Il primo ministro iracheno Ali al-Zaidi si trova davanti a un test di sovranità senza precedenti. Dopo il summit dello scorso 14 luglio alla Casa Bianca con Donald Trump, il governo di Baghdad ha fissato per il 30 settembre 2026 la scadenza tassativa per il disarmo e lo scioglimento delle principali milizie sciite legate all’Iran, in coincidenza con il ritiro programmato delle truppe d’occupazione internazionali. Ma la promessa rischia di schiantarsi contro una realtà strutturale: almeno cinque grandi fazioni hanno già rigettato l’ultimatum. Il vero nodo non risiede soltanto nei depositi di droni, missili o artiglieria pesante da recuperare. Il problema è che le Forze di mobilitazione popolare (PMF) sono oramai intrecciate in modo viscerale all’ossatura costituzionale, ai partiti di governo e all’economia della Repubblica irachena.

Il paradosso di una forza armata nell’ombra

Comprendere perché Baghdad fatichi a disarmare questi gruppi richiede di superare un equivoco di fondo. Non ci troviamo di fronte a bande clandestine da stanare nei deserti, ma a soggetti istituzionalizzati. La legge approvata dal Parlamento iracheno il 26 novembre 2016 ha riconosciuto ufficialmente le Forze come una componente indipendente e legale delle forze armate nazionali, posizionandole sotto la diretta autorità del comandante in capo. Questa architettura legale crea un corto circuito paralizzante. Quando una rete armata possiede la doppia veste di fazione politica e brigata statale, ordinare la “consegna delle armi allo Stato” equivale a chiedere a una struttura di trasferire materiale bellico da una mano all’altra. Gli annunci di facciata non sono mancati: il 2 giugno 2026 la presidenza del Parlamento ha lodato movimenti come Asaib Ahl al-Haq e Kataib al-Imam Ali per l’avvio del disimpegno e la restituzione di alcune dotazioni pesanti. Tuttavia, diverse fonti sul campo confermano un sospetto diffuso tra gli addetti ai lavori: dato che tali fazioni controllano direttamente le brigate 40, 41, 42 e 43 all’interno dell’organigramma delle PMF, i missili restano sotto le medesime catene di comando, cambiando solo etichetta burocratica.

50 mila uomini e reti finanziarie

Le dimensioni del fenomeno sono mastodontiche. Stime accreditate indicano in almeno 50.000 i combattenti operativi sotto l’ombrello dell’ampia galassia della resistenza sciita, equipaggiati con sistemi antiaerei e missili a lungo raggio. Rapporti d’intelligence basati sul tracciamento di segnali e geolocalizzazioni indicano che circa la metà delle 70 brigate ufficiali delle PMF garantisce supporto materiale o partecipa attivamente ad operazioni cinetiche sotto l’influenza dei Pasdaran iraniani.

Per gli Stati Uniti la questione si è trasformata da tempo da problema puramente tattico a nodo finanziario. Tra aprile e maggio 2026 l’ufficio OFAC del Dipartimento del Tesoro americano ha varato sanzioni pesanti contro comandanti apicali, società di facciata e alti dirigenti del settore petrolifero iracheno, accusati di deviare i proventi del greggio verso i conti delle milizie e di Teheran. La pervasività economica si affianca al rischio militare, rendendo ogni tentativo di smantellamento un’operazione a cuore aperto sulle finanze del Paese.

L’arresto del 17 agosto

Che la forza dello Stato incontri barriere altissime lo ha dimostrato un evento passato quasi inosservato a metà agosto. L’arresto condotto dalle forze di sicurezza irachene contro il capo dell’intelligence di Harakat al-Nujaba, il 17 agosto 2026, si è celermente trasformato in un pericoloso “stress test” istituzionale. La reazione del gruppo armato, condita da velate minacce di ritorsione contro gli apparati statali e da un immediato lavorio di mediazione politica dietro le quinte, ha mostrato quanto possa costare a Baghdad l’uso diretto della coercizione. Quando l’uso della forza pubblica contro un singolo comodo obiettivo genera un’onda d’urto in grado di minacciare la tenuta dell’esecutivo, la via giudiziaria o militare diretta diventa quasi inapplicabile. Kataib Hezbollah, una delle sigle più agguerrite, ha già messo in chiaro le proprie condizioni per sedersi a trattare: nessuna garanzia di disarmo verrà discussa senza l’uscita totale degli americani dal territorio e la fine dell’ingerenza economica di Washington sulle scelte finanziarie irachene.

Processo di facciata o reale controllo operativo?

