Idlib, which came to known as “the last rebel stronghold” or dubbed as “Gaza in Syria” has been under the heavy bombing of the Syrian regime and Russian forces for months now had seen better days. The central location on the ancient Silk Road that brought a privileged status and wealth in the past to the province, is a magnet for bloodshed and misery today. It became the deadlock of the 9 years old Syrian civil war. The interests of the Syrian regime, Russia, Turkey, Iran, US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, as well as the opposition – with all its variety – are all tangled and became a Gordion knot in Idlib. While a danger of a direct military clash between Ankara and Damascus or even between Ankara and Moscow is looming by day, how and by whom it is going to be cut will pretty much determine the future of the Middle East, no less.

L'articolo Everything you need to know about the Idlib tangle proviene da InsideOver.

Can the Ankara-Moscow alliance survive the Idlib test?

The Turkey-Russia Crisis Over Idlib

While a handshake was expected between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Syrian counterpart Bashar Assad after the high-level security talks between the parties under the auspices of Moscow, a serious crisis started between Ankara and Moscow.

There are many scenarios about the behind-the-scenes reasons of the crisis that erupted over the last offensive of the Syrian troops backed by the Russian air force to Idlib. It became even more serious after seven Turkish soldiers and one civilian military contractor were reportedly killed and thirteen other individuals were injured by Syrian army fire. Ankara’s harsh retaliation reportedly eliminated 76 Syrian soldiers, according to official Turkish sources. This is the largest clash between the two armies since the start of the war in 2011. Turkey has urged Russia to restrain Damascus and stop the offensive on Idlib.

There are signs that Ankara is turning towards Washington for support because of the conflict. Meanwhile, intensive diplomatic efforts are going on to solve the crisis between Moscow and Ankara. The outcome would determine not just the future of the Turkey-Russia alliance but the future of the region as well.

Turkey Blames Russia And Syria For Breaking Idlib Ceasefire

Ankara has been warning both Moscow and Damascus to obey the latest ceasefire in Idlib declared by Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ankara last month but to no avail. The overwhelming bombing going on in Idlib province⁠—one of the last strongholds of the rebel forces in Syria⁠—has also started a new refugee influx toward the borders of Turkey that is already hosting about 4 million Syrian refugees. Moscow is committed to prevent such a scenario by the agreements within Astana process, a tripartite mechanism to solve Syrian crises between Ankara, Moscow and Tehran. In the wake of Syrian attacks on Turkish troops, Erdogan furiously declared the Astana process dead and asked Moscow to choose either Ankara or Damascus as an ally.

Erdogan rushed to Ukraine⁠—which is at odds with Russia⁠—to sign a free trade agreement and offer about 30 million dollars credit to buy weapons from Turkey after he didn’t get a satisfying answer from Moscow but instead more bombings by Russian aircraft in Idlib. Hours before he flew to Kyiv, the Turkish soldiers were killed and injured by the Syrian shelling while they were trying to build new military posts in strategic Serakib region “to control the refugee flow” despite Turkey saying that the “information sent to the Russians and Syrians” on their mission and whereabouts. Was the strike in allowing Syria to hit the position a message from Moscow? There is no way to know for now.

Erdogan Promises Revenge

Erdogan vowed to retaliate at the airport, “We have responded in kind to these attacks and will continue to do so… We are determined to continue our operations for the security of our country, people and our brothers in Idlib.”

He was cautious enough, however, to make it clear that Turkey’s actions were not against the Russian forces in Syria. Yet that did not prevent Erdogan from redeclaring the annexation of Crimea by Russia as illegal during his visit to Kyiv. Erdogan has been silent on the issue since the military coup against him in 2016 that he prevailed reportedly with the support of Moscow. Erdogan toned down his harsh rhetoric on his way back. “There is no need for conflict or contradictions with Russia,” he said. “There are serious strategic initiatives taking place.” Nonetheless, Erdogan stressed that Turkey will keep its military observation posts in Idlib with necessary fortifications. “The attack targeted the Turkish servicemen was a very clear violation of the Idlib agreement and so will have consequences for the Assad regime,” he stated.

Erdogan And Putin Have Tense Talk On Phone

Erdogan and Putin reportedly had a scheduled conversation over the phone on Feb.4, yet apparently it did not help to ease the tension between them since different readouts of what was discussed were published afterwards.

Erdogan stressed that the attack against the Turkish soldiers was a big blow to mutual efforts for peace in Syria and Turkey will not hesitate to use her right of self-defence if such incidents occur in the future. This is according to the Turkish media.

On the other hand in the Kremlin ‘s information note to the press, there is no reference to the attack against the Turkish soldiers, nor any condolences whatsoever. The necessity of the strict implementation of the agreements between Turkey and Russia against the radicals in the region was underlined as well as the urgent need for two countries’ defense ministers to maintain close coordination.

The next day Erdogan said he conveyed to Putin that if the Syrian regime will not retreat from Turkish observation posts in Idlib in February, Turkey itself will be obliged to make this happen. Speaking to his party’s lawmakers in parliament, “Turkey’s sole expectation from Russia in Syria is that it understands Turkey’s sensitivities,” he added.

Moreover, he said, “Turkey’s air and land forces will move freely in all operation areas [in Syria] and in Idlib, and they will conduct operations if needed. The attack on our soldiers the day before yesterday was a turning point in Syria for Turkey,” Erdogan announced. Erdogan finally added that every attack on Turkish soldiers or its allies will face retaliation, without any warning, regardless of the source of the attack.

This is quite an ultimatum and not a sign of an ease of tensions between Ankara and Moscow⁠—on the contrary it is a clear sign of increasing confrontation.

The Situation In Idlib

When we look at the situation in Idlib, it is obvious that Assad was intent on capturing the last rebel-held parts of the country, since that was the only way to maintain his ultimate control. Moscow could not or did not stop him. The intense bombing reportedly was carried out not only against  radical jihadists⁠—as Moscow and Damascus claimed⁠—but also against innocent civilians. Thus, the operations in Idlib have started a huge refugee flow towards to the Turkish borders and any aid operation has been prevented. More than 40,000 Syrians have reportedly run away from Idlib province in the last week alone and the humanitarian condition is getting worse by the day.

