High in the mountains of the lesser Caucusus, a historical Rubicon has been crossed. Turkey has become the first country to openly intervene in a war in the post-Soviet space that was not formerly part of the Soviet Union. And even more remarkably, Russia remains on the sidelines while Armenia and Azerbaijan renew their stagnant war over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Post-Soviet Space Has Come and Gone

This is a seemingly historic moment, its significance belied only by the simple fact that the year is 2020 and not 2000, and in 2020 the post-Soviet space is little more than a relic of history.

Twenty years prior it may indeed have been unthinkable that a foreign power would intervene militarily in what Russia thought of as its “near abroad.” Russia had by then begun to develop what looked like a new political home for the country and those around it. One where late-Soviet apparatchiks were given a new lease on their careers as leaders of independent states.

In the early 2000s, the distinctly post-Soviet character of most of the USSR’s successor states was unmistakable. A summit of post-Soviet leaders would have included several former Soviet Politburo members, the former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the former Deputy Premier as well. Post-Soviet then described a living epoch. It was high-Post Sovietism.

The Ouster of Shevardnadze

But by the end of 2003 the first cracks in that system started to show when Georgia’s President Eduard Shevardnadze was toppled by pro-Western protests. The first of many so-called color revolutions which shook the post-Soviet elite to its core. Color revolutions toppled some and terrified the rest, while simultaneously proving the weakness of the post-Soviet space as a political concept.

It was a real political concept though, one that gave added meaning to the word that simply described a state of being formerly part of the USSR. One which manifested itself not just in the many informal ties that aided transnational cooperation between post-Soviet leaders, but also in numerous institutions built to keep post-Soviet states together politically and economically.

Also, one that progressively grew smaller by the year with each deposed post-Soviet autocrat. 

Moscow Shot Itself in the Foot

But the decisive blow did not come from the provinces, but from the center itself. Much like in the USSR’s case, it was the decisions taken in Moscow that proved fatal. With pro-Western forces in Ukraine overthrowing their second Russophile President within a decade in 2014, the Kremlin made a decision that guaranteed any shared post-Soviet space was dead. It annexed Crimea and provoked war in Eastern Ukraine, choosing nationalism over post-Sovietism, and likely condemning Russia and Ukraine to a generation of mutual antagonism.

This conflict also highlighted a paradox in the entire conception of a post-Soviet space to begin with. How could two countries so diametrically opposed be so widely conceived of as belonging to a single political space?

What Does ‘Post-Soviet’ Mean Anymore? Very Little

If Ukraine is post-Soviet and Russia is post-Soviet, Armenia is post-Soviet and Azerbaijan is post-Soviet, then what does post-Soviet even mean? Of course it means these four countries were all once part of the USSR, a country which has not been seen on the map for thirty years. But so too was Croatia part of Austria-Hungary and Serbia part of the Ottoman Empire, and yet we seem to be spared of incessantly hearing about the empires these countries were once part of because it has little to no bearing on contemporary political developments.

In the 1990s and into the early 2000s, there was genuine continuity across the space from Eastern Europe to Central Asia that made a post-Soviet space a real realm of political engagement. Today the phrase “post-Soviet” survives only as a distant and largely irrelevant cultural reference point for a distracted and disinterested western public struggling to keep up with a rapidly changing world.

Meanwhile Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan against Armenia and its proxy Republic of Artsakh is a sign of focus and interest on behalf of Ankara in advancing its political interests. From Libya and Syria to the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond, it is making full use of its strategically unique geographical position to project power in all directions.

That includes in the direction of the Caucusus. The mountainous region bordering Turkey’s northeast home to countless small nations, only a handful of which have independent states to call their own. One of those lucky few is Armenia, a country of just around 3 million inhabitants now stumbling into an all-out war with a neighbor three times its size supported by a country of over 80 million people in Turkey.

This is today’s reality.

The New Geopolitical Reality

It is hardly just in the Caucusus that this reality is playing out. In Central Asia China has already supplanted Russia as the most important foreign power in the region. In Ukraine and Georgia the temptation of the West has drawn both countries into armed conflict with Russia, while again in 2020 the allure of freedom has brought the people of Belarus into the streets in droves in hopes of toppling their geriatric post-Soviet leader.

New realities –  political, social, cultural, economic, and beyond – have changed every corner of what was once the Soviet Union. Permanently. Just as the Soviet Union is now merely a subject of history, perhaps it is time to accept that the post-Soviet space is as well.

Unlike the young men who perished in the first Nagorno-Karabkh War, the young Azeris and Armenians dying in the mountains of Karabakh have no memory of the Soviet Union. Their birthdays read 2000, 1997, or even 2002. A new millennium in which all things Soviet are a distant memory — and in time all things post-Soviet will be too.

L'articolo The Ephemeral Post-Soviet Space proviene da InsideOver.

They thought the pandemic had ended. Then, a second wave. Not just a second wave, but one much stronger than the first. Rather than being instructed to hunker down in their homes, the people of Croatia and Serbia were asked to do something else by their respective governments: go to the polls.

