The European Union enters 2022 with a dangerously declining ability to set the security agenda along its southern borders in the face of the strategic advances made by Russia, Turkey, and China in North Africa. A house divided, the EU delivery deficit in establishing a sustainable security architecture in the Mediterranean basin, particularly in Libya, created a vacuum that has been filled by the increasing military presence of Russia and Turkey in North Africa. As Russia and Turkey rewrite the rule sets in North Africa, China has also continued to gain strength strategically in the region and will seek to increase its military footprint along the southern rim of the Mediterranean basin.

Here are some of the key developments that have altered the strategic equation and will influence the trajectory of North African geopolitics and Europe’s ability to exercise a strategic impact on security matters along its southern flank.

The Resurgence of Russia power in the southern Mediterranean

The resurrection of the Russian-Egyptian military partnership is Moscow’s most stunning strategic comeback in the Mediterranean.  It is also one of Russia’s most strategically significant regional defence relationships.  Egypt is the largest nation by population in the entire Mediterranean basin and has one of the largest militaries in the region.  In the late stages of the Cold War, the United States had succeeded in peeling Egypt away from its alignment with the Soviet Union, turning Cairo into one of the most reliable American allies in the Middle East.  But that tight relationship frayed in the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’ uprising in Egypt that toppled the country’s long-time strong man Hosni Mubarak when U.S. President Barack Obama embraced the short-lived Muslim Brotherhood-led government. The 2013 ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood by the Egyptian military with popular backing and former General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi ‘s 2014 election as Egypt’s president led to a rift with the U.S. and NATO that persists to this day.

As Sisi was consolidating his power, Russian President Vladimir Putin demonstrated Moscow’s mettle with Russia’s successful 2015 military intervention in Syria, ostensibly to fight ISIS and other jihadi militants.  President Sisi turned to Putin’s Russia for assistance in combatting jihadi militants in Libya to secure Egypt’s eastern border. This led to the 2016 establishment of the annual ‘Defenders of Friendship’ joint Russian-Egyptian military exercises. Expanding in scope over the past five years, the original 2016 exercises involved joint tactical actions that paved the way for the 2017 deployment of Russian special forces and drones to Egypt’s Sidi Barrani air base near the Libyan border to assist the Egyptian-backed, Libyan General Khalifa Haftar to gain full control of Benghazi in July of that year. In late 2017, following that success, Cairo granted Moscow permission for the Russian air force to use Egypt’s air space and air bases, requiring only 5 days advanced notice.

During 2016-2020, Russia also became Egypt’s largest arms supplier with Cairo purchasing 41% of its weapons imports from Russia,  a laundry list of weapons that includes attack helicopters, fighter jets, and air defense systems.  In 2018, Egypt purchased 24 Su-35 fighter aircraft from Russia for $2 billion. In 2020, Egypt reportedly agreed to purchase 500 Russian T-90MS tanks that would be assembled in Egypt at a facility built by Russian tank manufacturer Uralavagonzavod.

Building on its deep defense cooperation with Egypt, Russian power has become entrenched in Eastern Libya, from the coastal city of Sirte, the western entrance to Libya’s oil crescent, to the highly strategic al-Jufra air base further south.  Utilizing upwards of 2,000 mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group backed by Russian air force assets, Moscow has succeeded to emerge as one of the main power brokers in Libya with a much lighter commitment of personnel and hardware than in Syria. The Wagner Group has extended Russia’s influence across adjacent regions of sub-Saharan Africa, most recently in Mali.

Concurrently, Russia revitalized and expanded its long-standing military relationship with Algeria. Shrewdly, Russia’s Putin cancelled Algeria’s Soviet-era military debt of $4.7 billion while Algeria committed to purchase almost twice that amount from Russia with future oil and gas revenues. The deal resulted in Algeria becoming Russia’s third largest arms buyer during 2016-2020, surpassed only by India and China. Algeria’s astounding Russian weapons shopping spree included 203 T-90SA main battle tanks, 300 ‘Terminator 2’  BMPT-72 armored fire support vehicles, 38 Pantsir-S1 air defense missile/cannon systems, 100 SA-17 Buk-M2 air defense missile systems installed on tracked vehicles, and 12 Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missile systems.

Algeria also possesses 6 Russian-made, Kilo-class submarines. As a sign of Moscow’s renewed power projection into the western Mediterranean, Russia and Algeria conducted a landmark joint naval exercise of the latter’s Mediterranean coast.  Russian-made Kalibr Club-S type cruise missiles fired by those Kilo-class submarines and Algeria’s land-based, Russian-made Iskander ballistic missiles are capable of striking the Spanish coast.

The distance between Russia’s naval and air bases in Syria and Egypt’s massive Mediterranean military base at Marsa Matruh is approximately 900 km. Combined with Russia’s extensive military presence in eastern Libya and deep defence relationship with Algeria, Moscow now presides over an arc of hard power across the southern rim of the Mediterranean spanning the southern border of Turkey and the eastern border of Morocco.

Turkey’s Strategic Advance in North Africa

The resurgence of Russian power across the Mediterranean basin has been matched by Turkey’s impressive advances to become one of the top powers in the region.  Turkey is the second most populous nation in the Mediterranean with one of the region’s most powerful militaries. Turkey’s efforts to expand its power projection capabilities in the Mediterranean is part of Turkey’s wider strategic agenda to establish forward bases in the Middle East and Africa, an ambition enabled by the impressive transformation of its domestic weapons manufacturing to become an industry leader in several categories.

Following Russia’s Syria intervention, Turkey conducted four cross-border interventions in Syria to carve out a buffer zone in northern Syria along the length of the Syrian-Turkish border. However, the turning point for Turkey’s Mediterranean military footprint came with Turkey’s 2020 military intervention to preserve the Government of National Accord then ruling western Libya.  Ankara’s first intervention far from its land borders and shoreline was an unqualified success – stopping Haftar’s Wagner-assisted assault on Tripoli in its tracks and then pushing Haftar’s forces 450 km eastward to the Sirte-Jufra line. Ankara now stands as the main security provider in western Libya, creating an important strategic beachhead for Turkey in the central Mediterranean.  Turkey maintains an air power deployment at the re-captured al-Watiyah air base, located 27 km from the Tunisian border, and is reported to be developing a naval base in Libya’s coastal city of Misrata.  Its first Mediterranean forward basing beyond North Cyprus, Turkey’s outsized military presence in Libya is nothing short of a strategic breakthrough, enabling Turkey to project its influence into the western Mediterranean.

