On Friday, November 27 the highest-ranking scientist behind Iran’s nuclear programs Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was mysteriously ambushed and killed in a small city in northern Iran. For decades, the United States and Israel have regarded him as the key figure secretly spearheading Tehran’s country’s efforts to develop an atomic warhead.

Who Was Behind the Fakhrizadeh Assassination?

A number of American officials — including sources from the US secret services — have said that Israel was behind the assassination of Iran’s leading nuclear scientist, as he had long been on the Mossad’s list of top targets. The ambuscade, which consisted of reportedly five or six men, was set up in Absard, a small city in Iran’s northern Damavand region, where Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was travelling in his car. According to Iranian reports, an explosion preceded gunfire.

“Terrorists murdered an eminent Iranian scientist today,” Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif reacted on Twitter. “This cowardice — with serious indications of Israeli role — shows desperate warmongering of perpetrators.” 

Iran soon vowed to take retaliatory action. The country’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that Iran will pursue those behind the assassination and punish both “its perpetrators and those who commanded it.” Echoing him, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said the Iranian people “are braver than to leave this criminal act unanswered” and promised a response “in due time” as he blamed Israel.

Project 110 and Fakhrizadeh’s True Identity

Iran had long depicted Mohsen Fakhrizadeh as a mere academic who taught at the Imam Hossein University, a public university in Tehran which is under the authority of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

But as early as the 2000s, at least, intelligence reports in the United States focused on the mysterious figure and disclosed key information about him. In 2007, a CIA assessment made for the Bush Administration revealed that Fakhrizadeh’s academic profession was a cover story.

In fact, Fakhrizadeh had been running what Iran labelled “Project 110” and “Project 111” — a complex endeavor aimed to create a nuclear warhead that is small enough to fit into a missile but which holds out against the pressure of re-entering into the atmosphere.

“He was their senior-most nuclear scientist and was believed to be responsible for Iran’s covert nuclear program,” a former Pentagon Middle East policy top official told the New York Times. “He was also a senior officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and that will magnify Iran’s desire to respond by force.”

2018: Israel Names Fakhrizadeh Enemy Number One

In 2018, Israel’s Mossad stole documents from an Iranian warehouse that held documentations of a program named the “Amad Project”. Relying on those documents in a televised presentation, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also revealed Fakhrizadeh’s role to be of extreme significance and named him Israel’s public enemy number one.

Netanyahu said that even after the Amad Project was abandoned Fakhrizadeh had kept it secretly alive. He added that the project was now run by an organization within Iran’s defense ministry known as the Organization of of Defensive Innovation and Research (Sazman-e Pazhouheshhaye Novin-e Defa’i or SPND) which was also led by Fakhrizadeh.

Why Was Fakhrizadeh Killed Now?

On November 12, President Donald Trump told senior advisers in the Oval Office that he wanted to strike Iran’s nuclear site in Natanz, but his advisers soon dissuaded him, fearing the beginning of an unprecedented armed conflict. The day before, Trump had dismissed his then Pentagon chief Mark Esper.

As he is expected to concede the American election in January, Trump is now focused on sabotaging any possible diplomacy between the United States and Iran under President-elect Joe Biden and a prospective return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the 2015 nuclear deal from which Trump withdrew in 2018).

Had it taken place earlier this month, the strike would have wrecked that possibility beyond repair. But the killing of Fakhrizadeh — which occurred shortly after Netanyahu met Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman for the first time — certainly sought to reach the same end goal. 

By baiting Iran into retaliation, Israel — along with its regional allies — is trying to escalate already fuming tensions i the region and impede any negotiation with Iran in the future. Still, the targeting and killing of Iranian nuclear scientists — and others — in Iran is nothing new.

While many Iranians mourned the death of Fakhrizadeh and took to the streets to demand severe retaliation, some blamed the killing on repeated breache in Iran’s national security. Indeed, on August 7, al-Qaeda’s second-highest leader, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (who went by the nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Masri), was gunned down in broad daylight in the streets of Tehran by Israeli agents on a motorcycle.

A History of Israeli Breaches of Iranian Security

“Over the current decade, several top Iranian scientists have been targeted and assassinated in terrorist attacks and our firm evidence clearly indicates that certain foreign quarters have been behind such assassinations,” Majid Takht-Ravanchi, the Ambassador of Iran to United Nations, wrote in a letter addressed to UN leader Antonio Gueterres and the UN Security Council following the death of Fakhrizadeh.

Almost precisely 10 years ago, on November 29, 2010, two Iranian nuclear scientists were targeted in coordinated bomb attacks, when attackers rode motorcycles and stuck bombs on their cars. However, only one of them, Majid Shahriar, was killed in that specific attack. 

A number of other targeted killings happened later, while Stuxnet — a computer virus believed to be an Israeli and American creation — destroyed Iranian nuclear centrifuges, including in Natanz.

In July of this year, an mysterious explosion took place at a nuclear research and development center at Natanz. Israel, which vowed to destroy Iran’s hopes to develop nuclear weapons at all costs, also has a history of bombing plants in Syria and Iraq.

Will Iran Strike Back?

