In the post-cold war period, many ethnic disputes remain unresolved and revival of nationalist aspiration and interest of external powers in these disputes make it difficult for the resolution of these disputes. One such ethnic dispute is the Cyprus issue. Since the cold-war period the conflict between the two ethnic community-Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are an important part of international politics. Cyprus dispute is not only between Greek Cypriot community and Turkish Cypriot community but it is also between Turkey and Greece.

Though all the European Union states back Greece’s stand on Cyprus, there are only a few countries that support Turkey’s claim on Cyprus. Pakistan tops the list of such countries. Pakistan and Turkey enjoy close cultural, historical, and military ties which are now expanding into deepening economic relations too. Pakistan considers Turkey to be a reliable defence partner. This is depicted by their placing all the three military (army, naval and air) attachés at the Pakistan embassy in Ankara, which is a very rare practice in Pakistani diplomacy. Turkey’s Islamist internationalism under its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also inevitably led to its deeper alliance with Pakistan.

Pakistan’s strategy

In 2018, Pakistan’s interference in Cyprus was revealed by Pakistan’s Army ex-Lt. Gen. Karamat Ahmed. He had then claimed that Turkey and Pakistan were 2 countries but 1 nation. Retired Lt. Gen. Karamat Ahmed had helped Turkish military in 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation. He was a member of a medical team who was sent to Turkey during the operation to help Turkish military personnel and civilians who got injured. He claimed that the operation took place in 1974, when Turkish soldiers interceded under Ankara’s guarantor status to protect the Turkish community in Cyprus. On July 17, 1974, a Pakistani team, consisting of 30 doctors, nurses and paramedical staff, left for Turkey aboard a special Pakistani military C-130 aircraft. Karamat and his team served in Turkey till September 1974 and returned to Pakistan after completing their duty. Recently, there were unconfirmed reports that Islamabad was considering appointment of a military attaché in the Office of the Representative of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

During 2016, Pakistan came to the rescue of Turkey to fill in the void created by sacking of Turkish fighter jet pilots who were considered to be the main conspirators behind the failed coup attempt against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Nearly 300 Turkish pilots were purged. The purge served a devastating blow to Turkey’s Air Force and severely undermined the country’s military capabilities. Turkish Air Force in its own internal report (January 2016) revealed that the military needed over 500 new pilots including 190 combat pilots to reach its normal level. By January 2017, the country had a shortage of 1,154 military pilots. Realizing the crisis could put Ankara in a serious national security predicament the country then turned to its ally Pakistan to train new pilots in a fast-track program and asked the Pakistani government to send trainers to fly F-16s.

A dangerous axis

It seems Pakistani pilots sent to Turkey have not returned since then as there have been reports of Pakistani pilots flying Turkish jets and violating Greek airspace on numerous occasions. Suspicion about Pakistani pilots flying Turkish fighter jets was reinforced after the November 2019 joint military exercises between Turkey and Pakistan. In November 2019, Greece lashed out at Pakistan for breaching its airspace, during the Dogu Akdeniz-19 (Eastern Mediterranean-2019) joint international naval exercise. On November 13, 2019, without filing a flight plan with Greek authorities, a Pakistani P-3 Orion Naval Co-operation and Information Collection Aircraft was flown into Greek airspace. This was the first time that Pakistan had violated Greek airspace, as this is usually something done only by the Turkish military. Greek military analysts realized that the exercise meant the beginning of a deepening new military alliance between Pakistan and Turkey.

Pakistan’s defence cooperation with Turkey is not limited to capabilities and products alone. During the past decade, Pakistan and Turkey have exchanged a high number of military officers under their bilateral military education exchange program. Around 1500 Pakistani military officers have completed a training course in Turkey during the past decade. Similarly, more than 130 Turkish military officers participated at war colleges throughout Pakistan as well as at their National Defence University.

What should worry Greece more now is the emergence of a China-Pakistan-Turkey nexus on nuclear proliferation. Pakistan, coordinating on capacity building of the three countries has already been flagged by watchdogs and media. Erdoğan has already expressed his desperation on developing the ‘Caliphate atom bomb’ to fulfil his neo-Ottoman aspirations, and China and Pakistan have been facing charges of illegal sale of missiles and creating a clandestine proliferation market. The growing relationship between Pakistan and Turkey could be a cause of concern for Greece. Cyprus issue has been the main conflict between Turkey and Greece for many years. No doubt, Pakistan will go all out to support Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in pursuit of his jihadist ambitions of conquest and revival of the Ottoman Empire that would include Cyprus as well.

L'articolo Turkey-Pakistan nexus: a concern for Greece proviene da InsideOver.

The Eastern Mediterranean has witnessed a relative calm this year in contrast to last year’s dangerous escalation spiral that almost set off a geopolitical maelstrom involving parts of Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. But is the current calm just a temporary lull?  Has a stable balance of power been established to create a new equilibrium? Or, has escalation been continuing by other means and the geopolitical storm will break out again in 2022? Here are some of the key factors to consider when looking over the horizon to determine the state of Mediterranean maritime security in the near future.

The 2020 Eastern Mediterranean Crisis was a Turning Point Event

Back in August 2020, the most combustible naval stand-off between Greece and Turkey during the 21st century nearly ignited into open conflict when a Turkish warship and a Greek warship collided at the height of the tensions. Rallying to Greece’s side, France dispatched warships to the contested waters, eventually sending its flagship Charles de Gaulle nuclear aircraft carrier. Egypt conducted joint naval exercises with Greece while the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Ankara’s staunch antagonist along the Mediterranean’s southern rim, sent its F-16 fighter jets to conduct joint air force exercises with Greece in the air space above the conflict zone.  With France, Egypt, and the UAE already in open conflict with Turkey in Libya, international alarm bells sounded that any further escalation could lead to a Mediterranean-wide conflagration.  Although a NATO-brokered de-confliction process achieved a climbdown in tensions, neither side has been idle. Swiftly changing geopolitical currents in the region have created new strategic conditions whose implications need to be examined.

Greece’s New Strategic Depth

In the absence of a convincing security guarantee from its European partners, Greece has spent the last half decade skilfully developing its defence relations with Egypt and Israel, and then subsequently with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.  Athens’ efforts are paying off big.  Combined with engaging select EU members, notably France, Greece is building an effective deterrent capability outside European Union and NATO frameworks. Since the striking demonstration of Middle Eastern solidarity with Greece during its August 2020 naval confrontation with Turkey, Greece’s regional security partnerships have reached an even greater level of strategic cooperation.

