Lebanon has become a failed state in recent years. It is in a continuous political paralysis that prevents the formation of a functioning government and this reality has contributed to the deterioration of the country into a severe economic crisis the likes of which Lebanon has not known since the end of the bloody civil war at the end of the last century.

A Failed State

As a failed state, Lebanon lacks weight and importance because even decision making as for its own future is not in its hands. In fact, it has become another arena of conflict, one of many, between rival regional forces, whether a conflict between Iran, which supports the Hezbollah organization, and Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries, which provide support to the members of the Sunni community in the country, or whether an Israeli-Iranian conflict in which the Hezbollah organization serves as a representative and protector Tehran’s interests on the shores of the Mediterranean.

Israel is aware of the weakness of the Lebanese state and does not see it as an entity capable of independent decision-making. In this context, it should be remembered that in recent decades, Israel’s regional policy has been based on four foundations:

The first, the preservation of regional stability, peace and calm, and certainly in the area around Israel and ensuring peace along its borders.

The second, an attempt to promote a peace process towards the Arab world based on normalized relations between Israel and the Arabs.

The third, an attempt to keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at a standstill, in terms of maintaining the status quo while managing the conflict and not necessarily an effort to resolve it. Preserving the status quo means preventing a deterioration into violence and escalation, but at the same time also avoiding progress towards a solution that involves territorial concessions on the part of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

And finally the fourth, an attempt to curb Iran’s attempts to achieve regional hegemony in the Middle East and more importantly, an attempt to curb the Iranian race to nuclear power.

With such evidence, the importance of the countries of the first circle surrounding Israel, led by Egypt and Jordan, to maintain peace and calm is clear, as is the importance of the Gulf countries, such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which are a cornerstone in Israel’s efforts to strengthen the strategic cooperation between the countries of the region against Iran.

Against this background, it will be understood why Israel’s focus is not on harnessing Lebanon so that it contributes to the advancement of Israel’s interests, but rather on denying the ability of Lebanon, and especially the Hezbollah organization, which is a significant and decisive player within the Lebanese system to harm These Israeli interests.

And so, if in the fifties and sixties of the last century Israel saw Lebanon, which was then under Maronite hegemony, as a possible ally for making peace; in the 1970s, after the PLO established a presence on Lebanese soil and even turned this country into a base for military activities against Israel, the latter focused its efforts on neutralizing the threat posed by the PLO from the territory of Lebanon. Today, Hezbollah is setting the tone in the country, and certainly in matters of calm or confrontation. This, due to the military power he built for himself with the help of Iran. For example, he has close to 150,000 surface-to-surface missiles, several hundred of which are long-range precision missiles that cover the entire territory of Israel. He also maintains considerable political influence in the country and, with allies from the Shia community – such as Amal movement – and others, has the right to veto the decisions made by state institutions.

The Hezbollah Influence

In Israel there is a debate about whether there is sense and logic in separating the Lebanese state – the Lebanese army, the government and the political system in the country – and the Hezbollah organization. Such a distinction is a cornerstone of the American policy towards Lebanon which holds that strengthening the Lebanese state will one day enable it to deal with Hezbollah.

But Israel maintains that Hezbollah is the decider in any case, even if it is attentive to the opinion of the Shiite and Lebanese public, and certainly do not want to bring a war on them. These are indeed a restraining factor in the organization’s decision-making, but on the other hand it does not listen to the Lebanese army or its government, and acts according to its interests and those of its ally Iran.

Therefore, Israel perceives the Lebanese state as a weak and even hollow entity, irrelevant to questions of peace and war. Instead, Israel focuses on establishing a deterrent capability against Hezbollah, with the help of which it hopes to ensure peace along the border between the two countries.

Alongside this, over the past decade, Israel has been conducting a secret campaign (a campaign between the wars) against Hezbollah, designed to harm its arming efforts – hitting Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah while they are in Syrian territory, as well as an effort to stop the missile precision project (turning missiles in Hezbollah’s hands into missiles capable of striking Precise).

It is clear to Israel that Hezbollah does not necessarily stand on its own, since it proves itself to be a link in the axis of resistance, or in the words of Israel and the US, the axis of evil, which is led by Iran and in which Syria and the Hamas organization are also members. Therefore, Israel takes into account that a confrontation with it may have an impact on what is happening in Syria and in Iraq and against Iran and vice versa.

In conclusion, the Israeli view of Lebanon is narrow – through the prism of the threat of missiles and terror posed by Hezbollah, and in any case, through the prism of the desire to neutralize this threat. However, Israel is attentive to what is happening in Lebanon and takes into account that the Lebanese public, certainly the Shiites, as well as the institutions of the Lebanese state can help restrain Hezbollah. The fact that Hezbollah is becoming more and more identified with the state, due to the ability to influence what is happening in it – politically and not just militarily – makes it more and more attentive to the moods in the country.

All this was reflected in the comprehensive negotiations conducted by the two countries with American mediation on the question of marking the maritime boundary line between the two states. An agreement on this question may allow Lebanon to extract gas from the gas fields off its shores and thus help it get out of its economic predicament. But due to the political paralysis that prevails in Lebanon, it is difficult to reach to the agreement, and Hezbollah is taking advantage of the impasse to unleash far-reaching threats of war, if an agreement is not reached according to the equation – that if Lebanon does not utilize its resources, Israel will not be able to utilize its own resources either.