Germany, which is a key US ally in Europe, urged the two sides not to allow the last weeks of the Trump administration to obliterate hopes for new negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.

“A few weeks before the new US administration takes office, it is important to preserve the scope for talks with Iran so that the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program can be resolved through negotiations,” the German foreign ministry said in a statement. “We therefore urge all parties to refrain from any steps that could lead to a further escalation of the situation.”

But Iran, which has suffered two major killings this year — the first being the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, then the highest-ranking individual in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — seems to be more intent on revenge than ever before.

“We assure you that we will not rest until we track down and take revenge on those responsible for the assassination of martyr Fakhrizadeh,” Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff for the Iranian armed forces, said in a statement responding to the assassination.

Meanwhile Israeli and American missions in neighboring countries have been put on high alert since the killing.

L'articolo Killing of Iran’s Top Nuclear Scientist Escalates Middle East Tensions proviene da InsideOver.

On Sunday, November 22, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took a direct flight to Saudi Arabia, marking an unprecedented event in Middle Eastern history and the two countries increasingly close covert partnership.

In Neom — a planned futuristic city in northwestern Saudi Arabia — Netanyahu was accompanied by Mossad chief Yossi Coen and met with Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

So far, Saudi Arabia has denied the occurrence of the secret meeting. But numerous reports citing top Israeli officials — including a recent story from the Wall Street Journal — claim otherwise.

According to the reports, the two countries’ leaders met to discuss the rising tensions with Iran and, most importantly, a prospective normalization of their diplomatic ties — all in the wake of US presidential elections that disfavored President Donald Trump.

A Biden presidency is likely to hold up the process of normalization as well as Israel’s sweeping annexation of occupied territories in Palestine, as a Biden administration also likely aims to reenter a nuclear deal with Iran.

A Quick Move During a Global Political Shift

Saudi Arabia’s prospective formalization of diplomatic ties with Israel is being pushed forward with increasing momentum in an attempt to complete it before President-elect Joe Biden takes office in January. It comes along with the recent wave of normalization between Arab countries and Israel encouraged by Trump.

The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan all signed agreements to establish formal ties with Israel recently, whereas Egypt and Jordan already reached peace agreements with Israel in the late 1970s and early 1990s.

President-elect Biden made it clear during his campaign that he would return to the Iran nuclear deal, otherwise known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The deal was concluded during the Obama presidency in which Biden served as vice president.

Biden also said he would reconsider US-Saudi ties, particularly in arms deals in the light of Saudi Arabia’s bloody intervention in Yemen, as well as regarding the country’s human rights record following the killing of American resident and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018.

Saudi Arabia and Israel vs. Biden and the Iran Deal

Moreover, the occurrence of the meeting between Netanyahu and Mohamed bin Salman, which took place in the same weekend after the virtually held G20 Summit, signals that two countries are willing to put in unprecedented efforts to counter a nuclear Iran, further challenging Biden.

Shortly after returning to Tel Aviv, Netanyahu reiterated his view on the nuclear deal with Iran. “Do not return to the previous nuclear deal,” he said, clearly addressing the incoming administration in the United States.

“We must maintain an uncompromising policy to ensure Iran does not develop nuclear weapons.”

Israeli Minister of Education: ‘An Amazing Achievement’

Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan promptly denied the allegations that the meeting between Mohamed bin Salman and Benjamin Netanyahu took place.

For his part, however, Netanyahu neither denied nor confirmed the reports, but his education minister, Yoav Galant, called the event “an amazing achievement” in an interview with Army Radio, a national radio network operated by the Israeli Defense Forces.

“Let us say that the very existence of the meeting, the fact that it was put on publicly, even if it is only half-official at the moment, is a matter of great importance from any aspect and matter,” Galant said.

On the night of the meeting, flight-tracking websites showed a business jet (bizjet t7-cpx) that belonged to an Israeli businessman, Udi Angel, to have flown from Tel Aviv to Neom. According to Israeli media, Netanyahu has used the same jet to go overseas on multiple occasions in the past.

Wrapping up a ten-day farewell tour in Europe and the Middle East, Pompeo was also present in Neom during the same time as the jet stayed in the city. Israeli media also reported that Netanyahu — in addition to Mossad chief Yossi Coen — was also accompanied by his National Security Adviser Meir Ben-Shabbat and his Military Secretary Avi Bluth.

What’s in It for Both Nations?

Although it worked with the United States to forward the normalization of ties between the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan, Saudi Arabia has traditionally been coy about publicizing its relations with Israel.

Riyadh had once put Palestinian statehood as the sine qua none for a potential normalization with Israel. It even proposed in 2002 to recognize Israel, but only if the Palestinians first obtained their own state.

But Riyadh’s tone has increasingly shifted in the last months, and even more so in the weeks that preceded the US presidential elections.

Saudi media has grown more easygoing with topics exploring Israeli politics and culture lately, and even broadcasted a long interview with a former ambassador to Washington and intelligence chief, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, that scolded Palestinian leadership.

For Riyadh, formalizing ties with Israel is one way to restore its image with Washington under Biden and further deter criticism over its human rights violations and war crimes in Yemen.