The 15 September 2020 signing of the ‘Abraham Accords’ normalising relations between the UAE and Israel was a strategic boon for Greece by more deeply connecting its circle of security partnerships broadly aligned to offset the expansion of Turkey’s “coercive diplomacy” in the region. On 18 November 2020, Greece and the UAE signed a security pact that included an Article V-type mutual defence clause.  In 2021, the juggernaut of Greece’s military diplomacy has gathered even more steam. In January of this year,  Israel signed a $1.68 billion, 20-year agreement with Greece – the largest defence deal between the two countries – in which Israel’s private defence company Elbit Systems will establish and maintain an air combat training facility in Greece for the Hellenic Air Force.  Italy’s defence manufacturing giant Leonardo will supply the M-346 advanced jet trainers. The state-of-the-art air combat training academy builds upon Greece’s 2020 agreement with France to purchase at least 18 fourth generation Rafale fighter jets for $2.5 billion, all helping to close the gap in air combat capabilities between Turkey and Greece.  By late September 2021, Paris and Athens signed a new bilateral mutual defense pact between Paris and Athens, accompanied by Greece’s $5 billion purchase of three Belharra frigates and three Gowind corvettes from France.

These relationships provide Greece with much needed strategic depth – geographically, technically, and psychologically. Bolstered by the early stages of an economic recovery, Greece is no longer Europe’s troubled and dependent appendage on the Balkan peninsula, as many in the European Union attempted to portray Greece during the EU’s sovereign debt crisis.  Greece is realising itself as an Eastern Mediterranean power leveraging its strategic links to North Africa and the Middle East.  Greece’s new found strategic depth continues to expand with the Hellenic Republic’s deepening military relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which began its first bilateral military exercise with Greece, Eye of the Falcon 1, in March 2021. Demonstrating the power of its new regional status, Greece hosted the September 2021 “Hercules 21′ exercises – the first multilateral joint military exercise between Greece, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

Turkey’s Becomes a Blue Water Power

Greece’s recent efforts to gain strategic depth were prompted by Turkey’s impressive advances to become a blue water power. Turkey’s efforts to expand its power projection capabilities in the Mediterranean started two decades ago with Ankara’s $3 billion ‘National Warship’ program, known by its Turkish acronym MİLGEM, to expand Turkey’s capacity to deploy naval forces far from its coastal waters. In March 2012, a decade into the MİLGEM program, then Turkish Navy Commander Admiral Murat Bilgel declared Turkey’s naval objective was “to operate not only in the littorals but also on the high seas,” identifying the Turkish Navy’s goals for the coming decade as “enhancing sea denial, forward presence, and limited power projection capacity.”  Supported by the rapid growth of its domestic defence industry, Turkey successfully implemented its strategic agenda to establish forward bases in the Middle East and North Africa region.

The turning point in this policy came with Turkey’s 2020 military intervention to preserve the Government of National Accord then ruling western Libya.  Ankara’s first intervention far from its land borders and shoreline was an unqualified success and created an important strategic beachhead for Turkey in the central Mediterranean.  Turkey maintains an air power deployment at the re-captured al-Watiyah air base, located 27 km from the Tunisian border, and is reported to be developing a naval base in Libya’s coastal city of Misrata.  Its first Mediterranean forward basing beyond North Cyprus, Turkey’s outsized military presence in Libya is nothing short of a strategic breakthrough, enabling Turkey to move beyond the efforts to contain its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Libyan intervention also showcased the power of Turkey’s home-grown combat drone and electronic warfare technology that would be later used by Ankara to assist Azerbaijan in the Autumn 2020 Karabakh war that ended 30 years of stalemate against Armenia and changed the map of the South Caucasus.  Turkey’s continued advances in drone warfare technology are changing the face of warfare in the Mediterranean and could upend the military deterrence for which Greece has been striving, especially as Turkish-made, unmanned surface and underwater combat vessels come into service.  Changing the Mediterranean’s strategic equation in 2022 is Turkey’s soon-to-be-operational, light aircraft carrier the TCG Anadolu – a landing helicopter dock based on the Spanish Navy’s Juan Carlos I-class design. The TCG Anadolu will be able to carry a formidable arsenal Turkish combat drones to any location in the Mediterranean theatre. As an amphibious assault ship, it will be able to transport a 1,000 troop battalion along with 150 vehicles, including battle tanks, for a marine troop landing. A blue-water power projection vessel par excellence, the TCG Anadolu will considerably augment Turkey’s efforts to set the strategic agenda in the Mediterranean.

Equilibrium of Escalation in 2022? Cyprus could be the Key

Greece’s deeper level of defense cooperation with its non-European partners also prompted Ankara to engage in serious diplomatic outreach to Egypt and Israel and then to the UAE and Saudi Arabia as a counter-balancing measure.  During 2021, Turkey has acted on its need to recalibrate its policy toward its Levantine and Gulf state neighbors to ease its isolation. This diplomatic opening creates the opportunity to increase commercial cooperation among the regional stakeholders that could act as a brake on renewed naval escalation in the future. While there is at least a temporary balance of power, such an opportunity should not be missed.

With its interlinked flashpoints, there is little reason to think that a stable equilibrium has been achieved in the Eastern Mediterranean. None of the underlying core issues has been resolved.  The most vulnerable point in the current security architecture is Cyprus.  A member of the European Union but not NATO, Cyprus was under military embargo by the United States until 2020 and consequently has insufficient naval capabilities to defend itself. Turkey maintains over 30,000 troops on the north side of the island and has established base for its combat drones in the self-declared Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. In 2021, Turkey upped its ante on the issue by formally declaring that North Cyprus should be internationally recognized as an independent state.  If a new cycle of naval escalation does break out in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2022, Cyprus is likely to be in the eye of the storm.

L'articolo Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Security in 2022 – Equilibrium or Escalation? proviene da InsideOver.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a region plagued by conflict and instability. The Syrian civil war has turned into a regional crisis, drawing other neighbouring counties into it. Post-Mubarak Egypt has sought a new role as a leading Arab country. Israel has been involved in a shadow war with Iran and its Shia allies. Simultaneously, Turkey is becoming increasingly assertive in pressing its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. The United States, Russia, and France have shown strong interest to engage in the regional security architecture. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has not diminished Greece’s diplomatic capability to cope with new complex security environments. In fact, Athens has developed a new foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean that deserves some attention.

The new geopolitics of energy

Following the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, the need to reduce dependence on Russian gas exports has forced European governments to consider the Eastern Mediterranean as a potential source of energy. Israeli, Egyptian, and Cypriot gas exports could contribute to the diversification of supply. The Eastern Mediterranean has an estimated 122 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered, but technically recoverable, natural gas. Greece’s geographic location makes it a natural bridge between the energy-rich Eastern Mediterranean and the energy-consuming Western Europe.

