In the post-cold war period, many ethnic disputes remain unresolved and revival of nationalist aspiration and interest of external powers in these disputes make it difficult for the resolution of these disputes. One such ethnic dispute is the Cyprus issue. Since the cold-war period the conflict between the two ethnic community-Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are an important part of international politics. Cyprus dispute is not only between Greek Cypriot community and Turkish Cypriot community but it is also between Turkey and Greece.

Though all the European Union states back Greece’s stand on Cyprus, there are only a few countries that support Turkey’s claim on Cyprus. Pakistan tops the list of such countries. Pakistan and Turkey enjoy close cultural, historical, and military ties which are now expanding into deepening economic relations too. Pakistan considers Turkey to be a reliable defence partner. This is depicted by their placing all the three military (army, naval and air) attachés at the Pakistan embassy in Ankara, which is a very rare practice in Pakistani diplomacy. Turkey’s Islamist internationalism under its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also inevitably led to its deeper alliance with Pakistan.

Pakistan’s strategy

In 2018, Pakistan’s interference in Cyprus was revealed by Pakistan’s Army ex-Lt. Gen. Karamat Ahmed. He had then claimed that Turkey and Pakistan were 2 countries but 1 nation. Retired Lt. Gen. Karamat Ahmed had helped Turkish military in 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation. He was a member of a medical team who was sent to Turkey during the operation to help Turkish military personnel and civilians who got injured. He claimed that the operation took place in 1974, when Turkish soldiers interceded under Ankara’s guarantor status to protect the Turkish community in Cyprus. On July 17, 1974, a Pakistani team, consisting of 30 doctors, nurses and paramedical staff, left for Turkey aboard a special Pakistani military C-130 aircraft. Karamat and his team served in Turkey till September 1974 and returned to Pakistan after completing their duty. Recently, there were unconfirmed reports that Islamabad was considering appointment of a military attaché in the Office of the Representative of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

During 2016, Pakistan came to the rescue of Turkey to fill in the void created by sacking of Turkish fighter jet pilots who were considered to be the main conspirators behind the failed coup attempt against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Nearly 300 Turkish pilots were purged. The purge served a devastating blow to Turkey’s Air Force and severely undermined the country’s military capabilities. Turkish Air Force in its own internal report (January 2016) revealed that the military needed over 500 new pilots including 190 combat pilots to reach its normal level. By January 2017, the country had a shortage of 1,154 military pilots. Realizing the crisis could put Ankara in a serious national security predicament the country then turned to its ally Pakistan to train new pilots in a fast-track program and asked the Pakistani government to send trainers to fly F-16s.

A dangerous axis

It seems Pakistani pilots sent to Turkey have not returned since then as there have been reports of Pakistani pilots flying Turkish jets and violating Greek airspace on numerous occasions. Suspicion about Pakistani pilots flying Turkish fighter jets was reinforced after the November 2019 joint military exercises between Turkey and Pakistan. In November 2019, Greece lashed out at Pakistan for breaching its airspace, during the Dogu Akdeniz-19 (Eastern Mediterranean-2019) joint international naval exercise. On November 13, 2019, without filing a flight plan with Greek authorities, a Pakistani P-3 Orion Naval Co-operation and Information Collection Aircraft was flown into Greek airspace. This was the first time that Pakistan had violated Greek airspace, as this is usually something done only by the Turkish military. Greek military analysts realized that the exercise meant the beginning of a deepening new military alliance between Pakistan and Turkey.

Pakistan’s defence cooperation with Turkey is not limited to capabilities and products alone. During the past decade, Pakistan and Turkey have exchanged a high number of military officers under their bilateral military education exchange program. Around 1500 Pakistani military officers have completed a training course in Turkey during the past decade. Similarly, more than 130 Turkish military officers participated at war colleges throughout Pakistan as well as at their National Defence University.

What should worry Greece more now is the emergence of a China-Pakistan-Turkey nexus on nuclear proliferation. Pakistan, coordinating on capacity building of the three countries has already been flagged by watchdogs and media. Erdoğan has already expressed his desperation on developing the ‘Caliphate atom bomb’ to fulfil his neo-Ottoman aspirations, and China and Pakistan have been facing charges of illegal sale of missiles and creating a clandestine proliferation market. The growing relationship between Pakistan and Turkey could be a cause of concern for Greece. Cyprus issue has been the main conflict between Turkey and Greece for many years. No doubt, Pakistan will go all out to support Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in pursuit of his jihadist ambitions of conquest and revival of the Ottoman Empire that would include Cyprus as well.

L'articolo Turkey-Pakistan nexus: a concern for Greece proviene da InsideOver.

