On April 26, 2023, more than a year after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in February 2022, Chinese president Xi Jinping held his first interaction with Ukrainian president Zelensky by way of an hour long telephonic conversation.

Both sides are reported to have discussed the crisis in Ukraine, with president Zelensky saying that he had a long and meaningful call with Xi. However, for a country of China’s standing that is seeking to play a major role in upholding the institution of global governance, the Xi-Zelensky phone call could be a classic case of too little, too late. Besides, being lost no time in clarifying that the conversation was requested by the Ukrainian side. In contrast, since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, President Xi has had several virtual and in-person meetings with President Putin, most recently in March 2023 when he visited Russia.
Lately, China has been trying to project an image of itself as a global mediator. On February 24, China proposed a 12-point peace plan for resolving the crisis in Ukraine. Ironically, till that time, President Xi had not had a single interaction with its Ukrainian counterpart – a fact that was increasingly creating murmurs even among countries of the global south. However, it is not just China’s inordinate delay in communication with the Ukrainian leadership that is the issue here, but rather Beijing’s questionable neutral position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

One may recall that just a few weeks before Russian troops entered Ukraine, President Putin met President Xi in Beijing on February 4, 2022. It was a time when Russia had already amassed a huge build-up on Ukraine’s borders. Instead of dissuading Russia from impinging on Ukraine’s sovereignty, President Xi went ahead and pledged a no-limits cooperation with Moscow. If China wanted to don the mantle of peace broker, that was the time to effectively do so. Instead, Beijing proceeded to provide a blanket reassurance to Russia, thereby further emboldening it to act against Ukraine.

Since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Beijing has maintained that it is a responsible power and a neutral party. Yet, over the course of the last year, China has stepped up its political, diplomatic,
economic and strategic support to Russia – all but stopping short of providing direct military assistance to the latter. China has been blocking UN resolutions criticizing Russia for its actions in Ukraine and has also extended Moscow an economic lifeline amidst wide-ranging economic sanctions. During President Xi’s recent visit to Moscow (March 20-22, 2023), both sides further renewed their pledges of strategic and economic cooperation.

China and Russia also have robust defence relations and have conducted several joint military exercises, even after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In February 2023, reports were rife about China’s plans to provide lethal miliary support to Russia in Ukraine. While this has been vehemently dismissed by Beijing and has, so far, not been confirmed, it is suspected that China is looking for ways to increase assistance to Moscow without tarnishing its own image. Some of the ways adopted by Beijing to avoid sanctions and reputational cost include supplying dual use equipment to Russia, operating through the cover of private companies, or even routing supplies through a third country. Over the last year, Chinese companies have provided assault rifles and body armour to Russia apart from navigating equipment, satellite imagery, vehicle and jet fighter parts, electronic jamming technology, and electronic parts for anti-aircraft missile radars. Such actions, for someone, could do not qualify Beijing as a credible mediator.

Again, for all of Beijing’s diplomatic language about sovereignty and territorial integrity, the startling remarks made by Lu Shaye, China’s Ambassador to France, questioning the sovereignty of former soviet states, gives a peek into Beijing’s actual worldview. Responding to a question on whether Crimea belong to Ukraine, Ambassador Lu had stated that ex-Soviet countries don’t have an effective status in international law because there was no international agreement to materialize their status as sovereign countries. This essentially disputes Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea and other Russian occupied areas. This is also not a very comforting statement from the emissary of a country professing to establish an alternative ‘global security’ order based on respect for sovereignty.

Though the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was prompt to distance itself from Lu’s comments, it is hard to believe that the statements of a hand-picked ‘wolf warrior’ like Lu Shaye, do not somewhere reflect the inner thinking of the Chinese Communist Party. More concerning is the fact that Lu is echoing what Moscow itself has been saying on Ukraine. As pointed out by Lithuanian Foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, this is the Russian propaganda on Ukraine, and now its being sent out by another country, which is in our eyes an ally of Moscow. Once again, this does not position Beijing very well as an impartial mediator in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Some like Czech president Petr Pavel have even assessed that it may actually be in China’s interest to prolong the status quo in Ukraine since it would allow Beijing to continue ‘pushing Russia to a number of concessions’ while also keeping the West occupied.
Apart from Beijing’s interest in resolving the Ukraine crisis, the other question that arises is its actual ability to do so. On April 27, the Russian Foreign Ministry commenting on the Xi-Zelensky call said that it had ‘noted’ Beijing’s willingness to put in place a negotiation process and welcomed any attempt to end the Ukrainian conflict ‘on its own terms.’ However, less than a day later on April 28, Russia resumed missile attacks on civilian targets in Ukraine, resulting in more than twenty casualties, including three minors. This is a clear message from Kremlin that it is not in a mood to be reined in by Beijing or anybody.

The only situation in which Russia may allow China to broker a peace on its behalf would be if it finds itself in an irrecoverable position of weakness, and needs to either buy time to fortify itself or to find a way out of Ukraine without losing face. China’s interest in mediating the Ukraine crisis throws up two scenarios: one is where China merely wants to gain some moral ground by posturing as a ‘mediator’ without changing anything on ground between Russia and Ukraine. The second and more concerning one is if China is posturing as a ‘neutral’ party trying to broke a ‘peace deal,’ but is actually acting as a proxy on behalf of Russia. This would change the nature of the conflict by providing Moscow tactical and strategic military advantages over Ukraine.

Following his call with President Xi, President Zelensky had remarked that it would act as a ‘powerful impetus’ to their bilateral relationship. Notably, he did not make any comment on how ‘meaningful’ or otherwise the talks might have been for resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict, per se. It is clear that Kiev has no illusions about the optics involved in China projecting itself as a mediator in the Ukraine crisis.

L'articolo The Xi-Zelensky Phone Call: a Case of ‘Too Little, Too Late’? proviene da InsideOver.

For all its bluster, Chinese foreign policy may be at a geopolitical crossroads on the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since last February, China has tried everything to keep itself engaged, albeit unilaterally and uninvited by any member of the international community, with negotiations to end the war. But it has nothing much to show at the end other than the realization that the global isolation is hurting it. Borrowing China’s consistent argument – it is one that Russia believes – that the United States-led West provoked Vladimir Putin until he crossed the Ukrainian border, the problem for China is the narrative remained with the West, not Beijing.