In both cases the deeply entrenched ruling parties won huge victories. Beyond the fates of these two small but regionally important countries, many were left wondering, what do these results mean for the future of the Balkans?

Political Stability in the Balkans?

Political stability certainly sounded like the answer after the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) won over sixty percent of the vote on the June 21. That overwhelming victory gave the party 188 seats in the 250 seat Parliament, with close to fifty more being won by its allies. The man giving the victory speech on election night – Aleksandar Vučić. Serbia’s most personally powerful President since notorious dictator Slobodan Milošević, and the SNS’ unchallenged leader.

At 1.99 m, Vučić towers over anyone else in the room. He also towers over the opposition, but that has nothing to do with his height. With heavily controlled print and TV showering the country’s weary citizens with endless positive coverage of the President and his party, many are sick of his personalized rule. So sick of it, they have turned their backs on Serbia’s stillborn democracy.

Serbia’s Opposition Parties Shut Out of Power

This year’s election saw a boycott by the country’s main opposition parties. Of the few that participated, only one entered Parliament. Shut out of the political process yet again, many have taken to the streets. The entire region has watched with shock at chaotic scenes unfolding in Belgrade as those taking to the streets have been met with a brutal police response.

In a strange twist, Vučić deflected blame for the protests not onto NATO or America – Serbia’s classic bogeymen – but rather on its popular “ally” Russia. A shocking betrayal? Not exactly. Vučić’s greatest success as Serbian President has been his ability to manipulate opinions not just at home, but abroad as well. That is how, despite ever-growing accusations of authoritarianism as well as open public discontent with his rule, he receives glowing praise and support from European leaders.

The European People’s Party

This is mostly thanks to his party’s membership in European People’s Party (EPP) – by far the most powerful political group in the EU. EPP politicians head the European Council, the European Commission, and the EU’s most powerful country – Germany. Beyond that, it is by far the most powerful trans-national political force in central and eastern Europe. When it comes to European enlargement and integration of the Balkans, the EPP may be Europe’s most important institution.

In the run-up to Croatia’s Parliamentary election, held a couple weeks after the Serbian one, a campaign spot was released in which EPP leaders read out “Sigurna Hrvatska” (Safe Croatia), the ruling HDZ’s campaign slogan. The figures giving their personal support included the head of Germany’s ruling CDU, Austria’s Chancellor Kurz, European Council President Donald Tusk, and the PMs and Presidents of numerous other countries. But the real controversy came from the presence in the video of President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, accused of meddling in Croatia’s election through the advert.

Croatia’s Future Entry into the Schengen Area

But it is easy to understand von der Leyen’s giddy support of Croatian PM Andrej Plenković and his HDZ when you consider that within a week of the HDZ’s strong victory Croatia entered ERM II, the “waiting room” for adoption of the Euro. This means within the next 5 years Croatia is likely to enter the Euro as well as finally joining the Schengen Area. While Hungary and Poland cause headaches in Brussels, Croatia under the HDZ happily pushes for European integration so long as it is free to act as a local mafia within Croatia’s borders.

The same implicit deal is being offered to Vučić by his European colleagues, and it is a deal he is happy to take. As he strangles his political opposition and establishes dictator-like control over the country EPP politicians either stay silent or cheer him on. The political calculation is clear, EU leaders give Vučić support and legitimacy in exchange for the assurance that Serbia will enter the EU. With that the added assurance that somehow the most important prerequisite will be resolved – recognition of Kosovo.

The Importance of the Balkans for the EU

The EU is bad at geopolitics, but the EPP may not be.

Without the currently non-EU Balkan states of Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo integrated into the European Union, the Balkans are for Europe a political and geopolitical vortex. In 2015 that vortex produced one of the EU’s most polarizing crises to date as millions of migrants and refugees arrived on Germany’s borders seemingly overnight though they had been moving through the Balkans for months beforehand.

Besides the geopolitical black hole in the form of uncontrolled external borders too close for comfort to the EU’s core, there is the issue of malicious foreign influence as well. Russian, Chinese, and Arab investors have found in Serbia, Montenegro, and elsewhere in the Balkans a highly welcoming atmosphere for trading in both economic and political influence. A situation tolerated for now, but not one that could comfortably last forever.

Vučić: European Solidarity is a ‘Fairytale’

In a prominent show at the start of the Coronavirus pandemic Vučić received a planeload of Chinese medical equipment at the airport to much fanfare. He called European solidarity a “fairytale” that “does not exist” while praising China and the Chinese government as the only ones that can save Serbia. It is concerning for EU leaders to hear, but they are in many ways backed into a corner. They have already decided they want Serbia in the EU, and they see Vučić as the one to realize that membership.

For Serbia and others it is a simple choice because there is nothing else on offer. The fates of those small Balkan countries are already so tied up with decisions made in Brussels that they have nothing to lose by being inside the club rather than outside it. Russia and China can offer symbolic victories. By treating countries like Serbia as equals they give them some pride, but little else. For now at least.

Can Serbian and Croatian Leaders Follow Through on Their Promises?