The Libyan intervention also showcased the power of Turkey’s home-grown combat drone and electronic warfare technology that would be later used by Ankara to assist Azerbaijan in the Autumn 2020 Karabakh war that ended 30 years of stalemate against Armenia and changed the map of the South Caucasus.  In 2020, Tunisia bought $150 million of Turkish armaments, including Anka medium-altitude long long-endurance (MALE) drones, Kirpi mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, and Ejder Yalçin armored combat vehicles.  The sale of three Anka drones and their ground control systems to Tunisia was Turkish Aerospace Industries’ first foreign sale of the Anka UAVs.

For its part, Algeria has kept Turkey at arm’s length when it comes to military cooperation.  Despite Turkey being one of Algeria’s leading foreign investors – Turkish investments in creating local factories and businesses have made Turkish firms collectively into Algeria’s largest foreign employer –  Turkey has not been able to translate its growing economic clout into Turkish arms sales to Algeria.  The Algerian military and political elite have been divided over Turkey’s role in Libya and especially Ankara’s use of Syrian jihadis as mercenary forces. In its effort not to become too over-reliant on Russia as its principal weapons supplier, Algiers has opted for German and Chinese-made weapons.

More recently, as Algeria-Morocco tensions have intensified on their border and in the disputed Western Sahara between Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front, Rabat has turned to Ankara as a weapons supplier.  In 2021, the kingdom purchased 13 Bayraktar TB2 drones, the system that has repeatedly proved itself effective against Russian air defense systems in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus.  Members of Morocco’s Royal Armed Forces has traveled to Turkey during the second half of 2021 to receive training in operating the drones and Morocco reportedly ordered an additional six TB2 drones at year’s end. The Turkish system complements Rabat’s recent purchases of Israeli drones as well as Israeli anti-drone technology.  Moroccan media has also reported that Rabat is now engaged in negotiations with Ankara to purchase naval vessels – 7 fast attack craft and an Ada-class corvette. While the warship purchase has not been confirmed, Turkey’s military cooperation with Morocco, should it expand, has long-term implications. Already the managed competition between Turkey and Russia sets the agenda for the security environment in Syria and Libya. This same dynamic could become influential in the western Mediterranean as well.

A Chinese Naval Base in North Africa?

At the close of 2021, the Wall Street Journal broke a story revealing Beijing’s plan to create a permanent military facility in Equatorial Guinea to provide China with its first naval base on the Atlantic ocean.  Could a Chinese naval base in North Africa be next? China is already poised to dominate the commercial ports across the entire southern and eastern arcs of the Mediterranean basin.  In addition to its massive transhipment hub in Piraeus, Greece, China upgraded and built ports in Tripoli, Lebanon and in Haifa bay in Israel. Hong Kong-based Hutchison Port Holdings similarly operates Egypt’s major Mediterranean port of Alexandria port and its auxiliary El Dekheila port. Hutchison is also an equivalent capacity port at Egypt’s nearby Abu Qir Peninsula that is scheduled to start operations in 2022. In the western Mediterranean, China is constructing Algeria’s El Hamdania transshipment port 60 km west of Algiers with three times the capacity of Egypt’s Alexandria port. China is also one of the main investors in Morocco’s Tanger Med port, which has surpassed Spain’s Algeciras and Valencia ports in container capacity to become the Mediterranean’s largest port.

With so much at stake for Beijing’s in China’s Mediterranean commercial network, an increased Chinese naval presence in North Africa is not a matter of if, but when.  China has already delivered a two frigates to Algeria and will deliver a Type 056 (Jingdao-class) corvette to Algeria in 2023. Egypt has purchased drones from China and Chinese-made Wing Loong II drones, purchased by the United Arab Emirates, have been a mainstay in Haftar’s arsenal in Libya. Should China establish a naval base on Africa’s Atlantic coast in addition to its Red Sea corridor naval base in Djibouti, then a base on the North African coast becomes Beijing’s missing puzzle piece for establishment of Chinese sea lines of communication from the Suez Canal to the Strait of Gibraltar. The logic for a Chinese base in the central Maghreb is compelling for strategic planners in Beijing.

The Need for European Action

From the Eastern Mediterranean to Libya to the escalating tensions between Algeria and Morocco, the European Union’s continued inability to act in a coordinated manner has eroded the union’s power to set the agenda for relations across its southern borders. The EU’s continued delivery deficit in establishing a sustainable security architecture in the Mediterranean will inexorably result in outcomes that neither represent European values nor serve Europe’s interests.

Prof. Michaël Tanchum is an associate senior fellow in the Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute (MEI) in Washington, D.C.  @michaeltanchum

L'articolo Russia, Turkey, and China in North Africa: a challenge for Europe proviene da InsideOver.

Recent developments in Libya are setting the ground for a renewed cycle of violence. While both sides are gradually fueling the tension, UN and international concerns are focused on the potential failure of the ongoing peace process.

Haftar Reacts Angrily to Turkey’s Libya Troop Extension

On the day marking the 69th anniversary of Libyan Independence, commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar stated that as long as Turkish Forces remain stationed in Libya, there will be no peace in the country. As predicted, Turkey’s Grand National Assembly recently approved a bill extending deployment of Turkish troops in Libya for another 18 months.

In his inflammatory remarks, Haftar stated that Ankara should withdraw its forces, otherwise the “Libyan people would by force drive out the colonizing force.” With these words, the Benghazi-based Libyan strongman indirectly passed an ultimatum to Turkey at a point where there is no chance that Ankara would back down. This highlights the fragility of the ongoing peace process.

Turkey Responds to Haftar’s Demand

Shortly after Haftar’s speech on Dec. 26 there has was a straightforward Turkish response. Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar landed in Tripoli accompanied by Turkey’s military leadership in an unscheduled visit to inspect the Turkish Forces based in the country. It was clear that at the same time Akar’s visit was intended to send a message to Haftar, emphasizing that Ankara is ready and committed to fully support Fayez al-Serraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA).

