The government of the United Kingdom is facing some difficult choices about what kind of role the country intends to play in both European and global affairs.  In some ways, the current challenges constitute the continuation of a process that has been underway for years.  Brexit marked an especially significant tipping point, since British voters decided that their country would no longer be one of several leading powers in the European Union.  However, it was not clear at the time, and it remains murky, about what kind of role London intends to play over the longer term.

There appear to be four major options for the United Kingdom.  One possibility would be to rescind Brexit and rejoin the EU.  Another option is to be a European Union fellow traveler.  That approach would give British leaders the opportunity to act with greater independence and flexibility than formal EU members, but it would still enable Britain to be a significant factor in European affairs.  In either case, Europe would be the principal focus of UK foreign policy.  

A third scenario would be for London to attempt to become a truly independent great power with interests and objectives throughout the international system.  In some respects, that strategy would attempt to recapture and revitalize the global role that Britain played before the country was so severely weakened by World War II that it was forced to retrench.  With the fading of U.S. global hegemony, and the emergence of an increasingly multipolar world, Britain may have the opportunity to be one member of a concert of great powers. 

The final option is to continue the current policy of being Washington’s obedient junior partner in global affairs.  That approach has significant advantages, but it also entails some worrisome disadvantages.  

One crucial advantage is that the “special relationship” has given London disproportionate influence over U.S. foreign policy decisions.  For example, it is not certain that George H. W. Bush’s administration would have opted to confront Iraq militarily after Saddam Hussein’s forces invaded and occupied Kuwait, if it had not been for London’s insistent lobbying.  British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher insisted that the development had far-reaching adverse implications and reportedly urged Bush not to “go wobbly” on repelling Baghdad’s aggression.  Bush and his advisers eventually concluded that Iraq’s conquest of its neighbor set an unacceptable precedent in what was emerging as a post-Cold War world. 

However, Washington’s increasingly brash, confrontational approach to world affairs is creating situations which could endanger Britain’s best interests and even its survival.  The willingness of Prime Minister Tony Blair to blindly embrace George W. Bush’s crusade to oust Saddam not only entangled the UK in mounting Middle East turmoil, his stance also impelled him to deceive both parliament and the British public, thereby damaging the country’s democratic system.

Matters have been equally bad on other occasions when British leaders have attempted to match the ill-advised hawkishness of the UK’s American patron.  London has been enthusiastically supporting the Biden administration’s policy of getting NATO members to provide Ukraine with military aid.  Indeed, there are indications that both U.S. and British intelligence agencies have aided Kyiv in its battle plans.  Such an approach carries serious risks of getting the UK as well as the U.S. entangled in a direct military confrontation with Russia.  

Washington’s increasingly hardline policies toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on both Taiwan and economic decoupling entails similar unpleasant risks.  However, despite some earlier deviations, London now seems fully on board with the Biden administration’s approach.

The risk-reward ratio for continuing to be Washington’s junior foreign policy partner is not promising for British interests.  The other options have more upside potential.  Focusing on Europe’s future rather than trying to play a global role should have considerable appeal for a mid-size power.  Trying to do so while remaining outside the structure of the European Union, however, makes that task difficult.  Being an EU “fellow traveler” would give Britain some additional policy flexibility, but it also would limit London’s influence on important matters. 

If Britain rejoined the EU, the country automatically would again be one of the “big three” players in determining that association’s approach to both European and world affairs.  At the same time, British membership would give the EU greater heft in dealing with the United States, the PRC, India, and other major countries.  Rejoining the EU also would have considerable appeal to factions within Britain (especially Scotland) who were unhappy with Brexit in the first place.  

However, being a truly independent power in a multilateral global system also has its own advantages.  It would spare Britain from being subject to excessive regulatory meddling by the EU’s bureaucracy in Brussels.  That attempt at economic micromanagement was a crucial reason why UK voters embraced Brexit in the first place.  There is no guarantee that a similar problem won’t arise if Britain decides to rejoin the EU.

A key question is whether the global system is now sufficiently multipolar so that a mid-size power such as the UK could be an effective player, economically, diplomatically, and militarily as part of a new concert of great powers.  That picture remains somewhat unclear, but it is apparent that both the bipolar system of the Cold War and the post-Cold War unipolar system that the United States has dominated to this point no longer reflect reality.  Russia has become a second-tier power in the international system, both economically and militarily, as its surprising difficulty in subduing Ukraine confirms.  The United States is still dominant militarily, but economically the world already is clearly multipolar.  Indeed, the Biden administration appears to be having mounting difficulties preserving the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.

