The friendly and close relations between Israel and the United States have become over the years, since the sixties of the last century, a cornerstone of Israel’s national security doctrine. The security, economic and political aid that Washington provides to Israel is significant in scope and beyond that it helps to strengthen Israel’s regional and international standing and its deterrence capability in the face of its adversaries. 

Israel has always been careful to emphasize its part in the unwritten alliance established by the two countries, mainly its contribution to the United States national security – during the Cold War, but also today, when Israel stands at the forefront of the struggle against Iran as well as against terrorism and Islamic radicalism.

The close relations between the two countries have withstood the test of time and even deepened. They relied on bipartisan support of Israel (on the part of both Democrats and republicans), as well as broad support of the American public, and especially of American Jewry. AIPAC, the pro-Israel Jewish lobby in the United States, is instrumental in maintaining these close relations.

President Donald Trump’s term in office (2016-2020) undoubtedly brought American support for Israel to a peak. But at the same time cracks were exposed during Trump’s term that could affect the intimacy and the strength of American-Israeli relations. 

The awareness of Israel, its government and the general public, of the importance of the unwritten alliance with the United States and even of Israel’s dependence on it ensures that no Israeli government will act to harm this alliance, intentionally or unintentionally. And yet, the shift to the right in Israel, and alongside it, deep processes within American society, such as the strengthening of the progressive camp in the Democratic Party, may erode the strength of these close relations and require a special effort on the part of the American and Israeli governments to preserve it. 

Relations between Israel and the United States – Difficult Beginnings

The relationship between Israel and the United States has become over the years one of the cornerstones of Israel’s national security doctrine and is seen as one of Israel’s main sources of strength.

However, it is interesting to discover that in the first decades of Israel’s independence, in the fifties and early sixties, its relations with the United States were characterized by coldness and suspicion. President Harry Truman (1952-1944) supported the partition resolution at the United Nations in 1947 and was the first to recognize the State of Israel shortly after it became independent. However, he did so under the influence of some of his Jewish associates, and contrary to the position held by the Department of Defense and the State Department, which opposed the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, because they believed that it would not be able to withstand the attacks of its Arab neighbors and that it might become a Soviet outpost due to the fact that the majority of its Jewish population originated from Eastern Europe.

Under President David Eisenhower (1952-1960), the United States refrained from selling arms to Israel, provided it with negligible economic aid, and repeatedly pressured it to agree to territorial and other concessions, such as the return of the Palestinian refugees to its territory, in order to bring the Arab-Israeli conflict to an end. During the Suez crisis in 1956, the United States stood up against Israel and against France and Great Britain, who joined forces in this war, and demanded that Israeli forces withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, which they had captured from the Egyptians. In those years, the United States hoped to mobilize Arab support in the struggle against the Soviet Union, and therefore tended to view Israel as an obstacle to Arab friendship with the West. However, many of the Arab countries, led by Nasser’s Egypt and also Syria and Iraq, chose to align themselves with the Soviet Union over the West. And yet, even when it became clear that the Arab countries were turning to Moscow, the American hesitation and reservation concerning the relations with Israel remained unchanged. Thus, Israel’s Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, met President Eisenhower for the first time only in March 1960, near the end of his term in the White House, and even then in a private meeting and not as part of an official visit to the United States. 

The tension between Israel and the United States continued during the administration of President John Kennedy (1960-1963). Kennedy sought to improve Washington’s relations with Egypt and this was seen in Jerusalem as a move that could come at Israel’s expense. The tension in American-Israeli relations was however rooted in the pressure of the Kennedy Administration on Israel not to develop nuclear capabilities. Israel was forced to allow American inspectors to visit the Dimona nuclear reactor and only in the early 1970s the two states reached an understanding, according to which Israel would be allowed to maintain and develop its nuclear capabilities, but would not become nuclear power (i.e. would not conduct nuclear tests and would not declare itself a nuclear power).  

The change in the relationship between Israel and the United States took place during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency (1968-1963) and especially after the Six Day War. The Israeli victory in this war strengthened Israel’s strategic importance, due to its ability to defend itself and to defeat its Arab adversaries, who were Soviet allies. Thus, the Arab-Israeli conflict turned into a part of the ‘cold war’ between the West and the Soviet Union, and the American military establishment started to see Israel as an ally. 

Indeed, it was in the period after the Six Day War, that the foundations of the “special relations” between the United States and Israel were laid and became a central component of Israel’s national security doctrine, based on Israel’s need, as a small country with limited resources, surrounded by hostile neighbors, of an alliance with a superpower that would provide it with economic aid, political support and weapons it needed for its defense. 

The United States supplied Israel with weapons during the October 1973 war and then played a central role in the efforts to bring the Arab-Israeli conflict into its end, for example in the signing of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt in March 1979 and in the 1990s, when it launched an Arab-Israeli peace process  that led to the signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993 between Israel and the Palestinians, and a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan in October 1994. 

The American-Israeli relations have also an economic dimension, since the United States gives Israel economic aid every year in the amount of about 2.5 to 3 billion dollars, and over the years has given it special grants and guarantees in the cumulative amount of tens of billions of dollars – for example after the signing of the peace agreements with Egypt; after the signing of the  Oslo Accords; and after the signing of nuclear deal with Iran in 2015. It should be noted that the United States is Israel’s largest trading partner (after the European Union), and the volume of Israeli export to the US is about a third of Israel’s total export, while the import from the United States is about 18% of all Israeli import.

It should also be noted that the rise of the high-tech industry that began in the late 1990s led to a dramatic increase in the number of Israeli companies (mostly high-tech companies) traded on the New York Stock Exchange to such an extent that they constitute the largest group of foreign stocks there.

Despite tensions that erupted in relations between the two states, the main interest of Israel’s foreign policy since 1967 has been to maintain close relations with the United States and establish bipartisan support for the special relationship between the two states.  Israel was assisted by the pro-Israeli lobby in the United States, AIPAC, which derives its strength from the commitment to Israel of the American Jewry, the second largest Jewish community in the world, which has significant weight and standing in American society and American politics.

Israel therefore attaches great importance to maintaining its special relationship with the Jewish community in the United States. However, during the last two decades, support for Israel grew among evangelical communities in the United States, although such support has provoked a backlash among liberal audiences in the American society.

Looking Ahead

The last decade was marked by several developments and processes that affected and probably will continue to affect the relationship between the two states:

On the one hand, the importance of Israel as an American asset in the Middle East increased significantly – Israel has become a regional power thanks to its economic and military strength. The contribution it provides to the United States, both in the intelligence and Cyber warfare and through the development of security and defense technologies, such as the Iron Dome and Arrow missile systems, strengthen and deepen the security ties between the two states and especially ties between the Israeli and the American military establishments. The operational and intelligence cooperation between the two countries has been proven invaluable in the struggle against terror and radicalism as well in confronting Iran’s ambitions in the region. 

On the other hand, the bond with Israel among parts of the American public and even the Jewish community has weakened – the shift to the right in Israel led to the abandoning of the of two states solution to the conflict with the Palestinians and to the efforts (at least by the Netanyahu government – 2009-2021) to preserve an Israeli presence in the West Bank, and to ensure that it would be possible in the future to annex it to Israel. 

All of these were perceived by the American administration as a development that could undermine regional stability, encourage violence and terror and thereby harm American interests in the Middle East and throughout the Muslim world. As someone who considers itself a close ally of Israel, the American administration also believes that such Israeli policy harms the long-term interests of Israel itself.

In American society, deep processes of a growing rift between liberals and conservatives, alongside the strengthening of the progressive camp within the Democratic Party, are evident. This camp tends to show suspicion and even animosity towards Israel, mainly against the background of its never ending conflict with the Palestinians. However, the shift to the right inside Israeli society and within the Israeli political system, as well as the close alliance forged between the right-wing circles in Israel and the Republican Party, especially during the Trump era, deepened the gap with Israel even among the “mainstream” Democrats. These processes do not spare the Jewish community in the United States either and certainly the young generation. The Jewish community is also affected by the strengthening of the ultra-Orthodox political power within the Israeli political system (the ultra-Orthodox community is hostile to the Reform and Conservative communities that make up the majority of American Jewry).