Yes, in Israel’s view, Hezbollah is Lebanon, and it therefore is focusing its attention on it. Thus, the only relevant question that preoccupies it vis-a-vis Lebanon is how it is possible to maintain peace along the border, to curtail the capabilities of the Hezbollah organization, and to prevent Iran from strengthening its influence there.

L'articolo Lebanon in Israel’s Middle East Strategy proviene da InsideOver.

Just days before the two-year anniversary of the 4 August 2020 Beirut Port explosion, a part of the burnt-out hulk of the nation’s grain silos destroyed in the blast, collapsed. For weeks, a fire had been smouldering in the silos as the extreme summer heat ignited the fermenting grains left to rot inside the mangled structure. It was an all too telling metaphor for the disastrous state of Lebanon’s economy likewise left to rot and poised for collapse. Is Lebanon nearing that point of no return?

Lebanon on the Brink

The national grain storage facilities were never replaced over the course of two years, just as political paralysis and corruption have prevented Lebanon’s leaders from setting the country’s ship of state on a steady course. Instead, the country’s citizens have been battered by waves of suffering since the onset of the economic crisis in autumn 2019. The country’s currency has lost 90% of its value since then and 80% of Lebanese live below the poverty line.  Food inflation is over 1,000% since 2019 and now bread is almost unavailable.  Without Beirut’s storage silos, Lebanon has one month’s worth of wheat storage capacity using flour warehouses in Tripoli. While the resumption wheat shipments from Ukraine could prevent Lebanon from running out of bread, it will not end the crisis.

Although Russia’s 24 February invasion of Ukraine exacerbated Lebanon’s woes, the crisis had already reached catastrophic proportions.  In August 2021, six months before Russia’s Ukraine invasion, Lebanon’s annual inflation rate hit 137.8%, surpassing Zimbabwe and making the Lebanon the leading candidate for the worst economic crisis since the end of World War II. In 2022, the inflation rate has been consistently over 200%. Fuel is exorbitant and in short supply, leading to power cuts that can last for 23 hours a day.  Known for its iconic cedars and ancient forests, Lebanon’s citizens are now cutting down the trees in those forests for fire wood amidst the fuel shortage.

Despite early warnings, Lebanon has lost precious time and numerous opportunities to adopt a path to reform its economic and financial system. “The cost of inaction is colossal not only on daily lives of citizens, but also on the future of the Lebanese people,” the World Bank’s Mashreq Regional Director warned in May 2022, adding that there is “a risk of a systemic failing of state institutions and pressure on an already fragile social peace.”

Lebanon’s Crisis is Putting its Service Economy Out of Service

Lebanon is a service economy. In its heyday as the Levantine commercial hub of the Arab world, services accounted for around 70 percent of the economy.  Even at the start of the crisis, the service sector – primarily commerce, financial services, and tourism along with health services and higher education – accounted for 60% of the country’s GDP.  Now Lebanon’s human capital is being severely depleted by the crisis, threatening to put Lebanon’s service economy out of service.

According to polling by  the Arab Barometer, 48% of the Lebanese population want to emigrate, a figure that jumps to 61% among those with a college education. One in five doctors in Lebanon has either already left the country or is planning to do so. From scientists and engineers to creative fields ranging from marketing to the movie industry, Lebanon’s best and brightest are leaving.  And, there may not be anyone in the future to replace them.

According a United Nations estimate, Lebanon’s fertility rate fell below the 2.1 replacement level in 2021 and is projected to decline to 1.97 by 2030. Many young Lebanese are reluctant to have more children amidst bleak economic prospects and soaring prices for such items as infant formula and diapers.  In 2021, the price of  infant formula increased  over 700% percent to 100,000 Lebanese pounds, equivalent to about $66 at official exchange rates.

Lebanon’s demographic decline is worsening the impact of the crisis and could push the country past the point of no return.  Companies, such as those in Lebanon’s engineering sector, are relocating their business outside of Lebanon.  In contrast, Morocco with its thriving business ecosystem and robust demographics has become a magnet for engineering services and business processes outsourcing. As supply chains shorten and firms servicing European markets seek to nearshore operations in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, Lebanon is being passed over for other locations. The one-time commercial capital of the Levant could find itself the odd man out in the new architecture of trans-Mediterranean commerce.

A Glimmer of Hope in the Eastern Mediterranean

The drivers behind the corruption in Lebanon’s political system are well known.  With a governance system that divides offices among the country’s major confessional faiths, elite capture has occurred through the wheeling and dealing among the elites of the various confessional communities. Lebanon’s resulting fiscal mismanagement, recently labelled by the World Bank as “Ponzi Finance”, has the country’s economy teetering over the edge of a cliff.  The major political actors within the Lebanese system are also connected to the larger geopolitical fault-lines in the Middle East involving Syria, Iran, the Arab Gulf States and Israel. These external rivalries serve to churn political conflict and violence within the country.

Lebanon has always thrived when it has been able to use its Levantine cosmopolitanism to broker interchange among people and business across the Eastern Mediterranean, linking Europe and the Middle East. The Eastern Mediterranean itself is now in a season of multilateral conciliation and this may provide a moment of opportunity for Lebanon. The Abraham Accords have brought Israel into closer cooperation with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, followed by a recent further thawing of relations with Saudi Arabia. Turkey has launched rapprochement initiatives with Egypt, Israel, and the UAE. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have been looking to reduce tensions with Iran.

