The initial launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Kremlin on February 24 was intended to be a short-lived affair, with the swift capture of Kyiv as the end goal. However, one year later, those plans failed, as Ukrainian forces successfully repelled Russian troops through a combination of determination and support from Western nations.

The conflict has had far-reaching impacts, reshaping our understanding of various fields, including military operations and strategy, diplomacy, intelligence, national security, energy security, economic statecraft, and much more. As the conflict marks its first anniversary, it is imperative to reflect on the key lessons learned from this ongoing war.

First and foremost – the Putin regime cannot be trusted

The past six months of Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, along with the country’s repeated invasions of neighbouring states and its recent hybrid warfare against the West, have demonstrated that agreements with the Putin regime are unreliable and can be detrimental. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine despite having committed to upholding the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity under the Budapest Memorandum. More recently, despite years of negotiations in the Normandy format and the Minsk agreements, the Kremlin has seized a fifth of Ukraine’s territory. These actions make it clear that any agreements made with the Russian government should be approached with caution.

The Russian government has consistently demonstrated its disregard for international law, liberal institutions, and various international agreements, both with its partners and rivals. Through its involvement in crimes against humanity in Ukraine, its violation of the principle of freedom of navigation, its weaponisation of food, and its use of energy blackmail, the Putin regime poses significant threats to the future of the Ukrainian nation and the global rules-based order.

The approach of appeasement, dialogue, and compromise with an aggressor has proven to be ineffective in the past. To achieve peace in the region, it is necessary for the West to adopt a stance of strength and assertiveness, as this is the only language that the Putin regime responds to.

Victory in conflict hinges on people, not solely equipment

In 2021, Russia allocated approximately $65 billion towards defence spending, surpassing Ukraine’s allocation by a factor of ten. Despite the significant investment in equipment, the outcome of the conflict has not met Russia’s expectations. The contrast in military performance highlights the impact of leadership and training on battlefield success.

With a shared military heritage dating back to Imperial Russia, the divergent results of the conflict offer valuable insights. Ukraine has been a participant in the US National Guard’s State Partnership Program since 1993, undergoing training based on the US model. This approach emphasises empowering junior officers and non-commissioned officers with mission-type orders, clear explanations of the commander’s intent, and the ability to make real-time decisions based on situational developments. Through realistic exercises, Ukraine has cultivated a culture that fosters individual initiative and encourages rigorous evaluation. These practices have contributed to high morale and effective performance in combat.

In comparison, the Russian armed forces heavily rely on conscripts and lack a professional non-commissioned officer corps, which deters initiative and discouragement of feedback. Decision-making remains highly centralised, with independence limited to senior officers. The approach to warfare employed by Russia is characterised by an absence of adaptability and low morale in the face of adverse conditions on the battlefield.

Ukraine is a key lesson in the pitfalls of linear thinking

The initial assumption regarding a Russian attack on Ukraine was that it would result in a military victory for Moscow. However, following the defeat of Russia in the Battle of Kyiv, it took some time for experts to recognise that the initial failures were not just temporary and that Russia was actually losing the war.

Another persistent prediction was that the conflict would result in a stalemate, similar to the First World War, with both Ukrainian and Russian forces entrenched in their positions, unable to make significant progress. This prediction has been proven incorrect by several Ukrainian counteroffensives. It is unwise to assume that the success of these counteroffensives will persist in the future, and it’s possible that the war may bring about unexpected developments rather than continuing patterns.

The war has proven that cyberspace is a legitimate conflict domain

The recent events in Ukraine, including Russia’s invasion, have resulted in a newfound role for the private sector in cyber conflict, as private firms are actively participating in direct cyber operations. Of course, Ukraine has a competent team of cybersecurity defenders who have successfully prevented attacks, but the efforts of these defenders have been augmented by private sector companies that have collaborated with the Ukrainian government to improve the country’s overall cybersecurity posture.

Leading technology companies, such as Microsoft and Cisco, have published reports on their defensive efforts and European cybersecurity firms, such as ESET, have also been involved.

It is imperative that the United States, NATO, and democratic nations in the Indo-Pacific region establish effective collaboration with relevant elements of the private sector to ensure seamless operation of cyberspace in the event of armed conflict. The National Cyber Security Centre in the United Kingdom and the US Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative are commendable initiatives; however, they currently lack the capability to address the challenges posed by large-scale combat scenarios. This is an important lesson; it has taught the world that it is essential to implement appropriate planning and operational mechanisms that cater to this challenge.