It is worth noting that the older generation of American politicians who led the American political system in the 1980s and 1990s were influenced by the events of the Holocaust and felt committed to Israel as the state of the Jewish people. These politicians were also influenced by the cold war and tended to see Israel as a Western outpost surrounded by Arab countries, which were Soviet allies. However, the new generation of American politicians is freed from these historical memories and burdens, and therefore their commitment to Israel is not self-evident.

All of this has burst to the surface already during Barack Obama’s presidency (2008-2016). Obama repeatedly expressed his “unshakable” support for Israel, however, at the same time he also showed sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians and tried to promote the vision of “two states for two peoples” based on the 1967 lines. Obama was also determined to reach a nuclear deal with Iran that was perceived by Israel as dangerous. The tension between the two states reached its peak with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to the US Congress in May 2015 in which he challenged, with the support of Republican Party, the president’s policy. 

Relations between Israel and the Trump administration that replaced Obama (2016-2020) flourished, and there will be those who would argue that this happened due to Trump’s efforts to win the support of the Jewish vote in the Presidential elections. Trump was perceived as sympathetic to Israel, as evidenced by his recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (December 2017) and the transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem and the recognition of the Golan Heights as Israeli sovereign territory (on March 2019). In May 2018, the United States also announced its withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran and imposed additional sanctions on its economy. In January 2020 he presented the “deal of the century,” an American peace plan, favorable to Israel,  to bring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to an end.  Finally, the United States played an important role in obtaining the Abraham Accords, the peace agreements signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and later also Morocco and Sudan. This was part of an American effort to promote regional cooperation, and even to form a Middle Eastern NATO, to face common threats to these countries, mainly from Iran.

President Biden, who replaced President Trump, belongs to the older generation of American politicians whose commitment to Israel is deeply rooted. During the years of his tenure, the close relations between the two countries continued and even deepened. The war in Ukraine and the world need for energy resources, mainly gas, have also increased the importance of Israel in the eyes of the Americans. But it must be admitted that in Biden’s party – the Democratic Party – the voices that show suspicion and express criticism and even hostility towards Israel are growing stronger, especially in the progressive camp in the party. As mentioned, the intimate relations between former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump led to the erosion in the bipartisan support for Israel and created a rift between Israel, and at least Netanyahu’s government, and the Democrats. The establishment of a new government in Israel under Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, a “government of change”, somewhat improved the atmosphere, but the possible comeback of a right-wing government in Israel may change this trend back.

And finally, Israel’s importance in the Middle East had to do with the importance of the region in general in the American strategic view, due to its central location on the world map and the dependence of the US on its oil resources. However, in the last decade, the United States seeks to disengage from the region, as its importance in its eyes has decreased, as compared to other regions in the world. This might have repercussions on the importance of Israel in the eyes of the Americans. It seems thus that the Middle East was pushed aside by other regions, such as the Far East, where the United States maintains competition and even rivalry with China, or Eastern Europe (mainly following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine at the beginning of this year). Israel, which sought to walk between the drops and preserve its relations with China, an important economic partner of Israel, as well as with Russia, has often provoked Washington’s irritation for not standing by its side in the rivalry between the United States and these countries.

In conclusion, the relationship between Israel and the United States is deep and based on political and security interests. It still relies on broad support both among the American security and political establishment, and among large segments of the American society and public opinion.

Taking into account the interest that both countries have in preserving and promoting these relations and the benefit they see from these relations, it can be assumed that they will do all they can to preserve and even deepen these relations.

It should be noted that Israel’s great advantage in the eyes of the United States has always been that it does not need American soldiers to fight for it. And thus, the Americans were asked only to help Israel help itself rather than to send troops to help it on the battlefields, as they were required to do in South Vietnam, Korea, and later in Afghanistan and Iraq.

However, an ill-considered Israeli conduct, in the case of a right-wing government coming to power in Israel – such as leaning too much on one side of the American political map or try to annex the West Bank to Israel, or even a deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian conflict, could put a strain on the relations between the two countries. These can meet the deep processes of slow but continuous erosion in the commitment to Israel that is already taking place within serval segments in the American public and thus damage the relations between the two countries.

And yet, as far as can be expected, the special relationship that Israel and the United States are establishing will continue for the foreseeable future as it is a vital interest for Israel and an major  interest for the United States, and both countries recognize this.

L'articolo The future of US-Israel Alliance proviene da InsideOver.

The corona pandemic did not pass over Israel, and like other countries of the world it was hit hard. 4,667,287 Israelis have been infected by the disease (out of a population of approximately 9.2 million) and the number of dead reached 11,710 (as of October 2022).

Along with health consequences, some of which are still unclear (after all, post-corona research is only in its beginnings), the pandemic also had far-reaching economic consequences, since during the first two years of the outbreak of the pandemic, the government in Israel adopted a strict policy of social distancing that included prolonged closures. This led to the paralysis of major sectors of the country’s economy and at the same time damaged the fabric of life, starting with the welfare system, education and higher education and ending with cultural life.

Israel was, however, in a good opening position compared to many other countries in the world, and this gave it an advantage in the fight against the disease. Its population and its government systems are practiced and have experience in dealing with emergency situations, although mostly security ones. In addition, the health system in Israel is considered an advanced system whose services are spread out and accessible to the entire population. All of this allowed Israel to become a pioneer in many aspects of dealing with the pandemic and, above all, performing mass tests to detect the disease, the ability to obtain a reliable and comprehensive picture of the state of morbidity and patients, and finally, a rapid mass vaccination operation of the entire population while monitoring of the results and effectiveness of the vaccinations. Israel was also a pioneer in formulating a policy of exiting the lockdowns in a way that allows the entire population to continue a normal life as much as possible. It is also worth adding that the fact that the population in Israel is relatively young eased the severity of the damage since the disease mainly affected older populations at risk.

However, Israel also had weak points, including the fact that political instability prevailed in it due to frequent election campaigns in those years, which often led to decisions that were based on political considerations rather than factual considerations. In addition, parts of Israeli society, such as the residents of the periphery, the ultra-Orthodox population and the Arab population tended to cooperate less than the general population with state institutions and follow its instructions, and their access to the health systems was also lower. This, alongside the fact that Israel controls the territories of the Palestinian Authority where millions of Palestinians live who are not its citizens but citizens of the Palestinian Authority, and therefore do not enjoy the same accessibility to health services.

After all this, it should be remembered that the disease was found to be deceptive, and thus for example the vaccines produced against it were found to be of limited validity since the body’s immunity weakens within a few months. In addition, new variants of the virus have been found to be resistant to the vaccine. Of course, all of this made it difficult to manage an orderly policy and to provide an intelligent long-term response to the pandemic.

But looking back, it can be stated that the Israeli system reacted quickly, functioned well within the limitations of the limited knowledge the world had about the pandemic, and gave a benevolent response to protect its population and this at the cost of only limited damage to the economy. And so, among the developing countries, Israel leads in all of the aforementioned growth rates recorded by the Israeli economy with the decline of the pandemic.

The outbreak of the Corona pandemic

At the end of December 2019, the corona virus that causes the disease COVID-19 began to spread in China, originating in the Wuhan province in the center of the country. In mid-February 2020, the virus began to spread rapidly throughout the world and soon, on 11 March 2020, it was defined by the World Health Organization as a global pandemic.

In Israel, the first patient was located on 27 February 2020, after he returned from a visit to Italy, and within a few days, the number of those infected by the virus began to climb to dozens and hundreds, and by the end of March 2020, there were already about 10,000 infected people. The first Israeli, an 88-year-old man, died of Corona on 20 March 2020.

Israel responded very quickly to the challenge, and certainly in comparison to many other countries, even though in the first stages of the outbreak of the pandemic, very little was known about it – how an how quickly does it spread? What are its dangers and how deadly is it, and finally, what is the right treatment for it. It should be noted that at this stage there was no vaccine for the pandemic or even a medicine that would relieve or even save the patients.