In the meantime, Israel could also benefit significantly from Saudi recognition, since the Gulf monarchy holds significant religious and cultural power in the Arab world as the guardian of key Islamic shrines and holy sites including the Kaaba.

Israeli officials also suggested that a lack of protests in Israel and the United Arab Emirates following the Abraham Accords shows that the deal would come about smoothly for the two countries in the event that they do declare formal diplomatic ties.

L'articolo Israel and Saudi Arabia Are Closer Than Ever to Normalization proviene da InsideOver.

On Wednesday, November 11, Moscow published a draft agreement to establish a logistics hub for its navy in the African nation of Sudan.

The agreement, which was signed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin a week earlier on November 6, envisions the hosting of up to 300 Russian troops and four warships at a time, including those equipped with nuclear capability.

The location coordinates of the navy hub, as per the agreement, suggest that it will be located in the city of Port Sudan, which sits more or less equidistant from Egypt, Eritrea and — across the Red Sea — Saudi Arabia.

Russia will also be able to import and export weapons and supplies for the warships with no payment of a duty or tax and no scrutiny from the country’s authorities.

A Project Dating From al-Bashir’s Time

Schemes for such a project are not recent. Omar al-Bashir, who ruled Sudan for three decades until he was overthrown following a coup d’état in 2019, had already made it public in 2017 that he and his Russian counterpart — and key ally — President Vladimir Putin were discussing the prospects of establishing a naval base on the coast of Sudan.

In December of that same year, Russia also signed an agreement with Sudan on developing a nuclear plant in African country. During that time, al-Bashir was still wanted by the International Criminal Court for the Darfur genocide.

Pressed by the West — and, most notably, by the United States — al-Bashir pushed to build stronger ties with Moscow. In his 2017 meeting with Putin, he even offered to construct an airbase for Russia near the Red Sea coast and to re-equip the Sudanese Army with Russian weapons, including SU-30 fighter jets and surface-to-air missiles.

Russia’s Presence in Africa

Russia stands out in Africa as a major supplier of weapons, as it accounts for almost half of the continent’s arms imports. Between 2015 and 2019, 49% of military equipment imported to the continent were from Russia, whereas US arms exports only accounted for 14% and China’s for 13%.

Currently, the Sudanese Army is said to be 60% equipped with Russian — or Soviet — military hardware. Sudan is Russia’s third biggest arms importer in Africa, standing behind Algeria (first) and Egypt.

Russia is also reportedly building military bases in six African countries. According to Bild, a German newspaper, those six countries Central African Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Madagascar and, besides Sudan, Mozambique.

Bordering Sudan in the south, Eritrea is also expecting a similar agreement to build a logistics base for the Russia navy on its coast, which stands closer to Yemen and the Horn of Africa, whereas Egypt had already signed a deal allowing Russian warplanes to use Egyptian military bases.

With or Without al-Bashir

Although Putin supported al-Bashir throughout the period of protests, he nonetheless recognized the interim Military Transitional Council (MTC) immediately after al-Bashir was ousted in April 2019.

The transitional leaders were then feared to pose a bigger challenge for Moscow, as the interim government seemed friendlier to Riyadh and Washington, in contrast to al-Bashir.

Yet the long-awaited naval deal came even shortly after Sudan was urged to normalize its ties with Israel, one of Washington’s major allies in the region, in order to be removed from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

Taking part in a UN anti-piracy effort, the Russian navy is temporarily based in Djibouti, which hosts permanent military bases of major world powers, including the United States and China. But after Djibouti rejected Russia’s request to make the Russian navy’s presence permanent in 2016, Moscow soon approached Khartoum.

Moreover, Russia has also invested significantly in the energy and mineral industries in Sudan, as well as in other African countries. Thus, having its own port in the Red Sea could prove highly profitable.

L'articolo Russia Finds a New Regional Stronghold in Sudan proviene da InsideOver.

On October 27, precisely one month after the war broke out in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Tehran dispatched its deputy foreign minister Abbas Araghchi to the capital of Azerbaijan.

In Baku, the Iranian envoy discussed an initiative with Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and other Azeri officials to end the relentless conflict in the mountainous enclave between Azerbaijan and Armenia over territories that Tehran still deems to be occupied by Armenian forces.

“We always support Azerbaijan’s efforts to liberate its occupied cities and areas,” Araghchi said in Baku. “The territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and other countries in the region, and the inviolability of borders are an important and irreproachable principle that must be respected,” he added.

From Baku, Tehran’s envoy then flew to Moscow, which stands out almost alone as Armenia’s supporter against Azerbaijan. In Russia, like in Azerbaijan, the initiative appeared to draw appreciation, as Moscow openly said later that it would welcome the initiative presented by Tehran.

A Viable Balance

After weeks of reticence, Russia finally took a stand favoring Armenia, with which it has significant military deals, whereas Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan seems to know no setbacks.

Unlike Russia and Turkey, however, Iran has more or less equidistant relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and it sees a space to fill in the gap left by the two belligerents’ refusal to commit to peacemaking.

Heavily affected by economic sanctions as it still grapples with the COVID-19 pandemic, Tehran could at last bring its diplomacy to restore its reputation on a regional and global scale.