It is the West that did nothing to prevent the war. It promptly imposed sanctions against Russia which the West subsequently turned a blind eye to – the example of how Russian oil takes a global detour to reach the United States is a glaring example. It continued to arm Ukraine, though with defensive and not offensive weapons – meaning thereby the intention was to prolong the war rather than end it. It used Ukraine as a photo-op for the heads of state of European nations. Even the wife of the US president went there. President Joe Biden just couldn’t stop watching the parade of guests and went there himself. Even today, the West and Ukraine are on a daily routine of chats to decide how they will strategise for the ongoing war.

The trading partners of the US and Europe are supporting them, vocally or silently. There has been not much of dissent seeking the US to rein in its ranking policy of allowing the war to go on indefinitely. China is the lone exception. It is not invited at any Western table. It finds itself having to pursue an entirely independent policy on the war. That is the root of the angst in Beijing. They want to belong to a group to show they have ideas to end the war – or at least pretend to have ideas. But nobody is interested. So they tag along, alone. And how? By treating Ukraine as a proxy war against the United States in particular, select portions of the West in general. Far away from Ukraine and with only rhetorical support to Russia, nothing explains China’s policy other than that it wants the war to set the stage for another Cold War.

Despite its anti-American propaganda, China has not really done much to help Russia. It publicly supported Russia over the invasion, calling for a negotiated end to the conflict. President Xi Jinping met with Putin but not Volodymyr Zelenskyy, but that has not stopped China from sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the initial months. Aware of the western sanctions against Russia, China ensured that it did not cross the line despite committing itself to its ‘no-limits friendship’ with Russia.

Look at the scenario. The China-US ties are worse than before, thanks to the ill-advised shooting down of a Chinese balloon(s) by the Americans. The Americans raised a bogey that China proposes to supply arms to the Russians, well knowing that Russia has the world’s second largest army in the world, followed by China. China bristled when US Secretary of State Antony Blinken made an issue out of the China-arms-to-Russia theory and issued a warning of serious consequences if ‘lethal’ weapons are supplied to Russia. The brouhaha ended up in a chilled round of diplomacy and exchange of words, but nothing else.

Beijing ramped up its anti-American propaganda thereafter, while the Chinese foreign ministry issued a memorandum to western journalists about American hegemonic intentions. China rounded up its campaign by announcing a deeper relationship with Russia, calling the alliance “as stable as Mount Tai”—to use a Chinese idiom.

So far, it has calibrated its foreign policy vis-à-vis Ukraine to how the world perceives it. A media report analysed thus: “China has walked a fine line: It suspended business when threats to Chinese interests necessitated it, parroting Russian talking points when they aligned with China’s criticism of the U.S., and continuing trade when the environment was conducive. In doing so, China has used the opportunity to further its foreign policy interests at an incredibly uncertain time in the international environment.”

This policy has given it the freedom to do what it really wants: Give no opportunity to the West to criticize Chinese actions, continue to support Russian actions without violating western economic sanctions, and all the while keep chastising the US. Such a policy has only one objective: Treat itself as a strategic rival of the United States and project the image as a policy at every opportunity the Ukraine war creates.

There is no public knowledge so far of China having provided any ‘lethal’ military support to Russia. But there is a logic to the proposition: China would not want to let go of an opportunity to test its current military arsenal even if by proxy by allowing Russia to use it against Ukraine. It may want to observe from close quarters how Russia strategises the war effort, to even theoretically equip Chinese military commanders with data to study how a war is fought—having fought its last war in 1979, nearly all of the Chinese military has never experienced conflict in the last 40-odd years.

L'articolo More Lessons Learnt than Taught for China on War Anniversary proviene da InsideOver.

After one year of war in Ukraine, Nato is stronger and more united. Inside Over dialogues with General (ret.) David Petraeus about the dynamics shaped by the conflict at the global level, the role of the Alliance in the world competition between powers and the possible ends of the war. Petraeus, born in 1952, has served 37 years in the U.S. Army and has served in many leading roles. From 2007 to 2008 he was the commanding general of Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), from 2008 to 2010 he has served as commander of the U.S. Central Command (Centcom), between 2010 and 2011 he has been the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and commander, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A). From to 2011 and 2012 he has been the 4th Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Cia). Now  Partner at KKR and Chairman of the KKR Global Institute,

How has the Ukraine War changed the strategic context in Europe? 

“I think it is accurate to observe that while Vladimir Putin set out to “Make Russia Great Again,” what he really has done is make NATO great again: prompting two historically neutral (and very capable) countries to seek NATO membership; fostering a level of unity in NATO that has not been seen since the end of the Cold War; resulting in increased defense budgets in Europe and the U.S., with Germany, notably, now committed to achieve the NATO goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense, after having not event gotten to 1.5% previously; leading to augmentation of forces in the Baltic States and eastern Europe; and, finally, dramatically reducing Russia’s military capability, with Russian forces having sustained enormous casualties and staggering losses of weapons systems and vehicles, as well as dramatically depleting its stocks of munitions.  In sum, Russia is very substantially diminished and NATO substantially strengthened”.

Can we state that the West is more united one year after the beginning of the war? 

“Yes, absolutely, despite occasional hesitation over provision of certain weapons to Ukraine (as in the decision over the provision of western tanks to Ukraine, which is now agreed, of course).  As I noted earlier, NATO and other western countries have not been this united since the end of the Cold War”.

What was the role of Western weapons and Intelligence support in strengthening the Ukraine resistance? 

“Absolutely vital.  Ukraine has done a truly extraordinary job of mobilizing the entire country to fight what Ukrainians see as their War of Independence; they have done vastly better than Russia in recruiting, training, equipping, organizing, and employing additional forces and capabilities.  But that would not have been possible without the massive assistance from the U.S. and other western countries.  The U.S. alone has now provided over $27 billion in arms, ammunition, and materiel to the Ukrainian military since the invasion last February, with another $2B reportedly about to be added.  And the weapons systems provided continue to be more and more capable.  And, reportedly, sharing of intelligence has been very helpful, as well, though I don’t want to speculate further on that”.

Which mistakes were committed by the Russian Army? 

 A staggering number of mistakes, – everything from the terribly deficient initial campaign design, overestimation of Russian capabilities, complete underestimation of the capabilities (and incredible determination) of the Ukrainian forces and people, lack of appreciation of western support for Ukraine, poor command and control and communications, failure to achieve combined arms effects (armor, infantry, artillery, engineers, close air support, air defense, and electronic warfare all working together), wholly inadequate logistics, terrible indiscipline by Russian forces, lack of a professional noncommissioned officer corps, poor senior leadership (which is why multiple leaders have been fired), and, clearly, a failure to take advantage of all the time Russian forces had in Belarus and Russia to actually train and prepare the forces for the invasion. 