Israel and the corona – a good starting point 

Israel enjoyed a series of advantages that gave it a good starting point to deal with the dangers of the pandemic:

First, due to the political reality in the Middle East, Israel is actually a sort of isolated island cut off from its surroundings, with almost no entry or exit from the neighboring countries. This, in contrast to, for example, the European Union countries that cannot prevent transit between them and are limited in their ability to control entry or exit within their borders. This of course  facilitated the hermetic closing of the country to tourists, workers and immigrants who were perceived at the time as those who might bring new variants of the virus to Israel. It should be noted, however, that this was not a hermetically sealed and absolute closure of the borders, since Israel allowed holders of Israeli citizenship to return to it and in many cases, for example on humanitarian grounds, also to leave it and return to it later. This, of course, contributed to the spread of the virus and the arrival of new variants, Delta and Omicron, in the country.

Second, the governmental systems in Israel, with an emphasis on the health system, but more generally the population in the country, are used to a quick transition to an emergency situation, in view of the security challenges and even the military conflicts in which the country has repeatedly been subjected. For example, the IDF’s Home Front Command took responsibility for caring for vulnerable populations when lockdowns were imposed in the country and assisted the police in enforcing them. The army also took on the management of the effort to break the chains of infection by asking each infected man about the people with whom he came in contact. Military intelligence directed resources to collect information about the disease and to assist in the analysis of the data about its spread in Israel, and finally, the General Security Service was entrusted by a government decision to monitor isolated and infected people to make sure that they do not violate the isolation instructions they received.

Thirdly, Israel has an efficient public health system and according to many international rankings it is seen as one of the best in the world, in terms of its accessibility and the quality of service it provides to citizens. Next to an array of government hospitals in Israel there are several big health maintenance organizations with a spread of clinics all over the country. According to the law, every citizen must be registered in one of the health organizations. This reality makes it possible to receive reliable information in real time about the health status of all citizens and the spread of diseases and pandemics. This fact made it possible to quickly use the health system for the purpose of transmitting information to the population, in order to carry out tests on a mass scale to detect the virus or to control the state of the disease, and later also made it possible to have a vaccination operation that encompassed the entire population, and of course everyone who was interested in vaccination.

Fourth, Israel’s population is relatively young compared to the population in Western countries. In 2020, the rate of children up to the age of 14 in Israel was about 28%, and in contrast, the rate of people aged 65 and over was about 12% compared to double the rate in many European countries. Studies have revealed that the adult population in Israel is more active compared to other countries in the world, less isolated and cut off from family members, and therefore showed greater immunity to deal with the consequences of the pandemic.

Israel and the corona – the weak points

Alongside all this, it must be remembered that there were also shadows in Israel’s preparation for the fight against the pandemic.

Political instability – Israel fell into a prolonged political crisis at the end of 2018. In the reality of repeated election campaigns, Israel lacked a stable government and this had consequences for some of the decisions it made. Along with the many praises that Prime Minister,  Benjamin Netanyahu, received at the outbreak of the pandemic, for quickly diagnosing the danger and quickly mobilizing to fight it, it was argued against him that in many cases he worked to leverage the pandemic for the purpose of spreading fear among the population in order to mobilize support for him and that he avoided making decisions to impose policies of strict closure among the ultra-Orthodox population so as not to damage the support it gives him.

A health care system that has suffered continuous cuts over the years – in the transition that Israel has experienced in recent decades from a welfare state policy to a market economy has led to continuous damage to the public health and welfare systems. These affected the scope of the medical services and also their accessibility mainly in the peripheral areas. This undoubtedly created a burden on the health care system in the early stages of the pandemic, although there was no collapse and the hospitals were also able to cope with over a thousand seriously ill patients at the height of the disease.

And finally, Israeli society is characterized by heterogeneity based on class, religion and ethnicity. There is a clear gap between the center – the Tel Aviv area – and the periphery in accessibility to health, welfare and education systems. Alongside this, in Israel there are two communities whose integration into the social fabric is partial. One is the ultra-orthodox population, which makes up about 13% of the total population. This population is often of low social status and its birth rates are high, i.e. this is the population living in a particularly high density and this of course had an effect on the spread of the pandemic. In addition, it is characterized by obedience to the rabbis and suspicion towards the state institutions. And so, the enforcement of a policy of closures and social disconnection on the ultra-Orthodox education systems and on religious ceremonies – prayers in synagogues, weddings and funerals, etc. – turned out to be only partial. On the other hand, the religious leadership mobilized to encourage vaccination against the virus, and this was an important contribution to high vaccination rates among this population.

It is also worth noting the Arab population, which makes up about 20% of the total population in Israel. This population also belongs to a low socioeconomic status and in addition lives mostly in villages and towns in the periphery. Of this, the Bedouin population in the south of the country, which makes up about a quarter of the Arab population, partly lives in nomadic settlements that are not connected to electricity and water infrastructure and do not enjoy full access to health services. This population shows great suspicion towards the state institutions. The result is difficulty in maintaining and enforcing a policy of closures and social distancing as well as difficulty in convincing this population to get vaccinated.

Alongside these, we must of course mention the Palestinian population living in the territories of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and under the rule of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. These are close to four million people and maybe more who are not citizens of Israel but are practically under its control as the occupying force in these areas. Israel did not see the Palestinian population as being under its responsibility but under the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas and therefore provided only indirect aid of testing and vaccination kits. It is worth noting that the Palestinian population comes into daily contact with the Israeli population – in the labor market, for example – and therefore the state of the disease among the Palestinian population had an inevitable impact on the state of the pandemic in Israel.

Israel is struggling with Corona

The corona pandemic was characterized by waves of infections that were characterized by the rapid spread of the disease to hundreds and thousands of infected people on a daily basis in the first waves and to over ten thousand infected people a day in the following waves. At the height of the disease in early 2022, when the Omicron virus became dominant, tens of thousands of people were infected every day, although most of them with mild symptoms.

As the familiarity with the disease became better, emphasis was placed on monitoring the number of seriously ill patients in need of treatment and even ventilation in the hospitals and not on the total number of patients, which as mentioned also included a young population, some of whom had no symptoms at all.

The initial response to the first wave – March – April 2020 – Israel responded quickly, and thus was among the first countries in the world, to response to the spread of the Corona disease. With the appearance of the disease in Israel, a policy of banning the entry and exit of non-citizens to Israel was announced, and later on the transfer of the educational systems to distance learning as well as work from home where this was possible. They also gave instructions to maintain social distancing and finally, within about a month, a total lockdown was announced in which the movement of citizens from their homes was restricted. Along with this, a policy of breaking the chains of infection was announced by questioning infected people about those they came in contact with, as well as a strict policy of isolation for infected people or those they came in contact with.

This policy indeed led to a dramatic decrease in morbidity rates and an exit from the lockdowns at the beginning of May 2020, but this was not done in a controlled manner and the result was renewed outbreaks of waves of infection (a second wave in May-July 2020, which culminated in a general closure of the entire country, and the third wave in December-January 2020).

It should be noted that Israel’s efforts to develop a vaccine for the virus on its own through the biological institute subordinate to the Israeli Defense Ministry did not go well as this required knowledge and ability that were beyond Israel’s ability. But an important Israeli contribution was an analysis of the available information found in the health systems in Israel about the trends and characteristics of the behavior of the virus that allowed Israeli scientists to make an important contribution in this field to scientific research in the world.

Vaccination of the population – With the development of vaccines for Corona by a series of pharmaceutical companies and receiving emergency approval for its distribution at the end of 2020, Israel quickly prepared to vaccinate the entire population starting in December 2020.

Quick action by the Israeli government while taking advantage of the country’s advantages and strengths – the fact that it is a relatively small population that has access to health services, made it possible to present a quick and reliable picture of the results of the vaccination. This fact made it possible to turn Israel into an attractive experimental laboratory for the companies developing the vaccines, and because of this Pfizer, for example, was willing to give Israel priority in the supply of vaccines, which made it possible to vaccinate the population with a full vaccine (two vaccines as required according to Pfizer’s medical specifications).

The rapid vaccination operation, within the framework of which about 60% of the country’s population were vaccinated within six months (and with the exception of their young people, no vaccination has yet been offered, this was even a much higher rate), made it possible to formulate a policy that allows the recovered and the vaccinated to fully return to their daily routine – on the basis of presenting a certificate of recovery from the disease or vaccination. And so, Israel also became a pioneer in returning to normality in the shadow of the disease for this population of those who are recovering and vaccinated. The data provided by Israel unequivocally proved the effectiveness of the vaccines, their contribution to improving the body’s ability to defend itself in case of illness, but also the decrease over time in the effectiveness of the vaccine.