In questo scenario è del tutto irrealistico attendersi che la data limite del 30 settembre porti a una smobilitazione istantanea o a sfilate con deposizione delle armi. Più probabile che la scadenza si converta in un lungo negoziato formale: consegne selettive di vecchi arsenali, un battage mediatico sul reinserimento dei quadri e il congelamento temporaneo delle attività cinetiche. Il vero indicatore della sovranità di Baghdad non sarà il computo dei fucili consegnati durante le cerimonie ad uso della stampa, ma l’effettiva titolarità della catena di comando. Fino a quando le chiavi dei depositi di munizioni, la gestione dei valichi di confine verso la Siria e la nomina dei comandanti di brigata rimarranno appannaggio dei singoli leader di fazione, il disarmo dell’Iraq continuerà ad assomigliare a una pericolosa illusione burocratica.

chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.difesa.it/assets/allegati/38337/05_citossi_os_4_ita_2022.pdf

L'articolo Baghdad e le milizie: così l’Iraq prova a disarmare se stesso mentre gli Usa se ne vanno proviene da InsideOver.

When a team from the global anti-money laundering watchdog, FATF, visits Pakistan most probably in the last week of July, they must keep in mind the fact the Sajid Mir case, more than ever, underlines Pakistan’s successful use of terrorists as strategic instruments of diplomacy. It has been done in the past—Khalid Mohammad Sheikh, Osama bin Laden and several top notch global terrorist leaders were given up in exchange for dollars or immunity from global sanctions. What should not be lost is the fact that it took Pakistan over 12 years to secretly arrest and sentence Mir despite considerable international outcry and pressure. It shows the state’s aggressive defiance of global conventions on terrorism. It is clear that only a combination of impending economic doom and tough posturing by international organisations like IMF, prodded by the US, has forced Pakistan to act against a terrorist known to be a key asset of the Pakistan Army.

The goal of Pakistan

There ought to be a similar clarity in understanding that the arrest and sentencing of Mir is not a move by Pakistan to disassociate itself from terrorism but to extricate from grey listing of FATF, get IMF bailout loan and reset its relations with the US, all in one go. Mir was reportedly arrested in April and sentenced in June this year for 15 years of imprisonment, perfectly timed to persuade FATF to take Pakistan off the grey list. Mir, with $5 million reward on his head, is high on the FBI’s list of most-wanted terrorists. He is one of the prime accused in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks that left 166 people dead, including six Americans.

It was not easy for the army to give up its one of the most protected assets. After the Mumbai attacks, the military and civilian leadership deflected international pressure to arrest Mir, declaring the LeT commander to be dead or hiding in foreign countries or gone missing. But in reality, Mir remained a key instrument of the army to carry out assassinations, threats and terrorist attacks in different parts of the world. A year ago, Mir’s name surfaced in the suspicious accidental death of the Swedish cartoonist, Lars Vilks. Vilks had been facing death threats over his controversial cartoon on Prophet Mohammad. Mir has also been instrumental in threatening several Pakistani bloggers and writers who had dared to question the army and forced to flee the country.

General Qamar Bajwa’s move

General Qamar Bajwa, the army chief, beleaguered from all sides since the abrupt removal of his protégé Imran Khan as the Prime Minister, is desperate to leave behind a positive legacy. He has taken upon himself, and the army, to rescue Pakistan from economic collapse—a part of this exercise was to rescue Pakistan in FATF. At the last FATF meeting, when it was decided to take Pakistan off the list after an onsite inspection, the army was quick to claim credit. The army claimed that it had a special cell working directly under Bajwa to fulfill the conditions set by the global anti-money laundering watchdog, FATF.

A critical part of the work involved in giving up, partly, its many assets in the terrorist domain. The army was not keen on giving up Mir and other primary assets. But when the combined weight of FATF and IMF fell on Pakistan, already struggling with political upheaval and economic collapse, Bajwa had no choice but to pull out his aces– the first one to go was Sajid Mir because an FATF member cornered Pakistan with irrefutable evidence of Sajid Mir’s presence in the country. There are several others, for instance Masood Azhar of Jaish-e-Mohammad.

Not to be ignored is another fact–the persuasive hand of the United States which wants Pakistan’s help in reclaiming lost strategic ground in Afghanistan. It is not a surprise that the ISI chief, Lt.General Nadeem Anjum’s visit to Washington this year coincided with the secret arrest of Sajid Mir. The ISI chief’s visit was followed by the new Foreign Minister, Bilawal Bhutto visiting the US where similar assurances were offered between the two countries. Mir’s arrest is part of this reset maneuver between the two old allies. Although there might be a sense of victory in forcing Pakistan to cough up its prime assets, the Mir’s arrest in effect underlines how Pakistan continues to use terrorists as state instruments in subverting international sanctions. The FATF must realise that Sajid Mir’s imprisonment is no indication that Pakistan’s would give up its patronage of terrorist groups in the near future.

L'articolo Pak giving up Sajid Mir a devious ruse proviene da InsideOver.

The European Union is concerned that in the longer term, Afghanistan could revert to being a safe haven for international terrorists who might target EU countries. The EU’s “preparedness to deal with the threat from terrorism has evolved significantly over the past decade”, according to the latest communique to European Parliament.

The Shadow of Taliban

An EU action plan “recognises that the Taliban takeover constitutes a ‘propaganda victory’, resonating with and encouraging jihadist and Islamist extremists globally, including in Europe” and calls on EU intelligence networks “to monitor the impact of the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan on the global Islamist extremist and jihadist propaganda scene, including the Afghan diaspora and Muslims in Europe”. The briefing says the EU will also “increase efforts to counter the spread and influence of Islamist extremist ideology” in Afghanistan and the region.

