fascino tutt’altro che discreto?

L'articolo Trump offre le sue atomiche all’Europa e tenta il divide et impera contro le proposte di Macron proviene da InsideOver.

On Thursday, the EU passed the delayed €1.8 trillion Euro budget and coronavirus recovery fund much to the relief of many of the bloc’s leaders. The fund was finally approved after Poland and Hungary removed their vetoes during the recent EU summit.

Polish Prime Minister Andrzej Duda and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban had blocked the approval of the budget last month, amid plans to link cash payouts to a nation’s respect for the EU’s core values.

Both Hungary and Poland are the subject of an Article 7 procedure — the EU’s so-called “nuclear option” which allows for nation states to be sanctioned if they are believed to be undermining democracy and the rule of law.

Judit Varga, Justice Minister for Hungary’s right-wing government, said she would challenge the new provision of making EU funds conditional on the bloc’s rule of law criteria in the European Court of Justice, but that never happened.

Poland and Hungary Have Suffered an Embarrassing Defeat

However, it is unlikely that this is going to be the end of the tale. Last week, a state-controlled Polish company said it would buy dozens of local and regional newspapers from a German media company, following years of calls for the “re-Polonization” of the media from Poland’s conservative Law and Justice party (PiS).

In Poland, the ombudsman’s office used to have the power to bring cases before the constitutional court and invalidate controversial legislation before the former became politicized.

According to the NGO Freedom House’s Nations in Transit report, which was released in May, Hungary is no longer a democracy due to the adoption of an emergency law that allows its government to rule by decree indefinitely, brought in after the coronavirus pandemic struck.

Therefore, the EU has its work cut out if it is serious about forcing Poland and Hungary to become more democratic. Yet the bloc failed to prevent both nations from sliding away from democracy this year, which shows how toothless the EU is.

The EU Cannot Force Poland and Hungary to Embrace its Version of Democracy

Making the coronavirus relief fund conditional on accepting the principles of rule and law and democracy may not be enough to persuade Orban and Duda to introduce democratic reforms. There is a strong possibility that both leaders have fooled the EU into believing that they will respect democracy and the rule of law just to receive the money they need to trigger an economic recovery in their respective nations.

Piotr Buras, Head of the Warsaw Office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, said EU member states should push for a transparent and fair mechanism of withholding financial assistance for countries ignoring the Court of Justice of the EU judgments relating to Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union, which outlines the union’s core values. He added that such a mechanism would be a strong warning that solidarity and democracy are indispensable pillars of the European order. But because of the economic crisis caused by the coronavirus, there seems to be no appetite for such a measure.

Bold Choices are Needed in the Year Ahead

On September 9, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said the EU should proceed with integration without Poland and Hungary. Tom Theuns of EU Observer suggests that Rutte’s argument is correct because a new EU could be founded without Warsaw and Budapest. Such a move would be bold on the EU’s part, but doing nothing is not an option for them, and they cannot realistically do anything else to stop the Polish and Hungarian governments from pursuing their individual paths.

Also, neither Duda nor Orban seem serious about triggering Article 50 so that their respective nations can leave the EU. This means the bloc is stuck with the headache Poland and Hungary are causing them.

The coronavirus relief fund is a short-term victory for the EU. It is likely that the war Budapest and Warsaw want to wage with Brussels will continue into 2021, but what happens next remains anyone’s guess.

L'articolo What’s Next for Poland and Hungary Following Their Defeat by the EU? proviene da InsideOver.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recentl;y paid Europe a visit. Within a week, he toured the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Austria, and Poland. His stops were anything but random, and they show the contradictions and rifts in Washington and within the EU.

What Was the Main Purpose of Pompeo’s Trip?

The main topics covered were the recently announced relocation of US troops out of Germany, energy security, including the dispute over the German-Russian gas pipeline Nord Stream 2 and technical cooperation in nuclear power and regarding 5G networks.

The overarching goal was to curb the influence of China and Russia and advance American influence in Europe.