As far as religion and ethnicity are concerned, Iran is doubtless closer to Azerbaijan than it is to Armenia. The majority of the Azerbaijan’s population are Shia Muslim, while the Azeri people constitute the largest ethnic minority in Iran.

Armenia, on the other hand, is one of Iran’s most strategic allies in the region as well as an essential trade partner. In 2018, trade relation between the two countries hit an all-time record high, despite the economic sanctions imposed on Tehran.

Moreover, Iran borders both Azerbaijan and Armenia, and, in addition to its cordial diplomatic ties with both sides, Tehran has a history of mediation in the two countries’ decades-long conflict.

Iran’s Conundrum

If Iran has managed to safeguard equal relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, however, it surely did so on account of the fact that it needs both countries equally — not least in a context of global discontent and economic sanctions.

On October 1, four iranian political representatives from provinces highly populated with Azeri ethnic groups released a joint statement that declared full support for Azerbaijan, claiming the war was an act of aggression from Armenia. Yet, that same day, Iran also reportedly opened its airspace for Russian military supplies bound for Armenia.

In addition to Turkey, which has long been at odds with Iran in Syria by supporting the opposition of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Israel – Iran’s regional arch foe – has also provided significant help for Azerbaijan, with which it has long established economic, military and intelligence cooperation.

Some even expected that Azerbaijan’s relation with Ankara and Tel Aviv would push Iran to stand with Armenia. Yet, in that case, Iran could easily face unrest among its Azeri population, as one of its major concerns regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains a potential spillover of violence into its own national territory.

Moreover, energy cooperation with Azerbaijan, notably in the Caspian Sea, could prove essentially beneficial to Iran in the event that economic sanctions are lifted. Tehran also hopes to join the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline to export energy to EU countries. All the same, Armenia has proved to be a strategic help for Iran to circumvent international sanctions imposed on its energy and banking sectors.

The Minsk Group’s Failure

After his visit to Azerbaijan and Russia, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Armenia, where he met with the country’s Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and discussed the human rights of the Armenian ethnic groups living in the disputed territories.

Echoing Russia, Armenia also said it would welcome Iran’s initiative to end the Nagorno-Karabakh fighting, for which Iran vehemently blames the Minsk Group – save Russia.

“Some of the member countries of this group are not even in the region and their inefficiency has been proven,” Araghchi said in Armenia, conspicuously pointing an accusing finger at France and the United States, who, he added, have “no real desire to establish peace.”

The Iranian envoy then traveled to Ankara, where he met Turkey’s Foreign Minister Sedat Onal.

So far, reports suggest that thousands of people, with civilians among them, have already died in the conflict, as three ceasefire agreements have been breached. Unlike Russia, Iran is less likely to pick one side at the detriment of the other. It could thus bring about the needed neutrality, a sine qua none for ending the conflict.

L'articolo Stagnation in Nagorno-Karabakh Presents a Chance for Tehran proviene da InsideOver.

On Monday, October 20, US President Donald Trump announced in a tweet that Sudan was finally to be removed from the US state sponsor of terrorism list. The long-awaited decision came only after the Sudanese government agreed to pay a sum of $335 million to victims and families of two 1998 bombings of US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and an attack on an American Navy destroyer in Yemen in 2000.

Trump: Sudan’s New Government is ‘Making Great Progress’

“New Government of Sudan, which is making great progress, agreed to pay $335 MILLION to U.S. terror victims and families,” Trump said in the tweet. “Once deposited, I will lift Sudan from State Sponsor of Terrorism list.”

Al Qaeda claimed all the attacks to which Sudan’s former regime, led by the fallen dictator Omar al-Bashir, was accused of providing support.

However, the country was added to the list in 1993, prior to the bombings, joining Syria, Iran and North Korea. It was accused of providing support to militant groups, including Al Qaeda, as well as hosting Osama Bin Laden, who stayed in the country from 1991 to 1996 before being expelled.

In August, a former defense minister of Sudan during the time of Bin Laden’s stay, said the United States had refused an offer from Sudan to hand over Bin Laden.

Economic Consequences of Being on the List

Sudan’s inclusion in the list had been disputed since last year, at least, when the former president al-Bashir was toppled in a coup. Many Sudanese have argued that Al-Bashir and his regime, which had ruled the country for 30 years, are the ones to be held accountable, not the new government.

Having its name included in the four-country list, Sudan saw its economy deteriorate over the years, as its designation as terrorism sponsor led to a number of restrictions in foreign assistance, exports and sales, as well as in financial transactions, pushing away foreign investments and commercial banks.

The United States resumed talks of removal from the list as soon as the new government was appointed in Sudan.

“The Sudanese reminded me that they would love to get off that list and we always measure twice and cut once before we remove someone from a list like that,” US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in February 2020.

The United States even offered $80 million in humanitarian aid earlier this year, to help the country fight against the pandemic. Yet Sudan had turned down the offer, mainly because the Trump Administration highlighted the prerequisite of normalizing ties with Israel.

Further pressure was then exerted on Sudan last summer and the country’s interim government grew more lenient.

Why Now?

This year’s pandemic has made it even worse for the African country’s economy, as nearly half of the Sudanese population live in poverty. Last month alone, Sudan’s annual inflation rose to 212%.