Is the perspective of an Ukraine victory a feasible one for the end of the War? 

“Yes, though the answer to that question obviously depends on how one defines “victory” and it also depends on a number of factors, most significantly continued strong western security and economic assistance for Ukraine and further tightening of the sanctions and export controls on Russia.  At the end of the day, I believe the war will end with a negotiated resolution when Russia realizes that it is unsustainable on the battlefield (where Russia has already lost more than 8 times the soldiers the USSR lost in nearly 10 years in Afghanistan) and also on the home front, given the ever-tightening sanctions and export controls.  And we need to do all that we can to hasten that day – and also to be ready with a Marshall-like plan to help rebuild Ukraine and also with an ironclad security guarantee for Ukraine, as well (whether that is NATO membership, which would be ideal, or a U.S.-led coalition commitment, if NATO membership is not achievable”.

President Biden stated in his Inauguration Speech that America was coming back as a global, reliable leader. Has the Ukraine War proven that he was right or America’s leadership is still in doubt? 

“I think that America’s leadership of the NATO and western effort to support Ukraine and to impose sanctions and export controls on Russia has shown that the U.S. is “back,” to use President Biden’s term (and that is particularly important in the wake of the withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, which allowed potential adversaries to contend that the U.S. was an unreliable partner and a great power in decline).  And in offering that assessment, please recall, Andrea, that I am not a member of any political party in the U.S. and do not even register to vote, much less vote.  I stopped voting when I was promoted to two-star general and have sought to stay non-political ever since”.

At the global level, the US is dealing with Russia’s expansionism in Europe and China’s ambitions in the Far East. What will be the most important issue for Washington in the coming years? 

“I think there is no question, that the most important relationship in the world is that between the U.S. – together with our allies and partners – and China.  Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s National Security Advisor, has described the relationship with China as one of “severe competition.”  And we all – all like-minded nations – must work together to ensure that competition doesn’t turn into conflict.  One might hope that patient, pragmatic, firm engagement could help reduce the sense of competition and increase areas of cooperation, eventually producing a relationship that is as mutually beneficial as is possible.  But we have to be clear eyed and coldly realistic, even as we seek to deal with differences and, again, ensure that they do not result in true conflict.  And we also all have to work together to ensure that the elements of deterrence (capabilities and willingness to employ them) are rock solid”.

L'articolo “Putin has made NATO great again”: a dialogue with David Petraeus proviene da InsideOver.

The initial launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Kremlin on February 24 was intended to be a short-lived affair, with the swift capture of Kyiv as the end goal. However, one year later, those plans failed, as Ukrainian forces successfully repelled Russian troops through a combination of determination and support from Western nations.

The conflict has had far-reaching impacts, reshaping our understanding of various fields, including military operations and strategy, diplomacy, intelligence, national security, energy security, economic statecraft, and much more. As the conflict marks its first anniversary, it is imperative to reflect on the key lessons learned from this ongoing war.

First and foremost – the Putin regime cannot be trusted

The past six months of Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, along with the country’s repeated invasions of neighbouring states and its recent hybrid warfare against the West, have demonstrated that agreements with the Putin regime are unreliable and can be detrimental. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine despite having committed to upholding the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity under the Budapest Memorandum. More recently, despite years of negotiations in the Normandy format and the Minsk agreements, the Kremlin has seized a fifth of Ukraine’s territory. These actions make it clear that any agreements made with the Russian government should be approached with caution.

The Russian government has consistently demonstrated its disregard for international law, liberal institutions, and various international agreements, both with its partners and rivals. Through its involvement in crimes against humanity in Ukraine, its violation of the principle of freedom of navigation, its weaponisation of food, and its use of energy blackmail, the Putin regime poses significant threats to the future of the Ukrainian nation and the global rules-based order.

The approach of appeasement, dialogue, and compromise with an aggressor has proven to be ineffective in the past. To achieve peace in the region, it is necessary for the West to adopt a stance of strength and assertiveness, as this is the only language that the Putin regime responds to.

Victory in conflict hinges on people, not solely equipment

In 2021, Russia allocated approximately $65 billion towards defence spending, surpassing Ukraine’s allocation by a factor of ten. Despite the significant investment in equipment, the outcome of the conflict has not met Russia’s expectations. The contrast in military performance highlights the impact of leadership and training on battlefield success.

With a shared military heritage dating back to Imperial Russia, the divergent results of the conflict offer valuable insights. Ukraine has been a participant in the US National Guard’s State Partnership Program since 1993, undergoing training based on the US model. This approach emphasises empowering junior officers and non-commissioned officers with mission-type orders, clear explanations of the commander’s intent, and the ability to make real-time decisions based on situational developments. Through realistic exercises, Ukraine has cultivated a culture that fosters individual initiative and encourages rigorous evaluation. These practices have contributed to high morale and effective performance in combat.

In comparison, the Russian armed forces heavily rely on conscripts and lack a professional non-commissioned officer corps, which deters initiative and discouragement of feedback. Decision-making remains highly centralised, with independence limited to senior officers. The approach to warfare employed by Russia is characterised by an absence of adaptability and low morale in the face of adverse conditions on the battlefield.

Ukraine is a key lesson in the pitfalls of linear thinking

The initial assumption regarding a Russian attack on Ukraine was that it would result in a military victory for Moscow. However, following the defeat of Russia in the Battle of Kyiv, it took some time for experts to recognise that the initial failures were not just temporary and that Russia was actually losing the war.

Another persistent prediction was that the conflict would result in a stalemate, similar to the First World War, with both Ukrainian and Russian forces entrenched in their positions, unable to make significant progress. This prediction has been proven incorrect by several Ukrainian counteroffensives. It is unwise to assume that the success of these counteroffensives will persist in the future, and it’s possible that the war may bring about unexpected developments rather than continuing patterns.

The war has proven that cyberspace is a legitimate conflict domain

The recent events in Ukraine, including Russia’s invasion, have resulted in a newfound role for the private sector in cyber conflict, as private firms are actively participating in direct cyber operations. Of course, Ukraine has a competent team of cybersecurity defenders who have successfully prevented attacks, but the efforts of these defenders have been augmented by private sector companies that have collaborated with the Ukrainian government to improve the country’s overall cybersecurity posture.