Russia’s Point-Of-View

Even though Erdogan holds Moscow responsible for what is happen, they see it very differently. From the Russian point-of-view, Ankara also has commitments according to the agreements within the framework of the Astana process. Especially with the 2018 Sochi deal under which Turkey and Russia created de-escalation zone in Idlib and started a ceasefire between the moderate opposition groups and the Syrian regime. Ankara, who set 12 observation posts inside Idlib was supposed to segregate the radical jihadist groups such as Tahrir al-Sham from the moderate opposition forces. The ceasefire is only aimed to apply to moderates. Ankara reportedly relocated a good amount of them to Libya and forced others to cut ties with the radicals. Yet the assignment has not been completed according to Moscow since the attacks of the radicals⁠—who are getting stronger inside the zone⁠—are ongoing against Russian and Assad regime targets.

Russia admits the difficulty of the job yet has doubts and believes it is possible that Turkey did not finish it in order to prolong its stay in Idlib to gain leverage over Damascus, and, in addition, to prevent a further refugee influx into Turkey. Therefore, Moscow decided to push Ankara through the intensive bombings, perhaps a little bit harsher than usual, which brought Erdogan on the brink of ending his alliance with Moscow which he identified as strategic only a week ago.

Behind-The-Scenes Scenarios

There are many possible scenarios circulating about the real reason for the crises between Ankara and Moscow.

1. Washington did not want Moscow to gain further influence in the region so started to support the Syrian rebels in Idlib again and forced the Syrian regime and Russia to initiate an intense operation. The fresh attacks from the opposition forces and favorable statements from Washington further strengthen those claims. Such as US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s statement. “We stand by our NATO Ally Turkey in the aftermath of the attack, which resulted in the death of multiple Turkish personnel serving at an observation post used for coordination and de-escalation, and fully support Turkey’s justified self-defense actions in response.”
2. Erdogan differentiates the Islamist rebels and did not want to betray the ones that he sees as moderate opposition forces. By preserving status quo in Idlib he wants to force Damascus to find a political solution with them. Thus, Moscow and Damascus started the latest operation to make that plan null and void.
3. Damascus wanted to get rid of all the opposition elements that were nested in Idlib, to change the balance of power in the province. Therefore with the backing of Moscow, the Syrian government started a devastating operation to force all of them out from the country.
4. There was tremendous pressure on Erdogan to shake hands with Assad and reach a deal. Yet he refused and apparently insisted on his policy based on regime change in Syria. Consequently, Moscow decided to use harsh military measures to finish the war and send Turkey a strong message.

Are Pro-US Elements In Turkey Gaining The Upper Hand?

The incidents have also stirred up a domestic policy debate in Turkey that the balance of power is changing in favor of pro-US circles while pro-Russia groups are losing ground. The latter groups have been urging Erdogan to make peace with Assad.

A week ago, the former intelligence chief of the army Ret. General Ismail Hakkı Pekin⁠ made a statement that Turkey should let the Syrian regime clear Idlib of the terrorists and gain full control to open to roads and restart trade. “This is the only way to maintain the territorial integrity of Syria and solve the Syrian crises. Ankara should also have negotiations on a political level with Damascus,” he argued. Pekin is an influential figure of the pro-Russian group dubbed as “Eurasians” which is quite dominant in Turkish politics behind-the-scenes, since with their support Erdogan reportedly defeated the previous military coup against him.

A day after Pekin’s statement the official Turkish newspaper of the pro-Russian circles Aydınlık published an article by Ret. Colonel Ihsan Sefa. It contained a veiled threat against Erdogan. “We the nationalists⁠—read as the ones who defend the nation state⁠—have been supporting the Erdogan administration because of its position against the US and EU imperialism and his policy for regional cooperation. If he leaves this position, our support will fade. Therefore, to make peace with Syria should be on the agenda urgently which is creating difficulties for the implementation of Astana and Sochi agreements,” Sefa warned.

Apparently, since Erdogan was strictly against the handshake with Assad he started to look for other supporters and they were more than ready to extend hands to him. The next day Erdogan’s adviser and director of pro-government think-tank SETA, Burhanettin Duran in an article implied that Ankara is losing patience with Moscow and looking for a new policy direction. He called upon the US and the EU to get involved in Idlib conflict.

A Chance For Washington To Get More Leverage In Turkey

Some Western analysts described Erdogan’s outrage at Moscow was a crack on the wall and saw this as an opportunity for Washington to cease Russian influence on Turkey. Perhaps the recent visit of Tod Wolters, NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe and the commander of U.S. European Command to Ankara was not a mere coincidence.

Taking the current situation under consideration, Moscow’s inability to reconcile Ankara and Damascus would be a big minus for its regional influence that is based on alliances with parties who have conflicting interests. Yet the signs are not encouraging at the moment. Given the strategic interests between Ankara and Moscow, relations will continue yet it is obvious that “the Astana spirit” between Putin and Erdogan has been severely damaged.

L'articolo Will The Ankara-Moscow Alliance Survive The Idlib Test? proviene da InsideOver.

Ankara and Moscow—trying to avoid a proxy war with each other—are enhancing their efforts to find common ground in Libya, albeit both sides are completely aware that the road in front of them is likely to be extremely bumpy. If everything goes right during the planned visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Turkey on January 8, a new joint initiative, very likely inspired by the Astana model implemented in Syria, is expected to be announced by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Russian guest. The two leaders will also inaugurate the strategic TurkStream natural gas pipeline that will carry Russian gas to Europe via Turkey.

Turkey’s Point-Of-View On Libya

Ankara is supporting the UN-recognized Fayez al-Sarraj administration known as the Government of National Accord (GNA). It is based in the capital Tripoli. In November, Turkey signed two Memorandums of Understanding with the GNA. The first one is on maritime boundaries of countries in the eastern Mediterranean region. It establishes a borderline between Turkey and Libya that made them maritime neighbors and enormously benefits the two parties’ strategic interests including offshore gas interests. The move created a huge reaction especially from Athens since with the deal, Ankara and Tripoli claim a large part of Greeks’ and Greek Cypriots’ assumed maritime rights. The other deal is on security and military cooperation, which provides Ankara with the legal base to support the GNA.

Moscow on the other hand, is also maintaining contacts with the other parties, and is mainly backing Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar whose LNA military forces control the eastern part of Libya and have started an offensive to capture Tripoli. Russia has reportedly installed private military contractors to help as well. Turkey has announced its readiness to dispatch some form of military forces, while Haftar’s supporters claim that there are already Turkish special forces on the ground.