Some even dispute Sudan’s ability to pay such a big sum of money, but the reopening of the country and its normalization of relations with other countries proved urgent. Moreover, the timing of such a move falls perfectly in line with President Trump’s “peace” efforts in the Middle East, engaging Arab countries with Israel, as he campaigns for his re-election in the upcoming US presidential vote next month.

Until last month, Egypt and Jordan were the only Arab countries with formal diplomatic relations with Israel. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain then followed, after signing diplomatic deals with Israel in September.

Now, Sudan is unquestionably seen as the next country to normalize its ties with Israel, while it aspires to be removed from the state sponsors of terrorism list.

The Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and other officials had long objected to the idea, even as recently as last month. But Israel have already worked with Sudan — although quietly, like it did with the United Arab Emirates — over the past year.

In February, Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu met with Sudan’s de facto leader, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Uganda in talks arranged by the Emiratis. Days later, Sudan allowed Israeli commercial flights in its airspace.

L'articolo Why is Sudan Being Removed from the US Terrorist List? proviene da InsideOver.

The Republic of Turkey has never been so involved militarily in other countries as it is at this point in time. Ankara’s military operations in the past years in Libya, Syria, Iraq and, most recently, Azerbaijan, are telling signs of its hegemonic aspirations.

Today, the Turkish Armed Forces hold bases and facilities in all the aforementioned countries, as well as in Cyprus, Qatar and Somalia, and Ankara’s involvement in Arab countries wracked by years of war has plainly revealed Turkish President Recep Erdogan dramatic geopolitical ambitions.

After successfully tipping the balance in Libya by pushing back Khalifa Haftar’s offensive against Fayez al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA) — mainly to safeguard a maritime delimitation agreement between Tripoli and Ankara — Erdogan’s last maneuver takes place in the South Caucasus, ethnic Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh are engaged in renewed fighting over the disputed territory that’s legally considered part of Azerbaijan and that’s regarded by the Armenians as the Republic of Artsakh.

A Failed Ceasefire Agreement

Both the United States and Russia, who are members of the OSCE Minsk Group (along with France), see the Turkish intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh as the main cause of the continuation and aggravation of the conflict.

After a first ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia fell through this past week, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo blamed Turkey blatantly and called for settling the conflict diplomatically anew.

“The resolution of that conflict ought to be done through negotiation and peaceful discussions, not through armed conflict, and certainly not with third-party countries coming in to lend their firepower to what is already a powder keg of a situation,” Pompeo said, pointing fingers at Turkey.

Ankara had already anticipated that the ceasefire agreement, which was brokered by Russia last weekend, would not last. Briefly afterward, indeed, attacks on both sides resumed and the two belligerents, Armenia and Azerbaijan, both accused each other of having first breached the agreement.

‘The Conflict Depends on Turkey’

For Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the conflict now depends on Turkey’s stance, not on Azerbaijan, which greatly depends on Ankara’s military support, and even less on Armenia, which has suffered great losses so far.

“I’m convinced that for as long as Turkey’s position remains unchanged, Azerbaijan will not stop fighting,” Pashinyan said.

Even after the brief ceasefire agreement, Azerbaijan made it clear that it aimed at recapturing more territories that it said Armenian ethnic groups had occupied. (Though falling within Azeri borders, the Nagorno Karabakh has long been home to a majority of Armenians who often voiced their aspiration for separation from Azerbaijan and self-determination.)

For so doing, however, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev heavily relies on the support his Turkish counterpart —as well as the backing of other countries that provide military support, such as Israel.

Turkey’s Ever-growing Support

So far, Turkey’s military exports to Azerbaijan have increased by six times compared to last year. Some reports even suggested that Turkey’s weapon exports to Azerbaijan knew a significant surge weeks before the Nagorno Karabakh conflict broke out last September.

Russia, which has long had almost equidistant ties with both Azerbaijan and Armenia, was compelled by Turkey’s intervention to take an abrupt decision. In contrast to its relation with Azerbaijan, Russia has military deals with Armenia.

Analysts are expecting that the conflict would not come to resolution so long as Turkey stands out as the only foreign actor — particularly as Ankara proved unwilling to back away.

Turkey also stirred unfavorable reactions this week as it deployed its maritime research ship Oruç Reis in energy-rich waters already disputed by Greece and Cyprus, despite sanction warnings from France and Germany. Erdogan also announced that another prospecting ship called the Yavuz would soon resume its mission near Cypriot shores.

What Next for Russia?

While the United States is preoccupied with upcoming elections, Russia has been reticent with regards Turkey’s patent zeal for regional hegemony, despite many standoffs already in Syria, Iraq and Libya.

But could the situation at the Nagorno Karabakh enclave bring Moscow’s patience to a breaking point?

Last Friday, on October 16, Russia’s state-run news agency RIA reported that the Russian navy had started planned military exercises in the Caspian Sea, which borders Azerbaijan from the east. Russia already holds a military base in Armenia, and Yerevan is a member of both the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, which are both led by Moscow.

L'articolo Turkey’s Growing Interventionism Calls for Radical Policies From US and Russia proviene da InsideOver.