Even Washington’s military primacy is fading.  The PRC has emerged as a serious challenger, especially in the Pacific.  Several war games conducted by the Pentagon and independent think tanks in recent years indicate that the United States probably would lose a war trying to defend Taiwan against the PRC.

In such an emerging multipolar international system, the concept of a concert of great powers is no longer fanciful.  British leaders need to give serious consideration to that option.  It probably is a close call between that choice and again becoming one of the three leaders of the EU with a primary focus on developments in Europe.  The least appealing option for the UK, by far, should be to remain as Washington’s junior partner.

Ted Galen Carpenter is a senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute and a senior fellow at the Libertarian Institute.  He also served in various policy positions during a 37-year career at the Cato Institute.  Dr. Carpenter is the author of 13 books and more than 1,200 articles on international affairs. 

L'articolo Which role in global affairs? Britain’s hard choice proviene da InsideOver.

Democratic Europe has habitually craved U.S. leadership of the transatlantic community since the end of World War 11.  Indeed, President Donald Trump’s comment that he was willing to reconsider some of America’s alliance commitments induced borderline panic in Europe.  When Joe Biden defeated Trump in 2020 and declared that “America is back,” the sense of relief among European governments and populations was palpable. 

Such fondness for U.S. leadership is misplaced, or at least excessive.  Washington’s policies do not always serve Europe’s best interests; at times they even undermine those interests, while creating needless burdens and dangers.  Dragging the European allies into the Afghanistan nation-building fiasco is a prime example.  So too is the attempt by both the Trump and Biden administrations to enlist NATO members in a common front for a containment policy against China.

The most graphic case, though, is Washington’s insistence that European countries sign on to the U.S. campaign to isolate and punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.  Revulsion at Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression understandably caused Europe’s democratic nations to embrace the Biden administration’s call for punitive action.  However, Washington’s multiple misjudgments are causing its European allies to endure the bulk of the collective pain caused by an increasingly dubious strategy.

The Biden foreign policy team made several major miscalculations from the outset of the Ukraine crisis.  U.S. officials overestimated the extent of international unity in favor of a coercive policy toward Russia, they had an inflated sense of the West’s economic leverage against Putin, and they seriously underestimated Moscow’s ability to retaliate for the West’s imposition of economic sanctions.  Europe is now paying a heavy price for Washington’s myopia and overconfidence.  

Barely days into the war, Biden boasted that the world stood united in its opposition to Russia’s aggression.  But his assumption soon proved to be wishful thinking.  Already in early March, there were extensive defections from a United Nations General Assembly vote calling for the withdrawal of Russian forces.  In addition to the 5 “no” votes, there were 35 abstentions—even though the resolution did not commit UN members to take any substantive action. 

Most of the abstentions came from nations in Africa and Asia, and the vote proved to be a harbinger of widespread indifference to the war and to Washington’s call to isolate and punish Russia.  Aside from NATO and longstanding U.S. allies in East Asia, the global map still shows almost no support for economic sanctions against Russia, much less for economic and military backing for Ukraine.  Hudson Institute scholar Walter Russell Mead provides an apt summary of Washington’s lack of success in broadening the anti-Russia coalition beyond the network of traditional U.S. allies.  “The West has never been more closely aligned.  It has also rarely been more alone.  Allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization plus Australia and Japan are united in revulsion against Vladimir Putin’s war and are cooperating with the most sweeping sanctions since World War II.  The rest of the world, not so much.”

Most damaging for Biden’s campaign to isolate Russia, Asia’s two demographic and economic giants, India and China, have stubbornly remained on the sidelines.  They continue even to exhibit a slight pro-Russia tilt despite Washington’s sometimes excruciating diplomatic pressure.

The Biden administration not only overestimated global support for an anti-Russia policy, it overestimated the ability of even a united democratic West to inflict economic pain on that country. Initially, the Ruble plunged in value, and Biden referred to it derisively as “the Rubble.”  However, the Ruble has rebounded, and Russia’s economy has cushioned the other shocks by increasing its links to China, Iran, and other countries.  