With ruling parties in both Serbia and Croatia thoroughly dominating their respective countries with the approval of Europe, the question will be whether those leaders can deliver on their promises. Another question remains as to whether Russia, China, Turkey, or others see an opening in the Balkans for their own European ambitions. With their power seemingly rising, and the power of Europe supposedly on the decline, it will be a race to the finish line for Brussels.

Friendly and familiar politicians at the heads of the former Yugoslavia’s two most important nations make political conditions brighter than ever for the region’s European future. That may seem cynical given the questionable democratic credentials of the parties at the heads of those two countries, but geopolitical considerations are hardly about democracy.

The US not only tolerated but supported more than a few dictatorships in its Cold War. How many will Europe be willing to support to play at geopolitics in the Balkans?

The answer will be the difference between a “European” Balkans, and something else entirely.

L'articolo The New Geopolitics of the Balkans proviene da InsideOver.

In early April, Ukraine marked a somber anniversary. Six years had passed since war broke out in its easternmost provinces, tying up the fate of one of Europe’s largest countries in a bloody conflict with no end in sight. Two days later, an even more tragic milestone was passed. The War in the Donbass has now lasted longer than the Second World War.

The Reality of Daily Life in Ukraine

Far from the guns and mortars of the frontlines, Ukrainians go about their day to day lives as normally as they can in a country at war. But the same conflicts and contradictions that led to war in the east still play out in day to day life for millions of Ukrainians as the country struggles to unify its sense of identity and its sense of place in the world. The most striking example of the division in Ukraine is found in the languages spoken by its people.

Ukraine’s Powerful Cultural Divide

Nearly every Ukrainian is proficient – if not fluent – in both Russian and Ukrainian, with many mixing the two seamlessly in everyday speech to create third language – Surzhyk. Ukraine’s divide appears linguistic, but is it really? What the ambiguous linguistic divide conceals, is a far deeper and more powerful cultural divide. One that runs not just through every Ukrainian, but through their memory and the memories of their parents and grandparents as well.

Ukrainians are constantly forced to reconcile the complexities of their identity with the simplifications of politics and nation-building under the pressure of the great civilizations lying to their East and West. It is no easy task, nor is it one most people care to engage in anyway. Language is the most symbolic aspect of this straddling, a symbolism which takes physical form in two vastly different Ukrainian cities – Lviv and Odessa.

Lviv and Odessa

Ukrainian is almost exclusively the language heard on the grand cobbled streets of Lviv. The city is – and for centuries has been – the cultural capital of the Ukrainian nation. Long part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and later to become one of the Habsburg Empire’s largest cities, it is unmistakably Central European. Russian meanwhile, is met with odd – in many cases hostile – looks. As I was told by a student from Lviv “I don’t get it when people speak to me in Russian, you are in Ukraine. Speak Ukrainian!”

Fair enough. It is Ukraine after all, why should people expect to be spoken to in Russian? But a few hundred kilometers away, perched on the sunny shores of the Black Sea, a completely different kind of Ukrainian resides. Odessa is a city founded by the “enlightened” Catherine the Great in what was then called Novorossija, or “New Russia.” It is the same name used by Ukraine’s separatists in the East for their breakaway federation. For centuries the city was a refuge for Russian nobles and intellectuals alike, keen on escaping the freezing Russian winters for warm sunny beaches. But not just for Russians. Ukrainians too found a home here along with scores of Jews, Romanians, Bulgarians, Poles, Frenchmen and countless other nationalities.

Russian – not Ukrainian – is the language that dominates the city to this day. Street signs, billboards, schools and government buildings are all Ukrainian domains, but on streets and beaches, in bars and streetcars, Russian is the language in use. “Do you feel more Ukrainian or Russian?” – a question which may warrant a smack in the face in Lviv, will be met with a pensive look in Odessa. “It’s complicated” I would hear from generations young and old alike in Odessa. They are Ukrainian, to be sure, but they cannot escape some identification with Russian culture and the Russian world. It surrounds them their entire lives.

So too does Ukrainian though. With schooling now entirely in Ukrainian, Russian speakers are faced with a strange reality. My Odessan host of several weeks held no animosity towards Ukrainian, and even treated the language with more respect than many Russian-speakers do but objected strongly to the change. Her young son agreed. Even for his generation Russian was the lingua franca, while Ukrainian the language of the teachers. This family, like millions of others, finds itself a minor victim of Ukraine’s political and cultural divide.

The Deep Roots of Identity

But identities stretch back further than the present, and the cultural memory of the two cities stand in stark contrast to one another. Odessa still clings proudly to its legacy as a Hero City, a Soviet designation for cities that put up exceptional resistance to the Nazis while the main square is graced by a statue of a Russian Empress. Two symbols that could not be more anathema in Lviv, which instead memorializes the anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera and his Ukrainian Insurgent Army while tearing down old Soviet monuments.

These two conflicting Ukrainian identities were on full display in 2014, as the anti-Russian and pro-Ukrainian Maidan Revolution ousted President Viktor Yanukovych, to which Russia responded by annexing Crimea and provoking a separatist war in the East. Six years on that war rages on, and so too does Ukraine’s struggle for national unity between two views of itself, two dejected faces of Ukraine.