A glimmer hope may rest in the progress made towards concluding an agreement between Lebanon and Israel demarcating their maritime boundary. Lebanon’s foreign minister announced that “massive progress” had been made in the 1 August round of negotiations, toward a final agreement.  A deal would help boost investor confidence in Lebanon’s efforts to develop its own offshore natural gas resources and could pave the way for Lebanon to join the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. Beyond natural gas, an agreement may help make Lebanon less susceptible to being an arena for regional tensions.

The Lebanese people have proven themselves time and time again to be resilient and resourceful.  A more cooperative Eastern Mediterranean environment could be conducive to helping Lebanon’s citizens to put the country’s economic house back in order before the house collapses.

L'articolo Out of Service: Is Lebanon nearing the point of no return? proviene da InsideOver.

Why Lebanon? Some years ago the distinguished historian Jonathan Steinberg wrote a book entitled Why Switzerland? And a similar question can be posed for Lebanon which, like Switzerland, is host to several different communities. In the Lebanese case we need to go much further back in time than the thirteenth century AD which saw the birth of the Swiss cantons. Instead, we are looking at the thirteenth century BC. For the coast of Lebanon might appear to be a narrow strip hemmed in by mountains, an unlikely centre of trade and industry, but its original importance lay precisely in the extensive resources of wood. As far back as 1075 BC an Egyptian official named Wenamun set out from the Nile Delta on his way to Byblos (modern Jubayl in Lebanon) to obtain timber for the rebuilding of an Egyptian temple. His adventures, fictional or more probably true, are recorded on a papyrus scroll that has survived till today. The resources in wood of the Lebanese mountains were a vital resource for the Egyptians, who could obtain poor quantities of wood of poor quality in Egypt.

It is therefore no great surprise that the strip of coast that now constitutes Lebanon was the birthplace of trans-Mediterranean trade in antiquity. The Phoenician merchants were easily able to obtain the wood they required for building sturdy ships able to sail to and beyond the Strait of Gibraltar. The merchants of Tyre founded new settlements as far west as Carthage and Cádiz. They also looked eastwards towards the growing power of Assyria, providing luxury goods for the court of the Assyrian kings. They remained a significant presence in imperial Rome, bringing luxury goods from the east. Lebanon was therefore already the crossroads between the landmass of the Middle Est and the entire length of the Mediterranean, a role that it would preserve for most of its history.

In the Middle Ages this same stretch of coast was conquered first by Muslim armies, in the seventh century, and then by the crusaders at the end of the eleventh century. The crusaders held it for less than two centuries, but they eagerly exploited its resources. Near Tyre sugar plantations, many of them owned by Venetian merchants, supplied what was still a rare and costly delicacy to western Europe. The conquest of the coastline by the Mamluk rulers of Egypt in the late thirteenth century was accompanied by the destruction of many of the Levantine ports, but this only gave greater prominence to Beirut, which was preserved and built close business ties to the Genoese and Venetian merchants who operated out of Famagusta in Cyprus. Among the products these traders handled was cotton, exported to northern Italy and transformed into textiles including the famous fustians of Lombardy made out of a combination of cotton and wool.

This was also an area of great ethnic and religious diversity. A Spanish traveller, Benjamin of Tudela, passed through Lebanon in around 1170 and noted the presence in the mountainous interior of the Assassin sect of Shi’ite Islam and of the Druze warriors, members of a religious group that diverged from Shi’ite Islam in the eleventh century and preserves distinctive beliefs and practices; one is reincarnation but others are still kept secret. To these groups should be added the Maronite Christians in the interior, who venerated several local saints and from the sixth century onwards developed loose ties to the Roman Catholic Church as a result of their common theological position, a relationship that was confirmed during the late twelfth century and still holds. The religious map of modern Lebanon is further complicated by the very substantial Shi’ite population living between Tyre and the Israeli border, as well as a large population of Palestinian refugees and their descendants, who are predominantly Sunni Muslim, while the country’s Jewish population, once a significant element, has all but disappeared.

When Lebanon emerged from centuries of Ottoman domination (the Turks conquered the region in 1516) these religious divisions became crucial in determining its future. The Druze and Maronite leaders were already cooperating with one another in the local government of the region during the eighteenth century; but the French mandate in Syria following the First World War and the break-up of the Ottoman Empire at last offered a chance for the ambitions of the nationalists to become real. In establishing a republic of Lebanon within French Syria in 1926, France recognized the exceptional significance of its Christian inhabitants while trying to accommodate the interests of the other groups as well. French attitudes were moulded by a nostalgic affection for the era of the crusader states, which were seen by historians as an early expression of the mission civilisatrice of France in the Mediterranean (not a view held nowadays). An fully independent Lebanese republic came into being in 1943 amid the chaos of the Second World War; its constitution still insists that the president must be a Maronite and the Prime Minister must be Shi’ite.

Since 1948 one of the major issues in Lebanese politics has been the presence of Israel to the south. Lebanon sees itself as an Arab nation and is a member of the League of Arab States, even if it is the only member to contain such a high proportion of Christians, mostly of them descended from the pre-Islamic inhabitants of the Middle East. Although Lebanon joined the Arab attack on Israel that year it tried as far as possible to keep a low profile in the wars against Israel. However, the government has never been successful in limiting attacks on Israel first by the Palestine Liberation Organization (bearing in mind the large Palestinian population in southern Lebanon), and subsequently by the Iranian-funded Hizbollah organization. Following the Lebanese civil war that broke out in 1975 and lasted till 1990, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, in support of Maronite allies, reaching the outskirts of Beirut, and later occupying a small strip of land across from its northern frontier until 2000. Syrian troops moved into the country – Syria never having recognized the independence of Lebanon – and were only dislodged in 2005.