Intense Bargaining Continues Between Erdogan And Putin

A tentative agreement describing a commitment “not to fight each other and facilitate an immediate cease-fire in Libya” was apparently achieved during recent telephone conversations between Erdogan and Putin on Dec. 11 and Dec. 17. It was further improved at the negotiations of a high-level Turkish delegation consisting of the Deputy Foreign Minister and top defense, intelligence and national security officials in Moscow on December 24. The negotiations reportedly also included consideration and discussion of the latest situation in Idlib and lasted three days between the Russian and Turkish officials with sometimes intense bargaining.

Ankara is trying to reach a new ceasefire after the heavy offensive of the Russian and Syrian regime forces in Idlib, to prevent mass migration which it says it cannot sustain on top of its already large numbers of Syrian refugees currently living in Turkey. Moscow, on the other hand, is using the fighting in Idlib as a bargaining chip in order to get concessions on Libya, according to some speculation. Yet despite the huge conflict of interests, the contacts between the parties are continuing around the clock thanks to the understanding created by the Astana process.

An Astana-Style Peace Process Could Create Synergy On Libya

The Astana peace process launched by Moscow, Ankara and Teheran, aimed to end the Syrian conflict in January 2017 paved the way for collaboration between the three parties even though they had competing and sometimes conflicting interests. Even though it has been a rough process with lots of ups and downs and the conditions in Libya are much different from Syria, “the Astana spirit” could once again create synergy between Ankara and Moscow.

In Syria, the common interest between the parties was and is the territorial integrity of Syria. In Libya on the other hand, a shared interest could be to promote Russian and Turkish interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and create a joint strategy that will benefit all parties.

According to Russian sources, although Moscow sees Ankara’s rising power in the East Med as a positive development it has other priorities it wants to pursue order to promote a multi-polar international system (meaning lessening Western influence) in the region. Moscow’s multi-polar priorities include: protecting the territorial integrity of Libya, putting an end to the civil war through the resumption of peace talks between the fighting parties and most importantly the elimination of the radical Islamic elements fighting in Libya on behalf of the GNA which Moscow sees as terrorists backed by Ankara. In return, Moscow would support Ankara’s aspirations in the East Med. This could be a winning Astana-style formula to bring the disputatious sides together.

Creating De-escalization Zones Is Also On The Table

Creating de-escalation zones, just like in Syria, under the responsibility of Ankara starting with Libya’s strategic Misrata region is also on the table. Moscow is reportedly welcoming such an option and Ankara is evaluating it. Since Moscow will be able to stop Haftar’s attack on Tripoli and Ankara can restrain the GNA and its supporters, a ceasefire seems achievable if Ankara will not dispatch Turkish troops as Erdogan vows. Erdogan, during his surprise visit to Tunisia on Dec.25, called for an immediate declaration of a ceasefire in Libya while repeating his pledge to send Turkish troops to support the GNA.

Erdogan Sees Sending Turkish Troops To Libya As Vital

The Erdogan administration sees sending troops to Libya as inevitable and necessary in order to tip the balance of power in favor of the GNA despite the objections of the opposition. The opposition parties argue that such a move would drag Turkey into Libya’s civil war.

Yet according to the assessment of defence analyst Can Kasapoglu of the Turkish think-tank EDAM, “bulky conventional formations of the Turkish Armed Forces operating in the Libyan territory” should not be expected, “nor the Turkish Air Force operating from GNA bases.” Therefore, according to Kasapoglu, “Ankara is likely to pursue a dual-track roadmap in Libya. In the short run, Turkey is likely to dispatch a capable military advisory mission and to boost arms transfers to the GNA. In the long run, Ankara will probably encourage private military compounds to be set up and used for expeditionary roles in high-risk territories and training activities for friendly forces.” He concludes that “although defending the GNA serves Ankara’s strategic interests, doing so in an open-ended conflict could lead to an unfavorable trajectory.” Meanwhile, the relations between Ankara and Moscow, and especially Putin’s forthcoming visit remain key factors to monitor.

Putin And Erdogan Can Work Together

In an article for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Libyan expert Emadeddin Badi underlined that Russia and Turkey are filling the vacuum created by the inaction of the US and Europe in Libya. Therefore, Putin can gain tremendous influence on the ground and appear as a power broker if he becomes involved. Erdogan on the other hand by “pursuing his ongoing and direct negotiations with Putin will ultimately undermine the political efforts of all other Haftar supporters,” according to Badi.

Badi concludes that “ideologically and operationally, both Putin and Erdogan have pre-existing areas of cooperation that could be leveraged in Libya, making this rapprochement all the more plausible. Much like Russia’s control over Haftar’s political legitimacy, the GNA’s destiny is in Turkey’s hands, with all other players gradually losing relevance.” Yet even Badi foresees that an Ankara-Moscow rapprochement could create temporary calm or provide short-term stability, as he notes that “it will not be enough to temper the interference of other players, nor will it bring Libyans to the table.”

Upcoming Berlin Conference Will Focus On Libya

Both Putin and Erdogan announced their eagerness to work with Western parties to stop the bloodshed in Libya and their support for the German peace initiative. A Libya Conference is expected to be held in January in Berlin. Although Ankara is invited to the conference, the harsh Western reactions to the deals it has signed with Libya and the prolonged isolation of Turkey in the Mediterranean by Greece, Greek Cypriots, Israel and Egypt with backing from the US and EU are likely to push Ankara further into the arms of Russia. Astana style cooperation in Libya between the two parties would only accelerate such a move by Turkey away from the West.

L'articolo A New Astana Model For Libya? proviene da InsideOver.

On Nov. 30, a small town on the Turkish-Greek border named Ipsala hosted a significant event. Azerbaijani gas was pumped to Europe through the much talked about Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), a major element of the EU’s energy policy since it began supplying a new source of natural gas to Europe by skirting Russia. Both Brussels and Washington gave tremendous support to the SGC with the hope that it will boost the European energy security by challenging the monopoly of Russia’s Gazprom in the European market. However, competition with Moscow might turn into cooperation out of necessity.

What is the SGC?

The SGC is reportedly one of the most complex gas value chains ever developed in the world. It crosses seven countries, contains more than a dozen major energy companies and consists of several separate energy projects that the total investment of all is approximately US $40 billion. Along with two plants on the Caspian Sea it consists of three pipelines; starting with the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCPX) from Azerbaijan to Georgia, the second leg is the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) crossing through Turkey and then the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) passes from Greece to Albania and ends in Italy. In addition to the expansion of the Italian gas transmission network, connections to gas networks in South Eastern, Central and Western Europe is a possibility.