Prior to Akar’s visit, his Libyan counterpart Minister Salahaddin al-Namroush stated in a televised interview that the UN-recognized Tripoli GNA government would not let Haftar carry out another major offensive to capture the Libyan capital. He also said that the Libyan Army, under GNA command, has been following and respecting the ceasefire terms, however the armed forces would be standing by to effectively respond to any provocations from the Haftar-led LNA.

Even earlier, during an interview on Dec. 11, al-Namroush was even more critical of Haftar, calling the General a war criminal and ruling out any possibility of forming a political coalition where Haftar could play any role at all. Considering that al-Namroush will remain one of the key GNA players and his footprint -in both the political and military aspects of the process — is significant, we could assess that a new escalation between the two sides could be likely. Therefore it is understandable that while Haftar remains in the equation, some GNA key officials could hardly negotiate to reach a consensus; in this respect a realistic precondition for the successful completion of the peace process would be the withdrawal of either party, which is not expected to be easy or uneventful.

We should note that the completion of the process could be the successful organization and implementation of the Libyan elections, scheduled for December 2021.

What is UNSMIL Doing to End the Libyan Conflict?

While the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has publicly congratulated the Libyan people in several instances, the in-country situation still remains far from optimistic. The recent exchange of prisoners between the opposing sides and the successful organizing of municipal elections in Al-Zawiya Al-Gharbia and Ar-Rajban areas in the northwestern parts of the country, are definitely positive signs.

However, the current transitioning period of the mission, will be critical for the next steps on the process. The experienced diplomat Nickolay Mladenov — who was expected to succeed Ghassan Salamé as the Head of UNSMIL — recently turned down the position due to personal and family reasons. Mladenov has previously held key roles in the UN Mission in Iraq and in the Middle East Peace Process; additionally his appointment was expected to be welcomed by Turkey as the Bulgarian diplomat built strong ties with Turkey, while serving as the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria several years ago.

For the moment, Stephanie Williams will remain the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL, until a new decision is reached for the permanent placement of the Head of the Mission.

Many Challenges Lie Ahead

Despite the positive signs, mainly derived from the exchange of prisoners, there are many challenges ahead, with one of the most prominent threats being related to the oil industry of the country. The LNA’s recent raid in Awbari (or Ubari) underscores this reality. UNSMIL has also strongly condemned the efforts of armed groups to intimidate the National Oil Corporation (NOC) in Tripoli. With oil exports being one of the main sources of revenue for the Libyan economy, any disruption in this sector could trigger hostilities and further destabilize the country.

Occasional skirmishes during December also indicate that the ceasefire agreement is not being fully adhered to, and an incidental unfortunate event could easily lead to another vicious cycle of violence. Finally, the harsh rhetoric and the military build-up from both sides is another worrying sign.

Turkey’s overt action and deep involvement in Libya — not only through the deployment of military forces but also through a direct intervention in the shaping of the political context — is also a critical destabilizing factor. The most telling example of this political involvement was the recent surprise resignation of al-Serraj — which rather disappointed Ankara — only to be revoked shortly after its announcement.

L'articolo Haftar Demands That Turks Leave Libya proviene da InsideOver.

According to the Italian newspaper La Repubblica, Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte is working to make peace in Libya a reality in the near future.

Specifically, Conte extended an offer from the head of the country’s presidential council Fayez Al-Sarraj, to field marshal the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), General Khalifa Haftar. The offer asks Haftar to nominate a new prime minister for the national government as part of a political solution.

Italian diplomatic sources were quoted as saying that allowing Haftar to nominate a new leader has “a thousand flaws” as he could nominate someone who may be very good at the job, or he may choose someone weak enough to allow militia leaders to manipulate him.

Al-Serraj previously announced his willingness to resign his position when there is a new head of the council, but due to the failure to reach a consensus on who his replacement should be, he was forced to withdraw his resignation and continue his role.

Enabling Haftar’s Control Over Libya’s Government Has Big Risks

La Repubblica is right to argue that enabling the LNA chief to decide who should become the next Libyan prime minister carries many risks. He may well choose a leader who he can easily manipulate, but as Aidan Lewis wrote for Reuters, he holds significant sway over the Libyan peace process regardless. 

Haftar may have suffered some significant setbacks this year such as his troops being driven out of western Libya, and his failure to take control of Tripoli, but over the last six years he has built up a massive security apparatus in eastern Libya.

The blockade that the LNA general imposed on Libya earlier this year led to the closure of the main eastern oil terminals. Haftar then allowed oil to flow again in September, which demonstrates that he still has relevance left.

Haftar Still Enjoys Significant Support from Russia

Furthermore, it has been reported that the LNA can still depend upon support from France, the UAE and Russia. Moscow has recently been accused of using a Syrian airline to send mercenaries to Haftar, alongside Paris and Abu Dhabi. This has led to accusations by Dr Guma el Gamaty, a special envoy to Libya’s UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) to Northwest Africa, that such a move adds strength to Haftar’s forces. With the support of three important nations, it is impossible to ignore the LNA.

Moscow is particularly anxious to not let the Turkish-backed GNA control the strategic city of Sirte, which remains under Haftar’s influence, as it could provide Russia with a gateway to dominate the ports of Sidra, Ras Lanuf, Marsa al-Brega and Zuwetina, where three gas conduits and 11 oil pipelines reach the Mediterranean coast. The Russian Government will continue to support Haftar so long as he can help the Russians advance their interests in Libya. This makes a permanent ceasefire even more complicated.

Peace is Better Than More War

Recent events have proven how difficult it is to end the Libyan conflict. Earlier this month, Libyan Defense Minister Salahaddin Namroush threatened to withdraw from a ceasefire agreement in his country because of Haftar’s actions. He called on the UN and peace-supporting nations to curb the LNA general following his attack on the southern town of Awbari, 964 kilometers south of Tripoli. Libya’s High Council of State decried it as a new violation of the ceasefire by the eastern warlord. In many ways, peace  nowdepends upon the LNA chief ending military action altogether.