The briefing, titled “Security situation in Afghanistan implications for Europe”, says: “In response to events in Afghanistan, the Council published a counter-terrorism action plan on Afghanistan in September, setting out four clear objectives, and making 22 recommendations for action….The EU’s ‘strategic compass’ process provides a framework for these discussions, including negotiations over a potential future rapid reaction or ‘initial entry’ force, able to provide a European capability to react to events such as those that unfolded in Afghanistan. Members of the European Parliament have called on the EU to reinforce significantly its capacity to act autonomously and for the strategic compass to address the terrorist threat from Afghanistan.”

The role of EU

The EU proposes, and is implementing, screening Afghan nationals and others evacuated from Afghanistan. The governments of EU states are to “systematically check biographical and biometric data of Afghan nationals or presumed Afghans and other nationals coming from Afghanistan and arriving at the EU’s external borders, including individuals evacuated to the EU, against all the relevant databases”.

Another critical recommendation reads like something out of a military manual to tackle terrorism. “The plan also recommends improvements in information-sharing, so that updated ‘battlefield information’ collected in Afghanistan – such as ‘fingerprints found on explosive devices or biometric data of fighters detained in Afghan prisons and who have been released by the Taliban’ – is available to the competent national authorities and Europol. The plan calls for screening to cover both Afghan citizens evacuated by the US to the western Balkans who may seek to enter the EU, and those evacuated to US bases in theEU, some of whom have requested asylum in EU Member States.”

The EU action plan highlights the importance of “assessing the presence and activities of terrorist groups in Afghanistan and their financing, and of monitoring terrorists’ travel between the EU and Afghanistan”. It calls for sharing “strategic intelligence on the terrorist threat resulting from developments in Afghanistan, especially through EUINTCEN, the EU’s in-house intelligence analysis and reporting service”.

The EU will be setting up an EU-level “pool of security-vetted specialists in Afghan languages, including Pashtu, Dari, Urdu and Farsi to monitor social networks and to promote counterterrorism dialogues with countries in the region.

The sources of Taliban funding

The EU is mooting the idea of cutting off two sources of Taliban funding: the drugs trade and arms trafficking. “The UN estimates that in 2020 Afghan farmers produced some 6300 tons of opium, accounting for more than 90 per centof illicit global supply. There has also been a surge in the production of synthetic drugs in Afghanistan. According to some estimates, the Taliban may have earned US$400 million a year in recent years, equivalent to a quarter of the country’soverall revenue, from drug-related activities, including opium production and the production of ephedra, methamphetamine and cannabis.”

The plan also draws attention to the “risk that weaponry seized by the Taliban after the withdrawal of US and allied troops, and taken from Afghan security forces, may be sold”. In this context, the EU is implementing the 2020-2025 EU action plan on “firearms trafficking, particularly with respect to the western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine”.

Admitting that the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan “represents a symbolic victory for the jihadist cause in general”, the communique says Europe should be concerned about “ideological boost for jihadist movements in sub-Saharan Africa”.Armed terror groups have increasingly developed strong Salafi ideologies and forged ties with movements predominantly active in the Middle East, namely al-Qaeda and Islamic State, and even the Taliban. “The spike in violence attributed to jihadist groups, and the destabilising effect this is having on the countries and regions involved, has prompted international stakeholders, including the European Union, to launch counter-terrorism operations and to deploy civilian and military missions,” it says.

L'articolo EU monitoring Islamist extremism in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan proviene da InsideOver.

Pakistan’s deteriorating economic situation and the growing global isolation due to fostering terrorism has made its Prime Minister Imran Khan swallow a bitter pill. Khan supported China on its policy regarding Xinjiang. Many countries have boycotted the Beijing Olympics as a mark of protest against the brutal suppression of Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minorities by the Chinese government. This comes as a big embarrassment for Khan, who has long projected himself as a champion of Islamic causes. Observers feel the growing dependence on China for economic aid and diplomatic support is the major reason that Pakistani leadership is left with no option but to publicly commit to China’s policies even though they are responsible for the genocide of Uygur Muslims.

Many human rights groups had demanded the boycott of the Olympics event. United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, Belgium, Japan, Lithuania, Slovenia, New Zealand, Australia and a few other countries have announced the diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics event citing “ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity” in Xinjiang and other parts of China. Uyghurs living outside China also sought support from the world against the ill-treatment of the ethnic minority. “China stop the genocide. Muslims don’t sleep, stand up for your brothers” chanted the protesters.