Over the weekend, right-wing nationalist Ersin Tatar won the presidential election in Turkish-controlled northern Cyprus. Tatar, who won 52 percent of the vote on Sunday, has made it clear that he wants to ensure that Cyprus remains divided.

His rival and predecessor, Mustafa Akinci, sought reunification with the Greek part of the island. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who supported Tatar during his election campaign, congratulated him on his victory.

Sunday was the second round of the presidential election, after Tatar secured 32 percent of the vote in the first round on October 11, while Akinci won almost 30 percent.

Tatar’s Victory is a Blow to the Cypriot Peace Process

UN Secretary General António Guterres had wanted to resume peace talks in the coming months, but these upcoming discussions might not even happen now that reunification no longer seems like an option.

Turkey was instrumental in ensuring that Tatar won both rounds of northern Cyprus’s election. For example, they helped Tatar orchestrate the opening of the once fabled beachfront of Varosha last week. Part of the sealed-off area of Famagusta deserted by Greek Cypriots when Turkish forces invaded in 1974, it has been off-limits ever since and is a component of negotiations.

Critics decried what they viewed as a political stunt intended to improve Tatar’s poll ratings, and Akinci described the move as a stain on democracy. But the move also demonstrates that Erdoğan has no interest in reunifying Cyprus either.

Turkey has Continuously Thwarted the Cyprus Peace Process

The current northern Cypriot President was also able to depend upon the support of Ankara and Turkish settlers who arrived in the northern part of the island from the Turkish mainland. The influx has transformed the north’s demographic makeup and contributed toward a growing sense of Islamization in northern Cyprus. If Tatar were to betray his base of support in the future, this would have devastating electoral consequences for him, which is why he will remain firm in his determination to keep Cyprus divided during his term of office.

The last time Cyprus came close to peace was in 2017 when a peace process was led by the President of the island’s internationally recognized and Greek-administered south Nicos Anastasiades and Akinci. It had been viewed as the most promising process in decades to end the conflict. However, talks collapsed in Crans Montana, Switzerland, in July 2017.

Anastasiades declared that the 2017 talks failed because of Turkey’s “inflexible stance and insistence” on maintaining the Treaty of Guarantee (which the UK, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus signed in 1960 to guarantee the island’s status as a republic), as well as a permanent presence of troops.

It’s Time for the US to Intervene in the Peace Process

Even though both Anastasiades and Guterres declared last month that they hoped that the negotiations would start again this year, both of them claimed that Turkey intended to preserve the two-state solution before talks even started. Thanks to Tatar’s victory, Erdoğan will no doubt interpret this event as justification for his stance toward the island.

Either way, it is time for the US to become more involved in Cyprus’s peace process. They could help modernize Cyprus’s military forces and participate in its energy sector. Washington’s presence would be able to counter Moscow and Ankara in the island. In 2021, the US should make it its priority to ensure that both Turkish and Greek Cypriots receive the same rights, and that both the Turkish and Greek governments uphold them. This would help ensure that the division of Cyprus ends in the long-term.

Northern Cyprus’s recent election is a short-term blow to the Cypriot peace process, but hope is not lost if the US starts to intervene in the island’s affairs more. It is the only option the UN and the EU have left considering they have both failed miserably to secure a long lasting agreement all this time.

L'articolo What Impact Will Northern Cyprus Election Results Have on the Peace Process? proviene da InsideOver.

In a sudden and unexpected move, Turkish authorities have decided to reopen a “dead” part of Famagusta in northern Cyprus, drawing international attention and provoking widespread criticism. This controversial decision comes at a moment when tension is already high in this troubled region of the Eastern Mediterranean; the move per se conceals several political motivations and the timing is by no means accidental.

Famagusta and Varosha

The city of Famagusta and the adjacent coastline town of Varosha used to be one of the most famous tourist resorts in Cyprus until the mid-1970s. With a population of approximately 40,000 residents, Varosha used to attract thousands of tourists every summer, including some of the most famous stars back in the day, like Elizabeth Taylor and Brigitte Bardot.

All this came to an end with the 1974 Turkish military intervention and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus which has been in effect ever since. After the events of 1974, all the Greek Cypriots residents of Famagusta were forced to abandon their homes and leave the area. Shortly after the occupation of Famagusta, the picturesque area of Varosha was sealed by the Turkish forces and the once attractive tourist destination was instantly turned into a ghost town, a situation that remains unchanged to the present day. The Greek Cypriot population that was pushed to flee their homeland — literally leaving their houses and belongings behind — hoped that at some point it would be possible to return; these hopes have eventually faded away as the decades passed.