Learning the lessons learned

The invasion of Ukraine has provided a unique opportunity to evaluate the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces and the impact of various military technologies and strategies on modern warfare. The purpose of this report is to shed light on the key lessons learned from the conflict, but it should be noted that this is an ongoing conflict, and we’ll be learning just what lessons can be learned for years to come. This time next year, there will undoubtedly be a greater understanding of what can be known from the conflict.

L'articolo Ukraine – One year later proviene da InsideOver.

As the war grinds on, I do not doubt there will be a great deal to learn. However, a shift in dynamics has already emerged at this early stage as on paper Russia should have won and taken Ukraine quickly but that hasn’t happened. I contend that there have been three significant shifts in military dynamics resulting from this war: the increased perception of the value of the individual soldier, the effectiveness of cheap drones and the increasing value of intelligence gathering capabilities over raw numbers.

The increased perception of the value of the individual soldier

Before the war, most assumed that tanks and armoured vehicles would be the deciding factor, with Russia able to overwhelm Ukraine by numbers alone.

That has proven to be false. The reason? Thousands upon thousands of anti-armour weaponry flooding into Ukraine from around the world. The sheer number of these weapon systems has demonstrably changed the war’s course. I cannot overemphasise that the number of cutting-edge anti-tank missiles shipped to Ukraine in recent months is breath-taking. In short, such a vast arsenal of these small, portable weapons may be unprecedented in a modern war.

Britain alone says it has sent around 4,000 anti-tank weapon systems; Germany around 1,000, Norway around 2,000, Sweden around 5,000 and the U.S. an unpublicised but massive number of missile systems. Other nations have also sent weapons.

Anti-tank weapons aren’t new, but their saturation in this conflict is new, and it’s causing a massive shift in thinking, in both defensive and offensive terms.

It is clear the invasion is not going to plan. This is partly due to Ukrainian resistance and Russian errors, but anti-tank weapons pouring into Ukraine in numbers never seen before are a factor. The armies sending these weapons would undoubtedly have had fewer available per soldier than Ukraine now has; this has highlighted how effective individual soldiers truly are when appropriately equipped.

The effectiveness of cheap drones

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia, now becoming a war of attrition, shows that cheap, lower end technology can be used effectively against high-end threats. Despite weeks of bombardment, Ukraine has kept up a fierce defence of its cities. One of the key enablers of this defence are Turkish-made drones. The drones are being used to carry out ‘pop-up’ attacks on Russian forces with lethal effectiveness, surprising many in the west, including me.

The poster child of cheaper but effective combat drones is the Bayraktar TB2 uncrewed aerial vehicle which carries lightweight, laser-guided bombs. The aircraft have previously excelled in low-tech conflicts, and Turkey has sold them to more than a dozen countries, including Azerbaijan, Libya, Morocco and Ethiopia.

Over the relatively high-tech battlefields of Ukraine, however, the drones have carried out repeated but unexpectedly successful attacks. The Turkish drones, quite frankly, shouldn’t be making a meaningful impact because they are medium-altitude, slow-flying aircraft with a large radar cross-section. But they most certainly are making a meaningful difference.

Ukrainian forces have been essentially flying in at a low level and then coming up and raiding with them, striking targets of opportunity. Before this conflict, no one would have seriously expected a low-cost drone to be making such a great difference, but they have proven their worth, and people are taking note of this shift in dynamic.

The increased value of intelligence gathering

The war in Ukraine, in my view, is perhaps the best example of why intelligence gathering capabilities might matter just as much, or more than, raw numbers. As things stand, NATO’s intelligence infrastructure functions well and is adequately supported by a computerised network that is continually improved, especially against cyberattacks. NATO members and, in fact, almost all western military forces regularly hold exercises to improve these skills. Russia does not.

Ukraine is, essentially, borrowing this capability from the western alliance as nations share real time intelligence with the country.

Ukraine is showing that small and agile forces equipped with intelligence are much better than a large force bumbling around. The key to providing support and defeating enemy attacks is effective intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities. These capabilities allow for attacks against logistics and other enablers, forcing Russian frontline units to be cut off from the fight after their supplies run out.

NATO countries have learned that aircraft capable of detecting and monitoring the locations of enemy forces are more valuable than a large number of battalions operating with less guidance and that end up pumping thousands of rounds into empty fields or forests. Boosting intelligence-gathering capabilities, even at the cost of the reduced size of combat forces, is proving to be of paramount importance in Ukraine, more so than previously thought.

One hundred fully equipped troops moving intelligently on the battlefield are worth more than one thousand with scarce supplies and decent intelligence-gathering capabilities. Numbers do not fight, people do, and people learn how to do it effectively with what they have.