Western influence has only made the Libyan war worse. For example, the 2018 Paris summit failed to consult the Libyan people or make significant progress on bringing together the war-torn nation.

But this time, Conte may be right to argue that Haftar should be provided with the opportunity to determine who becomes Libya’s next prime minister. He may select someone who is an utter disaster for the war-torn country, yet this could still be a better solution for the Libyan people than continuous fighting.

L'articolo Why Haftar’s Support is Crucial for the Libyan Peace Process proviene da InsideOver.

A proposal for the extension of the deployment of Turkish forces in Libya has been submitted for approval in the Turkish Parliament.

In January 2020, the Turkey’s Parliament approved the deployment of Turkish assets to Libya in support of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord GNA).

Turkey’s Previous Deployment Approval

According to that bill, the Turkish Forces would assist Tripoli for one year, including – but not limited to – logistics coordination, training, intelligence services and shipments of weapons, arms, and provision of technical equipment. The motion for the extension of the Turkish military presence has already raised concerns, as it comes at a moment where a ceasefire is ongoing between the opposing sides and the international community is urging for an arms embargo in Libya.

Ankara has officially announced that the latest moves of General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) are worrying, and a potential restart of the clashes could put at risk the Turkish interests in North Africa and the Mediterranean. It should be noted that Turkey has invested heavily in its Eastern Mediterranean presence and the Memorandum of Understanding with Tripoli has been a crucial and integral part of Turkish foreign policy so far in terms of its 2020 strategy.

Turkey is allegedly seeking the consolidation of the ceasefire agreement which has been in force since late October, under the condition that the GNA will maintain and potential expand its power and control across the country. The motion will be discussed in the Turkish Parliament in late December, and the most probable result is its approval by the majority of the MPs.

The establishment of Turkish assets in the country is fully aligning with my previous conclusions on Erdogan’s long-term plans for Libya.

Recent Incidents That Provoked Ankara’s Wrath

Earlier last week the Libyan National Army seized the Turkish commercial cargo ship Mabrooka as it was en route to the port of Misrata. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has harshly responded to the incident declaring that these are attempts to target the Turkish interests in the region, and such moves come at the expense of any efforts for a peaceful solution to the Libyan conflict.

The vessel was seized on the grounds that it entered a restricted zone, and did not answer to repeated calls from the coastal authorities. The incident came a few weeks after the Merchant Vessel (MV) Roseline A was boarded and inspected as per the standard operating procedures of the EU Operation IRINI; during the search, Turkish authorities rushed to officially deny the right to inspection, prompting the EU personnel to disembark the ship. The incident has been deemed as illegal by Ankara and caused friction between Turkey and Germany, considering that the inspection team operated off the German frigate Hamburg.

Is the Ceasefire at Stake?

While Turkish foreign policy dictates bold moves across Mediterranean and North Africa, the context of the Libyan ceasefire on the ground seems more and more fragile. GNA Defense Minister Salahaddin Namroush has warned that actions of Haftar and teh LNA are putting the ceasefire agreement at stake and could force Tripoli to withdraw.

An attack against a GNA military camp near Awbari last week was attributed to an LNA-affiliated militia. Namroush urged that such moves could trigger a new round of battles in the country. Awbari is located near the Sharara oilfield, one of the most important oilfields in Libya, therefore the latest attack could easily lead to a rapid escalation, without warning.

In the meantime, according to the latest information from the Sirte-Jufra Joint Operations Unit, Haftar is boosting the presence of LNA forces and military resources in the proximity of Sirte and Jufra. Reportedly during the weekend there has been a – possibly Russian – shipment of at least 23 armored vehicles, arms, and ammunition. These indicators raise further concerns for the viability of the current ceasefire deal.

Growing Presence of Foreign Fighters in Libya and Proxy War Scenario

Stephanie Williams, the UN Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya, highlighted in her opening remarks on the October agreement, that the immediate departure of all foreign fighters should be a prerequisite for the effective implementation of the ceasefire. More than a month later, Williams sounded the alarm again, stating that an estimated number of more than 20,000 foreign fighters are still in-country.

This fuels a serious crisis and constitutes one of the greatest challenges in Libya at the moment.  Despite the continuous negotiations and attempts for a long-term agreement, the EU and UN efforts for an arms embargo and the progressive monitoring of the situation on the ground, the mercenary numbers in Libya at the moment are growing exponentially and a major military build-up through foreign shipments for both sides is still ongoing.

Despite the random skirmishes and the expansion of mercenaries, the most important factor is essentially the ultimate intentions of the foreign forces involved. The Libyan Civil War has taken on all the characteristics of a proxy conflict over the last two years, the prospects for a stable and peaceful Libya that could go through an institutionalization process undisrupted, are depending on the long-term objectives of the major powers, backing the opposing sides.

A lasting ceasefire and peace would be desirable for Ankara, considering that current GNA elements could ensure their certain win in the elections planned for December 2021, thus prevailing all across Libya. Abu Dhabi and Cairo on the other hand treat this scenario as a catastrophe, considering that such a political outcome could boost the Muslim Brotherhood presence and undermine erratically the regional and domestic security status quo at their expense.

Even though those powers would also like to see stability in Libya, they demand that it should be achieved under their own terms, which means the marginalization of the GNA forces. Finally Russia seems to be benefiting from the extension of the conflict, gaining time and influence in the war-torn country. The combination of these particular circumstances and the conflicting interests of each side could possibly compromise the current truce any time and quickly drag the country back into chaos once again.

L'articolo Turkey Prepares to Extend Military Presence in Libya proviene da InsideOver.

In a new blow to Turkey’s power in Libya, the interior minister of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) Fathi Bashagha has imposed a travel ban on Libyan Central Bank Governor Sadik Al-Kabir.

Why Did the GNA Crack Down on the Central Bank Governor?

In a strongly-worded statement, the GNA Interior Ministry said all Libyan officials will be subject to the new travel restrictions without mentioning al-Kabir by name. However the ban came shortly after the bank governor filed a complaint with the Attorney-General’s office about having been prevented from travelling outside the country, making the linkage clear.

The rift between the two allies of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan surfaced against the backdrop of accusations that al-Kabir of squandering billions of dollars.