All this has had a serious effect on the capital, Beirut, In its heyday it was one of the major business centres of the Middle East, and with wealth came a reputation for a hedonistic high life. Its hotels and clubs attracted hordes of visitors from more Puritan parts of the region. However, the destruction in civil war of parts of the city, followed by their rebuilding, followed by their renewed destruction, has helped destroy the economy as well. In 2022 it has been marked by steep inflation, power cuts, food shortages and – of course – renewed political crises. The political influence of Hizbollah seems to be impossible to break. One consolation, perhaps, is that the Bekaa valley still produces excellent wines including those of the prestigious Château Musar; but at the moment the economic and political future continues to look bleak. No longer the bridge between the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Lebanon risks becoming a failed state.

L'articolo The Bridge Between the Mediterranean and the Middle East proviene da InsideOver.

As Lebanon entered 2020, the centennial of its establishment by France, the country was entitled to ask whether its 100th birthday would be among its last. In November of the previous year, the economy had collapsed, the result of an insurmountable public debt, declining capital inflows, economic mismanagement, and pervasive corruption.

Today, Lebanon’s economic situation is so dire, that it is legitimate to ask whether the country will soon emerge from it. A fall 2021 World Bank report described the situation as “one of the top ten, possibly top three most severe economic collapses worldwide since the 1850s.” The report spoke of a “deliberate depression,” orchestrated by a political elite that had captured the state and lived off its rents, leading to the disintegration of key pillars of the post-civil war political economy. The local currency has lost 90 percent of its value since October 2019, and nearly 80 percent of the population lives in poverty.

While Lebanon concluded a staff-level agreement with the International Monetary Fund last April, the political leadership has failed to introduce any serious reform measure in the past three years that could allow for implementation of the agreement. A European diplomat said this to me in late July: “It is clear that the Lebanese have no desire to implement the conditions of the IMF deal.”

In light of this bleak situation, Lebanon will face several major challenges in the coming months. The first is a presidential election whose timeframe begins at the end of August. The second is finalization of an agreement with Israel over disputed offshore gas fields. And the third is, simply, the introduction of reform measures to make the IMF deal possible before foreign currency reserves run out.

Lebanon’s last presidential election was scheduled to take place in 2014, but was delayed two years because Hezbollah and its allies boycotted parliament (which elects presidents) in order to impose their candidate, Michel Aoun. It is unlikely that this year we will see the same scenario. The economic crisis does not allow it, and few parties seem willing to obstruct parliament to bring a favorite candidate to office, or to prevent voting for a rival.

The general assumption today is that any president who comes to power must have the tacit acceptance of Hezbollah. While no one has emerged yet as a favorite, many people believe the candidate who has the best chance of being elected is Suleiman Franjieh, a grandson and namesake of a previous president. Franjieh is close to Hezbollah and has strong ties with the Syrian regime. His election would not necessarily do Lebanon much good, as he is a member of the political class that helped destroy the country, while his backing of Hezbollah will only harden the party’s efforts to keep Lebanon under strong Iranian influence. However, Franjieh is on good terms with the man likely to be his prime minister, Najib Mikati, so that there may be a concomitance of views between the two men in addressing economic policy. The rivalry between Mikati, who is currently the caretaker prime minister, and Aoun effectively crippled all progress on reform.

For Hezbollah, a president it can trust is a necessity at a time when two broad alignments are forming in the region. On the one side is Iran and its allies, including Hezbollah; on the other, Israel and most of the Arab states opposed to Iran, building on what was known as the Abraham Accords of 2020. Whoever Lebanon elects as president will have a bearing amidst this regional divide. While Franjieh, if he is ever elected, is not hostile to the Arab countries, especially the Gulf countries, if he is viewed as Hezbollah’s choice, this could have negative repercussions for how Lebanon is treated by Arab governments in the region.

A second challenge Lebanon faces is that it must soon reach an agreement with Israel on contested offshore gas fields. The Lebanese position has shifted, but it is clear that given the economic situation, this is a national priority. The main bone of contention today is that Lebanon has officially claimed that its gas fields lie within what is known as line 23, but it would like to see this zone extended to include all of the Qana gas field. It is still waiting for Israel’s response, which is expected soon via an American mediator.

Yet Hezbollah has threatened Israel with a military response if Lebanon’s rights are not respected. This may be a tactical move, to show its destitute electorate that it is defending the country’s economic interests. However, the threat means that if no agreement is reached, the prospect of war will rise. At the same time, Hezbollah wants a deal, as the anticipated revenues could allow Lebanon to avoid the IMF reform path, with which Hezbollah is unhappy. It regards the IMF as an extension of American power.

The third challenge is to address IMF demands for reform. The political class regards any substantial reforms as a threat to its patronage and corruption networks. Its immobility in the past three years has proven this, regardless of the population’s suffering. However, one thing the politicians must consider is Lebanon’s dwindling foreign currency reserves. For a country that imports most of what it consumes, the implications would be disastrous. The IMF has promised $3–4 billion, but unless the political class can find a way of introducing even limited reforms, it could conceivably reach a stage where, after Lebanon’s valuable gold reserves are used up to buy time, it will have little margin of maneuver with the IMF.

