At the AfD’s convention, the party’s direction was supposed to get redefined. However, an anticipated coup by the hard-right did not occur. Instead, the party may have laid the foundation to become a viable government option in the future.

Party co-founder and former CDU member Alexander Gauland stepped down as one of the party’s chairs during the convention. However, not before handpicking his predecessor Tino Chrupalla, who now, together with Jörg Meuthen will lead the federal AfD. Chrupalla had several opponents and thus won with only 54 percent of the vote. Meuthen, who is also a Member of the European Parliament, received a better result than expected at just under 70 percent.

After the party has been established in all German states and remains the biggest opposition party in the federal parliament, both men communicated the next steps: the AfD needs to become a governing party and more professional.

The conundrum with this goal? All other parties continue to categorically exclude any cooperation with the AfD, never mind a coalition. The fact that the nationalist group within the AfD “Der Flügel” continues to gain momentum, makes government participation anytime soon not more conceivable.

Neither Meuthen nor Chrupalla belongs to the Flügel, however, particularly Chrupalla has continuously used a rather dubious language that carries certain connotations, e.g. “Mischvolk” (mixed race) or “Umvolkung” (ethnic replacement) when referring to Germany’s immigration policies. His calling card has been his biography. Chrupalla is East German, geographically the party’s stronghold and, due to his previous profession as a painter, has the makings to become a highly relatable person for the working class.

In terms of his vision, Chrupalla remained vague, stating only a simple message: “We now have the task of bringing our country back on a better path. Our beautiful Germany deserves a different policy. ” How this path will be reached and what a different policy would look like was not addressed.

Prior to the convention, rumors continued to circulate that either Germany’s most controversial politician and Flügel leader Björn Höcke could seek to join the leadership team and thereby push the AfD into the same direction on the federal, the party has embarked on in the eastern states, including borderline neo-nazism.

In the end, Höcke decided to not compete for any federal office. The Flügel’s influence was omnipresent, nonetheless. Moderate elements of the party (e.g. Kay Gottschalk, Georg Pazderski) and thus main critics of Höcke and the Flügel’s other face, Andreas Kalbitz, lost their deputy positions during the convention.

It displays the continuing dichotomy within the party. Moderates such as Meuthen, who try to position the party for future government positions continue to struggle with the far-right elements the highly popular Flügel offers. A quasi civil war was expected, even Meuthen could have been voted out in favor of a radical replacement (one of the candidates, though not a member of the Flügel is a well-known Holocaust denier).

However, a rebellion did not occur. This leads to the question of whether or not the party has found a consensus that would, perhaps, result in toning down the rhetoric. It would allow the party to eventually position itself as a viable coalition option of the future.

Here, the CDU remains the logical partner and given the current constellation ins Germany, where a hard-left alliance cannot be stopped unilaterally, the AfD has the chance to become an inevitable quantity for the CDU if it manages to emancipate itself from its radical elements.

L'articolo Germany’s Far-Right AfD Elects new Leadership proviene da InsideOver.

The Berlin Wall was opened on the evening of November 9, 1989. It paved the way, for the collapse of the SED dictatorship as well as the dissolution of the GDR, while at the same time allowing Germany’s reunification. A revisionist theory has manufactured a consensus that credits Gorbachev and civil unrest within the GDR as being the deciding factors. The truth is that the fall of the Berlin Wall would likely never had occurred if it was not for President Ronald Reagan and the foundations he laid out during his quest for peace with the Soviet Union. 

The Hawk

While his domestic objectives were primarily based on ‘Reaganomics’, smaller government and deregulations, in line with a fiscally conservative mindset, his foreign policy demarches, particularly during his first term, were based on military strength, which included increasing the military budget by 40 per cent and the subsequent paradigm shift from détente to roll back.

With the communist threat continuously spreading and the constant pursuit of extending territory and ideology, Reagan realised the significance of conducting a different kind of policy than his predecessors. Moreover, the omnipresent scenario of mutual assured destruction (‘MAD’) between the two superpowers had been one of the main reasons Reagan was extremely eager to find a way to win the Cold War.

This alternative solution came in an unlikely form and remained one of Reagan’s most significant achievements in shaping the outcome of the Cold War. It was the introduction of the Strategic Defense Initiative (‘SDI’) in 1983, a futuristic defence program that would alter the American position significantly. The idea was to make nuclear war impossible. ‘SDI’, a missile defence system, some ground-based, some stationed in space, offered a chance not only to prevent attacks conducted by the Soviet empire but furthermore to put enormous pressure on the Soviet Union. Not without reason did Henry Kissinger once state that the US’ commitment to ‘SDI’ was one of the main reasons for the end of the Cold War.