Although Russia has experienced significant economic discomfort, it has not come close to being enough to alter the Kremlin’s Ukraine policy. In August, Russia exported a record amount of crude oil, and the state-owned energy company Gazprom has doubled its revenue in 2022, despite sending far less natural gas to Europe.  Higher prices and new markets elsewhere in the world more than offset the loss of European customers.  Such developments indicate that Russia hardly is on the verge of economic collapse because of Western sanctions. 

Indeed, there are growing signs that the sanctions strategy has backfired.  Populations in NATO members now are at risk of experiencing more pain than the Russian people from those measures, and that problem is especially true with respect to the energy sector.

Just as the Biden administration overestimated the West’s economic leverage on Russia, it greatly underestimated the Kremlin’s ability to retaliate. The Kremlin’s manipulation of energy supplies—especially natural gas flows to Europe has sent energy prices soaring.  That spike has produced a 2 trillion Euro increase in gas and power spending–a hike in energy bills by 200% across Europe.  Such an increase amounts to 20% of household disposable income, and that awful trend is almost certain to get worse.  Russian gas pipeline deliveries via the three main routes to Europe have fallen by almost 90% in the last 12 months.  In an early September speech Putin warned that energy and food (especially grain) shipments to the West were now in further jeopardy.  His rhetoric and actions underscore that Moscow is determined to play diplomatic and economic hardball in its dealings with the West and is quite capable of doing so.  

Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, contends that the European Union has “shot itself in the lungs” by joining the U.S. crusade to coerce Russia with economic sanctions.  If those measures are not reversed soon, he argues, they might well wreck Europe’s economy and cause even more widespread suffering.  Indeed, multiple signs now point toward a cold, dark winter for European populations and the EU’s descent into a deep economic recession.

Blindly following Washington regarding policy toward Russia is costing the European people dearly, and it already is fueling a surge of resentment against the continent’s current political leaders.  This episode again underscores the need for the EU nations to develop their own security policies instead of relying on the United States to make the key decisions.  Europe’s interests overlap with America’s, but they are far from being congruent.  It is apparent that Europe will pay a much greater price than the United States for the current economic war against Russia.  Europeans must take steps to ensure that Washington cannot lead them down a garden path to calamity ever again.

L'articolo US “Leadership” is Damaging Europe proviene da InsideOver.

Nearly a week after the official election day in the United States the outcome for the House of Representatives was still not entirely clear, although the Democratic Party will retain control of the Senate, and only eight week after the elections the Republicans have confirmed the narrow victory in the House.  Depending on the results of the December 6 Senate runoff election in Georgia, the party will have either a one-seat majority in that chamber or Vice President Kamala Harris will hold the tie-breaking vote.  Whichever side finally prevails in the extraordinarily close votes for control of the House, that party’s working majority will be razor thin.  The American public remains closely and bitterly divided.

On balance, the Republican Party’s election strategy failed, despite impressive victories in Florida and Ohio.  GOP candidates tried to highlight the country’s high inflation rate (the worst in 4 decades), a disturbing spike in violent crimes, the massive influx of illegal immigrants, and a variety of cultural issues.  Given the worsening economic environment (not to mention the other problems), the election logically should have been a major victory for Republican candidates and a rebuke to President Joe Biden’s administration and the Democratic Party.  Yet that result did not occur.  

In one sense, the failure of the Republican Party’s tactics was an encouraging development.  Much of the GOP’s rhetoric was uncaring, if not bigoted.  The notion that transgender children and their parents who seek medical advice and assistance somehow pose a dire threat to American civilization was deeply offensive.  So, too, was the notion that immigrants from desperately poor countries in Central America coming to the United States to fill entry-level job openings that often had gone begging for months was a dangerous criminal invasion.  The GOP’s position on those issues, as well as the party’s embrace of the controversial U.S. Supreme Court decision rescinding the right to obtain an abortion, mobilized pro-Democratic voters to such an extent that their ballots neutralized the Republican Party’s advantages on economic and crime issues.