Hence, Athens has negotiated with Nicosia and Jerusalem the construction of the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline, which would connect Israeli and Cypriot gas fields to Europe via Crete and mainland Greece. In January 2020, the three countries signed an agreement, although the final route is still under consideration. However, the EastMed pipeline project is feasible only with U.S. political and financial backing. The passing of the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 by the U.S. Congress sends that message.

As a result, Turkey feels even more left out and isolated. Therefore, Ankara needs allies to support its position. In November 2019, the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord of Libya signed a maritime agreement with Turkey in exchange of military support. The agreement has established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between the two countries by ignoring Greek islands, including Crete which is the fourth largest island in the Mediterranean. The legality of the agreement is disputed by the Libyan opposition but complicates the situation. Against this background, Athens was forced to reach out to Cairo. In August 2020, the two countries signed an agreement for a partial demarcation of maritime boundaries between Crete and the northern coast of Egypt.

But this is not all. The Cypriot government’s determination to exploit its offshore gas deposits has provoked a military reaction from Erdogan’s regime. Turkish drilling ships have repeatedly entered the Cypriot EEZ, accompanied by warships, to conduct various activities; yet, Nicosia has already licensed parts of its EEZ to foreign energy companies. Due to ethnic ties, Athens has supported the Republic of Cyprus in its confrontation with Ankara.

Energy geopolitics also play a role in Greece’s ambitious plans for renewable energy. In October 2021, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Egyptian Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi signed an agreement to build an undersea electricity interconnector via the new Greek-Egyptian EEZ. This project aims at bridging Europe and Africa by building a submarine power cable of total capacity 2000MW in either direction. In combination with the other interconnections that are developed in the region, including interconnections with Italy and Bulgaria, the interconnector with Egypt could transform Greece into an energy hub of cheap, environmentally-friendly energy.

Building realpolitik alliances

The partnership with Israel is the cornerstone of the Greek foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterraean. The deterioration of the Turkish-Israeli relations after the Gaza flotilla incident in May 2010 paved the way for a new era in Greek-Israeli relations. On the initiative of Netaniahu government, the two countries signed agreements in the field of security, energy, trade, and tourism. Jerusalem has shared Greek concerns about Turkish assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara has not only supported the Palestinians, but it has also offered moral support to Hamas. Not surprisingly, the air forces of Israel and Greece have conducted several joint exercises in recent years. Additionally, Athens plans to purchase advanced Israeli systems for its army, navy, and air force.

Moreover, Athens has built a new relationship with pro-Western Gulf countries. In late November 2020, Greece and the UAE signed a defence pact which includes a provision for mutual defence if one country’s territorial integrity is threatened by a third party. Three months earlier, Emirati F-16 jets were deployed at the Souda Air Base in Crete for training with the Hellenic Air Force. Abu Dhabi opposes Ankara’s attempt to dominate the Muslim world and supports the anti-Turkish opposition in Libya.

The UAE is not the only Gulf country that has developed military cooperation with Greece. In September 2021, Athens decided to deploy Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia for the protection of critical energy infrastructure. Some months earlier, Saudi F-15 jets flew to Greece to participate in joint military exercises. Like the UAE, Saudi Arabia has also opposed Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East.

At the same time, Athens has attempted to balance Turkey by forming an alliance with Paris, which views Erdogan’s Turkey as a geopolitical competitor. In late September 2021, Greece and France signed an agreement which includes a clause on mutual defence assistance. Consequently, the Hellenic Navy will soon purchase advanced French frigates to conduct operations far away from Greece’s shores.

An evolving scenario

Energy development and transportation in the Eastern Mediterranean is a game-changing factor. The Greek pivot to the Eastern Mediterranean serves as a test of capabilities and intents. Athens has formulated a new foreign policy by collaborating with key neighbouring countries, such as Israel and Egypt. Both Jerusalem and Cairo have shared Greek concerns about Turkish assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, the Athens has reached out to pro-Western Gulf countries that have their own problems with Turkey’s leadership and aspire to play a region in regional affairs. The French-Greek military agreement also confirms the growing commitment of Paris to regional security. This all amounts to a concerted, deliberate diplomatic effort to increase Greek presence in the volatile region of the Eastern Mediterranean.

L'articolo Greek foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Energy and Realpolitik proviene da InsideOver.

A developing Greek-Israeli defense partnership and the potential of establishing an armed drone program in the Hellenic Armed Forces is increasingly worrying Turkey.

While Turkish President Recep Erdogan is trying to enhance ties with Israel, the possibility of Israeli drones operating from Greek islands in the Aegean Sea is a concern for Ankara. In fact a prominent Turkish newspaper recently claimed claimed that Athens’ actions are an act of aggression which could quickly escalate to war.

The Greek-Israeli Agreement

The Hellenic Parliament approved a bill earlier this year on July 7 which established the partnership between the Greek and Israeli Defense Departments. The bill came as the concluding step of long negotiations between the two states that officially started back in 2011, when both sides signed a Principal Memorandum of Understanding.

The agreement formally consolidated the cooperation of Athens and Tel Aviv in the defense sector and highlighted the aligning geopolitical interests of the countries in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

Among other matters, in the context of this defense bill, the Israeli defense industry has agreed with Greece to provide a number of Heron drones on a leasing basis. Athens will initially lease the drones for a three-year period; at the end of the leasing timeframe, the drones could then be fully purchased by the Hellenic Armed Forces, according to further arrangements that will be finalized at a later stage.

How Will the Drone Partnership Work?

At the moment the program is ongoing, with military personnel of the two countries already working together in terms of training and familiarization with the control and operational procedures of the new systems. According to the current reports from the Greek side, Heron drones are expected to be operational within the next few months.

Based on information provided by senior-level officials the drones will be strategically based on specific Aegean islands in the proximity of the Turkish coastline. It is not clear as of now if Israeli personnel will be assigned to Greece for the primary stages of the drone deployment, but there are indications that the system will be fully operated only by Greek personnel once the necessary training has been completed.

The Strategic Significance of Drone Deployment in the Aegean

The eventual deployment of advanced drone systems in the Aegean islands would probably mean Athens turning the tables on Ankara. Both countries share extended maritime boundaries and airspace across the Aegean region. The Greek-Turkish decades-long dispute – which has been rapidly escalating during recent months – never led to a full-scale war, partly due to the balance of powers between the two sides.

Air power is a critical aspect of this balance of power, and the Hellenic and the Turkish Air Force have been in a state of constant antagonism, with both trying to outdo the other in their abilities, equipment and strategic edge.