Turkey’s Decision to Reopen and the Greek Reaction

Last week Turkish military forces opened up parts of Varosha after 36 years of closure. Once the gates to Varosha were unsealed, numerous visitors that had been lining up from the early hours entered the abandoned zone under widespread Turkish media coverage, in what seemed to be a well-staged political show. Ersin Tatar, the Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister, also visited the area later that day. Tatar was the one who announced the plans about reopening Varosha, after coordinating with the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

On the other hand, Turkish Cypriot President Mustafa Akıncı, has harshly criticized this plan from the very beginning. Akıncı highlighted that such a move would only deteriorate the relations between the two communities of the island, and eventually will prove to be damaging for the Turkish Cypriot population.

Unsurprisingly the President of Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades has described Turkey’s reopening decision as a direct violation of international law and UN Security Council resolutions 550 (1984) and 789 (1992). The Greek side has chosen to adopt a milder approach by condemning the Turkish provocation through an official announcement of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It should be noted that the timing of this move by the Turkish side is certainly not random, considering that after several months of a stalemate in diplomatic negotiations, Ankara and Athens were about to restart exploratory talks, with the top issue on their agenda their dispute over the maritime boundaries between the two countries. Now the Varosha issue presents a remarkable and convenient obstacle for the planned talks.

United Nations Statement

The United Nations Security Council met on October 9 and discussed the Varosha reopening. The Council expressed concerns about the unilateral approach of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sides and emphasized that a lasting, thorough, and fair resolution, according to the will of the Cypriot people should be the only way forward.

This approach would equally recognize the rights and needs of both sides and abstain from any bilateral action. In this sense the latest opening of Varosha is worrying and the UN Security Council will put an effort to find a solution after negotiating with all sides involved.

Turkey’s Political Motives Behind the Controversial Move

The Varosha reopening took place just of a few days before elections in the northern part of Cyprus. This move was a well-orchestrated maneuver to consolidate the nationalist voices and electoral groups in the election, among the Turkish Cypriot community.

Ersin Tatar, the current Prime Minister of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is offset by his main rival President Akıncı. Tatar is quite popular among hardline voters and is always aiming to attract more nationalist and right-wing supporters; Tatar is also backed by Ankara, being a much more favorable candidate compared to the relatively moderate Akıncı. Tatar also supports a two-state solution for Cyprus, an extravagant claim that has no realistic potential and is only supported by Turkey.

Akıncı, on the other hand, rejects such proposals as unworkable, stressing that this rhetoric can only lead to further tensions and will not improve the current status quo by no means. Following the elections in the self-declared TRNC which took place Sunday night, it seems that Tatar’s plan hit the target; Tatar gained approximately 32.5% of the votes, while Akıncı nabbed a reported 29.7%. Akıncı openly accused his rival of acting on behalf of Ankara, and the final result will be decided next week in the second round of the elections; however the current indicators show that Tatar is likely to be the ultimate winner.

L'articolo Turkey Moves to Reopen Part of Northern Cyprus, Increasing Tensions in Region proviene da InsideOver.

Since the Iraq War, relations between the United States and Turkey have fallen from their post-Second World War height. After Turkish President Recep Erdogan recently successfully bullied US President Donald Trump into not recognizing the Armenian Genocide, he is once again issuing threats against US policy he dislikes, this time with possible regional consequences.

Point Of Conflict: US Military Aid To Cyprus

A pair of bills passed by the US Congress on Tuesday would effectively end an arms embargo on Cyprus and provide $1.5 million for military education and training between 2020 to 2022. The Senate overwhelmingly approved of the embargo lift, which was attached to the National Defense Authorization Act, an annual spending bill required to fund the American military. The House of Representatives followed it up with legislation providing security aid. Trump has expressed support for both bills, which will become law with his signature. 

Energy Competition And Occupation In Cyprus

The Congressional acts come as a response to Turkish aggression in the Turkish-held area of Northern Cyprus, which it has held since 1974. Ankara recently sent a drone into waters off the Cyprus coast while ships searched for hydrocarbons in what has become an important Mediterranean resource-pool for the nation. 

The US has refused to recognize Turkey’s claims to northern Cyprus and has maintained a very positive relationship with the island state since 1960. Under Trump, the two nations signed a security agreement in 2018. Aside from the territorial and resource dispute between Cyprus and Turkey, Israel is another factor in the equation. In November, Cyprus sealed a $9 billion gas deal with Israel-based Delek, UK-Dutch oil company Shell, and Noble Energy, US. 

The Israeli component is reason enough for the US to back Cyprus, but Israel is negotiating with both Cyprus and Turkey to build gas lines in both nations. Nonetheless, Cyprus would like to defend its ability to leverage its own resources instead of relinquishing them to Turkish businesses.