Hope for a Better Future

What unity Ukrainians lack in identity they make up for in solidarity. Solidarity in the face of a dysfunctional political system corrupted by oligarchs. An economy ravaged by war and decades of mismanagement and corruption. Ukraine may be divided by language, by nationhood and identity, but it is united in one respect. It is united in its desperate hope for a better future, perhaps an attitude the rest of Europe will soon come to know.

L'articolo A Tale of Two Ukrainian Cities proviene da InsideOver.

In a somber tone, Boris Johnson warned the British people of the tragedy to come. Many more would lose their loved ones, he said. Many more would die. The date was March 12, 2020. It was a whole two months after the UK registered its first case. On that same day, Slovakia went into lockdown six days after its first registered case. The Czech Republic, Poland, Croatia, and Slovenia – all having recently registered their first cases – followed Slovakia’s lead. While Western European countries dragged their feet, Central Europe acted. Quarantines, border closures, curfews – nationwide lockdown.

Not All Lockdowns Were Created Equal

Since then nearly every other European country has done the same. But not all lockdowns have been equal. As of April 23, the UK has over 270 Coronavirus deaths per million people. France 320, Italy 415, and Spain 464. Between these four countries, thousands still die every day. Meanwhile in Slovakia, less than 3 people have died per million citizens. Of the remaining Central European countries mentioned, Slovenia has the highest death rate with 38. Why have deaths for Western European countries been a whole order of magnitude higher than they have been for their less developed Central and Eastern European neighbors?

Explaining Western Europe’s Crisis

Plenty of explanations have been provided by astute Western commentators. The BCG vaccine, lack of tourism, under-reporting. Even Communism has been offered as an explanation. These dubious proposals miss a glaringly obvious observation. Far from being some wildly successful Central European experiment in need of explanation, these countries simply followed the lead of those who knew best – Asian countries.

Asia experienced SARS in the early 2000s, and then the novel coronavirus before the rest of the world in 2020. They were better prepared, and implemented quicker and more effective responses than anyone else. There was no need to experiment. Asia’s experience was there for all to follow. Small Central European states looked to China’s example and went into “Wuhan-style” lockdown as quickly as they could. Relative to the spread of the virus, Central Europe acted far, far quicker than Western Europe.

It Can’t Happen Here? Wrong

The true experiments, meanwhile, have been in Western European countries. Most notably Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden whose strategies are based on untested theoretical models which rely on unproven behavioral theories and have led them to either delay proven measures or not implement them at all. But even those Western countries not experimenting were crippled by thoughts of “it can’t happen here”, and failed to acknowledge the spread of the virus even long after it had begun. For weeks they patted themselves on the back for preserving democratic liberties as COVID-19 spread undetected. When it became clear how much they had misjudged the situation and they finally locked down, it was too late.

Complacency is Deadly

There is no excuse that can make up for the complacency that poisoned Europe. The strongest explanation for the prolonged inaction and denial is the deeply engrained sense of superiority that pervades in Western Europe to this day. The generation that leads Europe grew up in a wealthy and modern continent looking down on a China they saw as a poor and dirty country far away on the other side of the world. Now China is more modern than Europe and sits firmly at the heart of the most globalized world in history. Yet it seems like those two old perceptions of China blinded Europe not just to the threats posed by the virus, but to its proven responses too.

Besides lockdowns and contact tracing, the most symbolic of these responses is the face mask. Common in East Asia since SARS, many countries in the region have insisted the mass wearing of face masks is essential to stopping the spread of coronavirus. The WHO disagrees, but Central Europe has followed the lead of Asia, not the WHO. In late March, the Czech Republic and Slovakia made use of face masks in public mandatory. And, in what may become one of the era’s most iconic images, Slovakia’s President wore an elegant matching face mask as she swore in the new government. It was an early symbol of the new world to come.

What About Germany’s Relative Success in Battling COVID-19?

Central Europe’s largest and richest country – conspicuously omitted until now – has perhaps been the biggest coronavirus success story of all. Germany is the EU’s most populous country but boasts a surprisingly low death rate at 64 per million, despite having the fourth most recorded cases in the world. This is thanks to a South Korean inspired model – mass testing and tracing of infected people’s contacts. So-called ‘test and trace’.

Though Germany’s decentralized government means individual states implement measures at different points and to varying degrees, the overall strategy from the beginning has been one inspired by the East Asian experience. Now Germany is even relaxing its lockdown, but not without a further measure – face masks. Like its Czech and Austrian neighbors, and against the advice of the WHO, German states are demanding citizens wear face masks in public. And joining Germany, the Czech Republic and Austria are loosening up restrictions too. Central Europe — late to the pandemic — is slowly becoming the first to overcome it.

Post-Lockdown Means Social Distancing, Face Masks and Closed Borders

While the UK, Spain, and others in Western Europe still debate what emerging from lockdown will look like, Central Europe is already there. Social distancing, face masks, and closed borders. With idealism stripped back and replaced by pandemic realities, a new normal is developing in the heart of Europe. One that is built to last.