The remarkable advancement of the Turkish drone industry and operational capabilities – as have been witnessed in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh – indicate clearly that Turkey has been rapidly establishing key infrastructure and skills in this vital field over the last few years.

Greece is seemingly behind. The scheduled deployment of Israeli drones in the Aegean islands could totally change the current status quo. However we should emphasize that in order to fully exploit the capabilities of the drone, the Greek government should make a priority the armament of the recently obtained UAVs.

According to the press release following the Greek-Israeli Heron deal the drones will be used vaguely for border defense purposes. The notice did not clarify if there is a potential for the drones to be armed, or they will be only utilized for reconnaissance missions.

Heron Drones and the Turkish Backlash

At the moment, two Heron drones have  reportedly been stationed at the Greek island of Skyros. The Heron model is one of the pioneering UAV systems of the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). With a Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) range of over 1,000 km, an operational attitude of over 35,000 feet and endurance up to 45 hours, Heron presents a huge challenge for Turkey.

It should be noted here that in early 2010s, Turkey has purchased a former version of the Heron UAV and there are unconfirmed claims that this model was used as the base for the development of Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 drones. 

Heron is not only superior from the Turkish UAV spearhead, the Bayraktar TB2, but also the geographical advantage of Greece – namely the numerous small islands in the proximity of the Turkish mainland which can be used as a base of operations for the Greek drones – presents an unparalleled challenge for Ankara.

On the top of that, Herons have the capacity to be equipped with ATG Missiles, laser-guided bombs, and long-range Air-to-Surface Missiles. This is why the deployment of armed drones would give a strategic advantage to Greece. Any weapons systems that will be chosen for the potential armament of Heron, combined with the unique capabilities of the drone, could literally enable Athens to conduct crucial strikes in the very center of the Turkish heartland.

Turkey is Worried About The Greek Drone Deal

If Greece take the decisive step to deploy a considerable number of armed drones across the Aegean islands, a harsh reaction should be expected from the Turkish side. President Erdogan will fully exploit any sort of leverage available to establish his plans for the eventual dominance of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, and in this sense any move that could give a strategic advantage to Greece will not go uncontested.

Turkey has been traditionally putting forward the casus belli blackmailing method to create geopolitical faits accomplis, with the most prominent example being the Greek reluctance to make use of its legal rights and expand its territorial waters from 6 to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean Sea.

Back in the late 1990s, we saw a much weaker – politically and militarily – Turkey blackmailing the Cypriot Republic (and essentially Greece) with regards to the deployment of the S-300 missile system in the island of Cyprus. In that case Athens and Nicosia eventually backed down and the missiles were transferred to Crete in a quasi-solution.

In the current situation, with Turkish operational and strategic capabilities significantly upgraded and an expansionist foreign policy from the Turkish side ever growing, it is up to the Greeks to have political willingness to proceed with the necessary steps, in order to consolidate robust defense and military capabilities, before the balance of power has irreversibly turned in Ankara’s favor.

L'articolo Turkey Goes Ballistic After Greece Announces Possible Drone Deployment in Aegean Sea proviene da InsideOver.

With a Greek-Turkish impasse ongoing since the summer, a new incident has now come out that puts even more tension on the relationship between the two countries. Two Greek citizens — both belonging to the Muslim minority of the country — have been arrested in the island of Rhodes and are being accused of spying on behalf of Ankara; and, as if this was not enough, one of them has also been serving as a Secretary at the Turkish Consulate General in Rhodes.

Greek Authorities Uncover Turkish Spy Operation

As per the latest reports the Greek authorities have put in their radar the two suspects since early August. As Greek-Turkish relations have been swiftly deteriorating since mid-summer, the Greek intelligence community was closely monitoring any suspicious activity near the borders, especially focusing in islands which Ankara has been trying to destabilize through the increase of the migrant flows, like Lesbos.

They were also focused on areas that have been directly targeted by Turkey like the small island of Kastelorizo, and also places like Rhodes. Sebahattin Bayram is one of the two individuals who have been arrested; Bayram comes from Western Thrace and has been serving in the Turkish Consulate of Rhodes for the last few years. Surprisingly, after being initially put in a translator position he was quickly promoted to the high-ranking Secretary of the Consulate. According to the latest information Bayram has been in direct contact with MIT, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization, thus his fast promotion to a key position in such a sensitive location for the Greek-Turkish affairs.

The second suspect has been working as cook for a ship regularly covering the trip between the islands of Rhodes and Kastelorizo. This is a very important detail, as many officers of the Greek army are quite often travelling with this ship.

The investigation from Greek authorities has revealed that the two men have been in regular contact, frequently using mobile encryption applications as an additional layer of protection for their communications. The Turkish Secretary of the Consulate was also likely using the Turkish mobile network — which overlaps the Greek network in specific areas of Rhodes — to provide updates to Turkish intelligence officers. Under Bayram’s guidance, his accomplice was trying to gather information from military personnel traveling on the ship using very basic HUMINT methods, such as overhearing and possibly recording conversations. He is also accused of taking pictures of military facilities and tracking the activity and intercepting codes of the Hellenic Navy as well as collecting data about the numbers and the routine of the Greek Forces based in Kastelorizo.

Why Were the Two Suspected Spies Released?

Both suspects were arrested on charges of espionage and conspiracy. However, after their initial arrest in December 13, the two charged individuals have been set free. Greek intelligence sources have unofficially claimed that this controversial move was made on purpose in order to track the immediate moves of both individuals right after their release, however there is always a risk that Bayram could be able to conceal additional evidence in the meantime.

A few days later, between December 17 and 18, both suspects were again arrested. Within the following days the Prosecutor in charge of the case will collect and asses their testimonies and decide the next steps of the process.

As the story is developing the Greek authorities are worried about the role of the Turkish Consulate in Rhodes and most importantly Thrace; in Greek areas where high numbers of Muslims can be found, the local Turkish diplomatic services are trying to control and manipulate members of the Islamic Community. The fact that both suspects are Muslims from Western Thrace, raises concerns regarding the extent of covert Turkish operations in Greek territory and how such cells could be utilized in the case of a Greek-Turkish confrontation. With this in mind the Greek government could take advantage of the current situation, as described below.

A Bargaining Chip for Athens — or Maybe Not

Let’s recall what happened in 2018 when Turkish authorities arrested two Greek officers over charges of alleged trespassing of the Greek-Turkish border in the area of Evros. Back then the Turkish government kept the two servicemen in custody for more than six months. Even though there was no solid ground for the detention the Greek second lieutenant and sergeant, they were actually used as a bargaining chip in exchange for the extradition to Turkey of the eight Turkish ex-officers who had fled to Greece requesting political asylum after the July 2016 failed coup attempt. Eventually the two Greeks were set free after a tense period, spending all that time under harsh conditions and under close monitoring by Turkish intelligence officers.