Although the Democratic Party’s strategy proved more effective, one aspect of that successful strategy is ominous and worrisome.  Biden and his followers repeatedly insisted that their political opponents were racists, fascists, and an outright threat to democracy itself in the United States.  It was the explicit theme of Biden’s September 1 speech at Independence Hall (with creepy red lighting ) and at Washington’s Union Station during the closing days of the election campaign.  Merely raising questions about the 2020 U.S. presidential election became outright “election denial” in the administration’s version of events.  The January 6 incident at the U.S. Capitol was not merely a nasty, farcical riot, according the White House and its media allies, it was an outright, extremely dangerous insurrection.  Such exaggerations smacked of the ugly tactics that Senator Joseph McCarthy and his followers used to smear left-wing political and ideological opponents as a menace to democracy during the Cold War.

The lack of meaningful losses for the Democrats in the midterm elections makes it likely that the party will continue to employ such a toxic approach in future political campaigns.  However, succumbing to that temptation will make it even harder than it has been to restore civility to America’s political discourse.  The United States may well become an ever more angry, polarized society over the long term, and that development is not healthy either for the United States or the world.

Given the nearly even split in Congress, with neither party having a clear mandate, there are unlikely to be many significant changes in domestic policies.  A legislative stalemate is the most probable outcome, with President Biden then resorting to an even greater use of executive orders—a tactic of dubious constitutional validity when used to implement broad policy initiatives, despite the absence of congressional legislation.  Biden’s fondness for such measures has already sparked intense opposition and multiple court suits.   

Foreign policy is the one area in which bipartisanship is likely to prevail, but that is not necessarily a good situation.  On policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC), for example, both parties have vied to see which one can create the image of being tougher on Beijing.  That form of bipartisanship has already led to multiple, risky gestures of greater U.S. support for Taiwan.  A major example was House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s high-profile visit to Taipei in July, a trip that received widespread praise from Republicans who had never made a favorable comment about Pelosi on any other issue.  Bipartisan support for coercive trade and other economic policies toward Beijing also is strong and rising as well.  The trend toward a more confrontational policy on multiple issues, heightens the risk of a dangerous U.S.-PRC clash.

Bipartisan support for Washington’s network of military alliances and a highly activist foreign policy elsewhere in the world also will continue largely intact, although Republicans have become somewhat disenchanted with regime-change wars and nation-building ventures in the aftermath of the debacle in Afghanistan.  There also is some GOP dissent about aspects of the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy.  However, that dissent in Congress seems confined to not giving Kyiv a “blank check” in terms of U.S. support and insisting on better monitoring and accountability about where U.S. financial assistance and weaponry has gone.  There is little opposition to the overall policy of supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia.

The days of strong opposition from some portions of the Democratic Party to bloated Pentagon budgets also appear to be over.  Most Democrats in Congress have endorsed the administration’s extremely generous outlays, and many have even embraced GOP amendments adding billions of dollars to the proposed budgets coming from the White House.  As the United States is on track to break the $1 trillion mark for military spending in the next few years, bipartisan support for such a financial hemorrhage remains intact.

The bottom line is that the U.S. midterm elections will have relatively little impact on the substance of either Washington’s domestic policies or foreign policies.  Change in the former will be difficult to achieve because of the thin governing majorities in both chambers of Congress.  Change regarding the latter is even less likely, given the suffocating bipartisan consensus in favor of activist, frequently militarized, approach to world affairs.  Populations in other countries have reason to view those situations with growing unease.

Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of 13 books and more than 1,100 articles on international affairs.  His latest book is Unreliable Watchdog: The News Media and U.S. Foreign Policy (2022).     

L'articolo America’s Bitter Divisions Continue: The Impact of the 2022 Midterm Elections proviene da InsideOver.

Expectations were high on both sides of the Atlantic when Joe Biden won the U.S. presidential election that transatlantic comity and cooperation would be restored, and that Donald Trump’s abrasive, destructive diplomacy soon would be merely a painful memory. Biden’s initial statements as president reinforced those expectations. In his inaugural address, the new president stressed that “We will repair our alliances and engage with the world once again.”

A month later, Biden amplified that goal and applied it with special emphasis to Washington’s relationship to its European allies in his speech to a virtual version of the annual Munich Security Conference. He stated that “I’m sending a clear message to the world: America is back. The transatlantic alliance is back. And we are not looking backward; we are looking forward, together.” He added: “The partnership between Europe and the United States, in my view, is and must remain the cornerstone of all that we hope to accomplish in the 21st century, just as we did in the 20th century.” In an unmistakable slap at his predecessor, Biden acknowledged that “I know the past few years have strained and tested our transatlantic relationship, but the United States is determined — determined to reengage with Europe, to consult with you, to earn back our position of trusted leadership.”