While some of the above may seem obvious, some may be old and forgotten concepts, but I believe that they represent a new strategic environment. The invasion of Ukraine will be discussed at length for years. People will debate over what the biggest shifts in military dynamics to emerge from the conflict are, but I believe the three I have outlined above are the most important.

L'articolo Ukraine has changed the dynamics of conflict proviene da InsideOver.

After quickly swarming rural districts and more significant urban hubs, Taliban forces entered the Afghan capital Kabul and seized power in an effort noted for scale and speed. The Afghan government should have, in theory, held the upper hand with a more significant force at its disposal.

The Afghan security forces are estimated to have numbered more than 300,000 on paper. The armed strength of the Taliban is even harder to measure, however, with some estimates suggesting a core strength of 60,000 with the addition of other militia groups and supporters, potentially bringing that up to 200,000.

The significant difference between the two forces was, very obviously, one had the backing of NATO, and the other did not. The other still won, however.

Throughout the conflict, the permeation of the concept of a Western “exit strategy” in strategic thinking meant Western politicians always focused on whether it was time to leave. Indeed, for 20 years, Western efforts signalled a lukewarm strategic commitment to the country. So all the Taliban had to do was wait. They knew Western forces would be leaving, just not when.

Waning Western commitment steadily lessened, and many of the underlying conditions for the Afghan military’s collapse began to blossom. US President Joe Biden argued, very publicly, that Afghan forces seemed to lack the will to fight. Others either blame issues with training, the overuse of private contractors or even just incompetency. I do not believe that the leading cause of what happened to the Afghan military is specifically any of those, nor do I think it a failure of character.

Instead, I believe that Afghan soldiers encountered what some have termed a “commitment problem” due to witnessing what to them must have been a significant shift in the strategic environment. This shift appeared to change their minds that winning was possible to the realisation that losing was probably inevitable – and dangerous for their families.

As Western forces began to withdraw their personnel and their equipment, the Taliban started gaining territory. There’s no separating one from the other; this happened because Western troops began to leave and, in some cases, took their support with them.

What’s notable is that while the Taliban advanced, they increased efforts to negotiate with Afghan forces at rural outposts and towns, convincing many of them to surrender and go home. Once that happened and those troops went home and spread the news that they surrendered, I believe a Taliban victory was from that point on inevitable. I think this is proven by the fact that as the Taliban advanced further, they didn’t really encounter any significant resistance and instead were met with increasing numbers of surrendering Afghan troops.

Towards the end of the Taliban march, as any of us would do, ordinary Afghan people that comprised their armed forces chose safety in numbers, and thousands of them surrendered together.

The rapid advance of the Taliban took the general public and even the defence community by surprise, even President Biden acknowledged that the US Government and the mighty US military had been caught off guard by the rapid dissolution of the Afghan military.

Despite the incredible advantages the superpower-backed Afghan army had on paper… the Taliban took over Afghanistan in a matter of weeks. So quick was this takeover; the withdrawal of foreign troops and citizens from Afghanistan hadn’t been completed. Many of you will even remember seeing imagery of Afghan citizens chasing western cargo aircraft down the runway at Kabul airport in the desperate hope of getting a flight to safety. For that to happen is proof that everyone involved appears to have been caught off-guard by how quickly Afghan forces folded.

So, again, why did Afghan forces dissolve so quickly in the face of the Taliban advance? What accelerated their “commitment problem”?

Rich Outzen, a retired US colonel speaking publicly in an interview with Turkish news outlet Anadolu Agency, attributed the surrender to a lack of support in the form of everything from combat air support, logistics, transportation and communications once the US and other Western forces and contractors finally withdrew from the country in the months leading up to the Taliban advance.

It is important to note that in a mountainous country like Afghanistan, ground forces would always be very heavily dependent on air support, and unfortunately, this support provided by the United States and private contractors was effectively taken away overnight.

This meant that people would be more inclined to surrender and go home as they could not feel the support of the central Afghan government or indeed US or western forces.

Soldiers, like any other people, seek safety in numbers. When they fight in battle, they can only win if they work together as one cohesive force. However, individual decisions to fight or flee typically depend on mutual expectations.

If a soldier believes that most of his comrades are going to fight alongside them, they can be confident of safety and strength as a team. Victory is possible. However, if a soldier expects that most of their comrades will surrender, surrender seems more reasonable. Defeat is inevitable. Once a soldier learns that hundreds, or even thousands, of their comrades have already surrendered or abandoned them, then there can be no turning back. The morale and even willpower to fight back is gone. Why bother? A trickle of desertions leads to a flood of surrenders and eventually the collapse of an entire fighting force.

I believe that this is what happened to the Afghan military.

L'articolo The Afghan Army should have won – why didn’t it? proviene da InsideOver.