A decade ago, as climate change was altering the geography of the region, the resource potential of the North grabbed attention, and states saw the chance to turn a profit. Today, this focus has shifted to concerns about the increased tension between NATO countries and Russia, with a dash of Chinese interests on top. 

This brief article unpacks Arctic geopolitics by exploring the different, at times contradictory, political dynamics at play in the North. It explores three levels of relations: the regional (Arctic) level, the international system, and the level of bilateral relations. Labelling these levels as “good,” “bad” and “ugly” – borrowing from Sergio Leone’s 1966 wester film – helps shed light on the distinctiveness of Arctic geopolitics. 

The Good: Regional Relations and Cooperation

Starting with the good in the Arctic, the regional relations among Arctic states: Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. The Arctic region was thrown onto the international agenda in the early 2000s due to the increasingly apparent effects of climate change. Arctic ice sheets were disappearing at an accelerated pace, which coincided with new prospects for offshore oil and gas exploration, as well as the opening of shipping lanes through sensitive areas such as the Northwest Passage. 

In response, the Arctic states publicly declared the Arctic to be a “region of cooperation.” They also affirmed their intention to work within established international arrangements and agreements, in particular, the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an international agreement binding states in shared pursuit of order, cooperation and stability at sea.5F

Since then, the Arctic states have repeated the mantra of cooperation. The deterioration in relations between Russia and its Arctic neighbours since 2014 — a result of Russian actions in eastern Ukraine and Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula — did not change this.

The emergence of the Arctic Council as the primary forum for regional affairs in the Arctic plays into this setting. The Council, founded in Ottawa in 1996, serves as a platform from which its member states can portray themselves as working harmoniously toward common goals. Adding to its legitimacy, an increasing number of actors have applied for and gained observer status on the council: Italy, for example, joined in 2013, alongside China, India, Japan, Korea and Singapore.

The Bad: Global Power Politics

What happens in the Arctic, however, is not the same as international global politics concerned with the Arctic. During the Cold War, the Arctic held a prominent place in the political and military standoffs between the two superpowers. It was important not because of interactions in the Arctic itself (although cat-and-mouse submarine games took place there), but because of its wider strategic role in the systemic competition between the United States and the USSR. The Arctic formed the buffer zone between these two superpower rivals, its airspace comprising the shortest distance for long-range bombers to reach one another’s shores.

Following the easing of Cold War tensions, from the mid-2000s onwards, the Arctic regained strategic geopolitical importance. A repeat of Cold War dynamics has seen Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, strengthen its military (and nuclear) prowess in order to reassert Russia’s position at the top table of world politics. Given the country’s geography and recent history, one of its obvious focus areas would be its Arctic lands and seas. 

This is where Russia’s strategic submarines are based, which are essential to the country’s status as a major global nuclear power. Melting of the sea ice and increased resource extraction on the coast along the Northern Sea Route are only some elements that have spurred Russia’s military emphasis in its Arctic development efforts: Russia’s north matters for the Kremlin’s more general strategic plans and ambitions in world politics. 

Within these shifting geo-economic and geo-strategic dynamics, China has also emerged as a new Arctic actor, proclaiming itself as a “near-Arctic state.” With Beijing’s continuous efforts to assert influence, the Arctic has emerged as the latest arena where China’s presence and interaction are components of an expansion of power — be it through scientific research or investments in fossil fuel industries. This has led to the Arctic becoming relevant in a global power competition between China and the United States. 

The Ugly: The Complexity of International Affairs

There is, however, one further political dynamic that requires examination: actual day-to-day interactions between Arctic states. This is where things get ugly, both because some relations are more fraught than others, and because it is difficult to draw generalizing conclusions across the region. 

Central here is the role the Arctic plays in considerations of national defence. This varies greatly amid the Arctic states, because each country prioritizes and deals with its northern areas differently. For Russia, with its vast Eurasian empire, the Arctic is integral to broader national defence considerations. For the Nordic countries, the Arctic is fundamental to national defence policy, precisely because this is where Russia invests considerably in its military capacity. 