TAP is expected to be finished and ready to supply gas to Europe in 2020 summer. It was completed in Greece and Albania but the construction of the offshore part and reception centre in Italy are yet to be finished. There was a considerable delay due to the objections of regional authorities and environmentalists in Italy. The new Italian government that came to power last year was initially against the project and very reluctant to endorse it since hosting the final part of the TAP might create serious environmental and security problems. Thus, Conte’s government only gave its final approval last October apparently under the strong influence of Washington and Brussels. The legal obligations stemming from the contracts and agreements accepted by the former governments were reportedly also a strong factor.

Is the SGC a threat to Gazprom?

Gazprom reportedly delivered 200.8 billion cubic meters of gas to European markets last year. On the other hand, the capacity of the SGC is 16 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Turkey will get six billion cubic meters and 10 go to Europe.

According to Wood Mackenzie, future expansion is vital for the SGC. Yet Azerbaijan does not have adequate reserves for meaningful growth. Russian experts do not see the SGC as a threat to Gazprom unless Turkmenistan gets involved which will increase its capacity to 60 cubic meters per year. Even though a Trans-Caspian pipeline (TCP) between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan is technically feasible, the inclusion of Turkmenistan to the SGC is quite problematic since Moscow, as the member of “Caspian Five”, would not permit the construction of the TCP as an opponent. The only other route for the Turkmen gas except Russia is Iran. Yet as Tehran is under sanctions and in odds with Washington, it is not a secure option either. Consequently, the SGC might very well end up in cooperation with Moscow. That would be a nightmare for Washington, which is still trying to clarify another question mark about the massive project.

The SGC for the service of Moscow

According to the Atlantic Council, there is a possibility that Gazprom will be able to book capacity in the TAP, which was granted a third-party access exemption by EU regulations for its initial capacity of 10 bcma (half of its ultimate planned capacity of 20 bcma). That exemption is allowing the gas suppliers to fully book that capacity without open competition. Thus, Moscow would be able to use a strategic project for Europe to boost is position within European energy markets. Even though it is still not possible to access the vital details of the Market Test held by TAP for this purpose and the studies will be completed by January 13, 2020, Gazprom may likely have expressed interest. Therefore, Gazprom can use the TAP expansion to deliver gas from additional lines of TurkStream to Europe as a way to limit or eliminate Ukraine transit. Because of the uncertain future of Nord Stream 2 (NS2), Gazprom may reconsider additional lines of the TurkStream project, which was planned as a four-line system.

Germany Wants Russian Gas

The second line of the TurkStream project (TS2), that will carry gas across the Black Sea to Turkey and on to Europe through Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary to Austria is another concern for Washington because of its possible effects on Southeast Europe’s energy security. However, the real alarm is NS2, which is to transfer Russian gas directly to Germany bypassing Ukraine.

Germany is insisting on receiving cheap Russian gas even though it is contrary to the EU’s regulations on pipelines coming from third countries. EU is divided on the issue and Washington is threatening Berlin to apply sanctions within CAATSA (The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) which includes an article prohibiting EU companies to make big investments in the Russian energy sector. However, that would only worsen already tense relations between Berlin and Washington.

Washington’s sensitivity on the issue reportedly stems from not only the importance it gives the energy security of Europe but also the desire of American LNG producers to flood the European market and become the main gas supplier.

To sum up, it seems quite difficult to compete with Gazprom in Europe in the foreseeable future. To put Gazprom under control by EU regulations to prevent Moscow to use its pipelines for political leverage is a way to curb Russian influence. Yet the best way may be to cooperate with Moscow not to compete. Since common interest is the best way to promote peace. The SGC with its vast capacity for expansion can very well be the symbol of international cooperation on energy which contributes to global peace through the network of pipelines.

L'articolo The Southern Gas Corridor: Competition or Cooperation with Russia? proviene da InsideOver.

On Nov. 6, the Chang’an Cargo Train has stopped at the Turkish capital, Ankara. After an official welcoming ceremony continued to Istanbul to pass under the Bosporus, using the Marmaray tunnel and became the first direct cargo train travelling from Xian, China, to Europe, passes through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Slovakia to reach its final destination Prague. Thus, finally the Turkish initiated corridor to Europe, (a.k.a. the Middle Corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative-BRI) became operational. Apart from its historical significance the Middle Corridor (MC) by creating an alternative shorter route to Europe is sidelining Russia. Yet beyond these, its activation is a significant step between Beijing and Ankara to have closer ties, as the revival of the ancient Silk Road was a matter of competition between the two capitals. Apparently, Ankara’s staying mum on a huge trade deficit between the two countries in favour of Beijing and on alleged suppression of Uyghur Turks in China for some time made this progress possible.

Turkish Silk road dreams

Reviving the ancient Silk Road that was connecting the West and East, mainly through Anatolia has been the ambition of Turkey since 1944. The independence of the Turkic states in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, made it more likely. In order to do that – as one of the most important elements – Turkey initiated the Trans-Caspian East-West-Middle Corridor Initiative “The Middle Corridor-MC” in short, which begins in Turkey and passes through the Caucasus region Georgia, Azerbaijan, crosses the Caspian Sea, traverses Central Asia and reaches China. It passes by rail and road through Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, (crossing the Caspian transit corridor) and reaches China by following Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan route. In addition to these countries, the MC initiative is also supported by Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

Besides the various protocols and agreements to further enhance the infrastructure of transportation between those countries, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) Railway named as “The Iron Silk Road” that was inaugurated on 30 October 2017 was also an important component of the Turkish Silk Road dream. Furthermore, in addition to the “Caravansarai Project” that aims cooperation between customs authorities in the region within the framework of the MC, major infrastructure initiatives connecting Europe with Asia was completed in Turkey such as the “Marmaray” undersea rail project.

Ankara thinks the MC initiative, “creates a natural synergy” with the BRI of China, which aims at developing connectivity between east and west. In this framework, Turkey supports the Belt and Road initiative based on the “win-win principle.” In that context, a “Memorandum of Understanding on Aligning the Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor Initiative” was signed between the two countries in November 2015, during the G-20 Leaders Summit in Antalya, Turkey. Thus the MC became the part of the BRI.

Ankara allegedly decided to align its MC with BRI in an effort to attract Chinese capital. On a trip to Beijing in July, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that there was “a natural harmony” between the two initiatives and called for further cooperation in areas including transportation, tourism, trade and investment. His Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping also called Turkey an important partner in jointly building the Belt and Road.“China is willing to move faster in dovetailing the Belt and Road Initiative with the Middle Corridor project,” he said. However, until now the MC was not operational.

MC vs NC

Beijing was preferring to ship or use the Trans-Siberian Railway the “Northern Corridor-NC” to send the approximately 10 million containers in a year to Europe, 96 % is transported by sea.