As mentioned, the corona was proven to be a deceptive disease because it soon became clear that the vaccine weakened after a few months and apart from that, new alpha, delta and Omicron variants were discovered that the vaccines turned out to be less effective against and that thus even infected or vaccinated people were infected once again.

Indeed, in June 2021, although about half of the country’s population was already vaccinated, there was a renewed increase in cases of infection, most of which originated from Israelis who returned from other countries and were infected with the delta strain of the virus that became dominant in the world and in Israel. And so, the fourth wave of the corona pandemic began in Israel, yet it was a virus whose impact on patients was easier. In July 2021 Israel was the first country in the world to vaccinate its citizens with a third vaccine (booster vaccine).

“Living alongside the pandemic” – but this time the government decided on a policy change under the title of “living alongside the pandemic”. The leading principle of the strategy states that contagion must be suppressed with minimal damage to the economy. Thus, the examination of the severity of the pandemic will not be done according to the number of patients but according to the burden on the health systems and the number of seriously ill patients and even those on ventilators.

And yet, at the beginning of September 2021, Israel was the country with the highest number of verified people in the world in relation to the size of the population. But on the other hand, life continued as usual and economic life began to recover.

A fifth wave began at the end of 2021 – in the months of November – December with the appearance of the Omicron strain. Although the government imposed a ban on entry and exit to Israel and encouraged work from home in the private sector, it avoided imposing a lockdown. In addition, it decided in January 2022 to give a fourth vaccine to the entire population. The sixth wave – in June 2022, morbidity began to increase again, mainly due to the spread of the 5.BA variant, but this did not receive any attention, as it turned out that, as a rule, its damage is mild in those who are vaccinated. In September 2022, Israel began to vaccinate the population with a vaccine against the Omicron.

In all of the above regarding the vaccination of the population of Israel against Corona, as of October 2022, 6,718,301 received at least one dose, of which 1,643,280 received two doses, 3,661,649 received 3 vaccine doses, and 849,358 received 4 vaccine doses (out of a total population of 9.2 m.)

It is worth noting that many avoided receiving the vaccines both because the delta and omicron strains turned out to be easier and because Israel’s population is mostly young anyway and the vaccines for children under 16 were developed and put into use after the pandemic had already passed its peak and therefore the rate of vaccination among the young population was relatively low.

It should also be noted that the response of the population knew ups and downs, in the beginning mobilization was evident, but as time passed, fatigue was evident and also the feeling that the pandemic is not so terrible since it affects adults. This had the effect of decreasing vaccination rates. It should also be noted that the effect of the vaccine opponents was marginal.

Israel’s economy and the corona virus

The pandemic also had economic consequences, since in order to slow down the rate of its spread, a policy of social distancing and closures was decided which resulted in the paralysis of economic life. The government in Israel  initiated a wide range of aid programs for those affected by the economic damage of the corona virus.

At the peak of the corona virus, the level of unemployment that was on the eve of the outbreak of the crisis increased from 3-4% to about 10%, but in practice about a quarter of employees were forced to go on temporary leave or were affected by the scope of the job and salary. But the recovery was quick. The extent of unemployment decreased starting at the beginning of 2022 to about 3%, even less than its pre-covid rate of 2.2%, the GDP per capita decreased by 3.9%, recorded a rapid recovery compared to all the developed countries of the world and recorded an increase of 8% in 2021 and a rate of approximately 7% in 2022.

In conclusion, during the waves of the Corona pandemic, 11,710 Israelis died and about four and a half million were infected. It goes without saying that research into the long-term damage of the disease, post-Corona, is still in its infancy and it is therefore premature to assess the long-term consequences of this number of patients on society and the country.

However, this is a relatively low number of casualties compared to countries like the USA where over a million people died (out of a population of about 330 million) Italy where over 177 thousand people died out of a population of about sixty million or Germany where about 150 thousand people died out of a population of 83 million.

In general, it can be stated that society and the government systems in Israel were able to successfully deal with the pandemic and its consequences, to respond as quickly and effectively as possible, in view of the limits of knowledge about the disease, and to reduce as much as possible its effects.

The robustness of the state’s systems, their points of strength and their experience helped the Israeli leadership make effective decisions. The rapid economic recovery from the pandemic and the return to normality are proof of this

Israel – as a society and as a country – was therefore able to successfully meet the challenge of the corona virus.

L'articolo Israel and the fight against Covid-19: a model for the world? proviene da InsideOver.

Lebanon has become a failed state in recent years. It is in a continuous political paralysis that prevents the formation of a functioning government and this reality has contributed to the deterioration of the country into a severe economic crisis the likes of which Lebanon has not known since the end of the bloody civil war at the end of the last century.

A Failed State

As a failed state, Lebanon lacks weight and importance because even decision making as for its own future is not in its hands. In fact, it has become another arena of conflict, one of many, between rival regional forces, whether a conflict between Iran, which supports the Hezbollah organization, and Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries, which provide support to the members of the Sunni community in the country, or whether an Israeli-Iranian conflict in which the Hezbollah organization serves as a representative and protector Tehran’s interests on the shores of the Mediterranean.

Israel is aware of the weakness of the Lebanese state and does not see it as an entity capable of independent decision-making. In this context, it should be remembered that in recent decades, Israel’s regional policy has been based on four foundations:

The first, the preservation of regional stability, peace and calm, and certainly in the area around Israel and ensuring peace along its borders.

The second, an attempt to promote a peace process towards the Arab world based on normalized relations between Israel and the Arabs.

The third, an attempt to keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at a standstill, in terms of maintaining the status quo while managing the conflict and not necessarily an effort to resolve it. Preserving the status quo means preventing a deterioration into violence and escalation, but at the same time also avoiding progress towards a solution that involves territorial concessions on the part of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

And finally the fourth, an attempt to curb Iran’s attempts to achieve regional hegemony in the Middle East and more importantly, an attempt to curb the Iranian race to nuclear power.

With such evidence, the importance of the countries of the first circle surrounding Israel, led by Egypt and Jordan, to maintain peace and calm is clear, as is the importance of the Gulf countries, such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which are a cornerstone in Israel’s efforts to strengthen the strategic cooperation between the countries of the region against Iran.

Against this background, it will be understood why Israel’s focus is not on harnessing Lebanon so that it contributes to the advancement of Israel’s interests, but rather on denying the ability of Lebanon, and especially the Hezbollah organization, which is a significant and decisive player within the Lebanese system to harm These Israeli interests.

And so, if in the fifties and sixties of the last century Israel saw Lebanon, which was then under Maronite hegemony, as a possible ally for making peace; in the 1970s, after the PLO established a presence on Lebanese soil and even turned this country into a base for military activities against Israel, the latter focused its efforts on neutralizing the threat posed by the PLO from the territory of Lebanon. Today, Hezbollah is setting the tone in the country, and certainly in matters of calm or confrontation. This, due to the military power he built for himself with the help of Iran. For example, he has close to 150,000 surface-to-surface missiles, several hundred of which are long-range precision missiles that cover the entire territory of Israel. He also maintains considerable political influence in the country and, with allies from the Shia community – such as Amal movement – and others, has the right to veto the decisions made by state institutions.

The Hezbollah Influence

In Israel there is a debate about whether there is sense and logic in separating the Lebanese state – the Lebanese army, the government and the political system in the country – and the Hezbollah organization. Such a distinction is a cornerstone of the American policy towards Lebanon which holds that strengthening the Lebanese state will one day enable it to deal with Hezbollah.

But Israel maintains that Hezbollah is the decider in any case, even if it is attentive to the opinion of the Shiite and Lebanese public, and certainly do not want to bring a war on them. These are indeed a restraining factor in the organization’s decision-making, but on the other hand it does not listen to the Lebanese army or its government, and acts according to its interests and those of its ally Iran.