Leading technology companies, such as Microsoft and Cisco, have published reports on their defensive efforts and European cybersecurity firms, such as ESET, have also been involved.

It is imperative that the United States, NATO, and democratic nations in the Indo-Pacific region establish effective collaboration with relevant elements of the private sector to ensure seamless operation of cyberspace in the event of armed conflict. The National Cyber Security Centre in the United Kingdom and the US Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative are commendable initiatives; however, they currently lack the capability to address the challenges posed by large-scale combat scenarios. This is an important lesson; it has taught the world that it is essential to implement appropriate planning and operational mechanisms that cater to this challenge.

Learning the lessons learned

The invasion of Ukraine has provided a unique opportunity to evaluate the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces and the impact of various military technologies and strategies on modern warfare. The purpose of this report is to shed light on the key lessons learned from the conflict, but it should be noted that this is an ongoing conflict, and we’ll be learning just what lessons can be learned for years to come. This time next year, there will undoubtedly be a greater understanding of what can be known from the conflict.

L'articolo Ukraine – One year later proviene da InsideOver.

As the war in Ukraine nears its one-year anniversary with little signs of abating, military analysts are drawing up the balance on how one year of large-scale conventional fighting in Europe has impacted thinking on modern warfare, hoping to draw lessons from the biggest land war in Europe since World War II. Though reports on the death of the tank have been greatly exaggerated, the war has highlighted the vulnerability of more than one weapons system as a multitude of new technologies and armament have made their combat debut.

The war in Ukraine has experienced several major phases: from the initial Russian advances in early 2022, to Ukrainian counter offensives with the aim of taking back lost territory in the summer of 2022, and then to an artillery duel spread across a largely static front since late 2022. During each of these stages, the ability to target enemy troop concentrations, ammunition depots and other high value targets far behind enemy lines has become crucial in gaining the upper hand. 

Artillery and multiple rocket launchers have played a prominent role in Ukraine ever since the outbreak of the War in Donbas in 2014. Especially the latter systems have proven capable of destroying enemy fortifications and breaking up enemy advances using only a few volleys of rockets. Yet precisely this capability is conspicuously lacking, or at least deficient, in the inventories of most NATO member states. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many European countries have over the past year sought to (re)introduce these types of weapons systems into the inventories of their militaries.

It was Russia that entered the war with a significant advantage in artillery firepower. Initially outgunned and outranged along most of the frontline, this situation began to change with the delivery of some 300 Western-made towed howitzers and self-propelled guns and some 40 HIMARS and MLRS rocket systems. These gradually allowed Ukraine to gain a decisive upper hand to the extent that it can be argued that Russian forces have not been able to close the gap since. This disparity has not merely been achieved through the delivery of the gun systems alone, as these systems came alongside an extensive arsenal of precision-guided munitions, scatterable mines and weapons-locating radars. Even if the first are generally considered too expensive for widespread deployment, they have allowed Ukraine to accurately engage high value targets that arguably justify their high production costs. The deployment of artillery-fired mines has seen Russian offensives being stopped dead in their tracks as newly laid minefields form an impassable hindrance in fields that had been cleared just a day ago. Weapons-locating radars for their part have allowed Ukrainian forces to engage in increasingly effective counter-battery fire, in which a radar detects incoming artillery shells and immediately calculates their point of origin. The artillery guns firing these shells can then be targeted and destroyed before they are able to relocate.

The War in Ukraine has also highlighted the need for far larger stockpiles of ammunition than had previously been anticipated for a land war of this intensity. Furthermore an extensive logistics and repair network is required that is capable of repairing sophisticated weaponry that can be prone to frequent breakdowns under the stress of intensive use. 

As in every conflict, it is only a matter of time before your opponent starts implementing solutions to deal with a certain threat. The large-scale use of loitering munitions, which are essentially unmanned drones packed with an explosive warhead that fly themselves into an enemy target, was especially looked at with much anticipation. However, the deployment of U.S.-made Switchblade loitering munitions on the side of Ukraine left much to be desired, and it would ultimately be Russia that first managed to effectively introduce this new mode of warfighting to the battlefield. Video footage of combat operations so far confirms it has used its Lancet loitering munitions to strike close to a hundred Ukrainian targets, amongst which dozens of Western-delivered artillery systems. Ukraine has attempted to mitigate their threat by installing mesh wiring above the location of howitzers, which are especially vulnerable to enemy drones for their inability to quickly redeploy after having fired. Evidently, the seemingly endless cycle of lethal innovation is playing out in real time on Ukraine’s bomb-scarred East.

Attracting more notice than the loitering munitions has been Ukraine’s (and to a more limited degree Russia’s) fleet of small drones used for target acquisition and, increasingly, bombing enemy tanks and positions. Small, agile and extremely difficult to spot, these small contraptions have in many ways exceeded the performance expected of larger drones, albeit operating at far shorter ranges. Especially in this phase, marked by mostly stationary frontlines, the constant harassment by these small systems can make life in trenches at the front a living hell. A myriad of different types are now deployed with integrated armament, ranging from heavy octocopters carrying multiple mortars to tiny models with a single anti-tank weapon, operated from first-person view using special goggles. And their popularity is justified: attrition amongst (particularly Russian) personnel and fighting vehicles from these new tools of war has been anything but insignificant.

Despite appearing stagnant, the conflict is in fact evolving faster than Western militaries are capable of tracking and analysing, let alone incorporating the lessons from. Although legacy armament can and will have a significant impact on the course of the conflict, truly effective tools that match all this war’s needs and particulars will only emerge as it plays out. Or as the legendary Will Rogers observed all the way back in 1929:

“You can’t say that civilization don’t advance, for in every war they kill you a new way.”

L'articolo How rapid innovation in modern warfare has shaped one year of war proviene da InsideOver.

After a year of war, it is possible to assess the Russian military strategy in Ukraine. The Kremlin initially applied the art of deception (maskirovka) at the strategic level, claiming that it was not going to attack Ukraine. For several months, Russian officials fiercely dismissed reports by Western intelligence agencies openly predicting an invasion. Operationally, the invasion began with an advance of motorized troops that attacked from three directions simultaneously: north, east and south. The Russian Air Force destroyed critical infrastructure (e.g., power stations) to plunge the country into chaos. In addition, the Black Sea fleet blockaded Ukrainian ports to stop any supplies from third countries. At the tactical level, Russian special forces attempted to create bridgeheads by seizing airports and carrying out acts of sabotage within cities. In effect, the Kremlin launched a blitzkrieg against Ukraine.