“By including this legislation in the government funding package, the United States Congress is recognizing our significant national security interests in the eastern Mediterranean,” said Sen. Bob Menendez, after introducing the NDAA. “Bolstered by strong and expanding relationships with Greece, Israel and Cyprus, this commonsense legislation will drastically strengthen our bonds of friendship through joint efforts to promote peace, prosperity and security for our nations.”

Ankara’s Angry Reaction To US Support For Cyprus

Ankara called the US Congressional action “hostile” and warned that the move to end the American embargo would be a “dangerous escalation.” Turkey also protested its continued exclusion from the F-35 fighter jet program, a move prompted by Turkey’s decision to procure Russian air defense equipment instead of American. 

The passage of the legislation “will have no outcome other than hampering efforts towards a settlement on the island and creating a dangerous escalation”, the Turkish foreign ministry said in a statement.

As a response, Turkey is considering deploying F-16 fighters to northern Cyprus where it maintains a standing army 35,000 strong and frequently dispatches drones from an airport there.

How Russia Also Figures Into This Crisis

The dispute over Cyprus is a continuation of the rift between Ankara and Washington over use of Russian military technology. Although Trump has repeatedly praised Erdogan, the two leaders cannot seem to reach an agreement. The US, seeking to maintain its influence over the region, desires to keep Russia locked out. There is also a financial side, something Trump boasted proudly about when Saudi Arabia committed to purchasing American defense equipment. Surely Trump would rather see those dollars go to US companies? Removing Turkey from the F-35 program did not convince Turkey to abandon its deal with Moscow, and the US has floated the idea of more sanctions.

“The language of threats and sanctions will never dissuade Turkey from resolutely taking steps to ensure its national security,” said the Turkish foreign ministry. “No one should doubt that necessary measures will be taken against these initiatives targeting Turkey.”

Unable to keep Turkey away from Russia, the US is now trying to secure its hold on Cyprus. In return for the military aid, Nicosia must refuse port access to Russian military ships. In 2015, Cyprus and Russia inked a deal granting such access.

Cyprus is only the latest development in the rift between Washington and Ankara, one born of a desire to solidify the region for American military manufacturers over its adversary and to keep sensitive military technology out of Russian hands. The conflict has never been about Turkey itself, although the perceived slight by an ally does little to help the situation. 

L'articolo Cyprus Becomes The Latest Focus In US-Turkey Spat proviene da InsideOver.

The Turkish strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean highlighted that Ankara will keep pushing with more and more expansionist claims, interpreting International Law to the best interest of the country. It makes perfect sense, that this policy has been unfolding at the expense of Greece and Cyprus; we have repeatedly noted that as long as Athens and Nicosia continue adopting a passive stance towards this situation, Turkey will keep raising further demands. If anything, Turkey’s latest moves in the region, keep confirming our assumptions.

Last Thursday, November 28, 2019, Turkish sources made the agreement between Ankara and the internationally recognized Libyan Government of Tripoli public. The agreement – in fact, a memorandum of understanding between the two sides – has been signed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Fayez al-Sarraj; according to the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, this has been an initiative for the “delimitation of the maritime boundaries”. The MoU per se and the following statements from the Turkish side triggered new tensions and wide controversy among the neighbouring countries.

From Idlib to the battle of Tripoli and back to Karpasia

If there’s one thing that cannot be questioned about the Turkish government, is the ability to make the most purposeful moves in terms of foreign policy amidst numerous challenges in several different fronts. The Turkish decisions up-to-date should be interpreted and assessed as a well-orchestrated, step-by-step and carefully-implemented long-term operation. Within the last three years, Turkey has managed to become one of the key actors in the Syrian front, achieving the strategic objective of mitigating the Kurdish presence in the area, with wide-scale offensives against YPG, namely in Idlib and Manbij. In the same time, Turkish forces have been actively engaged in the Libyan Civil War, playing a pivotal role in the developments on the ground and significantly contributing to the very survival of the Tripoli Government of National Accord (GNA)  even during the latest major Haftar’s offensive in June.

By providing equipment, like Bayraktar TB2 drones and BMC Kirpi Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, alongside vital intelligence support, Turkish involvement should be seen as a game-changer in the course of the conflict. The significance of these acts is even more important, considering that Turkey has ignored the UN arms embargo in Libya and openly criticized its purpose. Ankara’s stance in the Libyan front promotes Turkey´s position as guarantor of the Islamic world; Erdogan has been moving towards this direction by adopting a controversial attitude towards traditional allies, to protect fellow Sunni Muslim nations and groups against forces backed by the West – Haftar’s LNA in this case. Also, Turkey’s decision to ship equipment to Tripoli forces regardless of the UN sanctions, not only created greater leverage for Ankara towards the Government of National Accord but also consolidated further the image of Turkey as a fundamental regional player, able to form a surprising and unconventional foreign policy, independent of the western demands.