The impact of the Strategic Defense Initiative did leave the Soviet Union with two rather atrocious alternatives: It would either lead to a US breakthrough and the implementation of ‘SDI’ or consume all Soviet resources during the process of countering the United States’ plans.

Reagan’s ‘SDI’ was a game-changer. For decades, the Soviet Union had gone all-in to maintain its status as a global superpower, which had mainly been based on its nuclear arsenal. ‘SDI’ now threatened to make the weaponry impotent and obsolete with one single scientific invention. A fiasco for the Soviet Union, not only in terms of its ambitions as a superpower but also economically. Suddenly, the Soviets found themselves in a peculiar position and needed to resume arms control talks.

Another crucial element that forced the Soviets to collapse and allowed East Germany to be liberated was the idea that the United States would be able to passively engage against this spread of communism under Soviet influence by supporting anti-communist movements in several parts of the world. Born was the Reagan Doctrine.

It was the antidote for the Brezhnev Doctrine that had worked by the rule of whatever the Soviets got (i.e. territory), they would keep. The Reagan Doctrine aimed to negate this process and simply said: no, you will not.

The modus operandi here was to fund resistance fighters as mentioned above with financial capabilities and political influence with the ultimate aim of forcing the Soviets into an overspending and subsequent collapse of its system. While the United States spent less than one billion a year, the Soviet Union spent about eight billion per anum to overcome the impact the Reagan Doctrine had on communist expansion plans.

The Negotiator

Negotiations with the Soviets had been puzzling over the decades, with Brezhnev, Andropov and Chermenko having one trait in common: an ideology that went back to the second World War and culminated in the distrust against the West. This parochial attitude changed, however, and an opportunity arose when Gorbachev became Reagan’s new interlocutor.

Not only was Gorbachev the product of a different generation, but was more modern, moderate and most importantly, educated. In his approach to persuade the new Soviet leader, Reagan conducted four summits between 1985 and 1989, Reagan’s last year in office. Reagan’s hopes regarding Gorbachev were warranted, and the two leaders concurred on the idea to cut nuclear weapons in half during the Geneva summit of 1985.

However, one needs to take into account the fact that Reagan’s military expenditure – as well as Saudi Arabia, conveniently an ally of the United States, increasing its oil production to the Soviet’s detriment – had undoubtedly had a severe impact on the Soviet Union at this point already with its economy struggling to keep up with the US’.

It would, therefore, be rather ambitious to argue Gorbachev had been open to negotiations out of the goodness of his heart. More had it been out of necessity in order to stop an inevitable downfall based on overextension and the financial pressure Washington had put on Moscow via the arms race and economic embargos.

In October 1986, Gorbachev told party associates: ‘We will be pulled into an arms race that is beyond our capabilities, and we will lose it because we are at the limit of our capabilities. If the new round [of an arms race] begins, the pressures on our economy will be unbelievable’. Only days after his statement, Gorbachev’s proposed – inter alia- a 50% reduction of the nuclear arsenal Reykjavik summit.

His statement, as well as the following actions, reiterate the argument that it had been Reagan and his policies that made the Soviets change their course. Admittedly, it still takes a reasonable person as opposed to a hardliner on the other side of the table. However, Reagan had undoubtedly delivered the incentives.

During their summit in Reykjavik however, Reagan’s counter-proposal was as ambitious as ever. In his determination to end the Cold War and the threat of a nuclear holocaust, he not only proposed to abolish all nuclear weapons but was also willing to share his ‘SDI’ plans with the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev, however, did not believe the willingness of Washington to share ‘Star Wars’. He instead made it clear that the Soviet Union was willing to accept Reagan’s idea of abolishing all nuclear weapons but made Washington’s abolishment of ‘SDI’ his sine qua non.

One can see how close the two superpowers came in an attempt to jointly abolish their nuclear arsenal, guarantee peace and also the impact Reagan had had at this point in history already. Two sides that, only twenty-four years ago had come dramatically close to a nuclear war, were all of a sudden negotiating about abolishing all nuclear weapons and sharing technologies.

Nonetheless, Gorbachev had to convince many people within the Politburo, who did not want to rule out a play by Reagan and a potential first strike from the Atlantic coast. Gorbachev succeeded. Moreover, his policies of Perestroika and Glasnost arguably set the stage for a dissolution of the Soviet Union.

On December 8, 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, arguably the last piece of the puzzle – the progress that had started with Reagan’s presidency in 1981- and the initiation of the end of the Cold War as the world had known it.