The sense of relief in European circles after the Trump years was almost palpable. “Biden gave exactly the speech that many Europeans wanted to hear,” wrote Germany’s influential Der Spiegel magazine. It was a widely shared sentiment on the Continent.

In the aftermath of the chaotic and humiliating departure of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, and the reaction of European governments to that episode,” the president’s promises and confident hopes of transatlantic unity have been shaken to their core. Armin Laschet, a leading German politician, described the situation in especially harsh terms. “This is the greatest debacle that NATO has seen since its foundation, and it is an epochal change that we are facing,” he stated bluntly.

Some European leaders explicitly questioned the continued viability of the Alliance. Czech President Milos Zeman charged that because NATO had failed in Afghanistan, its legitimacy was in doubt. He argued that distrust in the U.S.-led alliance “from a number of member countries will grow after this experience, because they will say – if you failed in Afghanistan, where is a guarantee that you won’t fail in any other critical situation?” Even milder critics questioned the wisdom of Europe’s continued security reliance on the United States, given the Biden administration’s handling of the Afghan withdrawal. “Afghanistan is the biggest foreign policy disaster since Suez. We need to think again about how we handle friends, who matters, and how we defend our interests,” contended Tom Tugendhat, a prominent Conservative Party leader and chairman of the British Parliament’s foreign affairs committee.

European discontent has focused on two points. First, there is the perception that the withdrawal process was handled in an utterly incompetent manner—an amateurish operation that might have been expected from the Trump administration, but was utterly shocking coming from the experienced military and foreign policy professionals surrounding Biden. Second, NATO governments insisted that they were caught off guard both by the administration’s decision to adhere to the withdrawal agreement that President Trump had negotiated with the Taliban and by the speed of the withdrawal itself. Leaders in NATO members contended that Washington had not adequately consulted its allies, much less taken their concerns into account.

NATO leaders have directly disputed the latter complaint, however. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s Secretary General, emphasized that Alliance members had given unanimous approval for the withdrawal in April 2021, weeks before the process commenced. “You see different voices in Europe, and some are talking about the lack of consultation, but I was present in those meetings.” He did concede, though, that Washington’s notification and consultation “was somewhat artificial, because once the United States decided to withdraw, it was hard for other allies to continue without the United States. It was not a realistic option.” Stoltenberg perhaps inadvertently highlighted the main grievance on the part of key European NATO members—that the United States did not treat them as equal partners entitled to a meaningful role in the decision-making process.

The Afghanistan debacle appears to have been the most serious blow to transatlantic security cooperation under the Biden administration, but it is not the only one or even the first one. Signs of impending tensions between the administration and Washington’s European allies emerged even before Biden formally took office. The European Union did not respond well to the president-elect’s call to form a common front against China. In remarks delivered on December 28, he stated that “as we compete with China and hold China’s government accountable for its abuses on trade, technology, human rights, and other fronts, our position will be much stronger when we build coalitions of like-minded partners and allies to make common cause with us in defense of our shared interests and values.” The incoming administration specifically urged the EU to put on hold a major investment agreement that it was negotiating with Beijing. Just days later, though, EU negotiators signed the agreement anyway. Although the agreement still has not gone into effect, the delay is because of resentment at the PRC government’s crude bullying behavior toward the EU on other matters, not because of deference to the Biden administration’s position.

Increasingly, European governments seek to do the minimum necessary to placate Washington without unduly undermining European interests. The communiques that emerged from the G-7 and NATO summits earlier this year embodied such an approach. The Biden administration pressured both bodies to take a strong, collective stance against Russia and China. It was generally successful with respect to Russia, but the language with respect to the PRC was noticeably less hardline, with the G-7 document bordering on anemic. Biden stated merely that he was “satisfied” with the G-7 declaration—a comment that suggested something less than an enthusiastic verdict on his part.

U.S. and European security and economic interests substantially overlap, but they are far from congruent. Indeed, they have been diverging since the end of the Cold War, and Joe Biden’s invocations of transatlantic solidarity cannot change that reality. Europeans have reason to ponder whether signing on to Washington’s counter-insurgency, nation-building venture in Afghanistan served Europe’s best interests. Biden’s mismanagement of the withdrawal process significantly deepened already existing doubts.