Therefore, Israel perceives the Lebanese state as a weak and even hollow entity, irrelevant to questions of peace and war. Instead, Israel focuses on establishing a deterrent capability against Hezbollah, with the help of which it hopes to ensure peace along the border between the two countries.

Alongside this, over the past decade, Israel has been conducting a secret campaign (a campaign between the wars) against Hezbollah, designed to harm its arming efforts – hitting Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah while they are in Syrian territory, as well as an effort to stop the missile precision project (turning missiles in Hezbollah’s hands into missiles capable of striking Precise).

It is clear to Israel that Hezbollah does not necessarily stand on its own, since it proves itself to be a link in the axis of resistance, or in the words of Israel and the US, the axis of evil, which is led by Iran and in which Syria and the Hamas organization are also members. Therefore, Israel takes into account that a confrontation with it may have an impact on what is happening in Syria and in Iraq and against Iran and vice versa.

In conclusion, the Israeli view of Lebanon is narrow – through the prism of the threat of missiles and terror posed by Hezbollah, and in any case, through the prism of the desire to neutralize this threat. However, Israel is attentive to what is happening in Lebanon and takes into account that the Lebanese public, certainly the Shiites, as well as the institutions of the Lebanese state can help restrain Hezbollah. The fact that Hezbollah is becoming more and more identified with the state, due to the ability to influence what is happening in it – politically and not just militarily – makes it more and more attentive to the moods in the country.

All this was reflected in the comprehensive negotiations conducted by the two countries with American mediation on the question of marking the maritime boundary line between the two states. An agreement on this question may allow Lebanon to extract gas from the gas fields off its shores and thus help it get out of its economic predicament. But due to the political paralysis that prevails in Lebanon, it is difficult to reach to the agreement, and Hezbollah is taking advantage of the impasse to unleash far-reaching threats of war, if an agreement is not reached according to the equation – that if Lebanon does not utilize its resources, Israel will not be able to utilize its own resources either.

Yes, in Israel’s view, Hezbollah is Lebanon, and it therefore is focusing its attention on it. Thus, the only relevant question that preoccupies it vis-a-vis Lebanon is how it is possible to maintain peace along the border, to curtail the capabilities of the Hezbollah organization, and to prevent Iran from strengthening its influence there.

L'articolo Lebanon in Israel’s Middle East Strategy proviene da InsideOver.

The Eastern Mediterranean has witnessed a relative calm this year in contrast to last year’s dangerous escalation spiral that almost set off a geopolitical maelstrom involving parts of Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. But is the current calm just a temporary lull?  Has a stable balance of power been established to create a new equilibrium? Or, has escalation been continuing by other means and the geopolitical storm will break out again in 2022? Here are some of the key factors to consider when looking over the horizon to determine the state of Mediterranean maritime security in the near future.

The 2020 Eastern Mediterranean Crisis was a Turning Point Event

Back in August 2020, the most combustible naval stand-off between Greece and Turkey during the 21st century nearly ignited into open conflict when a Turkish warship and a Greek warship collided at the height of the tensions. Rallying to Greece’s side, France dispatched warships to the contested waters, eventually sending its flagship Charles de Gaulle nuclear aircraft carrier. Egypt conducted joint naval exercises with Greece while the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Ankara’s staunch antagonist along the Mediterranean’s southern rim, sent its F-16 fighter jets to conduct joint air force exercises with Greece in the air space above the conflict zone.  With France, Egypt, and the UAE already in open conflict with Turkey in Libya, international alarm bells sounded that any further escalation could lead to a Mediterranean-wide conflagration.  Although a NATO-brokered de-confliction process achieved a climbdown in tensions, neither side has been idle. Swiftly changing geopolitical currents in the region have created new strategic conditions whose implications need to be examined.

Greece’s New Strategic Depth

In the absence of a convincing security guarantee from its European partners, Greece has spent the last half decade skilfully developing its defence relations with Egypt and Israel, and then subsequently with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.  Athens’ efforts are paying off big.  Combined with engaging select EU members, notably France, Greece is building an effective deterrent capability outside European Union and NATO frameworks. Since the striking demonstration of Middle Eastern solidarity with Greece during its August 2020 naval confrontation with Turkey, Greece’s regional security partnerships have reached an even greater level of strategic cooperation.

The 15 September 2020 signing of the ‘Abraham Accords’ normalising relations between the UAE and Israel was a strategic boon for Greece by more deeply connecting its circle of security partnerships broadly aligned to offset the expansion of Turkey’s “coercive diplomacy” in the region. On 18 November 2020, Greece and the UAE signed a security pact that included an Article V-type mutual defence clause.  In 2021, the juggernaut of Greece’s military diplomacy has gathered even more steam. In January of this year,  Israel signed a $1.68 billion, 20-year agreement with Greece – the largest defence deal between the two countries – in which Israel’s private defence company Elbit Systems will establish and maintain an air combat training facility in Greece for the Hellenic Air Force.  Italy’s defence manufacturing giant Leonardo will supply the M-346 advanced jet trainers. The state-of-the-art air combat training academy builds upon Greece’s 2020 agreement with France to purchase at least 18 fourth generation Rafale fighter jets for $2.5 billion, all helping to close the gap in air combat capabilities between Turkey and Greece.  By late September 2021, Paris and Athens signed a new bilateral mutual defense pact between Paris and Athens, accompanied by Greece’s $5 billion purchase of three Belharra frigates and three Gowind corvettes from France.

These relationships provide Greece with much needed strategic depth – geographically, technically, and psychologically. Bolstered by the early stages of an economic recovery, Greece is no longer Europe’s troubled and dependent appendage on the Balkan peninsula, as many in the European Union attempted to portray Greece during the EU’s sovereign debt crisis.  Greece is realising itself as an Eastern Mediterranean power leveraging its strategic links to North Africa and the Middle East.  Greece’s new found strategic depth continues to expand with the Hellenic Republic’s deepening military relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which began its first bilateral military exercise with Greece, Eye of the Falcon 1, in March 2021. Demonstrating the power of its new regional status, Greece hosted the September 2021 “Hercules 21′ exercises – the first multilateral joint military exercise between Greece, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

Turkey’s Becomes a Blue Water Power

Greece’s recent efforts to gain strategic depth were prompted by Turkey’s impressive advances to become a blue water power. Turkey’s efforts to expand its power projection capabilities in the Mediterranean started two decades ago with Ankara’s $3 billion ‘National Warship’ program, known by its Turkish acronym MİLGEM, to expand Turkey’s capacity to deploy naval forces far from its coastal waters. In March 2012, a decade into the MİLGEM program, then Turkish Navy Commander Admiral Murat Bilgel declared Turkey’s naval objective was “to operate not only in the littorals but also on the high seas,” identifying the Turkish Navy’s goals for the coming decade as “enhancing sea denial, forward presence, and limited power projection capacity.”  Supported by the rapid growth of its domestic defence industry, Turkey successfully implemented its strategic agenda to establish forward bases in the Middle East and North Africa region.

The turning point in this policy came with Turkey’s 2020 military intervention to preserve the Government of National Accord then ruling western Libya.  Ankara’s first intervention far from its land borders and shoreline was an unqualified success and created an important strategic beachhead for Turkey in the central Mediterranean.  Turkey maintains an air power deployment at the re-captured al-Watiyah air base, located 27 km from the Tunisian border, and is reported to be developing a naval base in Libya’s coastal city of Misrata.  Its first Mediterranean forward basing beyond North Cyprus, Turkey’s outsized military presence in Libya is nothing short of a strategic breakthrough, enabling Turkey to move beyond the efforts to contain its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Libyan intervention also showcased the power of Turkey’s home-grown combat drone and electronic warfare technology that would be later used by Ankara to assist Azerbaijan in the Autumn 2020 Karabakh war that ended 30 years of stalemate against Armenia and changed the map of the South Caucasus.  Turkey’s continued advances in drone warfare technology are changing the face of warfare in the Mediterranean and could upend the military deterrence for which Greece has been striving, especially as Turkish-made, unmanned surface and underwater combat vessels come into service.  Changing the Mediterranean’s strategic equation in 2022 is Turkey’s soon-to-be-operational, light aircraft carrier the TCG Anadolu – a landing helicopter dock based on the Spanish Navy’s Juan Carlos I-class design. The TCG Anadolu will be able to carry a formidable arsenal Turkish combat drones to any location in the Mediterranean theatre. As an amphibious assault ship, it will be able to transport a 1,000 troop battalion along with 150 vehicles, including battle tanks, for a marine troop landing. A blue-water power projection vessel par excellence, the TCG Anadolu will considerably augment Turkey’s efforts to set the strategic agenda in the Mediterranean.