Even a Turkish ski jumper used the flag of the independence movement of East Turkestan (Xinjiang) on his skis during an Olympics game to speak out against the repression of Uyghur Muslims in China.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu expressed concerns about the treatment of the Uyghur during the meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Beijing. However, Imran Khan did the opposite. He welcomed Chinese policies of repression in Xinjiang. Every successive government in Pakistan has been vocal about the discrimination or suppression of Muslims anywhere in the world– be it Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, French newspaper publishing caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad or alleged atrocities in Indian-administered Kashmir. However, Pakistan has always turned a blind eye to Uyghurs’ plight. Now, it is rather backing China, and even radical Muslim leaders in Pakistan are unwilling to speak out. If Pakistan were to criticise China, it would be very powerful and effective, considering its position of influence within the Muslim world. Pakistan is a major player in the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a powerful intergovernmental organisation representing 57 Muslim nations.

Pakistan’s economy is in shatters. The country’s external debt is increasing, foreign reserves are depleting, inflation is surging at an alarming level and the current account deficit is widening. It puts Pakistan at the risk of getting bankrupt. The US is distancing itself from Pakistan after it had to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Financial aid from the US to Pakistan has seen a sharp decline in the past few years, leaving Islamabad in the lurch. In such a scenario, Pakistan had to rely more on its all-weather friend China for financial and diplomatic help. However, it came at a great cost. Islamabad has to agree with Beijing on every matter, even if it is about the persecution of Muslims. During the recent visit to China, Imran Khan accepted that Pakistan would support Beijing’s every policy unconditionally. “The Pakistan side underscored that Pakistan-China relationship is the cornerstone of its foreign policy and that closest friendship with China enjoys the abiding support of the people of Pakistan. Both sides reiterated their support on issues concerning each other’s core interests,” read the joint statement by China and Pakistan.

A request for USD 3 billion loan was on Imran Khan’s agenda during his recent visit to China. Moreover, he sought more investment under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which may help revive Pakistan’s economy and reduce the growing influence of India and the US. The conditions put forward by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for loans are stringent while the Chinese loan terms are confidential and often leads to corruption. Since Chinese loans are out of public scrutiny, it is convenient for Pakistani leaders to easily get them. Pakistani economist Kaiser Bengali asserted that the Islamic country had become 100 percent dependent on China. “While the conditions of the IMF are made public, China keeps the terms and conditions of loans and projects secret, which leads to suspicions,” he said. Imran Khan has in the past too preferred the Chinese version to Uyghurs’ fight. Now, every major country is trying to hold China accountable for the documented oppression of Uyghurs, Khan’s deafening silence defies the principles of Muslim brotherhood.

L'articolo Pakistan supports Uyghur repression in China for economic aid proviene da InsideOver.

At the turn of the Century, in his book “Beyond Belief” Nobel Laureate V S Naipaul had described Pakistan as a ‘criminal enterprise’. While there were the usual howls of protest in Pakistan, the last two decades have validated the prescience of Sir Vidia. It is one thing for people of a country to have a proclivity for criminality, and quite another for the state itself to indulge in criminal behavior. In Pakistan’s case it is the latter. The world can probably turn a blind eye, even hold its nose to the inequity, venality and criminality inside Pakistan. But when that starts to affect other countries and peoples, the international community needs to take strong measures to stop the flow of terror, violence and illegal acts emanating from Pakistan.

Later next month, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) will hold yet another plenary. Pakistan will once again present its case before the international financial watchdog and try to convince it that it has delivered on all the high-level commitments it had made in 2018 to address international concerns on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT). On paper, Pakistan will try to prove that it has beefed up its AML/CFT regime, not just in terms of tightening the laws and regulations but also in terms of successfully prosecuting and punishing people involved in money laundering and terror finance. In the last plenary, Pakistan claimed it had met 26 out of the 27 action points. The FATF appeared to have accepted the Pakistani case, but kept it in the ‘Grey List’ pending the delivery on the final point which was successful prosecution of designated terrorists and money launderers.

On the Grey List

The reality is however contrary to every assertion being made by Pakistan before the FATF. Not only has Pakistan not cleaned up its act on AML/CFT, it has no intention of doing so. The reason is simple: the real problem is not that non-state actors are involved in money laundering and terror finance; it is the state agencies that are involved in this activity and they use the non-state actors and criminal networks as a front to carry out their nefarious activities. Equally important is the fact even the actions that Pakistan had boasted of taking against terror finance have been reversed. But most of all, recent events in Europe have shown how Pakistani intelligence agencies are laundering money and financing terrorism in other countries, including in the UK, France, Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Canada.

Shortly after Pakistan was placed on the ‘Grey List’ the government announced that it had seized over PKR 1 billion from accounts linked to UN designated terror groups. But recently it was revealed that all the seized funds had since been released to the account holders; likewise for assets of designated individuals and entities. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. The real big story has come out London where a Pakistani origin man has been charged for trying to assassinate a dissident blogger based in Netherlands. According to the prosecution, the funds for the assassin were routed through Hawala networks using Pakistani banks and money laundering networks. Clearly, the only lot with any real interest in targeting the blogger was the Pakistani military establishment. The evidence presented in court clearly points at the intelligence agencies in Pakistan, though it does not name them. Nobody else has the baleful influence to skirt around the legal and regulatory framework and put huge amounts of money in a bank account and then launder it through middlemen to give it to the would be assassin. So much for the AML/CFT regime in Pakistan which has been complimented by the FATF.