The achievements in Libya and Syria should be assessed alongside the Turkish moves in the EEZ of Cyprus, where Ankara has managed to establish a de facto presence and has been raising claims for a share in the Cypriot gas reserves ever since. The moderate response from the side of Greece, Cyprus and the European Union, has encouraged Ankara to keep up with the same approach, accomplishing to make the international community familiar with the idea of potential joint exploitation of existing and potential reserves in Greece and Cyprus in due time. The well-structured Turkish plan is being materialized over the last few months. Initially, military sources have been leaking generic information around Turkish demands and their lawful sovereign rights between the 28^th and 32^nd meridian. Then repeated statements have been made by the Turkish Minister of Defence Hulusi Akar about the concept of “Blue Homeland” and finally an official letter has been sent by the Permanent Turkish Representative to the UN, where Turkey rejects the existence of sea zone for the Greek island of Kastelorizo and claims that the Turkish EEZ overlaps a large part of Greek maritime boundaries. Therefore this latest development should not be perceived as a surprise, since the combination of Turkish soft and hard power recently, has been unambiguously pointing towards this direction.

Athens’ past, present and future stance

Athens promptly condemned the agreement and stressed out that there is no legal basis to justify the Turkish actions. Greek Minister of foreign affairs, Nikos Dendias, contacted his counterparts in Cyprus and Egypt, Nikos Christodoulidis and Sahem Al Suhri, to achieve a coordinated diplomatic response from all sides against Ankara. However, the Greek reaction gradually is setting the context for what we have previously predicted. The Greek foreign minister from the first days of his appointment has implied in a Bloomberg interview, that an agreement with Turkey could solve long-term problems and establish a beneficial partnership for both sides. Of course, such an approach is exactly what Erdogan is looking for, as Ankara is stepwise achieving to legitimize the idea of joint exploitation within Greek and Cypriot boundaries.

Returning to the context of the Libyan-Turkish agreement, we should mention that one of its most worrying points, especially for Athens, is the provision that allows Turkey to have a physical presence in the Libyan fields south of Crete, next to critical strategic points of the Greek territory. Under those circumstances, Ankara is not only gaining access to a considerable part of the Greek exclusive economic zone but also can justify a permanent Turkish naval presence in the region. Such a development combined with the deployment of Turkish armed forces across the eastern and northern borders between the two countries, eventually leads to the Greek mainland and islands being equally surrounded, a situation that could turn out to be catastrophic for Greece from a military perspective.

Ankara’s prolonged gamble and General Haftar’s role

We have mentioned in the past that Turkey frequently adopts an opportunistic attitude in the fields of foreign policy, defence and diplomacy. In this case, counting too much on Tripoli Government of National Accord could prove to be a risky bet. General Haftar currently controls the largest part of the country and has been pushing towards Tripoli over the last few months. It is a fact that the efforts to seize the Libyan capital have been unsuccessful so far, however, it should be highlighted that both sides are working with in-country militias; such entities are prone to intra-conflicts, keen on crossing over and far from being perceived as trustworthy partners. To better assess the current situation, we should take a look at the key external actors supporting LNA and GNA. As already stated Turkey is backing the Tripoli Government of National Accord, with marginalized Qatar being the other major player in this “camp”. On the other hand, Haftar’s Libyan National Army, with a permanent base in Tobruk but with notable presence all across the country and currently at the gates of Tripoli, is being assisted by a complex “coalition” spearheaded by Russia, Egypt and the UAE. Simultaneously major Western powers including the US and France are favouring Haftar’s prevalence. Therefore in terms of foreign support, it is rather dubious if the Tripoli GNA could survive long enough, in order Erdogan’s decisions to play out well for Ankara.

Since Turkey has opened its cards in the Libyan conflict, Greek diplomacy is now left with the advantage to take the initiative; Athens could smartly reach out to President Sisi through official diplomatic channels and pursue a more aggressive stance towards Turkey’s regional claims, by establishing the EEZ with Egypt as an immediate response to the  Turkish-Libyan agreement. In the same time, backroom negotiations with General Haftar could be a well-purposed option for Hellenic diplomacy, so Greece could capitalize in case the Libyan conflict ends with his victory.