The Government Believes al-Kabir and his Associates are Corrupt

Last week, Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) said in a statement that it would not transfer money crude oil sales to the central bank until it shows a “clear transparency” about how it spends money.

The NOC cited that the central bank reported $1.77 billion in oil revenues in the first 10 months of the year, although the corporation’s estimates showed that it had deposited more than twice that amount of revenues — $3.7 billion — at the central bank during this period.

NOC President Mustafa Sanalla suggested that some officials in Tripoli were involved in wasting millions of dollars, accusing al-Kabir of benefitting from exchanging dollar at different rates. Sanalla explained that the bank governor exchanged the dollar for 1.40 Libyan dinars for some people, before reselling it at prices ranging between 6 and 10 dinars.

Interior Minister: ‘Corruption is a Scourge’

In a tweet, Bashagha vowed to take action against officials involved in corruption and money-laundering. “Corruption is a scourge that threatens every country’s present & future. We are dedicated in MoI to fight against corruption, trace money-laundering offences & determined to prosecute all who are involved in these crimes no matter who was it,” he tweeted.

The rift between Bashagha and al-Kabir comes as a bad news for Turkey, the only foreign backer of the Tripoli-based government. The two men are strong supporters of the Turkish military intervention in Libya in favor of the GNA against the Libyan National Army of eastern strongman Khalifa Haftar.

Signs of a split between Turkey and Bashagha have emerged in recent weeks after the Libyan interior minister visited Ankara’s main rival Egypt and France, a move that angered the Erdogan administration.

Last month, Bashagha held talks with Egyptian officials in Cairo, in a visit seen as an attempt by Tripoli to reassure Egypt about the GNA amid UN-sponsored talks for reaching a peace deal between Libya’s warring rivals.

Intervention Threat

In June, Egypt threatened to militarily intervene in Libya if Turkey-backed Libyan forces continued to advance on the oil-rich city of Sirte. The threat has helped to pacify the situation on the ground.

After his talks in Egypt, Bashagha travelled to France where he held talks on mutual security cooperation between Tripoli and Paris. The Libyan minister described his talks in Paris as “fruitful”.

Watching its close ally courting its regional rivals in Libya, Erdogan, who invested billions of dollars to gain a foothold in the oil-rich country, voiced resentment at Bashagha’s moves.

According to sources cited by the London-based Al-Quds Al-Araby newspaper, Erdogan said during a meeting with Libyan officials that Bashagha’s talks in Egypt and France served efforts by both Cairo and Paris to exclude Turkey from any deal in Libya. Both Egypt and France, along with the UAE, are major backers of General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in eastern Libya.

Bashagha’s rapprochement with Egypt and France is seen as part of his bid to replace Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj as leader of the GNA. Al-Sarraj has announced his intention to resign by October, before he rescinded his decision under Turkish pressure.

The Importance of Libya for Turkey

Turkey has been counting on Libya to give a much-needed boost to its ailing economy and ease the country’s growing economic woes. The Turkish government has been battling with double-digit inflation, high unemployment and weak Turkish lira, which fell to its lowest level against the dollar during the coronavirus pandemic.

Turkey has sought the help of its foreign allies, including Libya and Qatar, to boost its fast-depleting foreign reserves. According to the Dubai-based Al-Arabiya television channel, al-Kabir, the central bank governor, has deposited $8 billion in the Central Bank of Turkey for about four years without interest to help stabilize the Turkish lira.

The Qatari government has signed last month investment deals worth billions of dollars, including buying a big chunk of shares in the Borsa Istanbul stock exchange, in a move aimed to boost the Turkish economy.

Turkey Wants a Key Stake in Libya’s Reconstruction

Turkey is also looking for taking a big share of Libya’s reconstruction operations in any future deal between the country’s warring rivals. Murtaza Karanfil, the chairman of the Turkey-Libya Council of Foreign Economic Relations (DEIK), said in May that Turkish investors eye $120 billion investments in Libya.

Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Fatih Domnez also told the Turkish state-run Anadolu Agency that Ankara — which is looking to lower its energy imports — is evaluating opportunities to cooperate with Libya on oil and natural gas exploration. According to Donmez, Turkey’s energy imports cost $40 billion annually, which is inflating its current account deficit.

Therefore, news of a rift between its main allies in Libya comes as a deadly blow to Erdogan’s efforts to rejuvenate the Turkish economy. It also plays into the hands of Ankara’s rivals and their hopes of ending Turkish influence in the North African nation.

L'articolo Travel Ban on Governor of Libya’s Central Bank Deals New Blow to Turkey proviene da InsideOver.

Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj recently performed a complete U-turn and withdrew his resignation as Prime Minister. This means that he will remain in office until the ongoing intra-Libyan political dialog comes to an end.

Last week, Stephanie Williams, the acting head of the United Nations (UN) mission in Libya, presided over a permanent nationwide ceasefire including the exit of all foreign fighters and mercenaries from the nation for a minimum of three months.

The ceasefire includes the full opening of land and air routes, efforts to tackle hate speech, an exchange of prisoners and plans to rebuild the Petroleum Facilities Guard, a militia body and oil company linked to the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), General Khalifa Haftar.

This Ceasefire Has More Potential to Stick

Although many ceasefires have been agreed and shattered in Libya with frequency, this time it could be different because senior military officers have signed the agreement.

The ceasefire also paves the way for political talks between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the LNA on future power-sharing arrangements, as well as the future of sovereign institutions like the Central Bank of Libya and the Libyan Investment Authority.

The Libyan Prime Minister’s decision was motivated by the insistence of the High Council of State, which suggested that al-Serraj should remain until a new presidential council is selected to prevent a political vacuum detrimental to Libya’s stability. This just shows how much support the Libyan Prime Minister has at the top and how crucial he is in uniting the opposing sides in Libya’s war.

Al-Serraj Has the Support of the International Community

Al-Serraj enjoys international support. According to al-Jazeera, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas pleaded with the Libyan Prime Minister to remain in his post “in order to guarantee institutional and executive continuity” in the crucial weeks ahead, which is a reference to in-person negotiations due to take place on November 9 in Tunisia, to discuss holding national elections.