Even though Turkish officials were keen to emphasize that the MC is not meant to replace Russian routes but to diversify, Ankara has been propagating that the MC is more economical and faster than the NC:
“It is 2.000 km shorter, has more favourable climate conditions and shortens the travel time by 1/3rd (15 days) compared to the sea route. It offers great opportunities for the cargo traffic in Asia and if used effectively, important economic opportunities will arise for the Central Asian countries to benefit from the trade between China and Europe, estimated to be worth 600 billion USD annually. Moreover, the establishment of logistical centres and free trade zones at the ports of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan will facilitate the development and deepening of Trans-Caspian cooperation.”

Belt and Road Initiative

Chinese officials reportedly argue that the BRI is not a copy of the Turkish dream but rather a synergy that includes projects and strategies that could lead to creating more harmony between Turkey and China.

The BRI intends to deepen and expand the links between Asia, the MENA Region, Europe, and Africa by reviving the ancient Silk Road trade routes through both land (the Belt) and sea (the Road). Chinese President Xi, in 2013, raised the initiative of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, came to be known as the Belt and Road Initiative. It has attracted close attention from all over the world.
According to the “Action plan on the Belt and Road Initiative”,
it is a systematic project, which should be jointly built through consultation to meet the interests of all, and efforts should be made to integrate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road. The BRI is not limited to, the area of the ancient Silk Road. It is open to all countries, and international and regional organizations for engagement.

The train made the story

Yet those nice words of Beijing are not convincing for many in Turkey. Pro-western circles concern that getting closer with China would be another blow to already fragile relations with Washington. Moreover, they warn that China should not be a replacement for the EU. Pro-Russian circles, on the other hand, assume that flirting with Beijing especially by promoting the MC against Russian NC might annoy Moscow. Despite of those discussions about the cons and pros of the BRI and the future of Turkey’s relations with China, there is no doubt that the journey of 820 meters long train with 42 containers, carrying electronic goods and solar panels, makes 11.483 kilometres in 12 days, passes through 2 continents and seas and 10 countries, is historic and it’s an important progress between Beijing and Ankara.

As Transportation Minister of Turkey, Cahit Turhan underlined during the official ceremony, “This is a historic moment for global and regional trade. This train symbolizes the beginning of a new era in railway transportation.”

L'articolo A Significant Step In Sino-Turkish Relations proviene da InsideOver.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the most controversial politician in modern Turkish history was born in Istanbul’s neglected Kasımpasa district to a working-class family from Rize, a city at the Black Sea coast, on February 26, 1954. It was two years after Turkey’s membership to NATO and the Democratic Party (DP) was in reign.

L'articolo Who is Recep Tayyip Erdogan proviene da InsideOver.

Even though many observers declared the fifth Astana summit as unfruitful; the Turkish, Russian and Iranian leaders reached a tentative understanding in Ankara on a road map to solve the conflict in Idlib. According to which there will be limited military operations of the regime forces with the backing of Russia towards Idlib. There won’t be an all-out offensive as Damascus does not want a long-term cease-fire as Ankara demands. The radical jihadist elements will be removed step by step to prevent a new refugee flow to Turkey.

The M4 and M5 highways, linking Aleppo to Latakia and Hama, will be cleared from the radical elements and secured. Therefore, regime forces will effectively regain control of all main highways. At that point, a buffer zone, about 20 km deep, is going to be set up along the Turkish border across Idlib in which pro-Turkey opposition groups and Turkish observation posts are going to be relocated gradually. It will be a slow, partial retreat in certain pockets, not a total withdrawal at once. Ankara will transfer the observation posts to Russian forces.

Ankara hopes that the limited nature of the military operations will not cause a flow of refugees to her borders. Two humanitarian corridors will be open towards Damascus and Aleppo to let the migrants flee. Some refugees would be taken to the buffer zone. Moreover, the general amnesty declared by Damascus on the eve of the Ankara summit is expected to be helpful to limit the numbers of the refuges.

On the other hand, the planned gradual takeover of Idlib is expected to prevent the scattering of the radical jihadist elements inside to Syria, Turkey or Russia.

A Turkish-Syrian Join Operation Against The Kurds?

Simultaneously, Tehran and Moscow will support Turkey at their struggle to prevent the establishment of a sovereign Kurdish entity at the east of the Euphrates River in northern Syria albeit with conditions. Both Tehran and Moscow are not in favour of the safe zone Ankara is co-creating with Washington since they are against the presence of American forces in Syria. Yet they are against a sole cross border operation by Ankara to set up a larger safe zone. Instead, they proposed a joint operation to the region by Turkish and Turkish backed “Free Syrian Army” from the north and Syrian regime forces from the south. Consequently, to disperse the Kurdish military forces and the political entity Washington and its allies in the region – Israel, Saudi Arabia and UAE – are allegedly trying to set up there.

In that sense, the Syrian Foreign Ministry’s letter to the UN Secretary-General sent on the eve of the Ankara summit was quite encouraging for Ankara. In that letter Damascus identified the Syrian Democratic Forces by the leadership of the YPG is a separatist terror organization under the control of US and Israel.

Harsh Words Against Washington

Ankara has been openly expressing dissatisfaction about its cooperation with Washington in North-east Syria. They want to use the “safe zone” to repel the Kurdish YPG; the Syrian offshoot of the PKK Ankara has fought for decades, away from its border. Yet, Washington does not let Turkey push back the YPG, by extending the borders of the zone. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently said Washington is trying to protect the YPG from Turkey, not vice versa by establishing a safe zone. He proposed that it should be extended to eventually provide homes for 3 million returning Syrian refugees. In that sense, his planned meeting with American President Donald Trump during the UN General Assembly in New York is highly critical.

Speaking before his departure to New York he said “All of our preparations have been completed along the border. We are together with the US in NATO and we have continued our strategic partnership for many years.” He added “But in a place where the United States is not invited, we cannot afford to ignore the support it has given to terrorist organizations. In other words, their support for terrorist organizations such as YPG/PKK is obvious.” Erdogan underlined that Turkey will clear off terrorist organizations with the establishment of a safe zone. Whether alone or in cooperation with Damascus is unknown.

Seeking For The European Support

The details of the road map will be further discussed with the related parties and with France and Germany in New York and during the Syrian summit that will be held between Turkey, Russia, Germany and France in Istanbul next month.