Beyond these immediate problems, it is apparent that the Lebanese political system no longer works. The past years have been one long period of political dysfunction and blockages. State institutions are no longer operating as they should, and the country is losing much of its youth to emigration. A new social contract is urgently needed, but absolutely no one is discussing this at the official level. That is why, even if Lebanon resolves its problems, the long-term outlook for the country will remain uncertain.

L'articolo The Troubled Future of Lebanon proviene da InsideOver.

Reportage / Society 01.08.2022

Lebanon, the Middle East’s smouldering cauldron

Immense banana plantations stretch away for miles. The yellow clusters overlook the Mediterranean in a land that is a limbo. Between stretches of rock and what remains of the Mediterranean scrub, sumptuous villas emerge sporadically. Here in southern Lebanon, the…

Antonio Borrelli

Marco Ferraro

L'articolo Lebanon, the Middle East’s smouldering cauldron proviene da InsideOver.

Reportage / Society 29.07.2022

Art lost in tragedy

This reportage is among the winners of the Newsroom Academy course held by Daniele Bellocchio. When you enter an art exhibition, you expect to discover imagery and paintings about ancient times, a past era. The painting ‘Mary Maddalena’ by Artemisia…

Isabel Demetz

As difficult as the attribution was, due to a lack of adequate documentation, Buchakjian was certain that the paintings were the work of Artemisia Gentileschi. However the confirmation would only come thirty years later, after August 4th 2020.

“I entered the Sursock building a week after the explosion. Nobody had touched anything, it was as if time had stopped,” says Buchakijan. “The photographs released by the news do not do justice to what the palace and the city were.”

Buchakijan had entered the Sursock residence, accompanied by two colleagues Camille Tarazi and Georges Boustany, to assess the state of the building and the works in the collection. Upon their arrival, the artist remembers finding the Cochrane-Sursock family in a deep state of shock, unable even to speak. Lady Cochrane, daughter of Alfred Bey Sursock and Donna Maria, had been seriously injured by the explosion. She died shortly after on August 31st, 2020 at the age of 98.

With the hosts silenced, Buchakijan went to work.

“I moved around the palace as if it were my own home. I was equipped with a camera, a measuring tape and a notebook. I just knew I had to create an inventory of the works. This is where the question of Artemisia Gentileschie’s two paintings re-emerged.”

The paintings of the Sursock collection created by Artemisia Gentileschi are “Ercole e Onfale” and “Maria Maddalena.”

“The pieces of glass, wood and ceiling were all wedged into one another. I feared that the fragile balance would collapse any moment, further damaging the painting. Getting him out of that debris was a decision that took seconds. I had to detach it from the original frame, which was stuck to a beam. It’s a miracle that the canvas was in such good condition.”

In fact, the work was much less damaged than “Hercules and Onfale.” This, on the other hand, had major damage, including a large tear in the canvas, which made its transport temporarily impossible.

“Maria Maddalena”, on the other hand, could be brought to Italy for restoration.

THE RESTORATION

“Each painting has its own story”, says Andrea Cipriani, responsible for the restoration of the painting.

“I think about that when I restore. Who knows what this painting has seen, hanging on a wall, has it changed owners and where has it been? Gentileschi’s painting, for example, left Naples following a wedding. This was chosen among others, for who knows what reason? Perhaps emotional, maybe economic.”

Not all works, however, can we know their history. For some we just have to assume the path that they travelled, the restorer explains, others are lost – even before arriving with us.

“We were lucky because this work could have been destroyed, as happens to many other paintings. I often happen to imagine the events experienced by surviving art. In this case, for example, I imagine that, obviously in an explosion, the first thing one saves is oneself, but, as he leaves the house, he manages to take three things with him – among them is this painting. Thus, the work reaches us, when probably, many others will never reach us, because for reasons unknown they are not saved.”

Of “Mary Magdalene”, some confirmation of its history came exactly through this restoration.

The first step is conservative restoration, also known as structural restoration, Cipriani explains. This includes, among other things, the disassembly of the painting from the frame, relining, repairing and suturing the tears.

It was during this first phase of intervention that the restorer was able to discover something that would otherwise have remained hidden: during the disassembly of the painting from the frame, he found small shards of glass. “Most likely coming from the explosion that hit the place where the painting was located,” explains Cipriani.

The conservative restoration was followed by cleaning which allowed the recovery of the original colours. As the restorer says, “from a technical point of view there wasn’t much to discover. The pigments and the technique used by Gentileschi were already known and coincided with what resulted from the analysis of the painting.”

The management of the displaced was also shameful. The government barely intervened the next day. People who had just lost their homes, relatives and friends, spent the night on the street. Those who had the opportunity went down to the city to help, giving water and food to those who had just lost everything.”

On August 10th, the government, accused of being responsible for the explosion because of its knowledge of the ammonium nitrate cargo, resigned. 13 months later, on September 10th 2021, the formation of a new government was finally announced.

“We don’t have a government, a government is made up of good people, but these are not good people. They don’t care if more than 200 people died because of them,” says Mahmoud.

However, hope for political change remains sparse. Elections will be held in Lebanon on May 15th, but the sectarianism that divides the Lebanese by creed and politics is still far too deeply rooted in the population.