History books will not be writing about a great Central European experiment because there was none. With no other model to follow, Central Europe quickly looked to implement what had succeeded in East Asia. For the smaller, less well-off states it meant lockdowns and homemade face masks. For the larger and wealthier, mass testing and contact tracing. Either way, the result is the same. Thousands of deaths avoided, and probably a more stable long-term equilibrium.

History may not be so kind to Western European leaders. With greater means they achieved far less and with the consequences of the virus clear they waited too long to act. Some eventually realized their mistakes and belatedly began to implement necessary measures, while others have turned their countries into nationwide social experiments. And again, the result is the same. Tens of thousands of entirely avoidable deaths. Central Europe listened to Asia. Western Europe did not — and it is suffering the consequences.

L'articolo Central Europe Listened to Asia, Western Europe Didn’t proviene da InsideOver.

Like in any great European crisis, the European Union is playing catch up. Even with months to prepare, Europe has been caught out completely off guard by Covid-19, ending up as the epicenter of the worst global pandemic in generations. But however delayed it may be, European institutions are finally responding with bold proposals that could shape the development of Europe for decades. Time will tell if those policies succeed, but if there is one conclusion to be drawn from the pandemic it is that there can be either one Europe or none at all.

Europe is Under Enormous Stress

At first glance, it may look like the latter. European countries, far from responding as a bloc, have each handled the pandemic on their own. Not only that, but pillars of the European project such as freedom of movement have evaporated just as easily as anywhere else. In a matter of weeks the EU went from an almost borderless bloc to bordered regimes that would have been considered unimaginably strict under normal circumstances. Europe’s failure to mount a speedy and unified response to the pandemic has left the bloc looking like a non-entity with its future once again in question.

Hope on the Horizon?

There is a glimmer of hope for the EU in one aspect of this crisis though. It may seem counterintuitive, but the breaking down of Europe along national lines may be positive sign for Europe’s future. It means that Europe is not at risk of a regionalized fracturing, nor has it truly developed into a so-called multi-speed Europe. Which is to say it is a Europe divided by stages of integration.

The idea of a multi-speed Europe is as old as the EU itself. To a large extent, Europe is integrated to various degrees. There are many treaties which not all members are party to and many institutions which do not apply across the bloc. But politically, a multi-speed Europe would be one where some countries form a more integrated “core Europe” and others an un-integrated, peripheral Europe.

The thinking goes that this allows everyone to get their way. Eurofederalists can proceed with integration while Eurosceptics can sit on the sidelines without having to surrender any of their treasured sovereignty. It is the indecisive middle-ground of a bloc in continuous crisis and continual disagreement over its fundamental tenets. But how does that multi-speed Europe respond to a life or death crisis?

How Does a Divided Europe Respond to Disaster?

In a crisis like the one we are living through now, a divided Europe would inevitably offer a divided response, and at the center would be the European institutions meant to govern over one united Europe.

Let us take an unfortunately relevant analogy. An Italian doctor is being faced with an ever-increasing number of seriously ill coronavirus patients. His resources are limited, and the health of he and his colleagues is worsening by the day. They are being overwhelmed, and he must decide who to treat, knowing those he does not treat may die.

Now imagine his patients are from all over Europe, and those he treats are based not on need but on nationality. This is the system in place, and he has no choice but to treat those from “core Europe” and to leave those from the “periphery” to die. Now imagine our doctor is the European Commission and our patients are member countries of the EU. This would be multi-speed Europe’s reaction to coronavirus.

Europe Cannot Afford Division — Especially Now

It is precisely during crises that the EU is most vulnerable and can afford least to be divided. It is complicated enough for a loose supranational union with 27 members to respond to such a major crisis. Adding further layers down the line would make it even more complicated, and likely even less successful. If Europe is divided in times of peace and calm, crises will only exacerbate these divisions, and before long there may be not be a European Union to speak of at all.

But thankfully for the EU, the pandemic has shown that such clear delineations do not exist. As much as the EU has floundered in its response, no grouping of nations has fared any better. Even the original six members of the EU responded individually, and as of today are in profound disagreement over how to deal with the coming economic crash.

The famous Franco-German axis is nowhere to be seen. No “Nordic model” has emerged for others to aspire to. Even the much talked about Visegrad Group has not mounted anything that could be called a unified response, with its member countries instead being the first to close their national borders to foreign nationals. And the Eurozone — considered the prime example of Europe’s current bifurcated development — has pnly distinguished itself by even more internal disagreement.

As much as Europe bickers, and as indecisive as it is, it is still bickering together. There is no alternate decision-making forum or body that supersedes the European Union. The basis for cooperation — or lack of it — is still pan-European, which is to say, centered on the institutions of the European Union. The EU is not fractured based on regions or large country partnerships, and most importantly it is not dependent on stages of integration. If Europe is to have a future, it will have to be united.

L'articolo Europe Does not Have Two Speeds, it Has Two Paths: Unite or Collapse proviene da InsideOver.