The strong resistance of the Ukrainians caught the Kremlin by surprise. Moscow underestimated the Ukrainian military doctrine, which calls for the mass mobilization of the population in the event of a foreign invasion. The Ukrainian leadership initially moved the war into and around populated areas, where the defender has the tactical advantage. Within the urban environment, small groups can easily set up ambushes and hit enemy targets with anti-tank missiles. In fact, urban warfare is the nightmare of all regular armies. The Ukrainian side was well aware that Moscow is still haunted by the “Grozny syndrome”. The first war in Chechnya (1994-1996) resulted in a humiliating defeat for the Russian army. Small groups of determined fighters destroyed entire columns of Russian tanks that had entered the centre and suburbs of the Chechen capital.

Yet, the Russian forces was expected to overwhelm the Ukrainian positions within less than a week. Putin’s battle-hardened army did enjoy numerical and technological superiority. Following the 2008 Georgian war, minister of defence Anatoly Serdyukov’s military reforms changed the force structure of the Russian army. The creation of the battalion tactical group (BTG) was intended to increase the firepower and speed of the Russian forces. Indeed, each BTG has a motorized infantry battalion together with tank and artillery elements; a total of 600-800 officers and men. However, the main disadvantage of BTGs is the relatively small number of light infantry troops (around 200 men) which makes BTG vulnerable to ambushes. During the first three months of the invasion, the Russian BTGs became an easy target for the Ukrainian fighters.

Apparently, the Russian military were not prepared for such a large-scale invasion. Due to poor military planning, the Putin’s army has failed to conduct combined arms operations. This should have come as no surprise. In the 2008 war against Georgia, the involvement of the Russian army was limited in time and geography. Yet, its performance was assessed by analysts as rather poor.  Six years later, the annexation of Crimea took place with a hybrid and bloodless operation. In the Syrian civil war, the Kremlin has mainly used its air power, special forces, and mercenaries to support the Assad regime. In other words, it is the first time since the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan that the Russian military has been called upon to subdue a large country with a hostile population. It should be noted that there was an insurgency in western Ukraine after the end of the Second World War that lasted ten years.

During spring and summer 2022, the Russian military used indirect artillery fire and ballistic missiles to defeat the Ukrainians. This is not the first time in recent history that Moscow resorted to such tactics. During the Second Chechen war (2000-2002), the Kremlin bombed Grozny to the ground without any concern for the international law of armed conflicts. The Russian leadership chose the same siege warfare in certain parts of Ukraine.

Following a three-month siege, the Russian forces managed to capture the city of Mariupol in the Azov region. However, the invaders failed to capture Kyiv and Kharkiv, which are the two largest cities of Ukraine. According to Professor Louis DiMarco two factors could play a decisive role in attacking urban centres: the size of the population and the size of the area. The larger the population and the area, the more forces must be devoted to occupying a city. The American professor has challenged the 3:1 rule in favour of the attacker and advocated a 6:1 ratio for launching an attack in urban areas.

What has come, perhaps, as a surprise is the outsourcing of the Russian military operations to mercenaries. Since the summer of 2022, an unknown number of Russian and foreign mercenaries have joined the regular Russian army in fighting the Ukrainian army in Donbass. The partial “privatization” of the war is an innovation in itself. During the tsarist period, the army was under strict surveillance because officers were the only ones who could challenge the regime. In the Soviet era, the role of the political commissar was to enforce political control over the military through his presence at the strategic and operational levels. The use of private military companies, such as the infamous Wagner, runs counter to Russian military culture that prioritizes political control of the military. However, mass mobilization is neither desirable nor feasible in a middle-class country like Russia. The use of mercenaries allows Moscow to hide casualties from the Russian public opinion that does not massively support the war in Ukraine. The Wagner’s force functions as a small army capable of operational and tactical support when is needed.

The war has entered a new phase since September 2022. The Ukrainian counter-offensive succeeded in recapturing territories in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Yet, the Russian forces managed to stop the Ukrainian offensive before Christmas. Currently, there is a stalemate on the eastern front because of the trench warfare. The Kremlin has mobilised human and material resources for a new Spring offensive in Donbass. Europe and the United States must do whatever is necessary to stop it before it begins.

L'articolo The Russian Military Strategy in Ukraine: An Early Assessment proviene da InsideOver.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has revitalized the question of ethnicity in the former USSR.  The rhetoric and the actions of the Kremlin have indicated the adoption of a new doctrine, the Putin Doctrine, which requires the protection of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers. In effect, the Putin Doctrine is the Russian equivalent of the U.S. Monroe Doctrine; the former Soviet space is to become a Russian sphere of influence. Therefore, it is vital to understand how the Kremlin has explored inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine as a pretext to launch a full-scale attack.

Ukraine has been a multi-ethnic country, with Russians being the largest minority. Nevertheless, high rates of intermarriage, a common religion, and strong historical bonds have created a unique relationship between Ukrainians and Russians that probably has no parallel in modern European history. In fact, the break-up of the Soviet Union did not lead to a massive exodus of ethnic Russians from Ukraine like it happened with those living in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In contrast, most Russians even supported Ukrainian independence. Despite the occasional outbursts of Ukrainian nationalism, ethnic Russians have been well-integrated into the society. Moreover, Russian has been the second official language since it is widely spoken throughout the country.

Yet, Moscow has been able to mobilize many ethnic Russians against the Ukrainian authorities. Putin and his local allies have capitalized on eastern Ukraine’s grievances about the highly centralized nature of the state and the parliament’s hostile attitude toward the Russian language. During April and May 2014, many pro-Russian protests ended up in occupying public buildings in eastern Ukraine. It is open to speculation the role of Russian secret agents in these events, but it is clear that there was some coordination between secessionist leaders and the Kremlin. 