Conclusions

Greece has repeatedly condemned the Turkish policy in the eastern Mediterranean and has been presenting Ankara’s case as illegitimate and irrelevant to international law. Greek foreign minister has travelled to Egypt to discuss the recent developments, while the Libyan ambassador in Athens could be expelled. In the same time, a Greek delegation in the opening ceremony of the TANAP pipeline led by the Deputy Minister of Environment and Energy, Mr Dimitris Ikonomu, has left in protest against the provocative speech of the Turkish President. But most importantly the Greek Prime Minister has put forward the Greek agenda and has addressed the Turkish acts of misconduct in the context of the ongoing NATO conference in London. By the time these lines are written, a meeting between the Turkish President and the Greek Prime Minister has just been completed. According to the first reports, all the critical issues that are triggering the tension between the two countries, have been tackled and discussed in-depth, during the meeting.

From our side, we are quite sceptical about the results of the Greek approach, considering that all the quasi-measures adopted so far are seeking to maintain the popular political momentum, that the current government has been enjoying during the first months of the administration term, rather than consolidating a serious and well-respected international presence. The latest statements from the Greek Prime Minister amidst the NATO conference and those to follow are more of an effort to impress the in-country public.  Unless Greece implements a more determined policy – which is rather unlikely – the scenario of the joint exploitation between Greece and Turkey, always at the expense of Athens, will remain a probable one, regardless of the Greek government attempts to downplay this prospective.

L'articolo The Aftermath of the Turkey-Libya Agreement proviene da InsideOver.

Two years following the most recent attempt to resolve the Cyprus problem in the Swiss town of Crans-Montana, the President of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, will meet on August 9 with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mustafa Akinci. The meeting will be held at the office of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Cyprus, Elizabeth Spehar, in an effort to restart negotiations amidst rising tensions over natural resources exploitation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Discussions with the participation of the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres will continue in New York during the UN General Assembly in September.

Natural gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean over the last decade have turned the region into an energy hot-spot, but have at the same time exposed long-existing disputes among neighbours regarding rights over these newly-found resources.

Greece and Cyprus were quick to develop a close energy and security cooperation with Israel, which was followed by similar tripartite working arrangements with Egypt and Jordan. These efforts have been further consolidated by the signing of exploitation deals with energy supermajors in both the Greek and Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). Involving the American ExxonMobil, Italy’s ENI and Total of France, with the United States and the EU also joining in support of the region’s potential as an alternative energy source.

The recent dispatch of two Turkish drilling ships within Cypriot territorial waters was condemned as illegal by Cyprus, Greece and the EU, with the latter deciding to reduce its financial assistance and suspend high-level talks with Turkey. On the other hand, Ankara claims that exploration is taking place within the territorial waters of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognised only by Turkey.

Sharing the island’s hydrocarbons is the latest contentious point on a long list of issues dividing the two communities since 1974. UN-facilitated negotiations have been taking place ever since with the aim of establishing a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Cyprus’s accession to the EU in 2004 might not have led to its reunification, but it opened the way for meaningful interaction between the two sides. The presence of Turkish forces in Cyprus on the one hand and differences in the interpretation of full political equality on the other, have been the major sticking points in negotiations over the last 15 years.

The continuation of the status quo on the island would only mean the resumption of tensions between a politically and economically marginalised Turkey and a military vulnerable Cyprus. The incentive to benefit from the island’s natural resources might prove strong enough to encourage all sides to step up efforts for a solution, even though a definitive timeline is still out of sight.

Resolving the Cyprus problem could be the key to unlock the complex Eastern Mediterranean equation, allowing for unobstructed energy and security cooperation and the consolidation of the emerging political and economic structures in the region. It will also free up valuable diplomatic capital between the region’s main actors (Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Egypt) and no longer constitute a concern from a transatlantic point of view.

L'articolo Cyprus Peace Talks Rekindled Amidst Energy Tension proviene da InsideOver.

July 20, 1974: A large-scale Turkish military invasion in the northern part of Cyprus changes the picture of the island for once and for all. Only a small area has been initially occupied by the Turkish forces; a few weeks later though, and after an utterly failed peace negotiation process in Geneva, Turkish operations escalate, leading to the occupation of 36% of the island, creating a de facto state in the northern territory of the country. One remarkable paradox has been going on ever since, with the Republic of Cyprus being internationally recognised as a sovereign state, an important regional entity and an EU Member, while the aforementioned de facto state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is recognised merely by Turkey.

July 20, 2019. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan mentioned in his Presidential Statement that “the Turkish Army will not hesitate to take the same step it took 45 years ago if needed for the lives and security of the Turkish Cypriots”. These lines summarize the core of the Turkish foreign policy in relation to the latest developments over the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The very reason for such a comment though, should be traced several years ago when Nicosia made the first moves to consolidate the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus.

Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone for Cyprus

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS – in force since November 16, 1994 – has been finalized by merging and editing former treaties on the Law of the Sea, and is the document that has officially established the term Exclusive Economic Zone. It has provided an international point of reference for the EEZ definition, clarifying the rights and limitations that a country has over the respective area. In a nutshell, UNCLOS has defined the EEZ as an area expanding up to 200 nautical miles from the continental shelf of a sovereign state, where the respective state has the right to proceed in exploring, preserving and exploiting natural resources – living or non-living – for economic or other purposes. It is worth noting here that Cyprus has signed the Convention in 1988, while Turkey has never approved the UNCLOS provisions.

Until recently, the ongoing debate related to the convention discussed could be summarized in the Greek-Turkish disagreement with Cyprus being a rather insignificant parameter. The discord between Turkey and its Western neighbour over the sovereignty regime in the Eastern Mediterranean can be traced back to the late 1970s. Turkey has, since then, been pushing an agenda of continuous questioning of the Greek rights in the region, with tension being escalated twice in such a degree that the two countries have found themselves on the verge of war – the so-called Hora/Sismik and Imia incidents, in 1987 and 1996 respectively. Turkey has always been focusing on obstructing Greece from declaring its own Exclusive Economic Zone, an objective that has been undoubtedly achieved until now.

On the other hand, Cyprus has been methodically working since 2003, when Nicosia, after coordinating with Cairo, agreed on the demarcation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between the two countries. In the following years, Cyprus has also come to an agreement with Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010) defining the Cypriot EEZ in relation to all of the country’s neighbouring states, minus Turkey. Such developments have practically enabled Nicosia to set the base for immediate utilization of their rich subsoil; with prompt and purposeful moves, Cyprus has managed to, in less than a decade, clearly define the “lots” within their EEZ, complete a contest and award the respective lots to outbidding parties, quickly proceed to deep-sea exploration and establishment of the drilling process, and eventually reach a point where those resources are almost ready to be commercially utilized. Indeed, the findings so far have been encouraging, with fields like Glafkos and Aphrodite proving that the energy sector of the island could turn out to be a game-changer, not only for the domestic economy, but also for the geopolitical balance of the region. It should be noted here that Cyprus has attracted colossal firms of the energy industry like Italian ΕΝΙ, French TOTAL and of course, US ExxonMobil. At the same time, Cyprus’ government has made steps of strategic significance, pointing out that they don’t look to limit their activity solely in exploiting their gas reserves, but they aim for the Republic of Cyprus to be a major player within the Eastern Mediterranean. The initiative for the establishment of a gas liquefaction plant in the island, alongside the recent ratification of the agreement between Nicosia and Cairo for the creation of an offshore pipeline that will be connecting the two countries, are indicative of Cypriot intentions.

Erdogan’s narrative and strategic objectives

Since the Republic of Cyprus’ first movements in this direction, Turkey has made its position clear. Through the constant questioning of sovereign rights within the Cyprus EEZ, Ankara tries to consolidate its participation in the negotiating table as an equal partner. The main cards that the Turkish side is playing so far fall within a dual context; on the one hand, Ankara is pressing through diplomatic means, calling for UNCLOS not to be recognized and presenting themselves as protectors and guarantors of the Turkish Community in the northern part of Cyprus, which Erdogan claims should be equally benefitted by the exploitation of the Cypriot EEZ. On the other hand, those claims are always backed by an indirect or direct threat of use of force, in the case of non-compliance. Ankara has been systematically using the threat of casus belli in its bilateral relations in the Aegean and in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region; a tactic that has proven to be quite successful when dealing with Greece (extension of territorial waters, non-declaration of Greek EEZ), but rather inadequate in the case of Cyprus.

In this respect, Ankara has escalated its rhetoric over the last year, and has taken actions that are increasingly provoking the current status quo. Such moves could be summarized in the continuous issuing of NAVTEX for real fire naval exercises that are reserving parts of the Cypriot EEZ close to the area in which the drilling work is taking place. Additionally, Turkish drilling ships, Fatih and the Yavuz, have been repeatedly deployed in the area, to the west and to the east of Cyprus, and seismic operations have been taking place to the south of the island by the seismographic research vessel RV Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa. This research and drilling activity has been backed by Turkish naval and air-force presence, creating a tense situation. The main issue here is that Turkey has never been authorized by the Republic of Cyprus to operate in the area, though Ankara claims that all of this action has been legally approved by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; the de facto state that no one but Turkey is recognising within the International Community.