The Arctic arguably does not play the same pivotal role in national security considerations in North America as in northern Europe.21F Alaska and northern Canada are primarily locations for missile defence capabilities, surveillance infrastructure and a limited number of strategic forces. 22F Commentators have even argued that the most immediate concerns facing the Canadian Arctic today are not defence capabilities, but rather social and health conditions in northern communities, and their poor rates of economic development.

However, bilateral dynamics like in the case of Norway and Russia are multifaceted. Those two states also engage in various types of cooperation, ranging from co-management of fish stocks to search-and-rescue operations and a border crossing regime.26F These cooperative arrangements and agreements have not been revoked following the events of 2014. 

Cooperation and Conflict

The Arctic is on the global geopolitical agenda. However, things are not as straightforward as conflict or cooperation in the North. There are some paradoxical that are best understood through the threefold distinction presented here: international competition (why the United States is increasingly focusing on China in an Arctic context), regional interaction (why Arctic states still meet to sign new agreements hailing the cooperative spirit of the North) and bilateral relations (why some Arctic states, and not others, invest heavily in their Northern defence posture).

What these nuances imply is that simplistic descriptions of Arctic geopolitics or a new Cold War in the Arctic today must be taken with a grain of salt. Political dynamics in the North are far too complex for these reductive descriptions. Recognizing this complexity should therefore encourage further studies of security politics in a region that has become an international focal point of examination and discussion.

L'articolo Three levels of Arctic Geopolitics proviene da InsideOver.

In 2019, President Donald Trump offered to purchase Greenland from the Danish government. Embarrassed, the government in Copenhagen rejected the offer because nations are no longer sold in the way the former US president was used to buying New York real estate. What made the offer to buy Greenland particularly awkward was the fact that the United States in certain ways already owns the Arctic island and have done so since the Second World War. Mr Trump’s interest in Greenland probably arose from a briefing the president received about the renewed geopolitical competition in the Arctic and the pivotal role of Greenland in maintaining US interests in the region. In geopolitical terms, Greenland is an American island.

While Greenland constitutes a nation in its own right, and its 57,000 inhabitants are part of the Kingdom of Denmark as an autonomous region heavily subsidized by the Danish government, the island’s 2,166,000 square kilometres has been an integrated part of the North American security architecture since the United States required basing rights from the Danish ambassador in Washington during the Second World War. The US used airbases in Greenland as a refuelling point between North America and Britain, and it was weather data from Greenland that gave Allied commanders confidence to give the go-ahead for operation Overlord (the invasion of Western Europe) in 1944.

During the Cold War, the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States was bitterly cold in the Arctic. Nuclear submarines remained constantly on patrol in Arctic waters ready to provide a second-strike capability in case of a nuclear war, and a radar station in the furthest north of Greenland provided first waring if the Soviet Union were to launch a nuclear attack on North America. After the end of the Cold War, the Soviet bases in Siberia was neglected. The United States withdrew from its bases in Island and maintained a much smaller footprint in Greenland. US attention was elsewhere – fighting the global war on terror with engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the last ten years, the Arctic has returned on the geopolitical agenda. Russia has reinvested in its Arctic bases, and Russia demonstrated it renewed Arctic engagement with a couple of spectacular exercises in the region, included the landing of Russian paratroopers on the North Pole icesheet. Less spectacular, but equally importantly, China shows an interest in the region. Diplomatically, China sought membership of the Arctic Council, thus using the Arctic to demonstrate that as a true global power China has an interest in every region, however remote from Chinese territory. Economically, Chinese capital backed mining firms that sought rights from the Greenlandic government to develop mining projects – most spectacularly, an iron ore mine in the fjord outside Greenland’s capital city, Nuuk.