“They are frightening them again with the nightmare of civil war, saying that if we don’t keep the order created by sectarianism, we will go back to fighting each other on the street. The reality, however, is that we are currently worse off than during the civil war”, says Mahmoud – referring to the economic crisis into which the country is sinking.

L'articolo Art lost in tragedy proviene da InsideOver.

Reportage / Society 29.07.2022

Lebanon, an onslaught of hardship

To get to the center of Beirut from the airport – first you must travel through a black hole. The main road that connects the airport to Lebanon’s capital is completely dark. The only light comes seconds at a time,…

Antonio Borrelli

Marco Ferraro

Amplifying the drama is the country’s economic crisis. Lebanon has been brought to its knees by the explosion of the port and irreversibly injured by the war in Ukraine. The past two years, Lebanon relied on Ukraine for 66% of its grains and 12% from Russia. Today, there are no supply lines here and the nation can’t even count on a steady supply of grain stock. On top of that, the dramatic explosion at the port of Beirut on August 4th 2020 has left the capital, still, in a damaged state. 

“It is the third time I have come and this time I have seen how this profound economic crisis is being felt.” Says Colonel Claudio Guaschino, commander of the ‘Serenissima’ Lagunari Regiment on its third mission in the Land of the Cedars. “Amongst the population there is considerable difficulty in securing essential services. There is a shortage of medicines, difficulties in procuring diesel fuel – which is also used to build wells to extract water, and the price of bread has skyrocketed.” Guaschino, who was also here in 2006, during the most dramatic period of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, worries for Lebanon’s future. “Today’s situation seems even worse than back then. If a solution is not found at the government level, there is a real risk things could get worse.”

DISADVANTAGES IN THE SOUTH

In the south of the country, dotted with an array of small villages, life is even worse, explains Abdul Qader Safiyeddine, mayor of Shama – a village a few kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border. “These villages have been abandoned by the Lebanese government. If there is a hole in the street, nobody takes care of it except the Italian contingent of Unifil.” Shama, a small village of 4 thousand, middle ground in area that has always been unstable, has always linked its fortunes (if they can be called that) to the Italian base of the UN that the village hosts in its territory.

“In all of the villages around the area, Unifil, brought water to the homes of the Lebanese. By building wells, building retaining walls and rebuilding the roads. In addition, 250 people work on the base, all Lebanese, who take their salary in euros. This is a great help for them to live.” 

L'articolo Lebanon, an onslaught of hardship proviene da InsideOver.

Reportage / War 20.11.2020

Beirut’s Ground Zero

Beirut, 25 September 2020. I’m having a coffee at the entrance to the highway which runs alongside the port: the waitress is gracious  and thanks God she was not working that day. She refers to that day, without specifying. There…

Ivo Saglietti

Beirut, 25 September 2020. I’m having a coffee at the entrance to the highway which runs alongside the port: the waitress is gracious  and thanks God she was not working that day. She refers to that day, without specifying. There is no need. “That day” is  4 August 2020, when an explosion wiped out the port of Beirut, taking all that stood in its course with it. “I would have died”, says the waitress, “like the girl who was filling in for me”. It feels good in that small café, in the Beirut I am familiar with, courteous and pleasant. However, now evil and fear have set foot in there as well. It was but a few seconds. Fist the smoke, then a thousand red fragments and finally the blast. Tears, blood and corpses swallowed. In just a few moments Beirut was once again hurled back into the fears that have marked its past.

These are the memories of Beirut, the city that has seen refugees and armies march across it and leave. The city was above all a port.  Which now no longer exists. When I try to get nearer I am immediately stopped by the military.  They are  armed and have been ordered not to let anyone through. Investigations into what happened on 4th August  are still on-going. Observers from all over the world have come to try and determine what happened that summer afternoon. But to this day nobody has understood how, and above all why, such an explosion took place.  As these thoughts cross my mind, I inadvertently find myself walking along the highway. I’m a little worried: the Lebanese drivers will not pay much attention to a foolish Italian carrying a camera. However, as I stare at that pile of rubble everything becomes clear: it’s not like it is on TV. I immediately have a clear vision of the enormousness of the tragedy, of its vastness.  Wherever I look I see structures contorted by the heat. Entire window fronts have been destroyed and lie on the ground. Houses and offices have no roofs. A lorry lies overturned. But it is when you look over to the other side of the street that you perceive the feeling of the lives destroyed lives. The facades of  buildings,  restaurants and offices are hollow.  As my gaze lingers, inside I see the remnants of entire lives: photos hanging on the walls, chairs, armchairs and a few pieces of furniture with open drawers.  On one wall all that is left is a melancholic open cage.

The nearer I get to the center of the explosion, the more I can see that mushroom, that initial and terrifying blast. The panoramic camera augments the landscape.  As I walk, I see man with a crutch: I can’t understand if he’s missing a leg. I would like to talk to him but we are separated by language.  What happened to him? That day, as the waitress referred to it, was he at the port as well? I watch him leave, taking all the answers to my questions with him.  And so, almost without realizing it, I reach Beirut’s Spoon river, made not of words but of faces. Voiceless. There are only their photographs, their names, where they came from and their age and then a never ending and incomplete list of the victims. Around me just emptiness in- between the black cranes. When I reach the granaries I understand it was them, together with the sea, that saved most of the city from the shock wave, which collided onto them and fanned outwards, finally dying out at sea. 

L'articolo Beirut’s Ground Zero proviene da InsideOver.