Terrorism and terrorists

What is important to note is the use of middlemen by the intelligence agency to carry out a criminal, even terrorist action, in the UK. Clearly, if Pakistan had cleaned up the financial system, such middlemen and Hawala operators would have been put out of business. The fact that they have not is in large part because they are being used by the ‘deep state’ for nefarious purposes. It is precisely these criminal networks that also have a nexus with terrorists who use them for laundering and sources their money. These networks do not operate only inside Pakistan but are also operated by Pakistanis settled in Europe and North America. Take for instance the bust in France of a Pakistani network involved in money laundering and fraud using fake companies and forged documents. The French police arrested 11 Pakistani-origin men and seized over €1 million in this particular bust. It is precisely such dubious characters who are used by the Pakistani intelligence agencies to funnel money and to act as front men for criminal and terrorist acts.

Over the last couple of years, there have been other cases of dissident Pakistanis (both Baloch) dying under extremely mysterious circumstances. One such incident happened in Sweden, and the other in Canada. Both were explained away by local authorities as accident or suicide, and not murder. But the London case which was pre-empted, suggests that there was more to these two incidents than is being said by the Sweden or Canadian police. Even if the trail on the cases in Sweden and Canada has run cold, the FATF should demand an explanation from Pakistan on the money laundering in the London case. The Europeans too should ask the Pakistanis some tough questions because the London case documents reveal that there were other Pakistanis dissidents in continental Europe who were on a hit list. This hit list included a journalist in France as well.

It will be nothing short of criminal for the FATF to ignore the latest revelations that have come in the London as well as the Paris cases. Nothing exposes Pakistan’s deceit and deception on AML/CFT more than these cases, which should now become a test case to judge not just Pakistan’s delivery on its high-level commitments to FATF but also to judge the international community’s commitment to stop the export of criminality from Pakistan.

L'articolo The Pakistan’s Problems proviene da InsideOver.

The Horn of Africa region has been the scene of one of the longest insurgencies in the world. Although Somalia is at the epicentre of the crisis, Islamist militants have managed to spread their activities throughout the region. Despite numerous efforts to eliminate al-Shabaab, the group has remained active and dangerous.

The rise and endurance of al-Shabaab

The Islamist insurgency in Somalia dates back to the early 2000s when the Islamic Courts Union (al-Ittihad Mahakem al-Islamiya – hereafter ICU) was established in order to create an Islamic state. Although the ICU had managed to occupy most of south and central Somalia by the summer of 2006, the group was eventually defeated by the Ethiopian-backed Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The Mujahideen Youth Movement (Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen – hereafter Al-Shabaab) was formed sometime in 2006 by members of the ICU who vowed to continue the war against TFG and its Ethiopian allies.

The al-Shabaab is not a typical non-state armed group. Although it has lost territory over the years, the group has functioned as a proto-state in parts of the country still under its control. The implementation of a harsh version of Sharia has reduced violence and has increased sympathies among many Somalis who are tired of lawlessness and insecurity. Αl-Shabaab has even developed its own environmental policy. In July 2018, for example, the group declared a ban on single-use plastic bags because they are “a serious threat to both humans and livestock” and banned the logging of rare trees.

The endurance of al-Shabaab is phenomenal. The group still has thousands of experienced fighters across several provinces. Roland Marchal argues that the impressive survival of al-Shabaab is the result of widespread mistrust towards conventional clan-based politics among Somali youth, who seek a new ideological alternative. Al-Shabaab has presented itself as a vanguard movement fighting a war against literally everyone, namely corrupt locals (warlords), aggressive neighbours (Ethiopia, Kenya), and imperialist powers (the U.S. and Europe). This may be why the al-Shabaab insurgency has even attracted Muslims from abroad.

The role of the Somali diaspora

Al-Shabaab has recruited both diaspora Somalis and converts. In October 2008, Shirwa Ahmed, a Somali American from Minneapolis, became the first American suicide bomber to blow himself up outside a government compound in northern Somalia. In September 2010, a Somali American from Seattle launched a suicide attack against an African Union base in Mogadishu, killing 21 peacekeepers. According to an investigative report produced by the U.S. Congress’ Committee on Homeland Security, at least 40 or more American Muslims have joined al-Shabaab and 15 of them have been killed fighting in Somalia. In December 2012, Craig Baxam, a former US soldier converted to Islam, was arrested in Kenya while trying to travel to Somalia. He was self-radicalised through the Internet and decided to join al-Shabaab to defend territories controlled by the Islamists. Besides being foot soldiers, American Muslims have also risen to leadership positions. The American convert Omar Shafik Hammami (also known as Abu Mansuur alAmriki) was a senior member of al-Shabaab who published online his autobiography, The Story of an American Jihadi, describing his own radicalisation trajectory. To sum up, al-Shabaab has developed a sophisticated recruitment strategy to attract disenfranchised youth from Somalia and the diaspora alike.