After Reagan had left office, the Berlin Wall opened ten months later and the Cold War – though unofficially – was declared history on December 3, 1989. The Soviet Union ultimately dissolved in 1991, with Germany being able to reunify its country. While Gorbachev received the Nobel Peace Prize in the early nineties for his contribution during the Cold War, he once said about Reagan, and this is perhaps worth more than any external evaluation: ‘He has already entered history as a man who was instrumental in bringing about the end of the Cold War’.

As such, he remains the man, who laid the foundation for Germany’s reunification and ought to be commended for it by all Germans.

L'articolo Mr Gorbachev, Tear Down This Wall: Reagan’s Influence on the Soviets proviene da InsideOver.

The 9th of November marks the completion of thirty years since that autumn afternoon, when the Berlin communist authorities announced the lifting of travel restrictions for the citizens of the German Democratic Republic, signalling the beginning of the end of the socialist regime a few months later.

Thousands of people flocked in front of the Brandenburg Gate, the most distinctive point of the divided German capital, bursting with excitement in the face of the apparent access restoration to freedom. People’s dreams and hopes for a better life seemed to already come true with the detachment of the first 15-kilometre-long wall’s piece.

One generation afterwards, the first truly free in name and essence, the first without the memories of the socialist ideal, the nightmare of surveillance and the shortages of basic goods, the question about whether the expectations created by the reunification of a nation (and with it of a whole continent) were fully met remains unanswered.

History has repeatedly shown that it disregards any human prediction, let alone when it hastens to prejudge its end. History is a narrative, and that of the present era may not have condemned the socialist past with the uttermost certainty that one would expect three decades ago.

In today’s united Germany of exemplary social and economic planning, the contradictions remain alive: freedom and uncertainty, perspective and inequality, new and old, us and others. The euphoria of reunification was succeeded by the burden of reconstruction, the re-establishment of institutions and nation-wide convergence. Nowhere is this dual character of the present-day German state more characteristically reflected than its vibrant capital, where politics and art, development and poverty, cosmopolitanism and social exclusion compose an extremely dynamic portrait on a canvas of unparalleled cultural diversity.

For contemporary German youth, the notions of socialism, two German states and Stasi are not much more than demonized terms of a seemingly recent but empirically alien and ultimately incomprehensible historical period. For the elders, who have either lived in full or in part the most successful application of real socialism, an unexpected feeling of nostalgia shakes the coveted capitalist dream. Weren’t things finally what we imagined? Did the perpetual human feeling of dissatisfaction or incessant propaganda finally overshadow the self-evident conquests of the era that today seem utopian, such as universal employment, free housing, and education? Have the phenomena of secret surveillance, human rights violations, doping, party favouritism disappeared in our free society? Were we too quick to celebrate the end of illusions?

30 years after the wall fell, an invisible barrier remains between east and west, as large numbers of East Germans feel like second-class citizens. Two million people, mainly youngsters and women, have left the region since reunification in 1990, while the east is still lagging in terms of employment and income. This sense of insecurity and inferiority provides fertile ground for extreme parties, such as the far-right AfD and the far-left Die Linke.

The city of Berlin is fervently preparing for the anniversary celebrations. Among different events, an aquatic light installation will draw borderlines on the Spree River as numerous flashing rescue lamps will be used to symbolize a borderline between Kreuzberg (formerly West Berlin) and Friedrichshain (formerly East Berlin), a bright reminder of a dark past at a time when seemingly forgotten ghosts seem to revive. The message they send is more timely than ever: in man’s struggle for freedom, the greatest enemy is ourselves.

L'articolo 30 Years Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: A Tainted Legacy proviene da InsideOver.

L'articolo 30 Years Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: A Tainted Legacy proviene da InsideOver.

The elections in Saxony and Brandenburg were the latest success stories of Germany’s far-right party, the AfD. And the question amongst politicians remains: how to deal with this phenomenon, that seemingly overcomes a long-standing law in German politics: there is no life on the CDU’s right.

Despite Germany’s history, the country has had the occasional guest appearance of right-wing extremist groups in parliament. The Republicans, DVU or the NPD, all attempted to become part of the political discourse. They failed miserably. Daily political life exposed their inadequacies almost immediately. The AfD has altered this track record.

When the AfD was founded in 2013, it was considered an alternative for voters who felt alienated by Chancellor Merkel’s dogmatic way of policymaking.

Economic liberalism and above all by the fight against the Euro were on top of the party’s agenda. The potential was omnipresent, had the CDU under Merkel left centre-right and transformed into a centre-left party. With a rise in popularity, the party gained traction amongst rather dubious individuals also. As a result, the party’s founder, Professor Lucke, lost a power struggle with the populist right within his party in 2015. Paradigm shifts away from Euro-scepticism and Greece bailouts towards integration, Islam and refugees followed.