Czech Republic

Pompeo first arrived in Pilsen, Czech Republic on Tuesday and visited a new memorial to the liberation of western Czechoslovakia by US forces nearby. On Wednesday, he gave a speech in parliament to enhance the importance of parliaments in general, which are receiving less attention in the course of digitization and the direct meetings of the heads of government.

The Czech Republic must maintain good relations with the US. In projects such as the Three Seas Initiative launched by Poland, it does not seek the choice of whether to cooperate with its Central European neighbors. As far as the withdrawal of 12,000 soldiers from Germany, the Czech Republic remains just as skeptical as the Baltic states as it reduces the permanent US presence in Europe. Only 5600 of them are supposed to stay in Europe, mostly not all the time, but on a rotating basis.

Moreover, the Czech Republic is less dependent on China than Hungary or Poland and would like to remain open whether it follows the US demand for exclusion in the dispute over Huawei’s participation in 5G networks or German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s efforts to take a softer pan-European line.

Slovenia

In Slovenia, Pompeo was concerned with precisely this signal on Thursday: resistance to China’s influence via Huawei in the EU is growing. The government in Ljubljana has signed a voluntary commitment only to allow “clean 5G networks”.

It would exclude corporations under the control of foreign governments. Poland, Estonia, and the Czech Republic have already signed such an agreement with the USA.

Austria

Pompeo’s visit to Vienna on Friday, meanwhile, had several purposes. It served as a replacement for Chancellor Sebastian Kurz’s canceled visit to President Trump. The visit to Austria should primarily send the signal that Pompeo and the USA do not want to split the EU into old Europe (West) and new Europe (East). Pompeo left out Paris and Berlin on this trip, but not Vienna, which is also part of the old EU. Vienna is also the seat of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA.

Pompeo has called for the continuation of the sanctions against Iran, including an arms embargo that is currently limited to October 18 — with little success.

Poland

Warsaw on Saturday was a harmonious day for Pompeo. Poland sees itself as the best new ally in the USA. And for a good reason. President Donald Trump just helped President Andrzej Duda to win his re-election bid. After difficult negotiations regarding specific legal implications, the US will deploy additional US soldiers to Poland. Not permanently, but as part of a rotation.

Moreover, the US sanctions against companies that participate in Nord Stream 2 are in Poland’s favor. Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki recently used Trump’s argument that it was against solidarity for Germany to use gas deals to provide Russia with money and influence, which Moscow will subsequently invest in weapons, directed against NATO.

Washington’s New Strategy

The countries that Pompeo visited were chosen with care. Washington is cognizant that the Trump method does not work for the European powers Germany and France. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, which always feels a little neglected by its western neighbors, America is mostly welcomed with open arms and therefore has an easy time asserting its interests.

The fact that Europe is further divided with this method is deliberate, but unfortunately also due to the EU, which has never really been able to develop a coherent strategy that would make the East impervious to outside interests.

L'articolo Pompeo’s Visit to Europe proviene da InsideOver.

One of the most heated elections in Europe so far has ended in Poland, with the country’s National Electoral Commission declaring the incumbent President, Andrzej Duda, as the winner having achieved a vote share of 51.2 percent. It is Poland’s tightest presidential race since the end of communism in 1989.

The turnout for the election was 68.2 percent.

Trzaskowski Failed to Broaden His Appeal

The Civic Coalition’s (KO) candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski, failed to muster all the support from the other candidates such as Szymon Hołownia, who came third in the first round of the presidential election thanks to his campaign for ‘modern solidarity.’ This made it more difficult for Trzaskowski to topple his conservative opponent.

Trzaskowski also failed to take advantage of the votes right-wing nationalist Krzysztof Bosak won in the first round of the poll. Even though the KO’s candidate and Bosak share similar economic views, there is no doubt that many of the latter’s supporters ultimately lent their vote to Duda.

Now that Duda’s second term is secure, the Polish President has to ensure that he can heal the divisions that this election has caused. But now that he has secured a mandate for his policies and because of the Law and Justice’s (PiS) majority in Poland’s Parliament, it is unlikely that Duda will build bridges with those who voted for the KO in the second round of the presidential election.