In the recent incident of the suspected Turkish spies who were in Rhodes, Greece has a much stronger case considering that the suspects have initially accepted — at least partly — the charges. Furthermore, both of them are Greek citizens, therefore the Turkish capability for any official action is quite limited.

There has already been a formal reaction from the Turkish side through a statement of the Turkish Foreign Ministry; the December 18 press release claims among others that “Greece has violated the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the right to freedom and security, and the right to respect for private and family life in the European Convention on Human Rights.”

Athens is at a Crucial Crossroads

Athens is now standing at a crossroads. This development could be used in its favor considering that the Greek government has been struggling over the few months to convince other EU countries to take a more rigid stance against Turkey, a strategy that has not been really fruitful so far. The recent espionage revelation could give Greece leverage in the context of antagonism between the two countries; however there is no doubt that Ankara will try to put pressure on the Greek authorities through backchannels regarding the handling of this case. Thus Athens has a choice: move forward strongly or back down.

From what Greece has shown so far, it is questionable if Athens will be able or willing to take advantage of the current conditions and there is a real chance that it will eventually retreat under Turkish demands and threats.

L'articolo Greece-Turkey Tensions Rise After Shocking Spy Revelations proviene da InsideOver.

On November 21, Turkey announced through a NAVTEX from Antalya Station, that its research vessel Oruc Reis accompanied by the vessels Ataman and Cengiz Han, would once again conduct seismic research activities in the proximity of the Greek-Turkish maritime borders.

The announcement by the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources indicated that the nine-day process, would be the final act of the month-long activity of the vessel, which has prompted much tension between the two neighboring countries. As this chapter is to be concluded quite soon, analysts are now focusing on how much Turkey achieved of its objectives and what is likely to happen next in the Eastern Mediterranean context.

Ankara Uses Diplomatic Pressure After Achieving Main Objectives

In previous days, senior Turkish officials — including President Recep Erdogan — have called upon the EU to act “impartially” and stop targeting Turkey. During a recent speech to fellow Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) or AKP members, the Turkish President emphasized that Turkey is a part of Europe and fully supports an EU perspective for his country. However he highlighted that at the same time, the leading EU countries should keep their promises to Turkey.

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs  Mevlüt Çavuşoğl also stated in front of the Turkish Parliament that the European Union should acknowledge its mistakes. At the same time, Hami Aksoy, spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, slammed Athens for the Greek unwillingness to engage in dialogue with Ankara, and personally attacked Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias for his recent open criticism of Turkey.

Ankara Wants de Facto Control of Greek Maritime Territory

Ankara is turning to this sort of diplomacy and adopts this strategy of public grievance at a key point for the Turkish endeavors in Eastern Mediterranean. As we have mentioned in previous articles, Ankara has been looking to establish de facto control in Greek maritime zones.

Once the first NAVTEX was published from the Antalya station last summer covering parts of this region, major controversy arose in Greece and the issue made the headlines; at the same time the Greek Armed Forces have been fully mobilized across the country.

The latest NAVTEX from Antalya is directly stating that the vessel will conduct research in the Turkish Continental Shelf (a term that the Turkish side has been carefully avoiding) and also the zones enclosed in the Navigational Warning are located in the immediate proximity of — if not overlapping — the Greek territorial waters, namely six nautical miles or less from the Greek island of Kastelorizo.

Athens Has Made Many Mistakes and Failed to Engage in Strategic Long-Term Planning

Surprisingly, this latest development has been hardly covered from the major Greek media, while some commentators rushed to present Turkey’s wrapping up of seismic research activity as a Greek success; apparently all these media — probably on purpose — have missed the main point here: the end of the seismic research by no means indicate an actual Turkish withdrawal. It should be simply perceived as the end of the research phase in the Greek maritime zones, setting the ground for the next moves, according to long-term Turkish plans.

Amidst this unprecedented situation for Athens, some major mistakes from the point of the Greek side should be highlighted. First, Greece seemed to be putting too much effort to manipulate the domestic public opinion, rather than pragmatically handling the real challenges, ensuing from the Turkish claims. This dubious stance gave Turkey the necessary room to keep pushing further its positions, while Ankara apprehended that its neighboring country would hardly manage efficiently any provocations in both domestic and international level.

Greece is Too Dependent on Foreign Support

Greece has also been relying too heavily on foreign support, especially from the EU. As thoroughly examined in previous articles, the major EU nations — excluding France — are unwilling to directly challenge Turkey, considering their bilateral economic ties and the political balances across the continent. Therefore, Greek hopes have been rather unfounded, and the sought-after sanctions against Turkey have always been too little too late; and this will keep happening unless major changes are made.

Finally the most critical mistake from the Greek side in this dispute, has been the lack of a strategic plan towards Turkey and the absence of an adequate response mechanism that would block Ankara from establishing de facto conditions in the Greek maritime boundaries.

Paradoxically Athens has neglected the essence of strategic planning both in diplomatic and operational level, totally losing the initiative and forming its actions according to the Turkish moves. The unfortunate comment of Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis last September regarding  — once again — the activity of the Oruc Reis is perfectly indicative of this whole ongoing situation. As previously analyzed, the Greek administration consistently failed to correctly interpret Turkish maneuvers and never implemented a long-term or realistic policy towards their neighbors.

What’s Turkey’s Next Move?

Ankara has been executing a well-planned strategy to establish Turkish claims across Eastern Mediterranean. Judging from the Turkish moves in northern Cyprus and Ankara’s unilateral drilling activities, alongside the aggressive rhetoric after Ersin Tatar’s victory in the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, we should only expect Turkish demands to keep increasing.

Any de-escalation from the Turkish side is out of the question for now. The latest statements regarding the European Union indicate that Turkey will seek to keep a balance with the major EU powers while Ankara keeps expanding westwards in the Mediterranean Sea.

With regards to the dispute with Greece, if we accept that this really will be the last operation of Oruc Reis in the area, we can anticipate two different courses of action. Either Ankara will proceed to unilateral drilling during 2021 in the zones where the research vessel has been conducting seismic studies or Greece and Turkey will come to an agreement for joint exploitation of the resources in the area under question.

The latter scenario would likely be welcomed by the Greek administration, going by the lackluster approach that Athens has taken up to this point.

L'articolo What’s Next for Turkey’s Oruc Reis Research Vessel after Greece? proviene da InsideOver.