Equilibrium of Escalation in 2022? Cyprus could be the Key

Greece’s deeper level of defense cooperation with its non-European partners also prompted Ankara to engage in serious diplomatic outreach to Egypt and Israel and then to the UAE and Saudi Arabia as a counter-balancing measure.  During 2021, Turkey has acted on its need to recalibrate its policy toward its Levantine and Gulf state neighbors to ease its isolation. This diplomatic opening creates the opportunity to increase commercial cooperation among the regional stakeholders that could act as a brake on renewed naval escalation in the future. While there is at least a temporary balance of power, such an opportunity should not be missed.

With its interlinked flashpoints, there is little reason to think that a stable equilibrium has been achieved in the Eastern Mediterranean. None of the underlying core issues has been resolved.  The most vulnerable point in the current security architecture is Cyprus.  A member of the European Union but not NATO, Cyprus was under military embargo by the United States until 2020 and consequently has insufficient naval capabilities to defend itself. Turkey maintains over 30,000 troops on the north side of the island and has established base for its combat drones in the self-declared Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. In 2021, Turkey upped its ante on the issue by formally declaring that North Cyprus should be internationally recognized as an independent state.  If a new cycle of naval escalation does break out in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2022, Cyprus is likely to be in the eye of the storm.

L'articolo Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Security in 2022 – Equilibrium or Escalation? proviene da InsideOver.

Israel is experiencing a very particular time in its history. After 12 years, Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership is seriously being questioned, opening up the possibility of a government of change. Politics is intersecting with increasingly obvious signs of identity conflicts and challenges to relations between different groups. To get a better understanding we interviewed Gabriele Segre, Director of the Vittorio Dan Segre Foundation, based in Lugano, which aims to examine and promote a culture of coexistence between different identities.

With the upsurge of the Gaza conflict over recent weeks, coexistence both inside and outside Israel seems like an impossible undertaking…

Coexistence seemed impossible before and still is today. What happened was a huge wake-up call. However, those who are watchful of the dynamics of this area, going beyond everyday life, understand there is nothing new. We need to distinguish two levels of conflict: from an identity point of view and from that of coexistence. The first concerns the conflicts with Gaza and the Hamas missiles. It is a well-known topic at an international level and a widely dividing issue between Israelis and Palestinians. The second, on which few have focused their attention, is the most painful and divisive element. I am referring to the violence with and within Arab communities living in Israel, of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship as they define themselves. The level of division and the level of conflict we have seen are nothing new. There is a clear problem of coexistence. Christian and Muslim Arabs do not enjoy the full rights enjoyed by Jewish citizens, and this is a fundamental element to be taken into consideration if we want to understand what is happening.

Could you explain this better please…

Israel was built as an identity state, therefore in terms of rights the Jewish identity is considered predominant, prevailing and having priority. Until we do not understand this and we continue to think that Israel is based on full democratic rights, we will not understand what is happening here. I am not criticizing Israel’s democracy. I am simply presenting a problem which too often remains marginal. It is a conceptual and factual dilemma: is it possible for a State to be a full democracy and at the same time an identity state? The answer is no. Because a fully democratic State is characterized not by equality, but rather by the determination to achieve equality. The ability of democracies is to evolve according to the challenges they are faced with. Inequality and disparity are part of the construct of democracy. However, the difference between societies which work towards achieving a full democracy and other societies, is the fact that the former recognize the social and cultural limits expressed by that democracy and work to overcome them, renewing and innovating the democratic construct itself.

In what way?

If we are convinced that one identity is superior to the others and that it should remain so, which is the case in Israel with the Jewish identity (without wanting to discuss its legitimacy here), we are confronted with a conceptual limit of democracy’s ability to renew itself and evolve: there can never be a complete democracy because the value of identity will always be higher than that of democratic renewal. This may be legitimate however we need to realize this impossibility exists. We must overcome the hypocrisy that a state can be based on identity and at the same time be fully democratic. We need to make a choice which will come at a cost. We must start by being completely aware of the reality of the situation, and the reality is that in Israel different identities do not have equal dignity at a formal and substantial level.

This is true, on paper. Will it be possible for Israel to make this paradigm shift?

As things stand, conditions will not allow it, because the level of mutual trust between identities has been broken and continues to be worn down, also due to recent conflicts. The conditions are lacking in terms of culture, education and values. We are far from giving full recognition and respect to other people’s identities.

These attempts must be carried out on both sides. How can contact be made with the Palestinian side in order to lay the foundations to build a truly sound coexistence?

You say we need to work on both sides. However, this is only one of the levels where coexistence is missing. A culture of coexistence is also lacking within the Israeli community, between Israeli Arabs and Jews. We must avoid simplifying it by discussing only about Israelis and Palestinians because we risk creating a simplistic division of what is a much more complex reality, not just one-dimensional. There are different levels of problems as well as multiple perspectives. We should start by acquiring a profound understanding of identities. The reasons why violence has erupted within the community are not solely due to religious problems or of identity, but also because of social issues for example. And all this creates even greater divisions. What level of understanding should we be working on? Not just one but all of them. We must act on multiple levels, otherwise no intervention will be effective.

L'articolo Israel put to the test of coexistence proviene da InsideOver.

Reportage / Religion 22.03.2021

The Church and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Read the original version The Pope’s bold visit to Iraq prompts recollections of my attempts, over the years, to encourage European Christians to play a larger role in the effort to break the political deadlock of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and…

Abraham B. Yehoshua

The Israeli-Palestinian question is one of the longest and most stubborn conflicts since the First World War, despite the many attempts by powerful forces to resolve it. The numerous reasons for the impasse are beyond the scope of this article, but I do want to note that as opposed to territorial conflicts elsewhere, this one involves the entire territory and not just a part of it. In addition to the maximalist territorialism of both sides, underlying the Jewish-Palestinian conflict is the dangerous obstacle of the Old City of Jerusalem. The breathtaking plateau of the Al-Aqsa mosque and Dome of the Rock, considered the third most important religious site in the Muslim world, is built upon the ruins of the Jewish Temple that was destroyed in the year 70 AD.  

The Pope’s visit to Iraq is also significant in that it reminds the wider world that the Arab world is not homogenously Muslim, but includes Arab believers in Christianity.  In the past, if to a lesser degree today, Palestinian intellectuals and other elites were often adherents of Christianity.  Some Palestinian Christians were actively opposed to Zionism, while others, mainly members of the Palestinian communist party, recognized the legitimacy of the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947 that granted the Jews the right to establish a state in part of Palestine, because the Soviet Union had supported the plan. Christianity was born in the land of Israel.  Evidence of its origins in Judaism is apparent not only in the New Testament, but in the presence, throughout this land of my birth, the core of my identity as an Israeli (my family has lived here for six generations), of churches that have always been a source of pride for me and people like me. These Christian sites underscore the cultural, artistic and spiritual pluralism of this small territory that is home to Jews from all over the world.  Moreover, some of the Palestinians living among and beside us are distant descendants of Jews who refused to go into exile after the destruction of the Second Temple and the loss of Jewish independence, and in order to remain loyal to the homeland, they converted to Christianity and later also to Islam.

Christians, especially European Catholics, have a role to play in bringing peace between Israelis and Palestinians, not least regarding the sensitive subject of the holy places in Jerusalem.  The Catholics, responsible in the past for much of the injustice and persecution suffered by European Jews, should take the lead as partners and peacemakers in the creation of a Holy Basin for three faiths, as a means of facilitating Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation.

L'articolo The Church and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict proviene da InsideOver.

Don’t be fooled by public flattery: US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are not, by any means, friends. Biden has expressed pro-Israeli opinions throughout his long and illustrious career. This is unlikely to change just as he enters the oval office, at the tender age of 78.