Furthermore, the UN recognizes the GNA as the only legitimate governing body in Libya, as does the U.S., Turkey and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, and all of these factors are a significant boost to al-Serraj’s premiership.

Al-Serraj also enjoys support from the GNA as they released their own statement begging for him to remain in office. Because of the domestic and international support that the Libyan Prime Minister has, it is clear that if he did permanently resign, it would have had a detrimental impact on the Libyan peace process. Therefore, al-Serraj is the only Libyan politician capable of ensuring that his country’s latest ceasefire becomes permanent.

The Libyan Prime Minister is capable of building ties with nations that once supported the LNA. Al-Sarraj used a Twitter account that he created recently to thank Egypt for welcoming Libya’s permanent ceasefire. He also told Bloomberg that support from Egypt, the US and Turkey is crucial.

Al-Serraj Must Do All He Can to Make Libyan Peace a Reality

However, Egypt’s support for peace comes at a price. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi warned during his meeting with Libyan tribal chiefs on July 16 that the Sirte-Jufra red line, which is crucial to both Cairo and the LNA due to its vast oil supplies, must not be crossed. If al-Serraj is serious about remaining in office until the peace process has been completed, these are factors he must take into consideration.

The only country acting as an obstacle to peace right now is the UAE. They could persuade Haftar to disrupt the peace process and push for Turkey to be expelled from Libya. As Tarek Megerisi wrote for the European Council of Foreign Relations, the LNA chief should be threatened with sanctions if he disrupts the upcoming proceedings.

It is a huge relief for all the parties involved in the Libyan ceasefire that al-Serraj has withdrawn his resignation. The world will be watching him closely in the coming weeks.

L'articolo Libya’s PM al-Serraj Withdraws His Resignation – What Impact Will This Have? proviene da InsideOver.

Nine months ago, Germany hosted the first Libya Conference in Berlin. On Monday, October 5, it was time to assess how to advance stability further in the war-torn North African nation. However, although a ceasefire is currently in place, various actors are continuing to pursue their interests in the Libyan conflict and standing in the way of progress.

Libya’s War-Torn Reality

The people of Libya long for a better future. Their country has degenerated into a hell, used as a pawn by international actors. Crime is rising. The economy is in ruins, and jobs are scarce. It is no surprise that the people of Tripoli have been protesting against the government, against mismanagement, and the infrastructure’s deterioration for weeks. The fact that two protesters were recently shot dead by government security forces only fueled their anger.

After nearly a decade of war and chaos, Libyans long for peace, security, and economic prosperity. The previous month provided some hope. Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord (GNA) Fayez al-Sarraj announced his resignation at the end of the month. His power was crumbling, and thus the resignation is not necessarily entirely voluntary. Moreover, Sarraj fell out with his interior minister and felt pressure from armed groups within Tripoli.

Even Sarraj’s recent military successes did not help. With the help of Turkey, he was able to stop the offensive of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and its leader Khalifa Haftar who were advancing on the capital. Sarraj even forced Haftar’s troops into retreat. As a result, Sarraj can now control the flow of refugees to Europe – powerful leverage, as his supporter Erdogan knows.

Showdown in Sirte

Hafter, on the other hand, has maintained control over the rich oil reserves in the east. The two camps now face each other on the front-line town of Sirte. Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt support Haftar as their interest lies – among other things – in Libya’s gas and oil.

However, fighting Islamic militias is another important reason for them. Hence, Russia and the Emirates have sent military equipment and mercenaries into the region despite the arms embargo.

Despite all the saber-rattling on both sides, and the staggering amount of weapons and mercenaries sent to Libya, no one is interested in an escalation, let alone a protracted proxy war with Turkey on Libyan soil. It is one of the reasons why a window opened for diplomacy in August when both sides, although Haftar only agreed to a ceasefire and negotiations under strong international pressure.

The Battle for Power and Money

Since then, envoys from both warring parties have been looking for compromise lines in Morocco and Egypt through mediation. It is a tough battle for power and money. After months of blockade, Haftar has now resumed oil production. Both sides should benefit from it. An exchange of prisoners is also on the agenda, as is the formation of a unity government and, in the end, elections.

Numerous questions remain, however, particularly regarding the military on both sides. Who will be in charge of the Libyan army? How will the military units of the West and the East be integrated? Will they play a similar role as the armed militias are currently playing within the security apparatus? These are tough questions, and the potential process will need to find answers for them.

Aiming for a Diplomatic Solution

Nonetheless, the negotiating climate at the recent meeting was described as constructive. Representatives from 16 states and international organizations seek to take ownership of the situation starting on October 5 at an international conference.  This comes almost nine months after the Berlin Libya Conference, at which the participants could only agree on soft summit resolutions.

All actors involved are cognizant that a political solution’s chances of success are significantly better than a military solution. A quick breakthrough is nonetheless unlikely. The conflict is too complicated, the interests too conflicting, the mistrust too great. However, the chances of a peaceful settlement in the crisis-ridden country have never been as great, for better or worse.

L'articolo The Quest for Stability in Libya proviene da InsideOver.

Military and police teams from Libya’s warring rivals held UN-brokered security talks in Egypt’s Red Sea resort of Hurghada this week. The talks came amid international pressure on the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) of eastern strongman Khalifa Haftar and their regional backers to avert an attack on the oil-rich city of Sirte.

What Did the Two Sides Agree On?

The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) said a host of recommendations have been reached during the discussions to be presented to UN-brokered military talks in Geneva next week. This includes the release of all prisoners captured during military operations before the end of October and a halt of all hate speech campaigns.

The two sides also agreed to expedite the re-opening of air traffic and land transportation lines across all Libyan cities to ensure freedom of movement for all citizens. The talks also tackled the tasks and responsibilities of the Petroleum Facilities Guards (PFG) in order to ensure uninterrupted oil production. UNSMIL said the two Libyan sides have demonstrated “a positive and proactive attitude aimed at de-escalation of the situation in central Libya.”

Efforts to Counteract Turkey’s Increased Intervention in Libya

The Hurghada talks were part of international efforts to reduce Turkey’s increasing military intervention in the Libyan conflict, which has irked several regional players, including Libya’s next-door neighbor Egypt.