Following a brief period of stillness between Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, the tension is rising once again.

During the summer, the two countries reportedly reached the verge of military confrontation due to Turkish research activity in the Greek continental shelf. After the intervention of EU officials and diplomatic efforts spearheaded by Germany and the US, the two countries reached a stalemate and bilateral exploratory talks were due to take place.

However, since last week Turkish vessels have once again crossed Greek maritime boundaries and are currently conducting research and drilling activities in the proximity of the Greek islands.

Turkey is Gaining de Facto Control Over the Greek Continental Shelf

According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and specifically according to articles 77 and 81 therein, a coastal state exercises sovereign rights over its continental shelf, and any research or drilling activities by third parties may take place only after the clear and express consent of the coastal state.

Turkey is not abiding by UNCLOS provisions about the delimitation of the maritime boundaries between neighboring countries. Ankara has been proceeding with unilateral actions and interpreting international law as they see fit. Turkey has a considerably extended coastline, however due to the existence of numerous Greek islands near Turkish shores, Ankara’s rights over the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf are significantly reduced.

Thus Ankara is unilaterally rejecting the rights of the Greek islands in the Eastern Mediterranean, and proceeding in research and drilling activities as if access to the continental shelf in the area is determined by the Turkish mainland alone.

Turkey’s Actions are Against International Law

The Turkish approach can be by no means justified according to current international laws and conventions; however, Turkey is following a careful strategy and aiming to create a de facto situation of control over the extended region.

Last August Turkey conducted research in the Greek continental shelf and the only reaction from Athens was a discreet presence of the Hellenic Navy in the proximity of the Turkish vessels. The aforementioned vessels were conducting seismic research and directly violating Greek sovereign rights according to the UNCLOS, yet despite this Athens only reacted mildly. Once the research was completed the Turkish vessels withdrew and Greece falsely presented this development as a huge Greek success.

In fact, Turkey has concluded its first act, creating a de facto context for control and claiming rights in several parts of the Greek continental shelf, and Athens has hardly even reacted. Now we are witnessing the well-expected second part of this plan; Turkey has sent three ships, R/V Oruç Reis, Ataman and Cengizhan to the same area for further research activities.

This time the ultra deep-water drillship Kanuni is also accompanying the research vessels. Not only research but also drilling activities should be expected shortly in the region by Turkish ships. What we should also stress here is that this time the NAVTEX issued by the Antalya station, withholding the area for about 10 days, is referring to research activities in the Turkish continental shelf, emphasizing the Turkish achievement of de facto establishing its presence and supposed rights to areas which should actually be under Greek maritime jurisdiction.

The EU’s Muted Reaction and Greece’s Utter Diplomatic Failure

While Turkey is pushing forward its claims, Greece has avoided adopting a responsible stance. Further to the inefficient decision-making process domestically, Greece has utterly failed to appropriately address the issue via EU institutions.

Even though Athens has been supposedly pushing for EU support and a decisive response, there has been no progress at all in this direction. Albeit the Turkish moves in the Eastern Mediterranean have been put in the agenda of recent summits and meetings of the EU leaders, the adoption of actual restrictive measures to block the Turkish provocations are out of the question.

Athens has not been able to convince EU leaders to seriously consider the imposition of sanctions on Ankara, as the bilateral trade relations and political ties with Turkey of many prominent EU member states, and particularly Germany, are too deep to be interrupted.

In this sense the only Greek achievements have been some generic comments about possible consequences if Turkey takes further provocative steps; these statements have only been made to impress public opinion and have no actual impact on the international diplomatic scene or geopolitical reality.

The Question of 12 Nautical Miles and Turkey’s Likely Next Moves

As the Turkish research vessel Oruç Reis is en-route to its final destination, which is less than 8 nautical miles away from the Greek island of Kastelorizo, and Turkish top officials are openly talking about the division of the Aegean Sea according to the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, the political debate in Greece is escalating. Numerous sides are calling for the official extension of the Greek territorial waters in the Aegean Sea from six to 12 nautical miles.

The extension of the Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles is an unquestionable right of Greece according to UNCLOS; however, various Greek administrations have been consecutively hesitating to take this step, under threats and pressure from Ankara.

At this point, where Greek sovereign rights are constantly disputed, the extension of the Greek territorial waters seems to be the most appropriate solution, since it would crucially limit Turkish options for unilateral actions, and a potential violation of the Greek territorial rights from the Turkish side, an undeniably act of aggression, would definitely put Ankara in a very harsh position internationally.

The Greek government has wrongfully talked several times about so-called “red lines”, namely Turkish provocative actions that would not go unanswered. The continuous violations of those red lines and the incapacity of the Greek government to respond appropriately have eventually put in question the very credibility of Athens.

The best solution of extending boundaries might seem too simple for Greece at the moment, but it is seriously doubtful if this is going to happen. To the contrary, considering the current geopolitical balances and implications, the most probable scenario is that Turkey will keep pushing for further claims and keep successfully establishing de facto objectives at the expense of Greece.

L'articolo How Turkey is Stealthily Taking Over the Greek Continental Shelf proviene da InsideOver.

Since 2015, when the refugee and migrant crisis hit new highs across the coastal countries of the Mediterranean, the unrestrained activity of numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has been raising questions and concerns.

Sorting Honest NGOs from Imposters

Despite the presence of several acknowledged NGOs which have been clearly assisting in the mitigation of this unique challenge, there has also been a significant number of dubious entities with suspicious motives, literally created once the European Union started providing huge economic and material resources for the tackling of the refugee and migrant problem.

A recent coordinated operation of the Hellenic Police and the National Intelligence Agency of Greece brought to light a grim reality that many have been fearing for a long time: a number of NGOs not only neglected the problem but actually made the situation much worse by working alongside international networks of criminal migrant smuggling groups.

Operation ALKMINI

The joint operation under the codename “Alkmini” started approximately two months earlier around mid-August. Two individuals, recruited by the National Intelligence Service of Greece were sent to the coast of Izmir in Turkey, pretending to be migrants who were willing to illegally enter Greece.

In this context the two recruits established contact with a smuggling network, which offered to take them to Greek territory in exchange for a significant sum of money. The two agents were transferred to the Greek island of Lesbos alongside a number of other asylum seekers. In the process they collected information about the progress of the overall illegal operation and the role of specific NGOs that have been assisting all along.

Modus Operandi for Human Smuggling in the Mediterranean

According to the findings of Operation Alkmini the illegal transfer of these people was coordinated by members of four NGOs with presence in both the Greek and Turkish shores. In this case two women, an Austrian and a Norwegian, both of the working for NGOs, were coordinating the operation from Turkey acting as the link between the smuggling networks in Izmir and the NGO personnel in the Greek islands.