Yet two personas cast a long shadow over Biden’s evolving relationship with the Israeli premier, who is in the midst of a fourth round of elections in just over two years. One is Donald Trump; the other – Barack Obama.

The Close Trump-Netanyahu Relationship

Trump, whose quick exit from the international stage remains quite shocking, was genuinely close with Netanyahu. Trump was also surrounded by Jewish advisors and relatives, most of them deeply aligned with the Israeli right-wing. Netanyahu and his close advisors, former Israeli Ambassador in Washington DC Ron Dermer and Mossad Chief Yossi Cohen, easily found a way to communicate with the president and influence his decisions.

For the Israeli right wingers, Trump’s single term had been a dream come true. He was a four year Santa Claus, a gift that kept on giving.

An American withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran? Check. Moving the U.S. embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, as previous administrations had constantly promised but failed to do? Check. Recognizing Israeli sovereignty the Golan Heights? Check. Allowing former Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard to return home to Israel? Check. Pushing peace or normalization agreements between Israel and four Arab Countries? Check, check, check.

Netanyahu rewarded the president with constant groveling, Trump’s favorite way of doing business. The Israeli government had even announced the building of a new settlement in the Golan called Trump Heights. It was, unsurprisingly, an empty gesture. The settlement was never built. All that remains of it — like the Soviet Potemkin villages — is a deserted billboard, some of its letters torn down by angry opponents of the prime minister.

Netanyahu also stated that Israel had never had a friend as good as Trump in the White House. However, Netanyahu failed in delivering Trump’s most important need – a political change among US Jews. Most American Jews remained staunch Democrats, openly despising the Republican president and voting against him last November.

Political Division in Israel

Trump was the most divisive figure in the history of US politics and after the presidential elections Netanyahu remained on the wrong side of that great divide. This had come in addition to long years of animosity between the Israeli prime minister and the Democrats. The party leadership had disliked him since the mid-90s, when he rose to power shortly after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, whom President Bill Clinton had considered a close personal friend.

The relationship then became even more strained when Netanyahu was re-elected in early 2009, after ten years in the political wilderness, just as Obama became president. When the two first met, Netanyahu insisted on giving the young American president a short lesson on the history of the Middle East in front of the media cameras. Evidently, it was an insult Obama had taken note of. Later on, the Israeli premier intentionally eroded the basis of the bipartisan support for Israel in Congress, as he systematically sided with the Republicans.

Things arrived at an almost expected showdown as Netanyahu spoke in Congress in September 2015, shortly after the JCPOA — the nuclear agreement with Iran — had been signed. The PM received multiple standing ovations from Republican senators and members of the house. Netanyahu didn’t succeed, however, in persuading Congress to cancel the agreement, yet Democrats never forgave or forgot. As for the Israeli prime minister, he still sees that speech as his greatest historical moment: he stood up and defended Israeli interests publicly, even if the world’s greatest power didn’t like it one bit.

Netanyahu’s American Dilemma

Netanyahu’s main problem right now is that the new administration has been heavily populated with former Obama advisors and officials, led by President Biden himself. The new US envoy, appointed to lead the soon-to-be resumed negotiations with Iran, is Robert Malley, an Obama administration veteran who some Netanyahu advisors consider to be “too soft on Iran”. The fear in Jerusalem is that the Obama veterans remain obligated to the former president’s legacy and would rush to reaffirm what Obama saw as the crown jewel of his foreign policy in the region.

Netanyahu’s approach to the problem has been clear from the beginning. On January 20, as Biden was sworn-in in Washington, an Israeli TV channel quoted a “senior source in Jerusalem” claiming that “if Biden sticks to the Obama template, we will have nothing to talk about with him.” A week later, Israeli army Chief of Staff, Lt.-General Aviv Kochavy, gave a rather rare speech at a think tank, the Institute for National Security.

Kochavy directly advised the US not to sign a “slightly improved” agreement with Iran, warning that this would not prevent the danger of Tehran acquiring a nuclear weapon in the future and greatly endanger Israel’s strategic interest. He also found it necessary to tell the Israeli public that he had ordered the IDF to update its operational plans against Iran’s nuclear facilities. The military option, long forgotten, is apparently discussed again, though the chances of such a scenario materializing against deep American objections seem to be extremely low. The Chief of Staff’s remarks created a short political storm in Israel, considering both the delicate timing and the fact that the United States gives Israel $3.8 billion dollars annually, as defense support.

It’s Not Just About Iran

Netanyahu’s disagreements with the new administration aren’t necessarily limited to Iran, either.

Trump’s heavily Israeli influenced “deal of the century” with the Palestinians is clearly off the table, but what would replace it? It is evident that the Biden White House wouldn’t see the Palestinian conflict as top priority. Yet, one could assume that the new administration would not automatically side with Israel in every debate, like its predecessor did.

Later on, Netanyahu may expect rising tensions on settlement expansion in the West Bank, an issue Trump has deliberately ignored for the last four years. On the Syrian-Lebanese front it is assumed that Israel will continue its “Campaign between Wars”, attacking Iranian and Hezbollah convoys and bases. The question is whether the Biden administration will provide full support or express growing reservations, as US-Iran negotiations resume and the develop.

Israel will remain a close ally of the United States. It will also continue to be viewed in Washington as a great strategic asset in the Middle East. Yet it is becoming rather clear that Netanyahu is about to experience a period of tough love in his relationship with our most strategically important friend.

L'articolo Spotlight on US-Israel Relations: What’s Next? proviene da InsideOver.

Israel is about to break a world record. By Sunday morning, January 3, more than 1 million Israelis had been vaccinated against COVID-19, about 12% of the country’s population.

While Israel, like many other western countries, has failed quite miserably at containing the virus’s spread, it is much better suited to the current challenge – quickly completing vaccination of its most vulnerable population, about 2 million over-60 year olds along with citizens suffering from comorbidities. Within another week, most of these people would have received the first round of vaccine. As a result, the number of deaths and severe cases of illness is expected to diminish pretty quickly.

COVID-19 Exposes National Weaknesses – and Strengths

All over the world, the disease has acted like an X-ray, exposing each country’s weaknesses. For Israel, it was mainly lack of long-term planning, leadership and self-discipline. As I’ve noted here before at InsideOver, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s legal woes have made the situation even worse.

Netanyahu, who will soon be facing a fourth round of elections in two years, remains absolutely at the mercy of his political allies. Since he desperately needs their support in his efforts to stop the judiciary from moving ahead with his criminal trial, he depends on the Ultra-Orthodox parties and therefore cannot allow himself to frustrate them.

This is why Netanyahu didn’t force much-needed public health limitations on Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox communities, where the virus had been allowed to run wild. The result? The country is now in the midst of a third general lockdown, with all Israelis paying the price for the negligence among specific communities.

Israel’s Vaccine Advantage

Yet vaccinations are practically Israel’s thing. The country’s origins, as a mostly socialist state, are actually quite helpful this time. David Ben-Gurion and his partners left us with a reliable, efficient, healthcare system which registers every Israeli with government-linked insurance agencies. Those agencies, along with the hospitals, are very effective at delivering vaccinations and collecting data about the national operation.

The Israeli public is extremely positive towards all vaccinations. What’s more, the country is small and it doesn’t take more than a few hours to deliver vaccines to every town and village.

Political Implications for Netanyahu

Netanyahu has already promised Israeli citizens that their country will be the first in the world to overcome the coronavirus. This time he may be right. If Pfizer and Moderna fulfill their commitments and provide Israel with more vaccines during the next month, over half the Israeli population may be vaccinated by early March. This is especially crucial to Netanyahu’s party, Likud’s, campaign.

Netanyahu’s whole campaign relies on the narrative: I’m bringing you the vaccines and saving you from the virus and our economy will quickly recover, much earlier than everybody else. Many voters will buy into this logic, in spite of his failures handling the pandemic. Netanyahu can also present the public with his recent diplomatic achievements, signing normalization agreements with three Arab countries (United Arab Emirates, Bahrein and Morocco), possibly a fourth (Sudan), and maybe, maybe even a fifth (Saudi Arabia).