China also raised the possibility of financing an airport outside Nuuk as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinas civilian interest in Greenland challenged the traditional division of labour between the Danish and the American government which made Greenland a part of the North American defence architecture while the responsibility for the internal affairs and economic development of the island was left to the Danes in cooperation with the local administration. A Chinese presence in Greenland would clearly have security implications, and the Danish government moved decisively to make sure that the airport was financed by the Danish taxpayers and the Chinese backed mining firms never gained mining concessions.

While the Danish government was shoring up internal security, the United States reasserted its commitment to the region. US marines were stationed in Norway in the aftermath of the Russian incursion into Eastern Ukraine and the US military has begun to reinvest in Arctic capabilities. Yet, the nature of great power competition today is different from during the Cold War. This is especially true in the Arctic where the present great power rivalry is no longer about positioning for a nuclear exchange, but about how to utilise the new lines of communication and the new access to resources made possible by the thawing of the Arctic because of global warming.

The new climate offers the kind of promises which made Viking settlers name the island. At present the costs of extracting resources from Greenland remains prohibitive and even if the ice is losing its grip on the Arctic Sea, the time when containerships can sail from Shanghai to Rotterdam via the Northern Sea Route remains many years in the future. This future offers a powerful vision which great powers want to be part of, and that in turn offers the opportunity for the government of Greenland to deal in geopolitical futures in same way as you would deal in futures on the stock market.

The mere interest from China thus delivered investments from Copenhagen and an increased diplomatic recognition from the United States which opened a consulate in Nuuk (staffed with diplomats from the US embassy in Copenhagen). The Greenlandic government may use the prospect of Chinese involvement as leverage in the future, but the utility of this strategy decreases each time it is used. The Chinese presence in the region is already waning, as the United States reasserts itself.

The increased US interest in Greenland offers the possibility for the government in Nuuk to decrease its dependence on Denmark by dealing with Washington directly. However, it also demonstrates the very limited freedom of action which the government of Greenland in fact has on matters of security and foreign policy. The United States will never tolerate that Greenland moves outside the North American security architecture – whether the island at one point might gain independence from Denmark is a secondary issue from a US perspective.

In geopolitical terms, everything has changed, and everything remains the same for Greenland. The United States firmly controls the island’s geopolitics and has, with Danish cooperation, firmly rejected Chinese attempts to gain a presence on the island. As the prospects for the Arctic region changes Greenland will become more important in the region, but China and Russia will have few prospects for changing the Island geopolitical connection to the United States.   

L'articolo The geopolitical role of Greenland proviene da InsideOver.

In early August, when President Donald Trump announced his interest in purchasing Greenland, Americans were left on a reactionary spectrum. The purchase of a tiny Arctic country with a population of 56,000 left Americans laughing uproariously, scratching their heads in confusion, blindly supporting the president or just plain angry. This was true regardless of political ideology. The biggest question of all was why Greenland?

But since political divisiveness is the norm in America, there was no room to allow any objective discourse to take place. In the case of Greenland, it was warranted.

The country has long been of interest to the United States. When Secretary of State William Seward was negotiating the purchase of Alaska with Russia in 1867, he was also exploring the purchase of Greenland. This also isn’t the first time a president of the United States has tried to purchase Greenland. President Truman offered up $100 million for it in 1946.

Last year, Republican Senator Tom Cotton from Arkansas brought up the purchase of Greenland with the Danish ambassador. And in May of this year, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would re-establish a diplomatic presence in Greenland. This would be for first time since the 1950s.

So, why Greenland?

Its strategic location makes it an ideal hub for the military. On the one side is Russia, with China right below it. Representing North American on the other side is Canada and Alaska. And that makes the flight path over Greenland the shortest route for Russia and China – for both its bombers and intercontinental missiles. Naturally, this is something that North America would prefer to avoid.

Recognizing Greenland’s importance, China attempted to purchase an old American naval base there in 2016. The Danish government stepped in and prevented that. Then, in 2018, China made an attempt at building three airports before being shut down again by the Danish government (with much cajoling by the Trump administration).