Once the vessels with the smugglers and the asylum seekers were en route, the NGO members in Greece were notified about the time of departure, the estimated time of arrival, and the number of people onboard. Also the exact location of the boats was provided through the ALARMPHONE application. Alarmphone (Watch The Med Alarm Phone Project) is a hotline for boat people in distress; as clearly stated in their official website, the number is not a rescue line, but an alarm number to support rescue operations.

One of the main means of ALARMPHONE is to constantly seek media attention and coverage in order to put political pressure on the local Coast Guard authorities. In the case of the illegal smuggling organized networks, Alarmphone was widely used to either provide data to the NGO members in the proximity of a staged boat sinking so they could push the Coast Guard authorities to intervene, or to spread false alarms of wreck incidents so the local authorities would be kept busy and the boat with the smugglers and the asylum seekers could approach the Greek shores unattended.

The Four NGOs Under Investigation

During the investigation by the Hellenic Police and the National Intelligence Service, 35 people, 26 from Germany, and the rest from Switzerland, France, Spain, Bulgaria, Norway, Austria, Iran and Afghanistan were identified as perpetrators in the illegal smuggling business.

These individuals have been identified and are currently being accused of participating in a criminal organization, people smuggling activity, and espionage. All 35 were arrested and released after once the Greek authorities contacted the respective embassies, and while the investigation is ongoing. All the aforementioned individuals – apart from the two individuals from Iran and Afghanistan – are members of the following four NGOs: FFM eV, Josoor International Solidarity, Mare Liberum eV, and Sea Watch eV.

Three out of the four NGOs are based in Germany, with only Josoor International Solidarity being headquartered in Austria. All four organizations are supposedly based upon volunteer work and donations, but further details about their financial backers and the key personnel working for them remains obscure.

It should be noted that according to the confidential report of the Greek authorities, the NGO Mare Liberum has been playing a key role in the operation since the vessel under the same name and managed by the organization was docked in the island of Lesbos, and has been assisting with the overall illicit process. The Greek task force raided the ship and arrested its crew, while confiscating the electronic equipment found onboard.

Also one of the founding members of Josoor International Solidarity was present in Turkey during Operation Alkmini, reportedly coordinating with the foreign smuggling network. Finally the NGO Sea Watch made headlines in the summer of 2019 with the wide-known case of Captain Carola Rackete, who was arrested after entering the port of Lampedusa carrying 40 migrants onboard despite the ban from the Italian authorities.

How Athens Has Been Handling Rogue NGOs

Since January 2020 the Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, alongside the appropriate national and local authorities, has adopted a series of measures to deal with the uncontrolled activity of NGOs across the Aegean Sea and within Greek territory. For this reason an official register with all the NGOs operating in Greece was created. The purpose of this record is to separate the NGOs that are operating in good faith and according to the international standards and those that have a rather dubious activity and whose motives are not clear.

Further to this, an additional record was established with the data of the individuals that are working as field operators and are actively involved in rescue operations and the day-to-day administration of the refugee camps in the Greek islands and mainland.

The measures of the Greek government have significantly limited the scope of the NGOs work through constant monitoring of their activities, the continuous control of their access to the “field”, namely the sea routes and the refugee/asylum seekers’ camps and the appointment of Greek officials in key positions for the camps and facilities management and administration. These were roles that until recently were undertaken by the members of the NGOs themselves.

Finally, a constant centralized and well-organized effort among the Hellenic Police, the Hellenic Coast Guard and the National Intelligence Service of Greece is taking place, bringing remarkable results as in the case of Operation Alkmini. Greek authorities are also coordinating with international agencies like Frontex and the role of these bodies is also critical to the accomplishment of each mission and to crack down on dangerous smuggling operations.

L'articolo Dozens of NGO Members Busted for Allegedly Helping Migrant Smugglers on Aegean Sea proviene da InsideOver.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met his Greek counterpart Nikos Dendias on Monday as tensions between Greece and Turkey continue to escalate. Pompeo stressed the importance of US relations with Greece and their shared values.

The seven-week standoff was spurred by the discovery of underwater resources, which was escalated after Turkey deployed the Oruç Reis research vessel to conduct seismic surveys in contested waters in the eastern Mediterranean.

Athens retaliated by placing its forces on high alert.

The US Can Help Solve the Greek-Turkish Dispute

Live-fire exercises by the Turkish navy off Cyprus have added to the hostility of overlapping claims to the waters. Furthermore, Ankara started drilling for oil and gas off Cyprus last year, saying it was acting to protect Cyprus’s Turkish-Cypriot community after the discovery of reserves by the Greek-Cypriot community.

The US is arguably the one nation that is best placed to resolve the Greek-Turkish dispute. Both Ankara and Athens are NATO members and considering the US is the leading nation in this alliance, Washington is able to use its unique position to its advantage. For example, NATO has recently hosted discussions between the two nations to try and end the border dispute.

Erdoğan Wants to Give Diplomacy a Chance

Tensions between Greece and Turkey have eased somewhat as a result of the Oruc Reis being recently recalled from the eastern Mediterranean. This was a result that was achieved thanks to joint pressure from the EU and the US which forced Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to return the vessel to its base on September 13 and give diplomacy a chance.

However, the US cannot resolve this crisis on its own and many European states that have been affected by the eastern Mediterranean dispute also have a role to play. In a joint statement, the seven EU Mediterranean states (Greece, Italy, France, Spain, Cyprus, Portugal and Malta) said the bloc would draw up a list of sanctions on Turkey at the end of September unless Ankara negotiates to resolve the dispute with Greece and Cyprus.

The EU Summit Could Reset EU-Turkish Relations

Erdoğan has responded by saying that an EU summit due to take place this week is an opportunity to reset relations between both sides, but he added that the bloc must produce specific proposals and a timetable to work on a road-map together. Therefore, if Brussels is serious about avoiding a diplomatic war with Ankara, it cannot depend upon the US to solve all of Europe’s problems on its own.

One advantage that Brussels has is that it appears that Pompeo is standing firmly behind his Greek ally. During his visit to the Greek city of Thessaloniki on Monday, the US Secretary of State said that his country’s bilateral relationship with Greece is “at an all-time high.”

Turkey’s Relations with the US are Set to Deteriorate

The same cannot be said of America’s relationship with Turkey. Much to Erdoğan’s irritation, Washington has dropped its neutral stance on Cyprus after the US and Cypriot governments signed an agreement to open a training center. Also, Pompeo confirmed that he would lift a 33-year arms embargo on Cyprus and improve Washington’s security cooperation with Nicosia.