The guarantor states of the Astana process are reportedly giving great importance to get the support of Paris and Berlin as well as the UN. Because they don’t want to introduce the process as a separate anti-Western initiative. On the contrary, they are trying to improve its legitimacy by collaborating with the European powers and the UN. That’s why the constitutional committee that the parties have agreed on will be launched in Geneva, in coordination with the UN.

This is especially important for Turkey since Western governments are concerned that Turkey is getting more dependent on Russia by day to protect her rights in Syria while Ankara’s traditional ties to the West are loosening.

This is the concern of the pro-Western circles in Turkey as well. They harshly criticize Erdogan and pro-Russia circles behind him named as “Eurasians” for pulling Turkey apart from the West and put its interests in jeopardy by allying with Russia, an authoritarian regime.

Astana Process May Pave The Way For New Regional Alliance

Yet there are many conflicting points between Moscow and Ankara on Syria. Despite Moscow’s pressure, for example, Erdogan is still not shaking hands with Bashar al Assad. Therefore, given the tense situation in the region ripe for all kind of provocations, the understanding reached in Ankara is quite shaky. Yet those conditions also dictate a collaboration between the Astana guarantors. Thus the fate of Idlib becomes the key issue to not only to solve the Syrian crises but the continuation of the tripartite alliance in the Middle East.

L'articolo Idlib’s Fate Will Determine Much More Than Syria’s Future proviene da InsideOver.

Ankara and Damascus are archenemies at the moment. Yet the fates of the two countries they belong to are tied together. Ankara’s future policy in Syria would very much determine the destiny of the latter. The end of Turkey’s three year old flirt with Russia might pave the way for the disintegration of Syria.

Turkey is geographically situated between West and East. In Syria quagmire, Turkey has been trying to find a way to advance it’s interests between the rival policies of the US and Russia. To put it bluntly, Ankara has been playing Moscow and Washington against each other. But it is obvious that this game will come to end sooner or later.

Moscow already raised a red flag and sent a strong message to Ankara by giving free hand to the Syrian army to advance to Idlib, hit the Turkish military convoy on its way to Morek and encircle the Turkish observation post in Morek. Thus ahead of the 14th round of the Astana talks between its guarantors Turkey, Russia and Iran, scheduled to take place September 16 in Turkey, Moscow openly signals that Ankara should be either a friend or foe. Moreover, if the claims of some Turkish sources are true that the Turkish convoy was hit by a Russian pilot, meaning Turkey and Russia were in direct confrontation with each other, that message is indeed a very serious one.

After Ankara’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles, there was a honeymoon mood between Turkey and Russia. Yet seemingly Turkey’s safe zone accord with the US has spoiled it. The accord that was announced on August 7, seeking to create a “Kurds free strip” along the Turkish border” might prevent Damascus from returning to those areas and would be a threat to its territorial integrity as well as Russian interests in the region”, Moscow concerns. Thus, the situation in Idlib, the attacks of jihadist rebel groups is in secondary importance for Moscow according to the military experts. But more than anything the renewal of the Turkish-American alliance was what really alarmed Moscow.

The agreement between Ankara and Washington was struck after Turkey threatened to launch unilateral military action against the American backed Kurdish group the YPG, the Syrian offshoot of the PKK which Turkey has been fighting since the 1980s.

Although the details of the agreement are still vague, it “guarantees the gradual establishment of a proposed safe zone near the Syrian-Turkish borders for the Syrian civilians who had fled the conflict, with Turkish demands to exclude the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)- mainly composed of Kurdish YPG- from the borders.” It seems that there will be a five-kilometre buffer zone from which the SDF will not be allowed to operate with US and Turkish forces jointly patrolling it up to a depth of 9 kilometres, all SDF heavy weapons will be removed although infantry personnel belonging to the militia will be allowed to remain.

On Aug. 23 a day after the Syrian army surrounded the Turkish observation post in northwest Syria, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that the SDF had begun withdrawing in northeast Syria and demolished their military fortifications. Therefore, the first phase of a safe zone plan began. How successful it would be to avert Turkey’s concerns regarding its border security is a wild guess but it might provide more legitimacy to the YPG under the protection of the US according to some concerned Turkish circles.

In opposition to Washington’s alleged plans to establish an autonomous Kurdish administration in North and East Syria, Ankara, Tehran, Damascus and Moscow are seeing eye to eye. A Kurdish autonomous region in Syria and its recognition by the US and international institutions would pave the way for the disintegration of Syria and set a model for the Kurdish population in Turkey and Iran as well. The real motivation behind the Astana process between those parties started in 2016 was this common concern.

Yet as a Turkish Anatolia News agency’s commentary suggests, “The Syrian Arab Army is on the verge of killing Astana process and the Astana process is now facing a significant test that could seal its fate.”

Idlib has been a thorny issue between Ankara and Moscow. Ankara has been trying to prevent Damascus’s final attack to Idlib populated by up to two million civilians and scores of various rebel groups, some of them jihadis. In addition to Ankara’s sensitivity to protect the pro-Turkey rebel groups such military advance would start a new massive wave of refugees towards Turkey. Even at the moment, there is reportedly a significant build up at the Turkish border across Idlib. Thus, in September 2018 a demilitarized zone deal was struck in Sochi between Turkey and Russia within the framework of the Astana process.

Turkey set up 12 observation points to observe the cease-fire between the Syrian regime forces and the rebels and committed to fight against the extremist groups and prevent their attacks against the Syrian regime forces. But apparently, Turkey couldn’t succeed in this impossible mission. The jihadists did not pull back from the zone as agreed, and the regime and Russian forces started an intense bombardment of the region. The ceasefires didn’t hold and the Syrian regime military advance started.

Turkey is now stuck in Idlib with little room to manoeuvre. Perhaps the meeting between Turkish and Russian presidents in Moscow on Tuesday might produce an exit route for Turkey. Yet the situation created a golden opportunity for the pro-Western lobby in Turkey to raise an opposition campaign against Russia and the current Syrian policy of the Erdogan administration.

A heated debate is going on in Turkey at the moment. Some are saying that “Turkey should cooperate with Damascus regarding the Kurds in northeastern Syria because its interests correspond with those of Damascus’ in this regard rather than with those of Washington.” The others defend good relations with Kurds under the auspices of Washington while some are saying that Turkey can’t go farther with Russia in Syria since their interests are diverging and the Astana process was a trap.

The Idlib incident shows that sooner or later Turkey has to decide between Moscow or Washington. That decision would be a vital one for Syria as well.

L'articolo Moscow-Ankara Break-Up May Hurt Damascus proviene da InsideOver.