Moscow has probably drawn valuable lessons from its experiences in Moldova and the South Caucasus during the 1990s. It was the time when the Russian army was covertly involved in ethnic conflicts supporting secessionist movements in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh and Transnistria. Ethnic mobilization often leads to confrontation with state authorities. If there is a military response, the civilian population will suffer enormously. The victims would be turned into heroes and the perpetrators would be accused of being inhuman. As a result, a cycle of violence is then unleashed that would fuel a campaign for secession and would eventually provoke a Russian intervention. This process can be summarized as follows: 

Ethnic mobilization state military response  violence against civilians

        glorification of victims and demonization of perpetrators more violence and campaign for secession Russian intervention

Eastern Ukraine clearly fits this model: it is an ethnically diverse region with a large Russian community that has been mobilized against state authorities. During 2014-2016, the Ukrainian government escalated the crisis by sending troops to defeat the separatist forces. Many locals rallied around the separatist leadership which blamed Kiev for the violence. As a result, the logic goes, Russia has a moral obligation to assist ethnic Russians and enforce peace. 

Simultaneously, the Kremlin has initiated a process of new identity formation among Russians living in Ukraine. Thus, Putin has frequently mentioned the term Novorossiya (New Russia) to describe the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine. It was first used during the tsarist rule to describe Russian-controlled territories of Ukraine that had been liberated from the Crimean Khanate at the end of the 18^th century. The renaming of Ukrainian territories indicates a long-term strategy to reinforce a sense of ethnic consciousness among the local population. It is not coincidence that the pro-Kremlin separatists have invented a flag and other state symbols for this new entity.

The Russian strategy of weaponizing ethnicity is deep-rooted, embedding a sense of injustice about the disintegration of the Soviet Union. While it is difficult to predict whether the Kremlin would intervene in another country, there is one former Soviet republic that already feels the heat of the war in Ukraine. Kazakhstan is the largest country of Central Asia, with a multi-ethnic population of 19 million and significant energy reserves. The Russian minority resides in the northern part of the country which shares a 7,644 km border with Russia. While its percentage has fallen since the early 1990s, the Russian minority still constitutes around 18 percent of the total population. Not surprisingly, Kazakhstan has increasingly attracted the attention of Moscow.

In early January 2022, following social unrest sparked by rising energy prices, a Russian-led peacekeeping force was deployed to stabilise Kazakhstan. Yet, President Tokayev has frequently mentioned the principle of territorial integrity in his speeches since the beginning of the Russian-Ukraine war. This is hardly a coincidence. For many years, the Russian far right has made territorial claims against his country. The Kremlin had never openly embraced such rhetoric because Kazakhstan was viewed as a loyal ally. However, last August, former president Dmitry Medvedev called Kazakhstan “an artificial country” and claimed that “Kazakhstani authorities implemented resettlement policies of various ethnic groups inside the republic, which can be qualified as the genocide of Russians”. While Medvedev later denied that he made the comments, part of the Russian political elite harbours some territorial claims against Kazakhstan. If the Putin doctrine is to be implemented again, Kazakhstan would probably be the next victim of Russian revisionism.

In conclusion, the invasion of Ukraine has produced fear and uncertainty among Russia’s neighbours. Putin’s weaponization of ethnicity could ultimately lead to more interventions. The United States has been viewed as a stakeholder in the former USSR because it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. While a U.S. military intervention in the region is highly unlikely, Washington could send a message of reassurance to former Soviet republics like Kazakhstan. The creation of a greater Russia, in which all ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking would live, cannot be written off as “a thing of the past”. Hence, the Biden administration needs to be more proactive and prepare for more crises like Ukraine. Ethnicity has become a factor of division and irredentism in the former USSR.

*Dr Emmanuel Karagiannis is a Reader in International Security at King’s College London

L'articolo Russia’s weaponization of ethnicity in Ukraine: Lesson Learned for Washington proviene da InsideOver.

Posterity will judge harshly all those who don’t have understood the true nature of the conflict of the century, the Ukraine war. The bloodiest, most important trench of the great battle between the dying Unipolar moment and the rising Multipolar order.

Both Russia and Ukraine have their own motivations, as do the West and other powers, but we’re not here to discuss those. Indeed, reasons and origins of the Ukraine war have been widely analysed during the first six months of this conflict. We’re here to talk about the world order after Ukraine, a mission that has led us to Russian political scientist Ivan Timofeev.

A conversation with Ivan Timofeev

We’ve reached out to one of the most prominent Russian political scientists, Ivan Timofeev, so as to get to know the Russian perspective on the Ukraine war and to discuss a wide range of topics. Timofeev is an influential member of the Russian International Affairs Council and of the Valdai Discussion Club, where he respectively helds the position of Director of Programs and of Head of the Euro-Atlantic Security Program. He is the author of more than 80 academic publications and he teaches at the Academy of Military Sciences.

Professor Timofeev, many analysts thought a full-scale war in Ukraine was extremely unlikely as Russia, apparently, had more cons than pros. Despite that, it broke out anyway. What is more, Russia also managed to resist the so-called “total economic warfare” launched by the US, the EU and their allies. What we do know thus far is that the Ukraine war is a kind of “greater 9/11”: the watershed event of the 2020s. As a result, a lot of non-alligned countries appear to be realigning, with many of them taking Russia’s side, the BRICS are on an upwards path of expansion, the de-dollarisation process is experiencing a dramatic acceleration, and many other things are taking place. Our question is: whose side is the Rest on?

My answer is based on cautiousness. On one hand, I would consider the reaction of the outside world on the conflict in Ukraine as the evidence that Russia is not isolated. On the other hand, Russia is to a great and critical extent increasingly isolated by the West – visa bans, financial restrictions, cancel culture, eccetera.

Many countries are abstaining from voting [against Russia] in the UN General Assembly, many others have never joined sanctions. This, however, doesn’t mean that “the Rest” is alligning with Russia and is backing its positions. It merely means that several countries don’t want to compromise their core interests nor they want to be involved in the conflict. And some of them are pursuing this goal by inadvertently siding with the US, that is by carefully avoiding to be hit by American secondary sanctions. Even countries like China, if you look at Chinese businesses, are very careful in their dealings with Russia. With regard to China, ordinary businesses are coming as usual, but those operating in sanctions-hit fields are not coming or are studying carefully what to do.

In short: you are right that Russia is not isolated. However, this doesn’t mean that “the Rest” is siding with Russia on the Ukraine issue.

It’s once again the West versus the Rest (of the world), as it was during the Cold War. The impression is that the “Rest” were waiting for a “big event” so as to get rid of the West and give itself more cohesion. The behavior of the major powers of the Global South – Argentina, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, etc – seems to have shown us this. What is your opinion about it?