There is no greater show of China’s global ambitions than its Belt and Road initiative (BRI). Announced in 2013, the Belt and Road is the largest investment plan in human history. It promises over a trillion dollars in investment across the world, but more than that, the Belt and Road is meant to give birth to a new world, one that is integrated, interconnected, and globalized. But not like the globalized world of yesterday. This would be a world where all roads lead to Beijing.

The Belt and Road was already running into its fair share of problems before the coronavirus pandemic shut down much of the world. Back in 2013, the Belt and Road made a lot of sense. The West was weakened by the 2008 financial crisis and China was becoming the center of the global economy. We appeared to be entering another golden age of globalization. Political shocks had challenged that system, but they did not break it. If the coronavirus does, then the conditions the Belt and Road needed for success may be lost forever.

How Did Countries First React to the Belt and Road Initiative?

The first condition that was needed was a pliable world. The Belt and Road may be led by China, but it is a multilateral project. China can only involve itself abroad to the extent that it is welcome. Over 70 countries have already signed up to the project, and hundreds of billions of dollars in investment have been realized from East Asia to East Africa. Ports, highways, bridges — the list is endless. But for as long as the Belt and Road has been in progress, resistance has also been building.

Malaysia was one of the first countries to sign up to the Belt and Road, agreeing to multiple projects worth well over $100 billion. But then, in the 2018 election, a new Prime Minister was elected on an outspokenly anti-China and anti-Belt and Road platform. Not long after, he canceled several Belt and Road projects, citing a need to reduce debt accrued by the previous government.

In Central Asia too, popular resentment against China has not been abated by the project. The Belt and Road was announced in Kazakhstan, and the country is essential to the Belt and Road’s land route, and yet locals are suspicious of the project and fear Chinese encroachment will hurt their country, not help it.

It is Difficult to See How China Can Emerge From This Crisis in a Favorable Light

And then the coronavirus arrived late last year. Instead of using its early recovery to build international goodwill, China is using it to sow discontent abroad and enhance its own prestige. Its confrontation with the US is growing, and elsewhere in Europe calls are increasing to treat China as an adversarial power. Former Portuguese Minister for Europe Bruno Maçães observed recently that he had “never seen so much anti-Chinese feeling in [his] life.” It is difficult to see how China can emerge from this crisis in a favorable light.

Another condition that was needed for a successful implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative was a globalizing world. The Belt and Road assumed that the world would become more globalized. There could not have been – and was not – a Belt and Road during the Cold War. It is only thanks to free trade, the free movement of goods and people, and open borders that the Belt and Road could be proposed. In other words, a liberal world order.

The Belt and Road May Find National Boundaries Aren’t As Flexible as Hoped

The Belt and Road was a perfect strategy to replace American dominance. It only required China’s favorite strategy – to quietly grow and wait. China saw enough revolution in the 20^th century. Since Mao’s death, Beijing has instead worked within the system, adopting what works and abandoning what doesn’t, and the regime has not only survived – but thrived – because of it. But if that system fails to return, the Belt and Road may come up against the same national boundaries that have always blocked aspiring empires.

This gets us to one of the most important practical conditions for China’s ambitions to succeed – the free movement of labor. For the Belt and Road to function, China needs to be able to undercut competition for infrastructure projects abroad. How does it do that? By shipping in Chinese labor. Though local workers are used in some countries, these projects usually involve thousands of Chinese workers being brought in and paid low wages while living under strictly-controlled conditions.

With countries around the world outright banning foreign nationals amid a growing global economic recession — and with China calling its citizens home — who will be left to build these great projects? It is entirely possible that the world returns to normal once the pandemic has passed, but even in that timeline it would be well over a year – if not more before that happens. Even if this does not stop the Belt and Road, it will most certainly delay it.

If China faces a de-globalizing world hostile to its ambitions where Chinese labor and investment are met with unease and suspicion, the Belt and Road is dead. The coronavirus has proven yet again to the West that coexisting with China is difficult enough, let alone allowing Beijing to lead global affairs and dominate trade. So even presuming conditions return to normal and China can proceed with its signature endeavor, who’s to say the world will stand idly by and allow it?

L'articolo Coronavirus May Kill China’s Belt and Road Initiative proviene da InsideOver.

“Thank you Brother Xi!” reads a massive billboard in central Belgrade. Brother Xi naturally refers to Chinese President Xi Jinping, and the thanks for a shipment of essential medical equipment. But why brother? According to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Xi Jinping is exactly that. A brother of Serbia.

Serbia’s Embrace of its ‘Chinese Brothers’

In a speech announcing a nationwide state of emergency from mid-March, President Vučić declared European solidarity a “fairy-tale” and something that “does not exist”, before begging his “Chinese brothers” for help. The Chinese responded in due course, sending a plane full of medical equipment which Vučić greeted at the airport with glee. The spectacle was broadcast on national TV, complete with dozens of Chinese and Serbian flags and speeches by Chinese ambassadors to Serbia, both former and current.