However, the prime minister remains a deeply divisive persona. Slightly over a half of all Israelis regard him as a persona non grata according to recent public opinion polls. A new, enthusiastic, protest movement has also led to demonstrations demanding his resignation all over the country, a few times every week since the beginning of the pandemic. Protesters accuse Netanyahu of corruption and justifiably point out that his refusal to face trial has led Israel into a long and unprecedented political and economic crisis (the PM also refuses to pass a budget).

Gideon Sa’ar — formerly a senior Likud minister — recently left the party, challenged Netanyahu’s leadership and established a new party, unsurprisingly called “New Hope”. The animosity between Netanyahu and six different leaders of other parties, most of them former partners, may just prevent the PM from establishing a new coalition after the elections.

Netanyahu Shouldn’t be Counted Out Yet

On the other hand, we shouldn’t ignore the prime minister’s knack for exhausting and destroying all political opposition. Netanyahu has ruled Israel for almost twelve consecutive years, following a short and unsuccessful term for three years in the late 1990’s.

Last March he used the pandemic as a pretext to lure his main opponent, former army chief of staff Benny Gantz from the newly established Blue and White party, into joining an emergency national-unity government. Less than a year later, Gantz is a washed-out political has-been, his party shattered into pieces. It remains doubtful whether Gantz will even run in the next elections.

Netanyahu, it turns out, never meant to respect his commitments of working together and allowing Gantz to replace him as prime minister this November. He was only playing for time, waiting for a better opportunity. In less than three months, we will know if he, uncharacteristically, grossly miscalculated.

All of this may sound slightly similar to many Israelis’ perception of Italy in the 1980s and the 90s — a long national malaise, corrupt politicians and an endless cycle of collapsing governments and frequent elections. As one of Israel’s most capable politicians recently told me, all this comes with a significant distinction from Italy that makes Israel’s political situation different.

“Our coffee, ice cream and football teams were never that good”, he gloomily admitted.

L'articolo Israel and COVID proviene da InsideOver.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has appointed a new head of the Mossad foreign intelligence service. The previous deputy “D.” will take over as leader from current head Yossi Cohen. Cohen took office in early 2016 and is reportedly leaving in the summer of 2021.

Cohen’s Tenure as Mossad Chief

Netanyahu first appointed Cohen as Israel’s National Security Advisor in 2013, a role in which Cohen demonstrated his diplomatic skills. Cohen, whom former colleagues described as “sensitive, personable and highly charismatic,” from then on also served as his premier’s special envoy in, particularly precarious situations. At a time when the crisis with Israel’s most important ally on the question of the Iranian nuclear program was escalating, and anger over Netanyahu in Washington was growing steadily, Cohen became an essential mediator who continued to enjoy prestige and found open ears on both sides of the Atlantic.

Who is Cohen’s Successor?

The full name of Cohen’s successor, “D.” has not yet been released for security reasons. According to Netanyahu’s office, however, Cohen’s successor is a long-time Mossad agent and is also believed to have served in an elite Israeli Defense Forces reconnaissance unit.

The new director allegedly also served in a wide variety of Mossad divisions, including as head of the Tsomet division that recruits spies and also as deputy head of Israel’s Keshet electronic surveillance division. Former Mossad chief Danny Yatom, and former Mossad deputy chief, Ram Ben Barak both reportedly welcomed the appointment of “D.”

Brief Backgrounder on Mossad

The official name of the Mossad is Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations. Special operations are indeed attributed to the intelligence service, which has also led to some criticism of its approach and a reputation for being ruthlessly effective. Particularly in matters regarding Iran, the Mossad has often been accused of assassinations, espionage, and sabotage acts aimed at Tehran’s nuclear program in particular.

Due to its structure as a civil intelligence service, the Mossad is comparable in its function to the US Central Intelligence Agency – an agency the Mossad has reportedly held substantial connections with. The Mossad is widely considered one of the best-informed intelligence services in the world.

Spectacular cases such as the German Nazi criminal Adolf Eichmann’s kidnapping from Argentina to Israel in May 1960 have also been linked to the Mossad.

What Will D’s Responsibilities Be as Mossad Director?

Netanyahu made clear what’s expected of a Mossad director in a speech on Cohen’s appointment in 2016: “The Mossad will continue to act against threats, with operations that are best kept silent,” said the prime minister. Furthermore, the secret service “will have to adapt its task of collecting information to modern technologies”. However, Netanyahu defined a third area of ​​responsibility for Cohen: the Mossad will henceforth “help to establish diplomatic relations all over the world, including with Arab and Muslim countries.”

Due to the Middle East’s current developments, it can be assumed that this task area will also be assigned to “D.”

Until the recent talk of elections – and the pending government crisis in Israel – the announcement of a new Mossad director, was expected to be put on hold until later in the spring. More often than not, the next director is chosen as little as a month before the incumbent is set to leave.

“D.” must now be approved by the Civil Service Advisory Committee, led by former Supreme Court Justice Eliezer Goldberg, the government statement said. However, this is generally seen as merely a formality. If approved, the Mossad changeover would take place in June 2021.

L'articolo Israel Appoints New Mossad Chief proviene da InsideOver.

In a devastating blow to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s premiership, Likud Member of the Knesset (MK) Gideon Sa’ar — long seen as the Prime Minister’s nemesis in the Likud Party — announced he was quitting the party and will form his own right-wing party. Sa’ar’s new party will be called New Hope and he will run under its banner for the premiership in the next election, which looks likely to come soon.

The former leading Likud minister said his party had become a “tool for the personal interests of the person in charge, including matters relating to his criminal trial,” and has fostered a “cult of personality” around Netanyahu.

Sa’ar will also be resigning his Knesset seat because he felt it was right for him to step down as he was elected to parliament for Likud.

Sa’ar: ‘Replacing Netanyahu is the Order of the Hour’

Sa’ar, who failed in a leadership challenge against the current Prime Minister last year, said the current coalition had wasted its parliamentary support, and failed in its handling of the coronavirus pandemic.

“Replacing Netanyahu is the order of the hour,” he declared, adding that the dangers of overly protracted leadership create a moral hazard.

There are many reasons why Netanyahu should be worried about Sa’ar’s leadership bid. Israel elects its governments using proportional representation, which means that the number of seats a party receives in the Knesset is proportional to the number of votes it wins.

Sa’ar Could Pose a Direct Challenge to Netanyahu

On their own, New Hope might not receive a lot of votes, but Sa’ar’s new party will aim to join forces with other existing political factions before the next election. Derech Eretz MKs Zvi Hauser and Yoaz Hendel — who quit the Blue and White list when they joined the Netanyahu-led government in May — may also join New Hope.

Israel looks likely to be heading towards its fourth election in two years. Last Wednesday, the Knesset gave initial approval to a bill to dissolve the parliament amid a budget crisis and call a new vote.

Though the polls currently suggest Likud would be the largest party after a fourth election, Sa’ar could split the vote for Netanyahu. The Prime Minister is fighting back against Naftali Bennett’s Yamina, which is the official opposition party. Bennett has made significant gains in recent polls and he also poses a challenge to Netanyahu.

Has Netanyahu’s Luck Run Out?

Despite this, Israelis have little faith in either Netanyahu or his Blue and White counterpart Benny Gantz. The Israel Voice Index survey shows that 62 percent of Israelis view the Prime Minister as having very low or moderately low credibility, while 60 percent say the same for the Defense Minister. These low levels of support for both figures will affect how both of their parties perform during a fourth election, especially when Bennett’s credibility is rising in some polls.

Many political analysts told The Times of Israel that the current Likud-Blue and White coalition might incline more toward a compromise in the light of the electoral threat posed by Sa’ar’s party. If both parties do this, it is unclear what impact this will have on the state budget, which is due to be rejected on December 23. Once it is rejected, an election would automatically be called for March 23. Either way, both Gantz and Netanyahu realize that Sa’ar poses a threat to their coalition.

Netanyahu has been fortunate enough to win the last three elections over the last two years. Until now, he has also been the favorite to win a fourth election. The Prime Minister has survived many different scenarios over the last two years and with Sa’ar now leading his own party, maybe Netanyahu’s luck is about to run out, but that may not be a bad thing given how much his credibility has been damaged recently.

L'articolo What Impact Will Israel’s New Right-Wing Party Have on Netanyahu? proviene da InsideOver.