It has just turned 60 years old; Turkey’s one-sided love affair with the EU started on 31 July 1959, when it applied for association with the EEC (European Economic Community) founded in 1958. Turkish fascination with Europe began more than 300 years ago, during the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire. It was embodied first by the modernization of the army under the European military experts. Then, to put it mildly, with the encouragement of European powers, a reform process (Tanzimat-Reorganization) was started by the Ottoman elite that, according to some Ottoman historians, lead to the disintegration of the Empire. However, they had no other choice than to be a part of the emerging European order. Albeit that the first adventure of Turks with Europe ended with a complete disaster. 

After losing the First World War against the Allied powers, the Empire was invaded by them. Yet they succeeded in liberating a portion of the Empire, built a republic on its ruins, abolished the caliphate, swallowed their pride and anger, and once again turned towards Europe by starting a new reform process. Because “Europe was the source of contemporary civilization. The new republic should have adopted its ways to progress.” Many republican generations grew up with this belief. Thus in 1959, Turkey knocked on the door of Europe and started to wait to enter.

The EEC accepted Turkey’s application. The Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963. Turkey’s application for full membership was rejected in 1989, but it was stated that Turkey was eligible to join the community. The Customs Union was established between Turkey and the EU in 1995. In 1999, Turkey was officially recognised without any precondition as a candidate state. The Accession Partnership for Turkey was accepted in 2001. 

Turkey continued its reform process, to “extend the scope of fundamental rights and freedoms, strengthen the existing regulations on democracy, rule of law, freedom of thought and expression and human rights. Within this framework between 2002-2004, eight harmonization packages, and between 2001-2004 two constitutional amendments were accepted.”

In 2004, the EU Council stated, “Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria” and decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005. Turkey’s accession process is conducted in 35 chapters in the context of Negotiation Framework, 16 chapters are opened so far yet only one chapter is closed. 14 chapters are blocked because of Turkey’s refusal to recognize the Greek Cypriot led Republic of Cyprus – which was admitted to the EU in 2004, despite Turkey’s objections – as the sole representative of Cypriot people since it is not the original partnership State established in 1960. 

Therefore, after 60 years, Turkey is still waiting at the doorstep of Europe not because of the state of its democracy, or its economy or because of its decision to buy Russian made S-400 missiles but because of the Cyprus problem. 

“Why Turkey is not solving the Cyprus problem?” Turkey wants to solve it since it has been a huge burden both politically and financially and the negotiations to solve the Cyprus problem has been continuing, on and off, since 1958. Yet, it is believed that a final solution is being prevented by the forces that are against Turkey’s EU membership. 

Let’s verify this from a rather objective observer. A prize-winning journalist, then with Reuters, Paul Taylor found out that Europe itself is divided on the Cyprus issue. The most powerful member states, Germany and France, “may be content to see the Cyprus stalemate continue rather than deal with the potential consequences of a resolution that would bring Turkey closer to EU membership.”

At his article dated February 4, 2013, from Paris, he wrote that the Republic of Cyprus was broke and desperate to get a loan about €17 billion from the EU. Therefore, Brussels had the leverage to push the Greek Cypriots to join in a loose federation as proposed in 2004 by Kofi Annan, then the U.N. secretary-general. Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the Annan plan, encouraged by Turkey but Greek Cypriots rejected it. “Turkey invaded northern Cyprus in 1974 in response to a Greek-backed coup in Nicosia by Greek Cypriot hardliners seeking union with Athens. The island has been divided ever since. Turkey has about 30,000 troops in northern Cyprus. Under the Annan plan, most of them would have gone home by 2018,” he reminded. 

However, the Greek Cypriots who said no to the Annan plan became an EU state just after a week. At that time European officials, and especially Günter Verheugen, the EU enlargement commissioner felt betrayed Taylor wrote. He quoted him saying, “ The understanding was quite clear when we gave Turkey candidate status in 1999 and even clearer when we concluded negotiations with Cyprus in 2002: The Greek Cypriots would not allow the peace plan to fail, and if it failed due to the Turkish Cypriots, then Cyprus could join… We came very close. The problem was that in the end, we didn’t have any leverage over the Greek Cypriots anymore since they knew they would join anyway.”

On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots who accepted the peace plan were punished by being excluded from the Union and remained economically isolated. “At the time, Brussels released some funds that had been pledged to the Turkish Cypriots for economic development and promised to allow them to export their products directly to the Union. But the Greek Cypriots blocked direct trade with the Union. Turkey, in turn, refused to allow the Greek Cypriots direct access to its ports and airports,” Taylor added.

He also underlined that the US was actively engaged in trying to settle the Cyprus dispute until large amounts of natural gas were found over Cyprus, and Greek Cypriots began to cooperate with Israel. So Europe using the loan to put pressure on the Greek Cypriots is the last chance for the unification of the island, he warned but no avail. 

If we fast-forward, today we see American and European gas giants also got involved in the Cyprus issue. Washington is making harsh announcements against Ankara because of its drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean. 

A very aggressive media campaign has started, portraying Ankara as a rough state, which has no right over Cyprus or it’s continental shelf at all, only by using the fact that the Republic of Cyprus is the only internationally recognized state in Cyprus (which is in fact a great injustice to the Cypriot Turks.) On top of it, the EU has put sanctions on Ankara to stop its drilling. They are symbolic, yet the act itself was the last straw for Turkish people. It has proved once again that the EU plays a double game on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. 

In that regard, the findings of the comprehensive survey, “Public Perceptions on Turkish Foreign Policy” conducted by the prestigious Kadir Has University of Turkey just before the EU sanctions- are interesting. It has found out that 61.1 percent of the respondents still supported Turkey’s membership to the EU. Yet 68 percent think that Turkey can never become a full member of the Union, 65 percent of the respondents think Turkey’s membership has been blocked by European countries, 54.4 percent of them believe it is because of the religious and identity differences and 51.5 percent of them see the EU “not reliable and sincere”. Finally when asked, “Which countries pose threat to Turkey?” They responded as; USA 81.3 percent, Israel 70.8 percent, France 65 percent, United Kingdom 62.8 percent, Armenia 61.2 percent, Syria 60.1 percent, Germany 58.8 percent, Greece 53.5 percent and so on. In 2015 only 10.2 percent saw the EU countries as a threat. 

Consequently, after 60 years, most of the Turkish people lost hope in becoming part of Europe, and Turkey’s second adventure with Europe seemingly is coming to end, hopefully in peace this time.