More than a week of renewed vicious fighting has passed in the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, with the death toll brought to over 230 this past weekend. Many civilians were hit in bombings and attacks in the disputed territory as well as in other places. Yet even as many countries have called for peace, the two belligerents, Azerbaijan and Armenia, seem to be stepping up their fight.

Armenia vs. Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan claims the disputed territory, which has a long history of confrontations between Armenian and Azeri ethnicities, while the territory is home to a majority of Armenians. While these Armenians demand unification, Azerbaijani officials called them “occupiers” and said that there will be no end to the conflict so long as they stayed.

Armenia and its military forces “need to leave our territory, and then the war will stop and the conflict will come to an end,” Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev declared.

Echoing President Aliyev’s statement, Turkey’s leader Recep Erdogan also called for an end to the “occupation” of the disputed territory by Armenians and said Turkey was at the disposition of Azerbaijan “with all its resources and heart”.

Russia as a Mediator

Russia has long been the main player in the decades-long Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and thought it had it under control. In came Turkey, however, and the regional settings were disrupted.

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are former Soviet Republics, and even in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s Russia has remained deeply influential on both countries.

A member of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, Russia has been calling for an end to the conflict since the re-establishing of national borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Over the years, it succeeded in tipping the balance between the antagonistic neighbors, mainly by selling to each of them weapons and maintaining a more or less equal influence on their affairs.

Yet the recent outbreak of renewed fighting, which marks a spike in decades of intermittent fighting between the two sides, has compelled Russia to put more efforts into settling the urgent question. Moreover, Turkey’s coming into the game puts Russia in an even tighter and delicate spot – Putin must make a one-sided and clear decision now about what Russia will do.

The Turkish Factor

Azerbaijan, which appears to be prevailing, rejoiced in the adamant support from Erdogan. Both France and Russia have accused Turkey of deploying Syrian militiamen to fight along Azerbaijani forces in the conflict. In addition, Turkey is said to have provided drones and warplanes to Azerbaijan, which is now far superior in the air.

Soon after the war was declared, Armenia said that Turkey had a “direct presence on the ground” and that Turkish military experts were “fighting side by side” with Azerbaijan.

Thus, like in Syria and Libya, Russia finds itself in a standoff – and a proxy fight – against Turkey. Its relation to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as its influence on them, is at stake and depends on Turkey’s next moves. Moreover, whichever decision Russia makes will favor Turkey to some extent.

Russia’s Dilemma

Russia, by decisively backing Armenia – which it is more inclined to do – will lose ground in Azerbaijan, a country to which Moscow has been steadily growing closer politically over the years. Furthermore, by doing so it will also bolster the Turkish influence in Azerbaijan to the detriment of Putin’s relation to the Azeri political elite and his authoritarian counterpart Aliyev.

Doing nothing about the conflict, on the other hand, or backing Azerbaijan – which is conspicuously out of the question – will largely be read as a sign of weakness from Putin, not least because Armenia and Russia are bound by exclusive military agreements.

Russia has a military base in Armenia, and Armenia is a member of both the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, all of which are led by Moscow.

Moscow is all the more compelled to act in a timely manner as the conflict flares up, considering the current international context where the United States is preoccupied with the upcoming November presidential elections and Europe is grappling with a second wave of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

L'articolo Turkey’s Interference in Nagorno-Karabakh Puts Russia in a Delicate Spot proviene da InsideOver.

On Friday, August 21, Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) issued a statement saying its leader Fayez al-Sarraj had given instructions to “all military forces to immediately ceasefire and all combat operations in all Libyan territories.”

Temporary Ceasefire

The Tripoli-based government’s plead for a truce was unexpected and soon received a similar call for a truce from Aguila Saleh Issa, the leader of an eastern-based parliament aligned to Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA).

The two sides mentioned the growing spread of the coronavirus in Libya as grounds for bringing the armed conflict to a temporary halt. Although with scarce testing, daily Covid-19 cases across the country rose by the hundreds in recent weeks, reaching a total of over 8,000 confirmed cases and more than 150 confirmed deaths.

The ongoing Libyan conflict has left the North African country with impaired infrastructure, not least its healthcare system, after almost a decade of relentless fighting. On Thursday, August 20, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) warned that the humanitarian crisis in Libya has deepened, amid the country’s abrupt cuts in oil production, blockades of its ports and, more recently, the spread of the coronavirus. The Red Cross also called for negotiations between the warring factions.

Skepticism in Sirte

Although the mutual call for peace shed some hope in the ravaged country, adding to the Libyan National Oil Company statement that same day that it was ready at last to resume oil operations at a rate close to the pre-COVID-19 rate, many people in Sirte were still skeptical.

The call for a ceasefire itself came in a time where the two belligerents’ armed forces were both heavily settled near the central city of Sirte. The coastal city, which also nears the country’s major oil terminals, became the conflict’s point of focus recently, bearing the new frontlines as Haftar’s forces settled around the city after the Turkish intervention pushed the LNA back from Tripoli in June.

Haftar’s forces, backed by Egypt and the UAE, among others, were attempting to seize Tripoli, where the GNA is based, for over a year since April 2019. Although recognized by the United Nations, the GNA mainly benefits from the support of Turkey and Qatar.