Likewise, the administration’s continuing pressure on the European allies to join the United States in pursuing a hardline policy toward Beijing underscores a fundamental difference in U.S. and European interests. The United States is a Pacific power with a crucial stake in trying to maintain its hegemony in East Asia, even at the risk of war. The European nations have no similar stake, and maintaining good relations with Beijing logically has a higher priority than helping Washington preserve its regional dominance. No amount of hectoring from the Biden administration is likely to change that calculation.

Joe Biden did not create the divergence of interests between America and Europe. However, his policy clumsiness has served to underscore rather than paper-over the differences. Ironically, he may ultimately have undermined transatlantic solidarity more that Donald Trump’s boorish nationalism ever managed to do.

Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of 12 books and more than 950 articles on international affairs.

L'articolo How Joe Biden Has Damaged Transatlantic Unity proviene da InsideOver.

President Joe Biden and his advisers repeatedly emphasize that a top priority of the new administration is to restore America’s international leadership and repair the transatlantic relationship that former-President Donald Trump weakened with his emphasis on an “America First” foreign policy.

However, three noticeable areas of disagreement are already creating obstacles to a rapprochement between the United States and its European partners: the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline, policy toward Iran, and policy toward China.

The Biden administration inherited an already contentious situation regarding Nord Stream 2. U.S. leaders exhibited unrelenting hostility to the pipeline from the moment construction began in 2011. The Obama and Trump administrations argued that the pipeline, running under the Baltic Sea to link Russia and Germany, would deepen the dependence of Germany and other democratic European nations on Russian energy supplies. That enhanced dependence, U.S. officials argued, would give Moscow geopolitical leverage to a dangerous extent over its western neighbors. Despite strenuous European objections, the U.S. Congress in 2019 and 2020 even authorized the imposition of sanctions in an effort to halt construction.

Rather than backing away from such a confrontational policy, Biden and his foreign policy team seem determined to escalate matters. On March 18, Secretary of State Antony Blinken issued a statement demanding that firms involved in the pipeline project immediately cease work. “As multiple U.S. administrations have made clear,” Blinken stated, “this pipeline is a Russian geopolitical project intended to divide Europe and weaken European energy security.” The following week, he explicitly warned German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas that sanctions against his country’s firms were a real possibility if construction of the nearly complete pipeline continued.

Washington’s arrogant approach annoys many Europeans.

The reaction of Rainer Seele, the CEO of the Austrian energy firm OMV, to Blinken’s initial statement was typical. “This project is of great importance for the security of supply of the European gas market, it is therefore Europe’s responsibility to decide,” Seele told Austrian newspaper Wiener Zeitung. He added: “We have had a deep transatlantic friendship with the USA for decades. And friends shouldn’t threaten each other.”

Although there is opposition in Europe to Nord Stream 2 (especially in Ukraine, Poland and other East European countries), there also is considerable backing for the project—and mounting resentment at U.S. tactics. Despite both Moscow’s sometimes unsavory behavior and Washington’s growing pressure, the German government remains committed to the project.

Daniel R. DePetris, a fellow at the Defense Priorities think tank in Washington aptly summarizes the potential adverse outcome of the Biden administration’s current posture on Nord Stream 2. “The Biden administration came into office promising to repair and strengthen its alliances in Europe. But it is hard to see how to achieve that when this very same administration is open to waging economic warfare on European companies participating in Nord Stream 2. The White House must ask: Is taking a sledgehammer to the pipeline worth the damage to a U.S.-German relationship that weathered an intense amount of pressure over the previous four years?” Likewise, Daniel Benjamin, president of the American Academy in Berlin, notes that “For German politicians and business leaders who prayed for a Biden victory in the November elections — and, in some of the highest offices in the land, literally wept with joy during the new president’s inaugural address — the conflict over the pipeline has sparked fears that while Trump may be gone, America will remain a heedless and hostile partner.”