What Duda’s Second Term Means for Poland

This will result in a lack of progress for those hoping to secure more LGBT equality in Poland. Throughout the election, Duda described LGBT rights as an ‘ideology’ more destructive than communism. Furthermore, the country has been called the worst nation in the EU for LGBT rights.

Duda will also proceed with his controversial judicial reforms that caused him to clash with the EU. The Polish President’s reform program involved a supreme court chamber to conduct disciplinary actions against judges. PiS believes that the country’s flawed transition to democracy in 1989 caused the judiciary to be expropriated by a post-communist elite. Meanwhile, those on the left condemn the reforms as an attack on the rule of law.

The Polish President will also position himself closer to the Trump administration (assuming the US President wins a second election) and drift apart from the rest of the EU. This will exacerbate the EU’s divisions as Duda will continue to align himself with anti-EU leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban.

PiS Must Look to the Future

It is clear that the incumbent did not appeal to more liberal voters to secure his election victory, but under Poland’s constitution, a first-term president can only be re-elected once. Looking to the future, this means that although Duda will not contest the 2025 Polish presidential election, PiS, the party he is associated with, must appoint a candidate who can appeal to Poland’s more liberal voters if they want to prevent the next election from being so closely contested.

Duda’s voters tended to be concentrated in smaller towns, villages and older populations, while larger cities and women would vote for Trzaskowski. This election revealed how geographically and demographically divided Poland is. As the country’s more liberal voters expand in size, PiS would do well to drop its opposition to issues such as LGBT rights if it hopes to win the 2025 election with a broader coalition of voters. However, it is unlikely that this will happen by the time of the 2023 parliamentary election with Duda at the helm.

This election proved that PiS cannot continue to appeal to a narrow electoral base anymore and it exposed Poland’s polarized political divisions. Those voters Duda failed to appeal to will decide PiS’s fate over the next five years, which is why he cannot afford to take the electorate for granted anymore.

L'articolo The Consequences of Duda’s Victory in Poland proviene da InsideOver.

Last weekend, as Poles set out to elect their next president, Europe’s ideological divisions were thrown into sharp relief. In one corner, the incumbent Andrzej Duda — a man indicative of Eastern Europe’s growing conservatism — standing on a platform of nationalistic populism. In the other, Rafal Trzaskowski, a Europhile liberal and defender of minority rights.

Who Won Poland’s Election, Duda or Trzaskowski?

With the first-round votes counted, neither one had reached the requisite 50% (Duda took just under 44% of the vote, while Trzaskowski recorded just over 30%), triggering a runoff ballot to be held on July 12.

The decision ahead of Poles reflects a far wider crisis of unity afflicting Europe: the rise of nationalist governments who have generated controversy over their approach to press freedom and the rule of law in the East, versus the enduring liberal traditions of the West.

Though more moderate than, say, Serbia’s president Aleksandar Vucic or Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Duda has much in common with these right-wing leaders.

Taking a Look at PiS

Poland’s ruling Law & Justice Party (PiS) — with which he is aligned — is wedded to a program of state transformation, including new laws that limit media freedoms and punish judges who are considered to have inaccurately maligned the government or ruled by activist sympathies. As president, Duda has waved through these measures, chipping away at Poland’s democratic credentials.

Yet, the 48-year-old still clearly enjoys significant support, even though he failed to meet the 50% threshold for a first-round triumph.

Duda’s Popularity is in Decline

Duda’s popularity is in decline, however. Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, he looked set for a stonking victory. But the government’s lackluster performance on the pandemic and recent allegations of corruption have seen his support base ebb away.

The emergence of Trzaskowski — Warsaw’s cosmopolitan mayor — as a viable candidate has also stung the incumbent. Perturbed at the country’s trajectory under PiS’s brand of nationalistic conservatism, many Poles have turned to Trzaskowski in the hope that he will be a check and balance against the PiS’s right-wing policies. As president, the Warsaw man would have an effective veto on government legislation.

Gay Rights Becomes a Focal Point

Startled by Trzaskowski’s striking rise in the polls, Duda’s campaign shifted gears in the weeks running up to the first-round vote, forcing the conversation onto social issues. The rights of LGBT people has been a particularly fierce battleground.