“The Libyans reject Turkey’s blatant interference in the Libyan affairs and we are looking for solutions to unify the Libyan military establishment,” Major-General Khaled Mahjoub, the head of LNA mobilization department, said. “There is an agreement to disarm the militias and maintain the weapons in the hands of the Libyan army only,” he said.

The Pentagon estimates that Turkey has sent at least 5,000 Syrian mercenaries to Libya to fight on the side of the GNA. However, according to Mahjoub, Turkey-backed foreign mercenaries have already begun to leave Libya. “Around 3,000 mercenaries have left the country recently,” he said.

Libya’s Civil War

Libya plunged into civil war in 2011 after a NATO-backed uprising led to the ouster and subsequent killing of strongman Muammar Gaddafi, with two rival administrations emerging in Tripoli and the eastern city of Tobruk.

The situation escalated last year when Turkey signed controversial maritime and security agreements with the GNA, in response to a military offensive launched by Haftar on the capital Tripoli. The Turkish military support to the GNA helped it tip the balance of war in its favor, forcing Haftar’s LNA to retreat to Sirte.

The Turkish military intervention, however, has prompted Egypt to threaten to militarily intervene in the Libyan conflict. The Egyptian threat has forced the Turkey-backed GNA forces to halt their advance towards Sirte amid a military build-up on the frontlines.

As a result of the threat, intensive diplomatic efforts began to intensify in an attempt to avert an escalation of the military situation on the ground and push the warring rivals to reach a political settlement to their conflict. These efforts resulted in mutual ceasefire announcements by GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and Speaker of the Tobruk-based Parliament Aguila Saleh.

The Bouznika Talks

As the situation on the ground remained precarious, delegations from the two rival administrations held UN-brokered talks in the Moroccan city of Bouznika to explore ways of de-escalating the situation and reaching a roadmap for elections. The two rivals plan to start a second round of the talks this week.

In a move that helped to ease tension, Haftar announced on Sept. 18 the resumption of oil production and exports on condition that the revenues are fairly distributed among the three Libyan regions and not used with the aim of funding militias or in operations marred by corruption.

An agreement was also concluded with the GNA to form a committee tasked with overseeing the distribution of oil revenues and their proper use until the end of the current year, as well as to unify the exchange rate, open lines of credits in banks and carry out bank clearing operations away from any kind of discrimination.

Egypt’s Perspective

The Egyptian government, which backs Haftar, also invited the strongman and his ally Saleh to Cairo in a move aimed to build on efforts to reach a political settlement to the conflict in Libya. “Egypt seeks to avoid an escalation of the military situation and grant all Libyan parties the opportunity to reach a Libyan-Libyan peaceful solution,” Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry said.

In June, Egypt proposed an initiative to solve the crisis in Libya following the GNA military gains on the ground. This initiative called for a ceasefire, respect of an arms embargo on Libya and working towards a political settlement in the war-torn country. This initiative, however, was quickly rejected with the GNA and its backer Turkey.

With international involvement, the situation in Libya has stopped from escalating for now. But the question now remains about how far the foreign backers, particularly Turkey, are willing to help deescalate the situation and reach a permanent settlement to the conflict in the oil-rich country.

L'articolo Will Egypt-Hosted Military Talks Deescalate Libyan Conflict? proviene da InsideOver.

After Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj recently announced his intention to step down in October, the Turkish government was the first to question the move. After all, Ankara had been the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) largest supporter.

As InsideOver’s Amr Emam wrote, “Turkish support succeeded in reviving GNA hopes for gaining a sizable space on Libya’s political map” and pushing back rebel Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s forces.

The prospect of a GNA without Sarraj at the helm threatens to disrupt Turkey’s efforts at seeing the GNA succeed. However, although Ankara is dismayed by the prime minister throwing in the towel, it reaffirmed its support for Tripoli’s UN-recognized government, as Reuters recently reported.

Turkey’s Heavily-Armed Guiding Hand

In particular, the Turkish government will continue to uphold agreements with the GNA including a security deal, which was signed in 2019. The statement was made by Turkish Presidential Spokesman Ibrahim Kalin, who also downplayed the overall importance of Sarraj in the success of the partnership.

“These accords will not be impacted by this political period because these are decisions made by the government, not by any individual,” Kalin said.

Initially, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called the news of Sarraj’s potential upcoming departure “upsetting.” 

“A development like this, hearing such news, has been upsetting for us,” the Turkish president said. He also added that representatives from Ankara may visit Libya to hold discussions with Sarraj’s government.

For Turkey, a united Libya is has hinged upon Sarraj, who has dutifully played the part of Ankara’s puppet. However, it has mostly paid off: Turkey provides military technology, weapons and support, and Sarraj lets Ankara guide his hand. Until now, this strategy had been working.

Ankara Remains Involved

Even so, with Sarraj most likely on the way out, Erdogan still hopes to play an active role in Libya’s future. 

“If Sarraj does not remain in office, there are some names who are involved in the processes and can take the GNA forward. These are, of course, Libya’s own issues, but Turkey may provide some support,” a Turkish official said.

With Sarraj gone, Turkey’s fight to dictate Libya’s future will begin anew in earnest. Whereas before Ankara was tasked with assisting the GNA in fighting a civil war, one that is still only on pause, now it must focus on preserving the GNA itself. In that mission, Turkey is mostly alone as several regional and Western powers are pushing for the Cairo Declaration to be enacted.

France, Egypt, the UAE, and Russia have already spoken out in favor of the idea, concocted by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in coordination with Haftar’s Libyan National Army. In the arrangement, which was unveiled in June, all foreign soldiers and mercenaries will be sent home, a ceasefire declared, and Libyans would relinquish their weapons to the LNA. Then, a national election would be called.

Iran Joins Turkey

The Libyan conflict has also spawned an unusual alliance in Turkey and Iran finding common ground. Turkey’s interest in Libya has from the onset been essentially an economic one, Tahir Abbas wrote for Modern Diplomacy. What other Middle Eastern state is having economic problems? Iran.

Tehran boasts the largest proxy network in the region and could summon forces to ensure the GNA keeps hold of power long after Sarraj steps down. In return, Ankara can help its neighbor by advocating for it on the global stage against US-imposed sanctions. Iran has few allies, and fewer still who are willing to speak out on its behalf.