Outside of its location, Greenland has a wide array of resources that hold appeal. So much so, that in a 2014 report from the Brookings Institute, they referred to a coming “gold rush” of energy and mineral resources. The report goes on to note that, as the Arctic ice continues to disappear due to global warming, access to lead, zinc, diamonds, gold and, of course, oil is becoming more available.

Greenland politicians have made the extraction of natural resources and minerals central to its plans to extricate itself from the Kingdom of Denmark. Currently, Greenland receives about $700 million in subsidies annually from Denmark to help keep the country financially afloat. The Brookings report concludes that “large-scale mining” is an eventuality, but admits that it’s about ten years away.

Of those resources, oil is oil; human beings are on a neverending search for more. Finding another country with untapped oil resources would send any oil searching country’s political and capitalistic heart aflutter.

The importance of the other minerals on Greenland is almost incalculable. The country houses some of the world’s largest deposits of rare-earth minerals, like neodymium, praseodymium, and terbium. While not as fancy as diamonds or coveted as oil, these are some of the minerals used in the manufacturing of mobile phones, computers, and electric cars – three markets that China has a strong foothold in.

These minerals are also used in technology and defense – two of the most important, and identifiable, industries for both China and the United States. While the two countries are currently embroiled in a trade war, it’s easy to see why Greenland was appealing to President Trump.

Naturally, Greenland is of particular interest to industrialists across the globe. Tapping into these resources would make any capitalist salivate. In May of 2014, then-Prime Minister Aleqa Hammond repealed a ban on uranium mining. Australian company Greenland Minerals and Energy Limited wasted no time, and began building mines for uranium.

For its part, Greenland has been preparing for large-scale mining projects. However, it’s safe to say that they’ve been moving at a glacial pace. They’ve slowly been building regulatory structures and environmental safeguards. At the same time, they’ve been trying to foster an appealing investment climate for international investors.

As rare as the minerals themselves, it’s not often that “regulatory structures and environmental safeguards” and “appealing investment climate” work in tandem.

The inevitability of this large-scale mining would mean that this country of 56,000 could potentially see thousands of workers from all over the world. To accommodate this influx, the country must first develop the infrastructure to fit that kind of population increase.

While America has had a foot in Greenland for decades, it’s only Thules Air Base that remains. The other bases were abandoned years ago. The United States left Denmark the tab. That country is funding the clean up of all the decaying buildings, vehicles and old fuel barrels that America abandoned after World War II: to the tune of $29 million (US) over six years.

Unfortunately, that $29 million excludes the cleaning up of the deserted American under-ice nuclear missile facility. In 1967, when America realized that the glaciers were moving faster than expected, they just left. This raises the real concern that continued ice melting could bring radioactive waste to the surface.

So while this kerfuffle made for great media mania, on both conservative and liberal outlets, the reality is that purchasing Greenland isn’t a terrible idea. It’s that rarest of things from the Trump administration – a forward-thinking good idea.

At times it appears as though President Trump’s foreign policy resembles a combination of the board games Risk and Monopoly. After being rebuked by the Prime Minister of Denmark, Mette Fredericksen, who said any discussion on the sale of Greenland was “absurd”, the president’s petulant behavior got the better of him, as it often does, and he referred her comment of “absurd” as “nasty” – his favorite word for a woman who has run afoul of him.

Any type of civil discourse about what Greenland’s potential became impossible. It was the presidents’ behavior that ran the news cycle. Which is unfortunate, because Greenland, though perhaps not the purchase of it, warrants such a discussion.

Walking, or Tweeting, away from the table is a typical Donald Trump negotiation tactic. Each time he does this, it strongly suggests that that’s his only negotiating tactic. That may work in the world of real estate, or licensing your brand.

However, two years into his administration, the effect of this type of petulant behavior is, at best, questionable geopolitically.  

L'articolo Why Donald Trump Sees Greenbacks in Greenland proviene da InsideOver.