Seeking support from Poland’s rural, Catholic voter base which remains staunchly against same-sex marriage — Duda has played the family values card, promising to protect the nation against the proliferation of “LGBT ideology.”

A strong supporter of gay rights, Trzaskowski has offered Poles a very different vision with regard to equality. Elements of the media — which various mainstream and left-leaning analysts say is largely under the thumb of the administration — have sought to turn this against the moderate candidate. Sieci, a pro-PiS weekly magazine, recently published a front-cover depicting a hooded Trzaskowski wearing a rainbow armband, with the caption: “the extremist candidate”.

What Happens Next?

This attempted character assassination appears not to have worked, however. By taking 30% of the vote, Trzaskowski has secured himself a strong position for the second-round runoff. Indeed, if electoral polling is to be trusted, he — not Duda — is the odds-on favorite to win the deciding ballot next month.

That would send a strong signal that Eastern Europe still holds dear the core democratic values upon which the continent is built.

L'articolo Poland’s Presidential Race Reflects Europe’s East-West Ideological Divide proviene da InsideOver.

Poland’s presidential election this year proved to be the most heated contest Poles have experienced in recent years. Not only has the nation been crippled by the effects of the coronavirus, but the election was also held against the backdrop of widespread flooding. It was also originally scheduled for May 10, but it had to be postponed due to COVID-19.

The final historic turnout stood at 64.51 percent, which shows that there is a growing interest in the country’s democratic process.

PiS Stormed Ahead in the First Round

Out of the eleven candidates who registered to stand in the general election, only two received a clear mandate to participate in a second vote scheduled for July 12th. President Andrzej Duda, the incumbent associated with the ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS), received 43.5 percent of the vote. He will face Rafał Trzaskowski, the Mayor of Warsaw. The latter received 30.46 percent of the vote during the first election and he is the candidate for the main opposition party, which call themselves the Civic Coalition (KO).

During the first vote, Duda attempted to rally his voters behind PiS’s social policies, including their stance on LGBT issues, with the incumbent President describing LGBT rights as an “ideology” more destructive than communism and abortion. He also highlighted his high-standing with President Trump.

The US President even endorsed Duda when the latter went to Washington to visit one of his closest allies. “He’s doing a terrific job,” Trump commented.

Meanwhile, Trzaskowski concentrated more on COVID-19’s consequences, women’s rights and maintaining a close relationship with the EU.

Duda Had the State Media on His Side

Duda’s first and only victory so far has demonstrated the incumbent President’s ability to manipulate the state media into supporting him. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) criticized the conduct of Duda’s campaign. Its statement read that state broadcaster TVP served “as a campaign tool” for the President, and some of its reporting contained “xenophobic and anti-Semitic undertones.” By referring to Trzaskowski as ‘a threat to Polish values and interests’, it failed in its duty to be impartial.

However, Gazeta Wyborcza reports that TVP suffered a stunning defeat as it failed to prevent Trzaskowski from soaring to second place. According to BBC News, even conservative daily Rzeczpospolita admitted that PiS support has been mobilized to the limit, which means Duda may have to build bridges with KO at some stage.

Holding the presidential election in June worked to KO’s advantage. If the vote had been held in May, the incumbent President would have stood a better chance of winning in the first round as he was riding high in the opinion polls then. If there is one lesson that Duda needs to learn from this election, then it is that he needs to broaden his base of support to win in the future.

Duda Must Broaden His Support to Win

The New Statesman’s Annabelle Chapman argues that the independent candidate Szymon Hołownia, who came a clear third during the first election, could provide Trzaskowski with the largest reserve of additional votes due to his campaign for “modern solidarity.” Trzaskowski could even eat into the support of right-wing nationalist Krzysztof Bosak, who came fourth, as he shares economic views which are similar to Bosak’s. This is despite the fact that many of the latter’s supporters may vote for Duda.