As Lebanon’s Prime Minister-in-waiting Mustafa Adib missed the September 15 deadline set by French President Emmanuel Macron for the formation of a new Lebanese cabinet, President Michael Aoun has warned of a “hell-like” situation that awaits Lebanon unless a government is formed very soon.

Easier Said Than Done

Although many Lebanese pundits had warned the former Lebanese ambassador to Germany (and strong loyal affiliate of the mainly Sunni former prime ministers Saad al Hariri and Fouad Sanyoura’s so-called March 14 Alliance), Adib must have realized by now that the task of forming an acceptable new cabinet in Lebanon is much easier said than done.

Since his nomination for the job some three weeks ago, pro-Hariri PM-designate Adib has been striving to navigate the precarious inter-factional and sectarian waterways of Lebanese political affiliations. It’s a mission made even more challenging by an array of conflicting interests as well as regional and international references, patrons and backers.

Despite  growing local as well as regional and international pressure coupled with Macron’s “warnings” to Lebanese factional leaders prior to the original deadline he had set and later extended, Adib’s formation of an autocratic government away from the intervention and influence of Lebanon’s traditional political powerhouses and blind subordination has proven to be an extremely difficult and complicated matter.

The long-awaited white smoke does not appear to be coming soon, as many experts in Lebanese affairs have noted over the past week or so. Lebanon, however, has little choices but to settle smaller differences and minor internal disagreement if it wants to avert a fast slipping fully into the “hell” that Aoun referenced.

Who and What is Blocking Cabinet Formation?

Several factors contribute to the current blockage and various parties play into the main obstacles that are in the way of forming Lebanon’s new cabinet. This can be summed up as the difficulty of reaching an agreeable compromise between the country’s two major political blocks, known as the March 7 Movement (consists mainly of Shiite Hezbollah and Amal Movement,  as well as Maronite Free National Movement led by President Aoun’s son in law and former Foreign Minister Gibran Bassil), and the March 14 Movement (mainly contains Hariri’s Sunni leaders as well as Geagea’s Christian Forces and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt).

Inside information notes that most of the obstacles have been ironed out, except for the post of Finance Minister. This is a crucial one given Lebanon’s economic and financial dire straits, as well the principle of “rotation of posts” within the government and relevant senior traditionally-allocated civil service positions.

Some fiery statements made mainly against the “Shiite duo” especially regarding Hezbollah’s arms and other controversial issue were later toned down and followed by French reassurances (particularly to Parliamentary Speaker and Amal leader Nabih Barri) that Shiites of Lebanon would not be targeted. However, how much credence do Macron’s reassurances have, and who believes the anti-resistance factions’ rhetoric or promises remains another issue.

Ongoing Efforts to Get the Government Formed

At a press conference earlier this week, Aoun suggested a non-sectarian based distribution of ” key portfolios even-handedly among Lebanese parties’. Meanwhile, Jumblatt’s mediation efforts during a phone call he made from Paris where he met with some French officials including former diplomat and Director of the General Directorate for External Security, Bernard Emie, with the Hariri Block, have failed to produce any tangible results.

The political dilemma for Adib has worsened as many Lebanese nationalist writers and politician have voiced their refusal of what they call “an unviable sectarian system, as well as a civil project that lacks any genuine popular cross-sectarian common sense or support.”

Indeed, “many political leaders continue to fall victim to intransigent sectarian affiliation,” an article published Monday in the Al-Binaa nationalist Lebanese newspaper maintained.

It is widely believed that Adib’s upcoming cabinet is no more than a transitional one until Lebanon’s surmounts its ongoing critical situation. The country is virtually bankrupt and on the verge of total economic collapse. Making necessary reform and fighting deeply-rooted corruption, both political as well as financial, have been compulsory preconditions for any badly-needed foreign financial aid or IMF package. Months of difficult negotiations between the International Monetary Fund and Lebanon have reached a dead end, mainly due the IMF’s reform conditions before any financial aid that might well be swallowed up by corruption and mismanagement of funds.

Reservations About the French Initiative

The majority of those Lebanese factions that oppose or expressed reservations over Macron’s plan regarding their country so far, have done so because they do not view the French president not as an independent Western leader marketing his own endeavors, but as a mere “messenger” on behalf of US President Donald Trump.

The majority of Lebanon’s population who have long suffered from US sanctions and interference in their countries affairs have no trust whatsoever in Trump and his foreign policy adventures and blunders. They maintain that the American interference makes it look like that “Hariri, not Adib, is the one who’s forming the new government” tailored as per Washington’s prerequisites.

Others in Lebanon attribute any potential failure of Macron’s initiative to the deeply-rooted corruption as well as backing the wrong horses in Lebanon. General Jamil Al Sayyed, MP and former senior security chief who was unlawfully jailed along with three other officers on false accusations and fabricated allegations regarding the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri in Beirut 2005 tweeted earlier this week:

“The French initiative is a good recipe for cooking a salvation government. The problem lies in the fact that they handed the recipe to Lebanese chefs from March 14 (Movement) who had always partnered with others from March 8 (Movement). Both sides have been part of corruption in Lebanon and the plundering of its wealth. The March 14 chefs are today trying to appease America and launder their corruption by eliminating their other partners. Corrupted men are trying to judge the corrupted; it simply doesn’t add up!”