Well, again, I want to expose a conscientious reflection. The West is very consolidated – much more than the Rest. The West has its own security institutions, like NATO, it has a set of economic partnership organizations, like the G7, and many other bodies. If we look at the Rest, there is no such infrastructure. Let us only think about the BRICS. What is the BRICS group? It is a very informal entity, with a poor institutional basis, a kind of discussion club that is not getting to be something more in the forthcoming future. So, I wouldn’t overestimate the consolidation of the Rest.

Some countries belonging to the Rest are at odds with each other. For instance, China and India are both BRICS members, but they’ve strong disagreements in a lot of fields. You have rightly point out that Brazil and Argentina would be happy to cooperate with Russia as much as they can, but, at the same time, their relations with us keep being very tiny due to logistics and geographical distance. Morever, since both countries are heavily dependent on the US in terms of financial transactions, they’re not going to sacrifice their interests for the sake of a stronger cooperation with Russia.

In my view, the Rest is playing carefully. It is true that it is distancing itself from the Western narrative over Ukraine, and that, overall, it has little interest in overtly taking part in the conflict, but, again, this doesn’t mean that the events are encouraging or stimulating the Rest to be more consolidated.

Given the ensemble of events, which have the potential to pave the way for a post-American world order, one might say that the Kremlin’s gamble was right on the money. Every war is a bet and, at least in terms of global impact, it looks like Russia is winning. But, this is the toughest question, was it really impossible to keep negotiating?

The question is whether we’re witnessing a revolution or not. Definitely, we’re going through a transition of the international order, with the Ukraine events accelerating this process. The fact is that it is not the Ukraine conflict that stimulated, or provoked, this “revolution”. The revolution was already on the march and it is now keeping to march, although slowly.

Ukraine is just one of the factors that contributed to catalyze the arrival of a new world order. But it is not the only one. There are many others, like, for instance, the resistance of Iran to Western sanctions, the evolving US-China relations, the Taiwan issue, eccetera. Explained otherwise, this revolution is not resulting from the conflict, which is only one of an ensemble of factors.

As for the negotiations, well, in my view it was possible to keep negotiating. However, both sides weren’t ready to sacrifice their core interests for the sake of some compromise. There were some clear red lines. The US and the EU were not going to give up on the NATO’s open door policy, they were not going to state the Ukraine would have never joined in the Alliance, they were not going to recognize the Russian rule over Crimea, not to mention the recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk.

There were other rooms for dialogue, from arms control to climate change, but all these things weren’t crucial for Russia security. The crucial point was – and is – about NATO infrastructure and its development.

Let’s change subject for a while. What is your view about the killing of Darya Dugina? And why her? 

There are several legal statements on this, which have been made by the authorities who investigated on the case. There’s clear ground to suspect some Ukrainian citizens to be directly responsible for this assassination. We know their names. We know their faces. We also have a version of their activities in Russia.

On why her, well, she was clearly a symbol. This act has definitely been a symbolic gesture against Russia, its society and its thinkers, especially the conservative ones. This is why, for instance, people from very different backgrounds paid homage to the Dugin family.

In the West, it’s a common assumption that Aleksandr Dugin is an influential thinker. Among his nicknames, “Putin’s brain”, “Putin’s Rasputin”. Did the terrorist attack on his daughter have to do with his reputation? And is Dugin this gray eminence as described in the Western press?

Well, I wouldn’t say that Dugin is a popular thinker in Russia. Because he’s not. He’s quite marginal. He’s mistakenly considered to be a kind of Putin’s strategist or ideologist, while he’s not. He’s marginal and he’s not in the mainstream at all.

However, the assassination of his daughter… she could have any idea and she had the constitutional right to have her own ideas and to promote them. Her brutal killing stirred indignation and provoked outrage for many here in Russia, and this could mark a change.

Henry Kissinger has recently warned the Biden administration, and to a greater extent the American ruling class as a whole, that what he perceives as a combination of lack of long-term vision and loss of strategic thinking is laying the foundations of a direct military confrontation between the US and the Russo-Chinese bloc. Do you agree with his view?

I agree with his point. He’s right in the sense that the risk of the unintended consequence of direct confrontations among the major powers is increasing worldwide. It’s not only about the risk of a NATO-Russia confrontation in the light of the excessive NATO support to Ukraine. I’m also thinking about the Baltic Sea and Kaliningrad. As for China, well, risks of a China-US clash over Taiwan are growing.

It is true that Russia and China are more and more emboldened to cooperate with each other, but the question is: will they ever be military allies or will their alliance die first? I don’t think of all of this as a “Russia-and-China against the West”, as their partnership is still in progress.

Last question. Kissinger is one of the greatest strategists that’s ever lived. His teachings will be studied by generations to come. His legacy will be forever. However, we wonder if this time he’s wrong. What if the US strategy, however chaotic it seems, is still based on Zbigniew Brzezinski’s idea of using Ukraine to expel Russia to Asia? In the expectation of making it drown in the continent’s problem – terrorism, ethnic clashes, border disputes, regional rivalries, etc – and of making the axis with the People’s Republic of China implode due to forced cohabitation. This might be the hidden logic behind the seemingly counterproductive and anti-strategic “double containment” policy.

I remember this old idea, the concepts exposed in the Grand Chessboard… Well, logically speaking the US should have attracted Russia to its camp. In fact, the US could well predict that Russia would turn to China in the case of increasing pressures coming from the Euro-Atlantic area. However, the US is not doing this.

For what I understand, the US dominant thinking sees Russia neither a major problem nor as a major stakeholder. The US still regards Russia as a dangerous opponent, but one whose potential is not considered big enough to make a game-changing alliance in the competition with China in the Asia-Pacific.

I think the US is making a mistake and it is losing more than it could gain. Indeed, it could have tried to solve several international issues and to fix some systems of alliances by accommodating Russia. But now, the chances are completely lost. Russia is clearly and increasingly partnering with China. We don’t know what will be the fate of this relation, but we do know that there is no single chance right now to change the direction of it, even in light of what happened in Ukraine.

L'articolo The world after the Ukraine war, a perspective from Russia proviene da InsideOver.

The weight of the Russian war in Ukraine is already being seen in our energy bills on a global level, as a result of the reorganisation of energy relations across the world (especially in Europe). Food safety is also a major concern, a complex issue repeatedly brought up in recent months. There will likely be a long term hit on this, although the first tremors are already being felt. If there is one area that will suffer more than others, it will certainly be the enlarged Mediterranean.