‘Deceptive Calm’

During a visit to Tripoli last week, Germany’s foreign minister Heiko Maas warned of a “deceptive calm” and noted that both sides were still arming themselves “on a massive scale” although there hadn’t been much confrontation in recent months. Maas also reiterated the United States’ call for a demilitarized zone in Sirte and Jufra.

Although there has been relatively little fighting since June, Turkey and the GNA seem poised to make further advances, even after Haftar’s forces withdrew to Sirte.

The LNA did not quickly respond to Sarraj’s call for peace on Friday, but on Sunday it said it deemed the new ceasefire attempt dubious.

“The initiative that Sarraj signed is for media marketing,” said Ahmed Mismari, the LNA’s spokesman. “There is a military build-up and the transfer of equipment to target our forces in Sirte.” Mismari even noted that the LNA was “ready to respond to any attempted attack on its positions around the coastal city of Sirte, and Jufra, to the south,” according to Reuters.

Too Many Actors

Observers have long argued that the conflict of Libya could not be solved by military means. But given the level of foreign meddling in the country, it has proven even harder to resolve diplomatically.

Turkey, who is at odds with its Mediterranean neighbors over energy reserves in the basin, soon sided with the Tripoli-based GNA, who promptly signed a maritime boundaries contract in favor of Ankara, while the United Arab Emirates and Egypt openly back Khalifa Haftar’s military rule. Other major powers, such as France and Russia, have also been accused of meddling in favor of Haftar.

In June, Egypt was among the first to warn the GNA —and Turkey— that attacks on Sirte and Jufra constituted crossing a “red line” that would systematically trigger an Egyptian military intervention.

Many Unsuccessful Peace Attempts So Far

All attempts to bring about peace to the Libyan people after almost a decade of war —most recently, the Berlin Summit earlier in January— stalled so far, not least because of the pressure exerted by foreign actors, on whom either factions heavily depend, to further their geopolitical and sometimes economic interests.

No longer than the following weekend, however, on Sunday, August 23, guns were fired in Tripoli to disperse hundreds of protesters who had gathered near the headquarters of the GNA to demonstrate over their squalid living conditions amid the current sanitary and economic crises.

L'articolo Glimmer of Hope for Peace in Libya, but Fear Lingers proviene da InsideOver.

The United Arab Emirates became the first Arab country to open a nuclear power plant last weekend, on August 1. It is the third regional power to do so after fellow Middle Eastern arch-rivals Israel and Iran. But unlike Israel, who has a yet-to-be-known amount of nuclear weapons, and Iran, whose uranium enrichment program is demonstrably perilous to the Middle East, Emiratis haved vowed to only use their nuclear power for energy purposes.

Why is the UAE Building Up its Nuclear Power Program?

Purportedly built to diminish its dependence on oil and gas, the Emirates’ new nuclear program is expected to provide a quarter of the country’s electricity, while its oil and gas exports account for about a quarter of its gross domestic product. However, its four nuclear power units, which were designed by a South Korean firm, have yet to start running, Emiratis said.

Regional powers such as Qatar and Iran, reacted to the UAE’s move by deeming it a threat to the stability of the Middle East. While Doha fears that Emiratis are bolstering their regional hegemony with the new nuclear program, Iran saw in it a novel menace added to that of Israel. Although the United Arab Emirates and Israel have yet to normalize diplomatic ties — despite covert efforts — their shared enmity toward Iran and alliance with the United States appears to have only been growing over the past years.

Qatar and Iran Condemn UAE’s Nuclear Program

In a letter sent by Qatar to the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (a UN watchdog) last year, Doha expressed its concerns about its neighboring country’s nuclear program and called on the organization to establish a framework for nuclear security in the region.

“Qatar believes that the lack of any international cooperation with neighboring states regarding disaster planning, health and safety and the protection of the environment pose a serious threat to the stability of the region and its environment,” the letter read.

Qatar, whose ties with the United Arab Emirates have been strained in the last decade over accusations that Qatar supported terrorism in Syria and other conflicted neighboring countries, said that a radioactive plume from an accidental discharge could reach Doha within 13 hours. Qatar also feared that a radiation leak would have a devastating effect on the whole region’s water supply.

The Emirati Perspective

The United Arab Emirates, however, argued that its Barakah nuclear plant, based in Al Gharbiya region that borders Qatar and Saudi Arabia, conforms to the international standards, including those of the International Atomic Energy Agency. “We proudly witness the start of Barakah nuclear power plant operations, in alignment with the highest international safety standards,” Mohammed bin Zayed, the United Arab Emirates’ de facto ruler, tweeted the day of the opening of Barakah.

The nuclear power plant was set to launch on 2017, after a deal with the United States in 2009. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are likely to follow suit, after similar deals with the United States.

Inflaming Middle Eastern Tensions?

Many observers and analysts see in such projects the risk of flaring up tensions between the Middle East’s major actors, not least Iran and its regional proxies, such as the Houthi rebels in Yemen – who claimed an attack against the Barak plant while it was still under construction in 2017. But such plans would not come to be realized without the United States’ explicit support, and thus fall in line with the US foreign policy in the Middle East and the already existing geopolitical settings there.