The spillover effect

Since 2010, al-Shabaab has launched many attacks outside Somalia. The 2013 attack against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi attracted world media attention due to the presence of many Western civilians. In April 2015, a group of al-Shabaab fighters stormed the Garissa University campus in northeastern Kenya killing dozens of students. In early January of this year, al-Shabaab militants attacked communities in Kenya’s coastal Lamu region that borders Somalia. The group has extended its operations in the neighbouring country for two reasons.

First, the group does not see itself exclusively as a local group. Instead, it has developed a regional identity seeking to penetrate Muslim communities in Kenya. This is an ideological commitment that runs very deep. Al-Shabaab is the strongest jihadi-Salafi organisation in the region, but it has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has constructed a new transnational identity to promote its utopian vision of an Islamist takeover of the world. This new post-territorial identity aimed at creating a Homus Islamicus who would live and die by the Quran and the Kalashnikov. This new man would have allegiance to the umma and not his country of origin. Likewise, al-Shabaab has gone through a process of ideological transformation adopting a new modus operandi: the pursuit of a regional war

Second, the expansion of al-Shabaab’s reach can be viewed as a strategy of offensive defence against the United States and Kenya. In early January 2020, for example, a group of al-Shabaab assailants attacked a U.S base in eastern Kenya killing three Americans. It was obviously a response to the U.S. involvement in counterterrorism operations which have eliminated many senior al-Shabaab operatives. At the same time, Kenya is more than just a host to the U.S. Special Forces. Indeed, Kenyan troops have fought against al-Shabaab since October 2011. The Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) was launched by the Kenya Defence Forces to eliminate al-Shabaab from the border areas. The Kenyan forces later joined the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON) to stabilise the country. Since then, Nairobi has played an increasingly important role in overt and convert counterterrorism efforts in neighbouring Somalia.

The future of al-Shabaab

The group has suffered from several setbacks over years. Indeed, it has not been immune to internal disputes and external pressures. For example, ISIS criticised al-Shabaab for its allegiance to al-Qaeda and attempted to penetrate the organisation. Yet, the group has been able to maintain its autonomy, albeit as the al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate.

There are two factors that can have significant impact on al-Shabaab’s endurance and capacity to carry out attacks. First, the availability or lack of human resources can directly affect the group’s ability to execute operations. Second, ample access to diverse sources of funding can help al-Shabaab to sustain its presence in southern Somalia and possibly northern Kenya; without significant financial resources al-Shabaab would not be able to win many battles.

And, yet, al-Shabaab can survive if counterterrorism efforts start appearing more like foreign interventions. Islamist militancy is a symptom of a failed society that still shares a sense of common identity and national pride.

*Dr Emmanuel Karagiannis is a Reader in International Security at King’s College London’s Department of Defence Studies.

L'articolo Horn of Africa: The endless insurgency of al-Shabaab proviene da InsideOver.

Taliban in Kabul is eager to sport a moderate image. So are their sponsors in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.  it does not come as a surprise that the transformation of Mujahideen (freedom fighters) into Talibs (students in Pashto language) and now their rooting for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Empty coffers amidst scenes of chaos and bloodshed beamed into drawing rooms across the world have their own sobering effect on Taliban. So much so, a photograph that showed a Taliban spokesman being interviewed by a woman reporter of local TV is nothing short of a PR coup. Whether deliberate or accidental it served as the booster dose needed to reassure the world that Taliban 2.0 is truly different and they have changed in between 1996 and 2001.

Violence was an indispensable trait of Taliban in 1996.  The ‘transfer of power’ in 2021 was without any bloodshed.  The scenes at the Kabul airport and demonstrations against the takeover are simply tailor made to pump prime trustworthiness.

The Talibs trained in Pakistani Islamist schools are not known to honour their promises; they have been breaching their agreements with impunity. The do not respect the Pakhtoon code of honor which bars targeting women, and the unarmed.  They had promised peace after an agreement signed in Doha two years ago, but they returned to their violent ways shortly after.

Some gestures, some words and an odd photograph are not the barometer to gauge the change of heart. The Taliban have since invoked Sharia law and made it binding on women in particular. Clearly, the new Taliban frown upon the freedom Afghan women enjoyed for the 20 years that they werent there.  That was why even in the TV show designed to serve as PR, the woman reporter was seen sitting several yards away from the Taliban spokesman. Put simply, PR illusions and diversionary assurances have a short lifespan.

Pakistan’s role in the formation and support of the taliban contributes to the trust deficit Taliban suffers from. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is their creator and supporter; their creation was for creating a foothold in Kabul to secure the larger interests of Pakistan in the Middle East and Central Asia. This is what Pakistan sees as its strategic depth beyond Durand Line that divides the two countries.

There are reports that ISI had deployed its spies as liaison officers with the Taliban groups marching from across the country towards Kabul.

For Pakistan, Afghan Taliban and its offshoot, Haqqani Network are good Taliban, but Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP, is bad Taliban since they target Pakistani targets – soft and strategic alike.

Lending further credence to Pakistan factor vis-à-vis Taliban 2.0 is the statement of Interior Minister Sheikh Rasheed.