Energy and food are both part of this, but then there are also a number of issues when it comes to the relations between various states. Political and geopolitical games, instability and recomposition worldwide. A group of problems that Russia unfortunately has its hands dipped in. As well as the European Union, the United States, other Middle Eastern actors (Turkey, the UAE, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Qatar for example) and China. The effects of Russia’s assault on Kiev will be directed to all of these places. Wide reaching consequences from the long arms of conflict. 

The Russian Foreign Minister recently visited Libya, Mali, Central African Republic and Algeria. Meanwhile in Cameroon, Russia struck a military deal for further military cooperation. In the Arabian peninsula there is pressure in Syria, the great chokepoints of the red sea and the strategic peninsula the Corno d’Atrica. Moscow still wants to be a global power despite sanctions from those in Europe. The Russians are not retreating on any front despite being involved in an ongoing war that is far from being resolved. Although on the contrary: given the penetration in certain areas, it’s legitimate to think that Russia will try to use these fronts as a deterrent, a way to shift attention, interests and efforts.

The globalisation of the Russian war in Ukraine, emergencies with grains, energy, political instability and humanitarian effects finds its epicentre in the Mediterranean. New crises have the potential to explode. Not only the lasting Ukrainian war, but a number of possible hybrid conflicts are on the horizon. It is for this reason, given the centrality of the region for Europe and the world, in Brussels and Washington, but also in Rome, Paris, Madrid & Berlin – attention must be kept exceedingly high. This is why we can no longer postpone the duty to get work building a political movement with which to protect the Mediterranean from the fallout of war. 

There is a risk that this might trigger great chaos, an endemic disorder, when the basin – its policies and communities, ask for order and relaxation. Two countries, above all, can play a fundamental role in the future of the Mediterranean. Italy and France. Two Mediterranean powers that have an ability to exploit their weight within the EU to direct ideas and actions with which to build up a defence of the Mediterranean. Blocking the spread of crises. This can also work as a possible form of the containment of the war itself – in the global affairs that the Ukrainian war is stimulating, “Tout se tient!” The price of war will likely be felt everywhere, however the enlarged Mediterranean will feel it in a more direct and likely severe manner. This brings with it great risk of new social unrest and conflicts, on which Italy keeps its attention for reasons of national interest.

L'articolo The impact of the Ukraine War on the “enlarged Mediterranean” proviene da InsideOver.

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine continues, it is becoming clear that a lot more is at stake than just the future of Ukraine. Big shifts in global order are set to follow because Russian bad behavior is triggering a reorganization of global energy supplies. 

Russia is the second most important exporter of oil to the global market, after Saudi Arabia.  It is the largest single supplier of gas to Europe.  Before the war, this dependence put Russia in a special position—able to earn massive export earnings while protecting the nation from much retaliation.  All that is now changing.  

The key to the new order will be Europe.  With breathtaking speed and unity, the Western nations have sanctioned Russia and branded the country a pariah.  Lots of countries have played a role, of course.  But Europe has been central because it is the most dependent on Russian energy supplies and also holds most of the keys for cutting that dependence.  

So far, the sanctions regime has covered practically everything but energy.  It has largely closed Russian access to western banking and airspace; the sanctions isolate members of Putin’s regime and family and seize Russian assets and financial reserves.  But oil  and gas have kept flowing, for now, because there’s no practical alternative.  Shutting those supplies quickly would cause massive economic harm and probably splinter the western alliance as individual nations seek their own special deals.  The politics of dependence are ugly—something the West has known since the first energy crises of the 1970s.

What’s special about Europe is the massive effort, unfolding right now, to make permanent cuts in dependence on Russian supplies.  The result will be an energy system in Europe that is much less dependent on fossil fuels—and thus a lot cleaner.  And for Russia the outcome will be permanent economic harm that will take a generation or longer to recover, if ever.  

Over the short term the European plan is to find any energy supply that will burn and doesn’t come from Russia.  That means a bit more coal along with more oil from the rest of the global market.  Saudi Arabia and the rest of OPEC have been visibly unhelpful—refusing to deviate from production plans set before the war.  Winners in this effort to find new supplies include Libya and Iran—two countries on the fringe of global oil markets but invited back, quickly, because they are less abhorrent than Russia.  None of this is politically elegant and none of it will do much to cut emissions, for now, but all of it will isolate Russia.  

Replacing Russian gas will be harder.  For now, Europe, which buys about 40% of its gas from Russia, will source as much as it can from other suppliers—such as by tanker from the United States.  That tanker gas is expensive because it must be cooled and compressed to make the gas a liquid—a process that, itself, uses a lot of energy.  Worse, Europe must pay prices high enough to attract that liquefied gas that, otherwise, would go to markets in Japan, Korea, China and the rest of Asia.  For these reasons, the price of natural gas in Europe today is about five times the level it should be this time of year.  With costlier gas has come costlier electricity and a drag on the European economy.  

Over the short term, the next year or two, Europe will do what it must do.  But over the longer term the European response is what’s most important.  Big investments in efficiency along with alternatives to oil and gas—such as electric vehicles and hydrogen—will put Europe on a trajectory of much lower consumption of fossil fuels and emissions.  

The European investment to cut dependence on Russian oil and gas matters not just for Europe but the rest of the world.  That’s because big European investments in new technology will drive down costs, and those lower cost devices will be available to the rest of the world.  This logic is exactly how solar energy, today often the cheapest form of generating electricity, got competitive.  It started in niche markets — first the U.S. and Japan, then in Germany — and from there global manufacturing (centered in China) drove down costs further.  As the new technologies got cheaper their backers also got more powerful politically, which cemented the revolution.  One of the leading approaches to cutting dependence on natural gas—shifting to hydrogen—is poised to have its solar moment.  

A lot can go wrong of course.  Elections in France and the US could put demagogues in power that will make it harder for the west to stay unified.  China and India will inevitably erode, a bit, the impacts of western sanctions by purchasing Russian energy supplies, especially oil, on the global market.  

But what’s most surprising, so far, is how much has gone right.  After decades of a foreign policy marked by disagreement and incoherence, The crisis in Ukraine has unified Europe.  And the place where that unity is perhaps most apparent is energy policy.

L'articolo Europe’s energy agenda after the Ukraine War proviene da InsideOver.