While Egypt is also planning to build a plant with four nuclear reactors, Saudi Arabia aims at establishing the region’s most significant one, with a plant that would bear as many as 17 reactors.

But none of the Arab countries would use their programs to develop nuclear weapons, as required by the United States, which urged the Saudis and Emiratis to sign safeguard agreements that would allow intrusive inspections. Thus, Israel would remain the only regional country believed to have access to nuclear weapons (with few to no inspections at all), while Iran persists in attempts to achieve the same with its uranium enrichment program despite sanctions and international condemnation.

L'articolo Why the UAE’s New Nuclear Program Won’t Change Much in the Middle East proviene da InsideOver.

In an unprecedented public address, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced last Thursday, June 25, a new partnership with the United Arab Emirates to fight the coronavirus. The announcement came even after both countries said the outbreak was under control in recent weeks.

Israel and the Arab Countries

The announcement Netanyahu made came to highlight, once again, his country’s growing efforts to partner up —if not have formal diplomatic ties— with Arab countries, though they tend to disagree with Israel in light of its conflict with Palestine.

The United Arab Emirates, which is yet to publicly form diplomatic ties with Israel, said the cooperation with Israel was to be reached between both countries’ private sectors, dismissing a state-to-state partnership.

Yet if the Emirates set forth a muted statement that disclaimed state-level cooperation, Netanyahu praised the deal as a “blessing” that would “bring friends closer” and make them “more powerful at deterring our enemies”.

Netanyahu even argues the deal was important for the “well-being” of the Middle East, by creating “opportunities for us for open cooperation that we have not known so far with certain countries.”

Contrasting the Emirates’ claim that the partnership was to take place between four private companies, which it did not name, Israel said would engage both countries’ health ministries.

Awkward Timing? Not So Much

The United Arab Emirates had already cooperated —secretly— with Israel to fight the coronavirus outbreak in recent months, when the Mossad bought equipment from Abu Dhabi and other Gulf countries, such as Bahrain, according to the New York Times and other reports.

But what draws more attention regarding Israel’s last move to normalize its ties with Arab countries is the announcement’s timing. The deal was announced roughly a week before Israel’s plan to proceed to annex parts of the occupied West Bank, putting Palestinians’ hope for statehood further into jeopardy.

Under the Trump administration’s so-called Peace Plan, Netanyahu promised to annex pieces of land that constitute up to 30% of the occupied West Bank as soon as July 1. The move is a violation of international law, according to the United Nations, and has been rejected by most world countries and all Arab ones, including the United Arab Emirates.

The deal, which Netanyahu said stemmed from “intensive contacts in recent months”, also came soon after Emirati Foreign Affairs Minister Anwar Gargash called for public cooperation with Israel, saying there was no reason not to cooperate, even amid criticism of the annexation plan.

“Can I have a political disagreement with Israel but at the same time try and bridge other areas of the relationship? I think I can,” Gargash said in an interview with the American Jewish Community advocacy group.

Publicizing the Cooperation

Earlier this month, Emirati Minister of State (also ambassador to the United States) Yousef Al-Otaiba also called for cooperation with Israel in an op-ed published in Yedioth Ahronoth, an Israeli newspaper.

Al-Otaiba acknowledged that Arab countries have been coming closer to Israel in recent years. Even as he warned against the annexation plan, he wrote that much of the Arab countries “would like to believe Israel is an opportunity, not an enemy. We face too many common dangers and see the great potential of warmer ties.”

Palestinian rights activists said Al-Otaiba’s op-ed itself was a form of normalization. Though they may not all make it public soon, Arab countries, observers say, are coming to realize that Israel could be a viable partner in trade and, most importantly, in security, with the support of the United States and the growing regional enmity of Iran.

Last year, Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz made a public visit to Abu Dhabi to “discuss the threat of Iran” with Emirati officials. Although there is no diplomacy between the two countries, Emirati officials allowed other visits from Israeli officials in recent years.

In what Israel said was a historical event, the Israeli anthem was played in a judo tournament in Abu Dhabi in 2018. The then minister of culture and sport, Miri Regev, attended the event and also appeared on a public tour of the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque.

In May this year, when Etihad Airways made the first publicly known flight from Abu Dhabi to Israel, carrying coronavirus-related aid shipments to Palestine, Palestinian authority rejected the aid, saying it was an excuse from the Emirates to formalize ties with Israel.

Israel also has a mission representing its interests at the International Renewable Energy Agency in Abu Dhabi.

Secret Efforts to Strengthen Ties

But if some joint efforts were made public in recent years, many others went on secretly. Many reports suggested the two countries cooperated in intelligence as Yossi Cohen, director of the Mossad, made many covert visits to the United Arab Emirates, as well as other neighboring countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar, where he met with high-ranking officials and spy bosses, according to the New York Times.

Currently, Only Jordan and Egypt have public diplomatic ties with Israel. Critics have long said Israel cannot expect to normalize ties with Arab countries unless it gave up its annexation plans at least. But is Israel proving such claims to be false?

L'articolo Beyond COVID-19: Israel’s Step Forward to Normalization proviene da InsideOver.