With unexpected success – despite having moved even further to the right since its foundation. But the increasing radicalization of the party and its positions has not been a detriment. Quite the contrary. In 2014, for the first time, the AFD succeeded in becoming a member of a supraregional parliament in the European elections. Since then, the AfD has managed to enter all sixteen state parliament and established itself on the federal level also; becoming the largest opposition party in the Bundestagswahl of 2017 with 12.6%. Before the election success in east Germany, the party reached 11% at the European Elections.

The party’s gains since 2013 have been attributed to the mobilisation of former non-voters as well as protest voters, disappointed and disenfranchised by governing parties, particularly CDU and FDP as well as, to a lesser extent, the SPD and The Left. In recent elections, however, political scientists have observed the emergence of regular voters, who identify themselves with the AfD’s ideology of refugee immigration being a danger for the cultural homogeneity of society.

However, the AfD remains a schizophrenic party. Classical Conservativism, economic-liberalism and Christian-fundamentalist forces and the one side, mainly located in western Germany as well as on the federal level, which is being supplemented by nationalism, homophobic, anti-feminist, anti-Semitic and historical revisionist positions, as well as the occasional Neo-Nazism support – mainly, but not limited to, east Germany.

Particularly the east German AfD has been infiltrated by extremism. Here, its members openly fraternise with right-wing extremist groups and neo-Nazis. The latest example is Brandenburg’s AfD chair Andreas Kalbitz, who, in the past, had been cultivating memberships in neo-Nazi groups. Not a stigma in the AfD, nor east Germany. One week ago, he led the AfD into the Brandenburg state parliament.

But the extreme right’s poster child remains Thuringia’s Björn Höcke. Höcke has made a habit of making statements linked to Neo-Nazism and is known for his proclivity play down Germany’s role in World War II – to put it mildly. It has gone so far, that other party members have tried to expel Höcke. With no success. Next month, he will be Thuringia’s top candidate and is likely to be responsible for yet another AfD election success.

Kalbitz as well as Höcke are leading figures within the party and represent a group named “Der Flügel” (The Wing). It accounts for 40% of all AfD members in east Germany.

The Saxony and Brandenburg election results raised the question of how much longer the AfD is willing to be an opposition and protest party. So far, the political dictum for all German parties has been to isolate the AfD. However, for the party to become a conceivable option to CDU and SPD, the extreme elements within the AfD would have to transform or disappear. The status quo nor the recent success indicate that the AfD is seeking to transform anytime soon.

Historically, newly founded parties only survived if they succeeded in repelling their radical elements or keeping them at an infinitesimal level.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Greens had former members of communist splinter groups in their party. As a result, other parties chastised the Green and were unwilling to even consider cooperation. Over the years, this influence was gradually marginalized. It allowed the Greens to enter a coalition with the SPD in 1998. The Greens had emancipated themselves and arrived, at the time, at the apogee of their power.

The SED, which is now The Left, conducted a similar transformation. A Communist platform in the early phase, which was classified as extremist by the constitutional protection, has lost its influence in the party. Although individual members continue to maintain contact with anti-constitutional groups in the opinion of Germany’s intelligence service, they are not the mainstream of a party long since arrived in Germany and has held government positions on a state level.

However, there is an important distinction between these two examples and today’s AfD: ideology. Due to its history, Germany had almost been impervious to right-wing rhetoric and even conservative elements can deliberately be interpreted as 1940s propaganda. Meanwhile, the extreme left and the idea of a Marxist Utopia, has always had its market.

While an AfD coalition with neo-Nazi elements is rightfully out of the question, even a strong right-leaning conservative approach may be insufficient for the party to redeem itself.

Which raises the question: will there ever be a future for the party besides an opposition force? The answer lies in the other parties’ modus operandi. If the CDU does not reverse its course once Merkel ceased to be chancellor and if a coalition with the Greens is suddenly en vogue due to the climate hysteria, the chances of an AfD becoming stronger than the major parties in east Germany is conceivable. But in a parliamentary system based on majorities, the AfD would face the same conundrum again: finding a partner.

On the federal level, the party is likely to increase its support as well, but likely never to the extent of its eastern branch – unless it says au revoir to its radical elements and becomes a viable alternative for conservatives and former CDU voters.

Until then the AfD will remain a party with strong voter support but out of power. And while this paradigm shift is unlikely to occur while the party continuous to receive this much support, Germany will face a political Groundhog Day at every election: major parties lose support, the AfD gains. Outrage. Calls for a new strategy against the AfD.

L'articolo Unsuccessful Despite Being Successful – Who are Germany’s AfD? proviene da InsideOver.