The affection was not one-sided either. China’s former ambassador insisted “all of China and her people love Serbia” and that Serbia and China are “one family, truly.” Various Serbian media outlets have bizarrely even claimed that over a billion people had watched a clip of the event (As of March 31^st the video has about 150,000 views). Serbia’s stance towards China during this pandemic has left many observers puzzled, but this love affair is nothing new.

The China-Serbia Affair

In December of 2019 Vučić posted a video of himself announcing his forthcoming visit to China and thanking China for increasing cooperation — in Chinese. It quickly went viral in Serbia. Not so much due to the content, but more so due to Vučić’s comedic attempt at Chinese. But the content was nothing to laugh at. Cooperation between China and Serbia truly has been developing for years under the EU’s nose. Serbia, with its population of just 7 million, has become the fourth-largest recipient of Chinese investment in Europe.

Its investments are far-reaching and plentiful. It has given billions in infrastructure loans and purchased Serbia’s lone copper mine as well as a steel plant. Many of these investments are not up to European legal standards, but that has done nothing to slow down Serbia’s accession to the EU. Serbia is currently in line to join the European Union within the next decade and it has been warming its relations with China and Russia freely along the way.

Serbia Can Be Friends With Whoever it Wants

A recent report from the European Council on Foreign Relations asserted that Serbia must be held to account for Vučić’s disparaging comments on Europe. But, of course, it won’t be. Serbia has realized what many other countries have in recent years. We are not living in a bipolar Cold War world anymore, nor are we living in a unipolar American world.

As much as some European politicians may groan at Vučić’s friendliness towards China, this PR campaign will do nothing to dampen Serbia’s accession chances. Just like Vučić’s anti-democratic tendencies and already dubious business dealings with China and Gulf countries have done nothing to stop Merkel or Macron’s praise for the Serbian President.

After all, “Europe” — which is to say the European Union — has no unified foreign policy. Europe does not play geopolitics. But China and Russia do. So, too, do Turkey and the Gulf states, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Even states within the EU are pliable and open to foreign influence, as has been demonstrated in Italy itself, where Russian and Chinese aid has been received warmly and publicly while the EU and European solidarity has been maligned as fictitious.

China’s Control of the Coronavirus Narrative

More than anything though, this coronavirus aid game is a PR push on the part of the Chinese government, and one in which it is succeeding. China is controlling the narrative within China and influencing it abroad. It is not doing this without reason either. It is a concerted and proactive effort to see the prestige and influence of China rise while damaging the influence and prestige of Western countries. And so far, it is succeeding.

It is succeeding especially in places like Serbia, where local rulers are more than happy to emulate China’s narrative control and use it for political gain. Vučić’s speech was intended not just for foreign audiences, but for domestic ones as well. In the same speech quoted above, Vučić declared Serbia would not show European solidarity. Rather, it would show Serbian solidarity, by sending aid to the Serb Republic in Bosnia.

Vučić’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy

Besides scoring nationalist points by spurning the EU and making appeals to Serbian unity, President Vučić is building domestic prestige by portraying himself as a statesman who can balance relations between many great powers. Vučić is not the first leader in Belgrade to pursue such a strategy either. Long-time Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito similarly transformed diplomatic prestige into domestic prestige by balancing relations between the Democratic, Communist, and non-aligned worlds.

But we are not in the bipolar world Tito maneuvered in anymore. What Vučić is pursuing, is a modern “multi-vector” foreign policy. The term has been widely used by several states in Central Asia and the wider post-Soviet sphere in referring to a foreign policy that balances relations with several large powers. That foreign policy is, in turn, used to justify and popularize the rule of domestic regimes.

Serbia’s turn towards China is unlikely to signal a fundamental or new shift in the nation’s foreign policy. After all, Serbia has pursued friendly relations with China for years, and Russia has long been Serbia’s spiritual brother nation on the world stage. Despite some calls for Serbia to be held to account, the EU took a different approach, and aid has come in due course. Millions upon millions in emergency loans to buy medical equipment, on top of the billions invested over the years — though not enough to buy the proud nation’s loyalty.

In decades past a pat on the head from the German Chancellor was enough to feign a coherent European foreign policy. Back then the EU was the only game in town. But that strategy is running up against a China-sized great wall. The EU can send more money, as it will, but if it continually flounders in times of crisis, if divisions are exposed and exploited by Chinese and Russian information warfare, if it is outspent and outwitted at every turn — and all on its own doorstep — how can Europe hope to be treated as a formidable power on the world stage?

L'articolo Europe Has a Serbia-Sized China Problem proviene da InsideOver.

Vladimir Lenin wrote in 1905 that there are decades where nothing happens, and then there are weeks, where decades happen. In just the few weeks since the coronavirus pandemic has gripped the world, it already appears that the course of modern history has changed decisively. And, as if a deadly global pandemic with the potential to kill millions wasn’t enough, it comes accompanied by an unprecedented global recession, if not depression. Whatever semblance of order that was left in the world is crumbling before our eyes.