This could result in an extremely close result that will have major implications for Poland. Daniel Gleichgewicht of the New Eastern Europe highlights that a victory for the opposition could lead to a potential paralysis of the state as PiS hold the largest number of seats in Poland’s parliament. The President has the power to veto legislation, and a KO victory could thwart PiS’s parliamentary agenda.

If Duda wants to prevent such an outcome, he needs to broaden his image to win a vaster array of voters, and fast.

L'articolo The Lesson Duda Needs to Learn proviene da InsideOver.

Five years ago, the US troops stationed in Poland could fit on a bus. That was before shadowy, insignia-less soldiers crossed from Russia into the Ukraine, annexing the Crimean peninsula. Aghast at Moscow’s seizure of sovereign land, the West began a concerted, if cautious, military build-up in Eastern Europe. But now, a more decisive step forward – one thousand extra American soldiers are to be deployed on Polish soil. It’s a modest move, some believe, but one that reflects the mounting anxiety over Russian aggression. 

For a year now, Poland has been trying to coax President Trump into upping his military presence. Warsaw’s head man, Andrzej Duda, knows how to entice his US counterpart: money, loyalty, praise. He’s willing to foot the bill for a new base – around $2bn – and has appealed to the President’s swollen ego, offering to name it ‘Fort Trump’. And it seems to have paid off for the Pole – precise details of new US facilities, which, according to Mr Trump, will be “very beautiful”,  are now being firmed up.

But the White House’s commitment falls short of Duda’s ultimate goal: a permanent US deployment in Poland. Instead of an embedded division, he’s getting 1,000 extra American troops, who will join the 4,500 already rotating in and out of the country. There will be a squadron of Reaper drones, a helicopter brigade, and a smattering of special forces units also.     

Each will serve as a tripwire should Russia mount an invasion – a prospect the Poles are taking seriously. The Kremlin is “definitely very, very aggressive,” says General Rajmund Andrzejczak, Warsaw’s army chief. Unlike their Central European neighbours (and even some of their Eastern ones) Poland shares a land border with Russia. Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave, which sits on the nation’s northeast frontier, and is home to some of Moscow’s most advanced nuclear-capable Iskander missiles.  

The arithmetic is less clear for America’s mercurial leader, who seems rather fond of Mr Putin. But having grudgingly endorsed the NATO framework, Trump is keen to cosy up with his European allies – so long as they pay their bills. Alliance members are obliged to meet 2% GDP expenditure on defence, a pledge each renewed in 2014 but only a fraction fulfil. Poland is one of them, having embarked upon an American-built spending spree this summer (rocket launchers, planes, air defence systems). By 2030, the plucky Eastern European state plans to hit 2.5%.

Germany, by contrast, is lagging behind. Come January 2024, forecasts suggest just 1.5% of Berlin’s budget will be arms-related – billions of dollars short of their NATO commitments. Little coincidence then that the US troops destined for Poland will be shifted from German garrisons. Ever the wily businessman, Mr Trump is frustrated with allies not pulling their weight – the US accounts for two-thirds of NATO’s expenditure – and seems happy to punish the most egregious under-spenders.     

But not all are convinced. General Ben Hodges, a former US Army commander, believes Germany to be America’s most important European ally, having built up a complex military and bureaucratic framework in the country since 1945. To achieve any semblance of this on Polish soil would take not just time, but stratospheric sums of money. 

Indeed, the American contingent presently based in Poland endure a distinctly sub-par infrastructure. About a quarter live in a tent city near the town of Powidz, suffering spotty internet service and dismal water pressure. Duda’s accord with Trump will hope to address these shortcomings, experts say, focusing closely on development and longevity. 

“[The agreement] ensures the long-term sustainability and support of American forces in Poland,” says Ray Wojcik, Warsaw Director at the Center for European Policy Analysis. “[It also] emphasizes that more is needed to prepare for the sustained, robust, and enduring presence of US forces in Poland.”

But what Poles deem military peace-of-mind, the Russians interpret as provocation – and not without good reason. In 1997, NATO promised it would not permanently station troops in Eastern Europe, a commitment now hanging by a thread. Senior officials would argue that Russia’s Crimean land grab changed the rules of the game – but Moscow is clear in its belief that America is threatening regional stability.    