The US Secretary of State’s policy decisions risk alienating Erdoğan further at a time when his country is strengthening its cooperation with Iran in the Middle East. Pompeo is right to take a firm stance toward Turkey. It is also likely that if the Turkish President does not change course then he risks facing sanctions from the EU and possibly being thrown out of NATO in the future. There must be consequences for Turkey’s actions.

All hopes for peace rest on the EU-Turkish summit this week. The US can only solve the Greek-Turkish crisis with the help of its allies, but relations between Washington and Ankara are only likely to deteriorate if Turkey continues to provoke its fellow NATO allies.

L'articolo Can the US help Resolve the Turkish-Greek Dispute? proviene da InsideOver.

September 22, 2020 should go down as a landmark date not only for the energy sector in the Eastern Mediterranean but also for the fragile political landscape of the whole region. Six countries – Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Jordan, plus the Palestinian Authority – have signed a historical agreement which opens the road for tight cooperation in the gas sector. At the same time, the agreement has significant geopolitical implications for the ever-changing balances in the wider region.

From a Quasi-Formal Forum to a Full-Blown International Organization

The first efforts around the establishment of the EastMed Gas Forum go way back. In autumn 2018 the leaders of Cyprus, Egypt and Greece met in the Greek island of Crete and held talks about the consolidation of cooperation among gas-producing countries. This meeting predominantly aimed to achieve efficient coordination among Mediterranean states which are involved in the process of gas production and distribution, in order to gradually maximize the potential gains for all the sides involved.

This promising idea has received a more official format a couple of months later, when in January 2019, the “Natural Gas Forum in the Eastern Mediterranean” took place in Cairo with the participation of all the 6+1 parties that signed the charter of the Organization on September 22, 2020. Since January 2019 the Forum has been gradually moving to the establishment of a concrete international body, and the strategic initiative has been officially completed and reached its final form through the virtual ceremony which took place yesterday.

High-Ranking Virtual Conference

The following Ministers of Energy-related sectors participated in the virtual conference: Natassa Pilidou (Cyprus), Tarek al-Mala (Egypt), Kostis Hatziadakis (Greece), Yuval Steinitz (Israel), Hala Zawati (Jordan), alongside the Italian Undersecretary of the Ministry of Economic Development (MISE) Alessandra Todde and the Palestinian Ambassador in Egypt, Diab al-Louh.

According to the joint statements issued by the participants shortly after the completion of the works, the organization will function as a factor of peace and stability in the region, bringing closer the gas producers, the suppliers and the consumers. The ultimate goal of this joint initiative is to establish a robust and viable territorial gas market in the Eastern Mediterranean, which will crucially benefit the people of the region in the long-term.

It should be noted that France has expressed its interest in becoming a member of the organization, while the EU and the US will probably engage with the initiative under an observer status.

Gaza Field and Status of Israeli-Palestinian Relations

The Gaza Marine field was discovered in the late 1990s approximately 35 km offshore Gaza Strip. In 2000 the UK British Gas company bought the rights of the field for research and exploration and in 2016 the field came under the possession of Royal Dutch Shell, when the latest acquired the BG Group.

The project has been into a stalemate for almost 2 decades due to the unique political and security challenges in the area and disagreement over the exploitation rights of the field between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In 2018 the Gaza Marine gas field has been bought by the Palestine Investment Fund, a sovereign fund which invests in strategic projects, with ultimate purpose to strengthen the struggling Palestinian economy. Since 2003 the public shareholding fund is functioning under the guidance of the Palestinian Authority, seeking to participate in initiatives across vital industry sectors that could serve the interests of the Palestinian people.

The acquisition of the Gaza Marine gas field by the PIF and the participation of the Palestinian Authority in the official establishment of the EastMed Gas Forum signify an optimistic outlook regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations. It is not only the participation of the PA in an international body where cooperation with Israel is de facto achieved through the mutual economic benefits that both parties would seek via the exploitation of the gas reserves.

Such a potential major project in the Gaza Strip which could bring prosperity in the area and could potentially limit the influence of the radical Hamas organization in the region or possibly force Hamas to adopt a more moderate stance towards Israel and the PA, in order to establish a viable work environment for the people living in Gaza.

Turkey’s Exclusion and Possible Counter-reaction

The establishment of the EastMed Gas Forum comes at a critical moment for the stability in the region. Turkey has been unilaterally conducting seismic research and drilling in the declared Cypriot fields over the past year without any authorization from the Cypriot administration. Since last July, Ankara has also been raising tension over disputes with Greece, regarding the maritime zones of the Greek islands.

The very establishment of the EastMed Gas Forum organization sends a political message to Turkey. The exclusion of Ankara from the EastMed Gas group highlights the fact that the unilateral and aggressive decision-making in the region will not be welcomed by any of the neighboring countries.

We know that President Recep Erdogan hates being isolated, and he has never been actually isolated in the past, regardless of what some commentators are persistently claiming. However, this latest move leaves officially Turkey out of a club, where Ankara could be playing an major role under different circumstances. In this respect, Turkey has been lately trying to find common ground with Egypt. Either through seeking rapprochement in the Libyan conflict or through proposals for declaring their respective exclusive economic zones with much more luring terms than Cairo has done with Nicosia or Athens.

Apparently the last plan is fundamentally based upon the Turkish “Blue Homeland Doctrine” according to which the maritime rights of Greece and Cyprus are severely degraded. Nevertheless it is rather improbable to see a cooperation between Cairo and Ankara any time soon, or at least under the current political status quo. Turkey’s harsh criticism against the al-Sisi administration alongside the fierce support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt foreclose any impetus for a political reconciliation between the two counties.

Cause for Concern

This assumption leads us to a concerning conclusion. In the event that Turkey ends up being at odds with the seven of the EastMed Gas Forum then we can be expecting unconventional reactions from Ankara. After all, the recent signing of the charter should not be seen as only an energy deal but also as a political agreement.

And in this special occasion, the ideal method for Turkey to counter-react would be to utilize the relations with Hamas. This includes ties that have been built over the years through the essential assistance from Turkey in support of the Palestinian cause.

If such a scenario is to materialize, then we should expect Ankara to decisively attempt destroying any potential of cooperation in the Gaza Strip, as we have described earlier. And a Turkish boost to Hamas in order political objectives to be achieved through local tensions could bring catastrophic results to the wider theater of the Eastern Mediterranean, threatening the now visible regional peace and stability that’s been sought after for such a long time.

L'articolo The Prospects and Challenges of the EastMed Gas Forum proviene da InsideOver.