Nothing is Sacred in the New Corona World Order

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has been animated by a sense of ever-increasing globalization and interconnectivity. Political movements in recent years have brought this global system into question, but no political shock has come close to what the novel Coronavirus is doing. Nothing is sacred in the new corona world order. Entire economies are being thrown onto the pyre while governments promise infinite spending. Transport, travel, tourism: put on hold indefinitely. Even the borderless Schengen area has evaporated in a matter of days, with every single country in the area closing its borders to cope with the pandemic. Nobody can be sure what awaits us on the other end of this pandemic, but it is hard to imagine that the world is not changing permanently before our eyes.

‘Competing Versions of Equilibrium’

Henry Kissinger said in an interview with The Atlantic that “A [world] order tends towards chaos when its key challenges are to its system: then it evolves with competing versions of equilibrium.” Of all the possible shocks to the system, global pandemic was probably not on his mind when he gave this interview in 2016. Kissinger has seen his fair share of system shocks in his decades long career at the pinnacle of world diplomacy, but it is safe to say he has never seen something quite like this. In the most globalized era in human history, the world has failed remarkably to coordinate any effective international response to a deadly pandemic. Relations between states have devolved into a game of blame and insults, not coordination and solidarity.

Countries have struggled throughout history to build a safe and stable international order. However, emerging from the Second World War, a group of countries with radically different ideologies and worldviews managed to build a world order that has kept us free from direct war between major powers for 75 years. When the coronavirus pandemic comes to an end, as it will, a monumental effort will be needed to reestablish a stable world order. Do our leaders look up to the task?

No Serious Attempt at Forming a Stable International Order

Granted, it is a misnomer to say the same world order has been around since the Second World War. While the trappings of that order have stuck around, it has long since disappeared along with the Soviet Union. That bipolar world order did function though — so long as leaders in Moscow and Washington were committed to maintaining stable and peaceful relations — however fraught they appeared. That order was no natural process, though. World order does not blow in from the East or set on the horizon. World order is built by the tireless work of committed and competent people with a mission.

Since the end of the Cold War, it is not clear that there has been any serious attempt at forming a stable international order at all. Instead, the United States has contently allowed forces of global capitalism and hyper-globalization to run rampant around the world, confident that history was on its side. But in Beijing and Moscow, Ankara and Tehran — and many other capitals around the world — leaders have been quietly waiting for their moment to take their place in the sun. That moment has arrived.

To be clear, this moment did not spontaneously arrive with the coronavirus. Decades do not happen in weeks, after all. But it does only take a couple of weeks for us to realize the decades that have passed and how significant they were.

Repudiating Universalism

On Lenin’s 150^th birthday, Russians will go to the polls to give their constitution its most radical overhaul since 1993. It will allow Vladimir Putin to rule until 2036, while enshrining the country’s Soviet past and WWII victory as a sort of national mythology within the constitution. Most importantly, it will encode in the constitution the supremacy of Russian law over and above international law. Article by article, the Russian state is repudiating universalist Western liberalism. Russia has once again found its place in the sun, and it won’t be giving it up without a fight.

Meanwhile Xi Jinping’s China has become more assertive than any Chinese regime in decades. Determined to use China’s economic success for geopolitical gains, Xi has initiated the largest investment program in history – the Belt and Road. Through it, China is attempting to physically alter communication and interaction across the Eurasian continent, fundamentally reshaping the world order as we know it.

Beyond Russia and China, perhaps the biggest challenges to the liberal world order — as much as there ever truly was one — came from within the West itself. America’s official national security strategy from 2017 “begins with the determination to protect the American people, the American way of life, and American interests”. Hardly an internationalist line. Meanwhile the new European Commission added a Commission for Promoting the European Way of Life. This as Britain finally heads off to promote its own way of life, ending decades of political cohabitation with the continent.

Turkey too has given up on its European dream, pursuing its own nationalist path of development under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan instead. In late 2019, Turkey joined the Syrian Civil War directly, invading the northern provinces under the dubious pretext of creating a “safe zone” for refugees. Then, in early 2020, Turkey sent some 2,000 Syrian militiamen to fight in Libya with the promise of Turkish citizenship. Moreover, Turkey has been quietly expanding its reach in the Mediterranean for years now, laying claim to more and more open waters as its own.

The Pandemic is Amplifying a Global Power Shift Which Had Already Been Underway

Already before the Coronavirus revisionist powers were becoming increasingly powerful and involved beyond their borders while Western powers found themselves unable or uninterested in projecting power abroad. It may be mere coincidence that under the shadow of global pandemic and looming depression so many monumental political events are occurring, but the result will be the same. The world emerging from the coronavirus pandemic will not be characterized by globalization or multinational cooperation. Instead, it is shaping up to be exactly the multi-polar world order that has long been anticipated.

Italy has more confirmed — or at least officially recorded — cases of coronavirus than China, with over 101,700 cases and 11,591 deaths. Its European allies have banned the export of medical equipment, while Russia and China are sending medical aid. What kind of world awaits us if Russia and China are more capable and willing to project power into the heart of Europe than the United States or Great Britain? Only time will tell, but it won’t be the world order of the past.

L'articolo World Order in the Time of Coronavirus proviene da InsideOver.