Considering Turkey’s stance until now, we are not expecting normalization of the relations between the two sides in the near future. The European Union has recently reacted amidst continuous objections from Nicosia against Turkey, however, the EU sanctions have been openly downplayed by Ankara, suggesting that they have been, at the very least, inefficient. Greece has been following a moderate policy towards Turkey over the last decades, trying to achieve balanced relations with the neighbours and avoid any escalation, or even confrontation, whatsoever. The region of Eastern Mediterranean forms a vital part of Erdogan’s grand strategy, and should be seen as an extended geopolitical chessboard for the Turkish President. However, he has proven that he can be unpredictable, and would not hesitate to put at risk, or even sacrifice, long-term strategic alliances in order to promote the Turkish interests.

L'articolo Erdogan’s Long Game in the South-Eastern Mediterranean proviene da InsideOver.

Turkey has recently sent a drill ship (Fatih, “conqueror”), after announcing its willingness to conduct exploratory natural gas drilling, in an area of the Eastern Mediterranean that Cyprus considers to be part of its Exclusive Economic Zone. According to Cyprus News Agency, Nicosia directly issued a warning, demanding Fatih to immediately cease its actions, defining them “illegal operations violating the international law and maritime safety procedures” which constitute “serious criminal offences under the laws of the Republic of Cyprus”, and receiving the full support of all the highest representatives of the EU. Cyprus President, Nicos Anastasiades, compared Ankara’s behaviour to a “second invasion”, after a Turkish occupation of the northern part of the island triggered by a brief Greek-inspired coup, in 1974.

Referring to this accusation, the spokesman of Turkey’s ruling AKP party, Omer Celik, called on Cyprus to “remember 1974”, since the Turkish invasion was aimed at “protecting the lives, rights and interests of Turkish Cypriots”, as reported by Kathimerini. Celik also condemned Greek and Cypriot leaders for “signing deals with countries that have problems with Turkey”, probably alluding to Israel and Egypt.

Turkey has consistently challenged the Greek Cypriot administration’s policy over drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean, considering it as “unilateral”. Ankara insists the exploration is part of its and Turkish Cypriots’ “legitimate rights” over hydrocarbon reserves in the East Mediterranean, as confirmed both by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. Çavuşoğlu said Ankara would send a second drillship (Yavuz) to the Eastern Mediterranean to look for oil and gas. This stance has been bolstered by Turkish vice president, Fuat Oktay. In order to support its posture on this issue, Ankara conducted its biggest ever military exercise (“Blue Homeland”, Feb. 27-March 8) in the Aegean and East Mediterranean, involving frigates, destroyers and fighter jets.

The area has never been officially demarcated, as Turkey (the only member state of the United Nations) does not recognise Cyprus, even if Nicosia has notified the United Nations on the limits of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in line with the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Cypriot EEZ has been delimited by bilateral agreements with Israel, Lebanon and Egypt. But instead, Turkey claims there is no Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone, and moreover it argues that a part of this area belongs to its continental shelf. Ankara has never signed the UNCLOS because of the Aegean dispute with Greece and because Turkey objects to certain UNCLOS articles.

The dispute started in late 2011, after the discovery of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean has generated another point of contention between Turkey and Cyprus (and, by extension, Greece). Cypriot Foreign Minister, Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, visited both Greece and Israel to request support for the drilling program.

The Cyprus-Turkey tension is part of a broader competition for the exploitation of new gas discoveries in Eastern Mediterranean, in countries that were previously thought to have no such natural resources. Such a geopolitical contention involves Greece, Cyprus and Egypt on one side, and Turkey on the other side, and has drawn the interest of international oil companies (ENI, ExxonMobil).

In January 2019, a meeting of energy ministers of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian territories has been announced, aimed at expanding cooperation between natural gas producers and consumers in the region, creating a powerful global energy player and potentially providing Europe with an alternative supply of gas. The forum – Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) – headquartered in Cairo, is also planned to ease exploitation of Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves to further economic development in the region. The EMGF has excluded the other Eastern Mediterranean gas players, notably Syria, Lebanon and Turkey. As a countermeasure, Turkish energy experts relaunched the idea of establishing a north-eastern Mediterranean gas forum with Northern Cyprus, Lebanon and Syria.

Greece, Cyprus and Egypt are also boosting their multilateral cooperation and share their vision of Turkey as a threat. If the Greek(and Cypriot)–Turkish dispute dates back to several decades ago, the resumption of the Turkish–Egyptian hostility traces back to the military coup against the Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, in 2013. It allowed the rise to power of the current President, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who adopted an anti-Muslim Brotherhood stance, while Erdoğan’s Turkey is considered to be the main international sponsor – together with Qatar – of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In the light of this framework, and because of the increasing militarization of Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey-Cyprus competition for gas could escalate out of control.

L'articolo Turkey-Cyprus Drilling Issue is Escalating Tension in the Mediterranean proviene da InsideOver.