“Previously, Pakistan was supporting the US due to which TTP and Taliban were on the same page. That is not the case now,” Rashid was quoted as saying in a front-page dispatch in the Lahore based Daily Times on the 18th August. His comments appeared amidst reports that former deputy chief Maulana Faqir Mohammad and other key Pakistan Taliban commanders were released from Afghan jails.

“We have taken the Taliban on-board over the TTP issue. We told them that Pakistan will not allow its soil to be used against Afghanistan and we expect them not to allow the use of Afghan soil against us”, the minister stated. He, however, ducked questions on the role of Sirajuddin Haqqani, seen as Pakistan’s proxy, in the new dispensation, according to Daily Times. GHQ Shura reportedly told Taliban to induct Sirajuddin in the ruling Kabul circle.

The Taliban Pakistan link will remain for as long as terrorism is the key plank of Pakistan’s foreign and security policies targeted as much against India as facilitating the emergence of a new caliphate in the region and beyond.

The US is aware and monitors Pakistans involvement. Beijing is aware of Pakistan’s jihadi approach but has its geo-political compulsions, which range from contrasting the White House to checkmating insurgency in its own Uighur Muslim stronghold.

Russia is the odd man out in the Kabul theatre today. The desire to rewrite history and reclaim the lost glory is an overwhelming urge that made Moscow continue its engagement while it keeps Islamic terror at bay in the CIS states.

It is these concerns coupled with Pakistan’s quest for a larger than life role to control the Taliban’s finances that appear to reset the stage in Kabul.

Expectedly, the Pakistani establishment sees Indian ‘defeat’ in the return of Taliban. This is an extension of their India fixation that dates back to the day of their creation from British India.

Also,  during the past twenty years, India was actively helping Afghanistan to build its civic infrastructure – roads, schools, hospitals, and dams.  It was not Afghan specific outreach but Gandhian philosophy in action of helping less developed countries in whatever way possible.
Anyhow, India, unlike Pakistan’s Durand line conflict, has no dispute with Afghanistan.

Taliban 1.0 did not accept the Durand Line. Taliban 2.0 may do like-wise, as a part of its survival mantra.

Being Pashtun at the core, Taliban has an eye on the Pashtun speaking areas along the border on Pakistan side. It is too early to predict whether the Taliban will work to carve out a new buffer Pashtun state to undo an historical wrong.

But if it does, it will mean that the two-state theory which created India and Pakistan in 1947 will have failed a second time. The first time in 1971 with the creation if Bangladesh from Pakistan and now with the creation of a new pashtun state, which may lead to the balkanization of pakistan and creating a failed nuclear power.

L'articolo Has the Taliban changed? Taliban 2.0 has new PR but the fundamentals are the same proviene da InsideOver.

L'articolo Taliban have to decide on ties with islamist terror groups proviene da InsideOver.

The withdrawal of American troops has finally revealed the true essence of the so- called Afghan conflict – this is the Pakistani-Afghan hybrid war that Islamabad is waging against the government and people of Afghanistan at the hands of the Taliban militants.

Pakistan government needs Taliban to solve a strategic task – to overthrow the current President and the Government of Afghanistan and replace them with politicians controlled by Islamabad. Pakistani generals see the future of Afghanistan only as their colony or a vassal state and are busy recruiting thousands of militants from Pakistani cities and madrassas for the same. The relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan government remains mainly based on friendship and ideological sympathy.

Pakistan’s terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) have assured Mullah Yaqoob, deputy leader of the Taliban, of their full support in recruiting enough fighters for his group. They have already set up three new major camps in Tera Agency area in Pakistan to mobilize their fighters for fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistani military itself is providing training to around 5000 Taliban fighters in LeT’s training camps in Hyderabad, Punjab.

While some Pakistani terror groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), LeT, JeM, Lashkar-e-Islam, Jamat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), Tanzim-ul-Badr and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi are involved in fighting in eastern provinces like Kunar, Nuristan and Nangarhar, the Haqqani Network is fighting in Ghazni, Logar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Zabul, Kandahar and Helmand provinces. LeT has deployed around 7200 of its fighters in eastern Afghanistan. In Kunar province, the group’s military commander, Amer Saqib, has set up 6 camps under Al Qaida’s name. These fighters are being dispatched in groups of 200 members which include 3 to 8 suicide bombers and 5 to 10 Pakistani military officers. Around 300 fighters of LeT, JeM, Tanzim-al-Badr and other radical Pakistani groups have proceeded in three separate groups to Achin, Nazian and Bor Baba districts of Nangarhar province. Besides, 800 newly recruited fighters from LeT and Mojahidin-Al-Badr training camps have been sent to the military commission of Taliban out of which 600 will be deployed in eastern and northern provinces.

While Islamabad has been denying that “jihadis” from Pakistan are going to Afghanistan, the country has been receiving dead bodies of its citizens from across the border on the Chaman-Spin Boldak and Torkhum border crossings. According to locals in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, dozens of Pakistanis have been killed in Afghanistan in the past few months while fighting alongside the Taliban against the Afghan forces. Hundreds of people, locals said, had attended the funerals of the Pakistani fighters in various parts of the two provinces.