L'articolo How the EU lost its leverage on Turkey proviene da InsideOver.

On July 7th, 2019, Greek people elected a new prime minister, the leader of the New Democracy Party, Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Meanwhile, in the eastern Mediterranean, a second Turkish drillship, Yavuz, was sailing towards Cyprus to begin drilling for oil and gas by adding more flames to the already hot dispute, between Greece, Greek Cypriots and Turkey, stemmed from the drilling rights over Cyprus. Just a few hours after the announcement of his landslide victory against his rival Syriza’s Alexis Tsipras, Mitsotakis received his first phone call as a prime minister from a head of state, a rather unexpected name. President of Turkey Recep Erdogan congratulated Mitsotakis on his great victory and wished him good luck. Erdogan wished that the results will contribute to the relations between the two countries, and to the regional prosperity.

The next day, before departing to Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Balkan Summit, Erdogan vowed continued oil and gas drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean. He followed this up by stating:

“My wish is to run this new process with Greece in peace and in solidarity. After the polls, we will carry out our talks through our relevant officials. Our desire is not to experience any sort of difficulty in the Mediterranean and in the Aegean in the upcoming period.” 

Ankara reportedly hopes to start a new era with Athens. That might seem a little naive within the light of harsh announcements already fired up between Ankara and Athens just after the elections regarding the tense situation in the eastern Mediterranean, and long list of unresolved disputes between the two countries, not to mention the deep-rooted historical hostility. Yet according to the seasoned observers of Greek-Turkish relations, after the former coalition government which had included ultra-nationalists such as former defence minister Panos Kammenos, who created tension between Ankara and Athens, Mitsotakis’ election as prime minister regarded as a positive development.

To begin with, the Mitsotakis family, which has a long political heritage, have always maintained cordial relations with Turkey. When Constantine Mitsotakis, Kyriakos’ father, was arrested by Greek military junta in 1967, the then Turkish Foreign Minister, Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, helped the family escaped to Turkey to flee to Paris. Kyriakos was just one year old at that time. As a prime minister senior, Constantine never followed a pro-Turkey policy, yet always had warm personal relations with Turkish leaders. Thus, it is considered that Kyriakos will follow in his fathers’ footsteps – he knows the importance of Turkey and won’t follow an adventurous policy.

The New Democracy Party is a nationalist party, and used hawkish rhetoric regarding Cyprus, energy issues in the Eastern Mediterranean, and relations with Turkey during the election campaign. Unlike Syriza, it has the absolute majority in the parliament, and doesn’t have to cooperate with the ultranationalists. This means that they can exert pressure on the Greek Cypriot government, not vice versa, unlike the situation during the tenure of Tsipras. 

Despite their stormy relationship during Tsipras’ government, Athens and Ankara were succeeded to maintain dialogue channels. In addition to high-level meetings, they have been talking at a technical level on confidence-building measures especially on the security issues in order to avert a hot conflict.  Ankara already invited the new government to swiftly revitalize existing dialogue channels and start contacts as soon as possible to address issues on two countries agenda. Mitsotakis also reportedly expressed his readiness to have an honest discussion with Turkey and Erdogan while fighting for EU to apply tough sanctions on Turkey in order to put an end to her drilling in the eastern Mediterranean.

Therefore a new set of technical talks might resume shortly if not a high-level meeting between the two countries despite the war of words and rising tension on drilling rights over Cyprus and exactly because of that too. Since the risk of accidental confrontations at sea or in the air is seen higher than it has been for decades at the moment.  

Yet even the two sides luckily will be able to prevent a hot conflict the possibility of calming the crises completely and start a detente as in 1999 is vague as so many other dynamics are involved. Such as Mitsotakis’  performance as a prime minister and if he will succeed to bring welfare to his people, domestic policy developments in Turkey, Turkey’s relations with the Western block especially with the US after the deployment of Russian made S-400 missiles, Turkey’s relations with Russia therefore the situation in Syria, the future of “Mediterranean Pact” between US, Greece and Israel, Turkey’s relations with Israel,  the interests of global powers over Cyprus such as natural resources, sea, and air bases; what will happen with Iran and so on… But it is a possibility. Comprehensive negotiations between Athens and Ankara might start during the reign of Mitsotakis.

It is necessary to note that the main problem between Turks and Greeks, who have many cultural similarities,  is psychological. Greek people were under the control of the Turkish Ottoman Empire for 400 years then achieved their independence through a series of bloody wars. Afterwards invaded a large part of declining Ottoman Empire’s lands with the backing of Britain only to got a very humiliating defeat.  A lot of bloodsheds. Those memories rooted deeply in their psyche. Similar traumatic events took place in Cyprus between Turks and Greeks and resulted in the “intervention” of Turkish troops in 1974.

Besides history,  geography is also an important fact. Conflicts  such as territorial waters, delimitation of the continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, and  air space, between Turkey and Greece mainly stem from the unmarked demarcation lines  because of the unique  characteristics  of the Aegean which is “a semi-enclosed Sea located in between the Turkish and Greek mainlands and is dotted by thousands of islands, islets, and rocks.” Turkey wants an equal share while actually saying, “ I have to be strong” but Greece says, “ No, I own many islands so it is not fair for you to have equal share” meaning, “You are already stronger than me.”

The latest crises in the eastern Mediterranean has sparked with the finding of the reserves of oil and gas around Cyprus which are probably not rich and feasible enough to compete for. Yet the core of the problem is political. Greek Cypriots  claims that as the internationally recognized The Republic of Cyprus they have every right to give licenses to the foreign companies such as America’s Exxon Mobil and Noble Energy, France’s Total and Italy’s Eni  to drill in the blocks in Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Turkish Cypriots can only get their share when the island will be united.  Turkey, who send its troops to the island in 1974 “because of the military coup backed by Greek junta to protect the Turkish Cypriots there”, says first they have to reach an agreement with the Turkish Cypriots on how to share the resources. Moreover, Turkey claims part of the EEZ is lie within its continental shelf and already send 2 drilling ships to the region “to protect its rights”. Perhaps resuming of Cyprus talks might help to ease the situation and there are already signs in that direction even both sides have preconditions.

It was announced that Mitsotakis will visit Greek Cyprus between July 20-22, at the 45th. year of  Turkish intervention.  So be ready for more bellicose rhetoric from both sides. Since neither Greek nor Turkish people want war but like harsh words, “Harsh words but no war” seems like to be the new motto between Ankara and Athens.

L'articolo The New Motto Between Athens and Ankara: “Harsh Words But No War” proviene da InsideOver.