Transatlantic tensions also are resurging over policy toward Iran. European leaders reacted angrily when President Trump rescinded the U.S. commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—the multilateral agreement restricting Tehran’s nuclear program—and they were pleased when Biden announced Washington’s intention to return to that agreement. However, the administration’s subsequent actions proved to be rather disappointing. Instead of merely resuming U.S. adherence to the JCPOA, administration officials insisted on negotiations with Iran over the specifics of that process. Worse, the Biden foreign policy team initially insisted that Iran take the first steps with respect to negotiations—although the administration has seemed to retreat from that stance.

The result has been an increasingly surly impasse between Washington and Tehran. Even some of the president’s progressive supporters in the United States are becoming impatient at the administration’s continued foot-dragging. As with respect in the case of Nord Stream 2, concerns are rising on both sides of the Atlantic that Biden’s Iran policy may be little more than “Trump lite.” The worries of European leaders increased when the administration rebuffed their pleas for Washington to rescind some sanctions on Iran. Discord on Iran policy threatens to abort a meaningful transatlantic reconciliation as the window of opportunity to revive the JCPOA appears to be closing.

Policy differences regarding China may have an even greater potential to exacerbate transatlantic tensions. Contrasting approaches arose even before the new administration took office. In remarks delivered on December 28, the president-elect stated that “as we compete with China and hold China’s government accountable for its abuses on trade, technology, human rights, and other fronts, our position will be much stronger when we build coalitions of like-minded partners and allies to make common cause with us in defense of our shared interests and values.” But just two days after Biden’s statement, the European Union signed a major investment deal with Beijing, even though the incoming administration’s policy team had urged the EU to delay taking action. Prominent RealityChek blogger Alan Tonelson contended that the EU’s action constituted a “punch in the mouth” from America’s European allies.

Resistance to Washington’s attempt to enlist Europe in a common front to contain Beijing’s growing power was increasingly evident during the Trump years, and that stance showed every sign of continuing. Both French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel openly spurned Biden’s suggestion to form an alliance of democracies against China.

The PRC’s own abrasive conduct toward Europe, though, may now be mitigating U.S.-European differences regarding China policy. In retaliation for relatively modest EU sanctions on four Chinese officials, Beijing responded with counter-sanctions against a far greater number of European diplomats, parliamentarians and academics. Furious members of the European Parliament subsequently threatened to kill the aforementioned EU-China investment agreement. France, Germany, Italy and other countries also summoned their ambassadors home from Beijing for consultations.

Nevertheless, Europe has little to gain by being caught in the middle of a growing confrontation between the United States and China largely involving strategic and economic issues in the western Pacific, and both European governments and European populations apparently understand that point. Despite clumsy blunders by both Beijing and Moscow toward Europe’s democratic nations, the long-term trend toward fully revived transatlantic solidarity under Washington’s dominant leadership is not favorable. Boston Globe columnist Stephen Kinzer’s conclusion seems accurate. “The United States, through the NATO alliance, has traditionally set European security policy and dictated to allies on important matters. That obedience reflex is now weakening.” In particular, “Europeans are seeking stronger ties to [both] Russia and China, often against Washington’s will.” How gracefully the Biden administration can adjust to that new, not entirely agreeable, reality will be a test of maturity and skill on the part of those officials.

L'articolo The Biden Administration and Washington’s Continuing Rift with the European Allies proviene da InsideOver.

Expectations are widespread throughout the world that the election of Joe Biden to the US presidency marks a dramatic change in both US domestic and foreign policy. That belief is based on the pervasive stereotype that Donald Trump’s presidency epitomized authoritarian populism at home and a surly unilateralism, if not outright “isolationism,” abroad.

Like many stereotypes, such a view of the Trump years contains some elements of truth, but it also includes exaggerated or inaccurate features. Joe Biden’s presidency  undoubtedly will adopt markedly different policies on certain issues. Indeed, some of those changes have already become evident during the initial weeks of his administration.

However, those who assume that Biden will pursue a radically progressive domestic agenda and adopt a foreign policy nearly identical to the one that Barack Obama epitomized are likely to encounter some major surprises.  

What Changes are Coming?

There is no question that certain changes are in store regarding a variety of domestic issues.  Among the new president’s initial flurry of executive orders were those that reversed the Trump administration’s policies on environmental policy. The United States will rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement and cancel the Keystone XL oil pipeline—high-priority objectives for environmental groups. Biden also signed executive orders rescinding Trump’s restrictive policies, and instead established new protections for LGBTQ rights, abortion rights, and immigration.