In mid-July, 22 year old Adul Rasheed was laid to rest in the suburbs of Peshawar city in the northwest. Rasheed, according to his family members, had gone to Afghanistan in May for ‘jihad’ and was recently killed in the Nangrahar province. His uncle Maroof Khan called Rasheed a source of inspiration for other young Pakistani jihadis fighting in Afghanistan. “Many of his young friends want to be martyred like him,” he said.

In Balochistan, funerals and prayers are frequently held in the Pashtun-speaking areas along the border with Afghanistan upon the arrival of dead bodies of local militants. “Funerals are held. The Taliban make speeches at funerals and congratulate families for their martyrs,” said a resident of the Panjpai town in Balochistan.

Though, Zahid Hafeez Chuadhary, Pakistan’s foreign office spokesperson, rejected reports about Pakistani jihadis fighting alongside the Taliban, Pakistan’s interior minister Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed recently admitted that the dead bodies arriving to the country were of the Afghan Taliban as families of many of them reside in Pakistan.

The Pakistan government must be held accountable for the mayhem it is orchestrating in Afghanistan. The FATF needs to watch closely as to how these terror groups, whose existence has been consistently denied by Pakistan, have come out in the open and in full force to support the Taliban in destroying the once magnificent country, Afghanistan.

L'articolo Pakistan Terror Groups join hands with Taliban to destroy Afghanistan proviene da InsideOver.

Taliban has stepped up its offensive, attacking Afghan cities and killing people in the backdrop of the US forces leaving the country after two decades of prolonged war. Now, the government in Kabul is trying its best to defend the country from Taliban and allied radical Islamist forces. However, Taliban continues to capture new areas and subsequently impose regime thatintends to take Afghanistan to old days under Taliban’s rule. It which means the non-existence of human values and even death punishment for petty crimes or violations of rules.The territories that have fallen to the Taliban in the past few days have witnessed horrors from the past. There have been reports of Talibani forces killing civilians and off-duty security personnel as well as bombing homes and assaulting women.Many such videos of atrocities by Talibani militants are going viral, which also show distressed Afghani people asking for global help.

As the Talibani militants are capturing cities, many people are migrating to other parts of the country, which are under the Kabul government, in order to escape brutal treatment. “We know that the Taliban have warned residents and have given some neighbourhoods time to leave their homes in a matter of hours,”reported TRT World’s correspondent Bilal Sarwary. “People continue to abandon their homes and livelihoods and move from one part of the city to another,”Sarwaryhas been covering the fighting between Taliban and Afghan forces. The assault on civilians by the Taliban has caused the deaths of hundreds of innocent people including children. Over 900,000 people are reported to have been displaced after the Taliban launched attacks on civilian areas in the past three months.

The Taliban forces are setting homes of average, unarmed Afghan families on fire and even using civilians as a human shield during the gun-battles with armed forces. Mohammad Nazar, a resident of Tazarigh village in Kaldar district of Balkh in northern Afghanistansaid the Taliban was assisted by foreign militants from Pakistan when homes in his village were destroyed. “Here it was our home. The Taliban, who are the slaves of Pakistan, came here and destroyed our homes, they planted mines here,” he told media.

Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) has reported that as many as 2,957 civilians casualties were reported in the first six months of 2021, of which 1,213 deaths were deaths. Taliban was responsible for 48.5 percent of these civilian casualties. Now, the UK and the US have accused the Taliban of ‘massacring civilians’ in possible ‘war crimes’ in Spin Boldak, south Afghanistan. Taliban took 900 people out of their homes and shot them to death.“The Taliban’s leadership must be held responsible for the crimes of their fighters The Taliban massacred dozens of civilians in revenge killings. These murders could constitute war crimes,” the US and the UK embassies said.

And women are worse affected by the Taliban brutalities. They are being beaten in public and even killed. Innocent Afghani women are being forced into “jihad al-nikah”, in which daughters and wives are forcefully sent to terrorists to serve them sexually.Former US president George W. Bush has feared that Afghan women and girls are going to “suffer unspeakable harm.” It led him to question the decision to pull out troops, which led to the war-torn country being swallowed by Talibani militants. “I think the consequences are going to be unbelievably bad,” he said.

Now, Taliban militants are trying to impose rigid and suppressive rules based on Sharia laws in the area they have captured recently.New fatwas (decrees) issued by them forbid women from going out of their homes without male companions while forces men to grow a beard. They also have come up with dowry regulations for girls, said Merajuddin Sharifi, a social activist. They urged women in a statement to not leave home without a male relative. Taliban insist on trials without evidence,” he said. There are a few more sanctions on women. Now they should not ride a taxi and be always covered ina burqa.Revoking old memories, the Taliban has banned the production and distribution of music or any audio-visual entertainment.

L'articolo Taliban kills civilians, assault women as they capture new areas Afghanistan proviene da InsideOver.