Under Erdogan’s leadership, Turkey is positioned to be the strong regional ally Iran desperately needs, particularly as neighboring states join together on issues such as relations with Israel.

Turkey’s Libya Mission Grows More Difficult

The Turkish path forward in Libya will look strangely similar to the one it has already walked, mired by political discussions of how a new government should look and disagreements in how the Libyan people should be represented. Oddly, although Turkey and the GNA have proved successful, the strong, stubborn band of international actors aligned against it are determined to see it fail.

As leader of the GNA, Sarraj embodied and personified its success. With Sarraj gone, those states will ramp up their efforts to push for a government dominated by the LNA. To be clear, not all Libyans support the GNA, but it has legitimacy.

Fortunately, with international involvement, peace processes will continue to play out between the two factions even without Sarraj’s leadership. With his pending resignation, the nation is not suddenly doomed to spiral back into the civil war that has marred the state for six years.

However, for the actors that have backed the GNA, namely Turkey, the mission to keep it alive has grown incalculably harder. 

L'articolo Turkey’s Mission in Libya Grows Harder With Sarraj’s Pending Resignation proviene da InsideOver.

According to a Janes report from early September approximately 5,000 Turkish-backed Syrian mercenaries have been deployed to Libya to support the Government of National Accord (GNA).

The report quotes sources from the US Africa Command and the US Office of the Inspector General. The same sources reveal that dozens of military advisors of the Turkish company SADAT are also in Libya, training the Syrian fighters and monitoring the day-to-day operations of Turkish-affiliated militias.

Rumors around SADAT have started circulating shortly after the publication of the report, and some recent comments of the company’s President Adnan Tanriverdi for the Daily Telegraph did not provide any further clarity. We shall now have a brief look into the company that according to many commentators could be the Turkish counterpart to the Russian Wagner Group on the Libyan front.

Who is Adnan Tanriverdi?

Adnan Tanriverdi is the founder and current President of SADAT Board of Directors. A former General in the Turkish Armed Forces, Tanriverdi was discharged back in 1996 allegedly due to concerns around his strong religious beliefs.

Tanriverdi became widely known to the public in August 2016, when President Recep Erdogan chose him as his new military advisor. The appointment came shortly after the failed coup attempt against the Turkish President; this move indicated Erdogan’s intention to establish a network of supporters and allies in key positions of the country’s administration in order to cement his position in the long-term and diminish any internal threats that might lead to another regime change attempt.

Further to his SADAT Presidency, Tanriverdi was also appointed President of the Turkish-based NGO Association of Justice Defenders back in 2004,, a Group Member of the Union of NGOs of the Islamic World.

What is the SADAT International Defense Consultancy?

SADAT is a private registered company, providing Security and Military Training and Consultancy Services. It was founded in 2012 by Tanriverdi who has also been serving as President since then. The personnel is exclusively composed of Army Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Turkish Armed Forces from all ranks, with many having a Special Forces background. As clearly stated the company is not providing services to individuals; SADAT is working entirely with branches of the Turkish government and possibly with fellow Muslim governments which hold friendly ties with Ankara.

The company’s Vision and Mission is to “reorganize or modernize the Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces of Islamic Countries in a modern and effective sense to ensure National Defense and Internal Security.” Inspired by the concept of Private Military and Defense Companies, which has thrived in Western Countries over the past decades, Tanriverdi came up with a plan to establish a Turkish Private Military Company that would fit in an anti-Western religious and political context.

The ex-military personnel, which should be estimated at approximately a hundred individuals directly employed by SADAT, is reportedly utilizing its broad experience in the Turkish Armed Forces to deliver services ranging from urban warfare operations training to training courses for helicopter pilots.

A Counterweight to the Wagner Group?

Even though SADAT has been presented by mainstream media, as the Turkish equivalent to the Russian Wagner Group, there are some critical differences. Wagner has managed to establish its presence out of nothing. The term Wagner today refers to any Russian-affiliated foreign fighter operating abroad. There is no official record about Wagner, its activity is not advertised online or through other means and there is no company registered under that name either in Russia or abroad.

The “Wagner Group” is a ghost entity pushing Kremlin’s interests overseas, and since it doesn’t officially exist, the Russian President and his administration can’t be held accountable for the activity of the Group under any circumstances.

On the other hand, SADAT does officially exist and there is nothing secret about its presence and area of operations. Headquartered in Istanbul and under Tanrverdi’s leadership the company does not seem to be keeping anything covert about its very existence. The company is publicly advertising its activity through its website and the press. There is a precise organizational chart and an approximate estimation on the number of personnel acting as consultants and advisors.

In this respect there is no point comparing the ambiguous and shadowy Wagner group to the commercial entity registered in the issue 8015 of “Turkish Trade Registry Gazette” and doing business under the name “SADAT International Defense Consulting Construction Industry and Trade Inc.”

Evaluating Claims of SADAT in Libya

Until now there have been many claims that SADAT has a presence in Libya, and the latest AFRICOM report comes to further strengthen these assumptions. Tanriverdi for his part has repeatedly rejected these claims. The most probable scenario is that SADAT personnel could be actively involved in the Libyan front, however no traceable connection between the company and operators deployed to Libya should be expected.

The fact that SADAT is gaining international attention could also prove to be a very useful tool for massive recruitment if played right by the Turkish authorities. In the case of Wagner we have seen that the wide media coverage urged hundreds of Syrians to rush to sign up with Wagner for a deployment in Libya.

We should not expect by no means an open recruitment process for fighters willing to fight in Libya or Syria on behalf of the company; however the public talk around SADAT could prompt several individuals to become involved in one of the Turkish fronts abroad, with the company acting strictly as an initial point of contact, if there is any involvement in the whole process at all.

In the case of Wagner, President Vladimir Putin, a mastermind in psychological operations and political manipulation, undoubtedly managed to turn the whole Wagner story to his advantage. We only need to stand by and see if Ankara could exploit the noise around SADAT in a similar way at this particular moment.

L'articolo New Report Says 5,000 Turkish-Backed Syrian Rebels Deployed to Libya proviene da InsideOver.