All of Biden’s steps were consistent with the overall progressive agenda. However, the administration has also signaled that it may propose new legislation to target domestic terrorism. That approach splits the progressive coalition, as some progressives worry about possible abuses of civil liberties — a fear that many conservatives and libertarians share.

On the foreign policy front, Biden and his advisers are moving to restore a greater US commitment to international cooperation. In addition to rejoining the Paris Climate Accord, the administration reversed Trump’s withdrawal from the World Health Organization, and announced that the United States would seek a five-year extension to the New START arms control treaty. Biden’s move paid immediate dividends when Vladimir Putin’s government confirmed that Russia likewise would continue to abide by the provisions of New START.

Biden’s administration also pursued conciliatory steps on some other issues. Washington confirmed that it wants to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — the multilateral agreement that had placed limits on Iran’s nuclear program. Trump had torpedoed that measure, leading to a nasty policy split with the European allies and causing Iran to take steps to escalate its nuclear efforts. Biden’s foreign policy advisers and congressional allies also indicated that other changes might be in store with respect to Washington’s Middle East policy, including ending US support for the brutal war that Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies have waged in Yemen since 2015.

Many Things Will Stay the Same

Nevertheless, one must be careful not to overstate the extent or significance of the likely policy changes.  For example, there is no indication that US ties to Israel will diminish; indeed, the new administration made it clear immediately that Washington would abide by the Trump administration’s decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, despite continuing complaints from Arab governments. There is no sign whatever that US economic and military aid to Israel will decrease even slightly.

Other aspects of US policy in both the Middle East and Central Asia also look as though they will continue on autopilot.  Despite Washington’s willingness to return to the JCPOA, overall US hostility toward Iran remains intense. Similarly, there are no prospects for a significant reduction in US meddling in the Syrian and Afghanistan conflicts. Indeed, the Biden administration appears receptive to perpetuating those US military missions indefinitely, and is coming under pressure from NATO allies to do so.

What About US-China Relations?

Biden and his advisers do place high priority in restoring cooperation with America’s traditional allies in both Europe and East Asia. However, even that agenda is likely to encounter more difficulties than anticipated. One key objective of the new administration is to enlist the NATO allies in a common front to deal with China. In remarks delivered on December 28, Biden stated that “as we compete with China and hold China’s government accountable for its abuses on trade, technology, human rights, and other fronts, our position will be much stronger when we build coalitions of like-minded partners and allies to make common cause with us in defense of our shared interests and values.”

That quest is likely to fail. Indeed, just two days after the president-elect’s comments, the European Union signed a major investment deal with Beijing, despite requests from the Biden team to hold off on such a decision.  Evidence is even stronger that Washington cannot count on European solidarity with the United States if it comes to a diplomatic confrontation with China over human rights or other issues. That point became glaringly apparent last year when the Trump administration failed in its efforts to enlist the European allies for a united response to Beijing’s imposition of a new national security law on Hong Kong.

The China issue is perhaps the most graphic case in which Biden’s policy — much to the frustration of many U.S. allies — may not differ much from the confrontational approach Trump adopted.

The administration’s initial actions regarding Taiwan underscore that point. Not only did Biden invite Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to attend his inauguration, the first time that occurred since the United States switched diplomatic relations to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, but administration officials have issued several statements emphasizing Washington’s “rock-solid” commitment to Taiwan’s defense.

The United States also dispatched an aircraft carrier battle group to the South China Sea as a display of U.S. military power in the region barely a week after Biden took office. The Biden administration may seek to ease the trade war that Trump launched against China, but US policy toward the PRC on the security front looks decidedly uncompromising.

The bottom line is that Joe Biden likely will seek to govern as a slightly left-of-center president on domestic affairs, while delaying or diluting the more grandiose progressive goals, such as Medicare for all and the Green New Deal, and adopting a surprisingly strong “law and order” stance.

His approach to foreign affairs will resemble the policies that the Democratic presidents (Bill Clinton and Barack Obama) who preceded Trump, but with a noticeably more hawkish posture toward China. In short, Biden will not be the architect of dramatic policy change that many of his supporters want or his opponents fear. Instead, he will leave his own distinctive, but generally moderate, mark on policy.

L'articolo Prospects for Change and Continuity with President Joe Biden proviene da InsideOver.