Regardless of who is at fault, the permanent deployment proposition can’t escape a central fallacy: if the Russians come, a temporary detachment will serve the tripwire purpose just as effectively. Rotational or otherwise, if an American unit is engaged, a response will be forthcoming and matters will escalate. Deterrence is about force, but it can also be an exercise in diminishing returns.

This will mean little to the Poles, who value strength and security above all else. Theirs is blood-soaked history, a country carved up by bigger neighbours time and again. In Trump, they see a man who can offer permanent protection. But the cost could be high. A bump in NATO’s regional presence might be justified by Russian belligerence – but it also invites challenge. One miscalculation, and the consequences could be historic. 

L'articolo Trump Deploys More Troops In Poland Amid Russia Fears proviene da InsideOver.

When asked in an interview for his views on relations between the US and Russia, Russian President Vladimir Putin said ‘relations between Moscow and Washington are getting worse and worse.’ Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump told reporters during his visit to Poland this week: ‘I hope that Poland is going to have a great relationship with Russia. I hope that we’re going to have a great relationship with Russia.’ But he failed to explain how he was going to improve the relationship between the two global powers and his actions in Poland this week speak louder than his words.

Warsaw asked the US for help in deterring Russian aggression, and in response, Trump announced during his visit to Poland that he will be deploying 1,000 troops in the possible event that Moscow invades Eastern Europe. He made this announcement during a joint press conference with Polish President Andrzej Duda at the Polish White House Rose Garden after the pair signed a cooperation agreement.

Duda said the agreement ‘helps solidify Poland’s ties to the West’, thereby making it clear he would prefer for his country to be tied to NATO, not Russia. In a further blow to the Russian President, Poland’s leader said Russia is ‘showing its unkind, unfriendly imperial face. Russia is always looking to take our territory.’ NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg welcomed the news and called America’s response ‘measured, defensive and proportionate.’

Trump’s actions have angered Moscow. Although the Russian leader has not yet directly responded to the US’s actions, Vladimir Dzhabarov, deputy head of the Duma’s international affairs committee, informed the Moscow Times Poland ‘could become the target of a retaliatory strike.’

Relations between the two nations have soured since the days George W. Bush claimed he could ‘get a sense of Putin’s soul.’ Trump and the Russian leader forged a positive relationship following their first meeting at the G20 summit in Hamburg in July 2017. But they worsened following the poisoning of former Russian spy, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter, during a nerve-agent attack in the UK allegedly approved by the Russian state. In response, the Trump administration expelled 60 Russian diplomats. Moscow retaliated by expelling 60 American diplomats.

Although both leaders enjoyed a successful summit in Helsinki in July 2018, which reaffirmed both countries’ commitments to the new START and the INF Treaty, Trump later ignored Putin at the G20 summit in Argentina in November 2018, citing Russia’s capture of Ukrainian ships in the Crimea. Furthermore, both leaders suspended their involvement in the INF Treaty, with America accusing Russia of failing to fulfill its obligations to the agreement.

Poland has now driven a further wedge between the US and Russia. It seems Trump is no different to his predecessors in his approach towards Putin. As long as the Russian leader proceeds with his aggressive actions, NATO must be prepared for any move Moscow makes to invade its neighbours. The US President has been right to suspend his country’s involvement in the INF Treaty and deploy American troops to Poland, whilst Russia refuses to abandon its expansionist aims.

Putin’s and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s snub towards the D-Day celebrations last week legitimises Trump’s National Security Strategy, which warns that Russia and China ‘challenge American power, influence and interests.’ With the Russian leader in office until 2024, Moscow will use this time to exert its global influence. Putin’s actions indicate he has no interest in forging an alliance with the US. Russia has ruined the hopes of anyone praying Trump would rebuild relations with Moscow after they were tarnished during the Bush and Obama years. The world could be on the verge of another Cold War, this time with Russia and China. Trump must not waiver, or the rest of the world will suffer the consequences.

L'articolo How Poland is Driving a Wedge Between Putin and Trump proviene da InsideOver.