General Al Sayyed’s remarks, harsh as they might seem to some, reflect the feeling, attitude and approach taken by many cross Lebanon’s confused spectrum, who have had to pay dearly for decades of corruption and ineptitude of the country’s main political dynasties. Tens of thousands have taken to the streets of Lebanon over the past year or so protesting against practices by war lords turned politicians across the board, as well as corrupt policies that have virtually crippled their country and depleted its resources.

Does France Have a Plan B?

France, as well as many major Lebanese parties in fact, do want Hariri to return as Prime Minister; the man is seen by many key players as an acceptable compromise, despite having been undermined and humiliated by Saudi Crown Prince and virtual ruler Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who summoned Hariri to the Saudi capital Riyadh in 2017, arrested Lebanon’s incumbent PM and forced Hariri to announce his resignation from Saudi Arabia.

Following the failure to meet his September 15 deadline, Macron issued a statement expressing his “regrets” that Lebanon has been unable to form a new government after a deadly explosion in the port of the Lebanese capital Beirut caused a mass resignation from the Hassan Diab’s government. “It’s not too late” though, Macron’s statement read, in which he pleaded for Lebanese leaders and officials to help the prime minister-in-waiting Mustafa Adib “form a government that can tackle the gravity of the situation”.

A former French diplomat involved in the Lebanese file and promoting the March 14 Movement in the United States in 2005, has categorically ruled out an immediate withdrawal of Macron’s initiative, noting that Paris actually knows what, who and why have prevented its success so far.

A second modified French plan, void of direct American influence or pressure, might soon be presented to Lebanese leaders as the current one appears to have entered “clinical death,” the official added. Unless an agreement is reached soon, the deepening crisis threatens to turn Lebanon from the once acclaimed Switzerland of the East to a failed state with the feared potential of the hell of civil war once again breaking loose.

L'articolo Lebanon President Aoun: Country Going to ‘Hell’ if Govt Not Formed Soon proviene da InsideOver.

The political crisis crippling Lebanon shows no sign of ending as the country’s politicians failed to form a new government before the deadline agreed with French President Emmanuel Macron.

Failure to Agree on a New Cabinet

Lebanese President Michel Aoun met the leaders of parliamentary groups at Baabda Palace on Monday and Tuesday, but they failed to agree on a new cabinet that could have been led by Prime Minister-designate Mustapha Adib.

Macron has invested considerable political capital into Lebanon’s political process since the Beirut explosion last month. During his last visit to the nation he received reassurances that politicians would form a government within 15 days of his trip.

Government May be Formed by End of the Week

However, Nadim El Kak, a researcher at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, told The National that the political class are “engaging in sectarian battles,” even though some in the Lebanese media believe that a government could be formed by the end of the week.

The biggest obstacle to forming a new government is that several parties which control the interior, foreign and defense ministries fear that a reshuffle threatens the hold that they have over these institutions.

Parliamentary Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri insists that a Shi’ite figure be given charge of the finance ministry. Macron failed to persuade him to change his mind.

If Lebanon has any hope of reforming its political system following the Beirut explosion, then the nation’s elites have no choice but to allow for a rotation between parties in Lebanon’s key political institutions. It is not fair that a certain group has an exclusive right to any ministerial portfolio.

Fires Continue to Shatter Lebanon’s Psyche

Aoun’s son-in-law, Gebran Bassil, who leads the President’s party, accused internal and external forces of thwarting the formation of a new government.

As the political elites continue to frustrate attempts to initiate radical reforms in Lebanon, fires continue to shatter the nation’s psyche. A fire broke out at a shopping center being built in Beirut, marking the third blaze in a week in a city still reeling from the devastating explosion in August.

The shopping center was designed by British-Iraqi architect Zaha Hadid.

Although the disaster is still being investigated, the fire was reportedly triggered by a detonation of 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate that had been stored unsafely.

A Government Must be Formed Quickly

That is why Lebanon’s politicians must form a government quickly. Jogger Joe Sayegh told Reuters that the latest fires signify that if the country’s new administration is formed by the same politicians then “nothing will change.” This is just one example of how citizens’ confidence in their politicians has been damaged by recent events.

Whoever leads Lebanon’s new government has a daunting task ahead of them. Macron wants the country’s elites to initiate a reformed electoral law and to hold parliamentary elections by September 2021. Given the current state of affairs in Lebanon, this might be easier said than done.

Iran will be monitoring developments in Lebanon carefully as they are one of the main sponsors of Hezbollah, a Shi’ite Islamist party which has influence over the Lebanese Government. The Washington Institute discovered that the Iranian Government provides the terrorist group with $100 million per year. The Iranian Government has already spoken out against Macron’s interventions, and they may attempt to block the French President’s planned reforms.

Time is Running Out for Lebanon’s Political Elites

The Council on Foreign Relations’ Amir Asmar suggests the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were instrumental in defeating ISIS and it is one of the few institutions that Lebanon’s citizens have a positive view of. They can act as a restraining force against Hezbollah and Macron would be wise to engage with them if he is serious about reform.

With Lebanon’s currency losing 80 percent of its value against the dollar and the economy likely to contract by 24 percent this year, it is imperative that a new government tackles the ongoing economic crisis the nation faces. Continuous delays to the forming of a new administration means that the tough decisions which are necessary to spark an economic recovery are not being made.

It is clear that the next stages for Lebanon’s political elites are to form a new cabinet, initiate reform and rebuild the economy. Time will tell if this is too ambitious for them to accomplish or not.

L'articolo What’s Next for Lebanon? proviene da InsideOver.