The friendly and close relations between Israel and the United States have become over the years, since the sixties of the last century, a cornerstone of Israel’s national security doctrine. The security, economic and political aid that Washington provides to Israel is significant in scope and beyond that it helps to strengthen Israel’s regional and international standing and its deterrence capability in the face of its adversaries. 

Israel has always been careful to emphasize its part in the unwritten alliance established by the two countries, mainly its contribution to the United States national security – during the Cold War, but also today, when Israel stands at the forefront of the struggle against Iran as well as against terrorism and Islamic radicalism.

The close relations between the two countries have withstood the test of time and even deepened. They relied on bipartisan support of Israel (on the part of both Democrats and republicans), as well as broad support of the American public, and especially of American Jewry. AIPAC, the pro-Israel Jewish lobby in the United States, is instrumental in maintaining these close relations.

President Donald Trump’s term in office (2016-2020) undoubtedly brought American support for Israel to a peak. But at the same time cracks were exposed during Trump’s term that could affect the intimacy and the strength of American-Israeli relations. 

The awareness of Israel, its government and the general public, of the importance of the unwritten alliance with the United States and even of Israel’s dependence on it ensures that no Israeli government will act to harm this alliance, intentionally or unintentionally. And yet, the shift to the right in Israel, and alongside it, deep processes within American society, such as the strengthening of the progressive camp in the Democratic Party, may erode the strength of these close relations and require a special effort on the part of the American and Israeli governments to preserve it. 

Relations between Israel and the United States – Difficult Beginnings

The relationship between Israel and the United States has become over the years one of the cornerstones of Israel’s national security doctrine and is seen as one of Israel’s main sources of strength.

However, it is interesting to discover that in the first decades of Israel’s independence, in the fifties and early sixties, its relations with the United States were characterized by coldness and suspicion. President Harry Truman (1952-1944) supported the partition resolution at the United Nations in 1947 and was the first to recognize the State of Israel shortly after it became independent. However, he did so under the influence of some of his Jewish associates, and contrary to the position held by the Department of Defense and the State Department, which opposed the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, because they believed that it would not be able to withstand the attacks of its Arab neighbors and that it might become a Soviet outpost due to the fact that the majority of its Jewish population originated from Eastern Europe.

Under President David Eisenhower (1952-1960), the United States refrained from selling arms to Israel, provided it with negligible economic aid, and repeatedly pressured it to agree to territorial and other concessions, such as the return of the Palestinian refugees to its territory, in order to bring the Arab-Israeli conflict to an end. During the Suez crisis in 1956, the United States stood up against Israel and against France and Great Britain, who joined forces in this war, and demanded that Israeli forces withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, which they had captured from the Egyptians. In those years, the United States hoped to mobilize Arab support in the struggle against the Soviet Union, and therefore tended to view Israel as an obstacle to Arab friendship with the West. However, many of the Arab countries, led by Nasser’s Egypt and also Syria and Iraq, chose to align themselves with the Soviet Union over the West. And yet, even when it became clear that the Arab countries were turning to Moscow, the American hesitation and reservation concerning the relations with Israel remained unchanged. Thus, Israel’s Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, met President Eisenhower for the first time only in March 1960, near the end of his term in the White House, and even then in a private meeting and not as part of an official visit to the United States. 

The tension between Israel and the United States continued during the administration of President John Kennedy (1960-1963). Kennedy sought to improve Washington’s relations with Egypt and this was seen in Jerusalem as a move that could come at Israel’s expense. The tension in American-Israeli relations was however rooted in the pressure of the Kennedy Administration on Israel not to develop nuclear capabilities. Israel was forced to allow American inspectors to visit the Dimona nuclear reactor and only in the early 1970s the two states reached an understanding, according to which Israel would be allowed to maintain and develop its nuclear capabilities, but would not become nuclear power (i.e. would not conduct nuclear tests and would not declare itself a nuclear power).  

The change in the relationship between Israel and the United States took place during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency (1968-1963) and especially after the Six Day War. The Israeli victory in this war strengthened Israel’s strategic importance, due to its ability to defend itself and to defeat its Arab adversaries, who were Soviet allies. Thus, the Arab-Israeli conflict turned into a part of the ‘cold war’ between the West and the Soviet Union, and the American military establishment started to see Israel as an ally. 

Indeed, it was in the period after the Six Day War, that the foundations of the “special relations” between the United States and Israel were laid and became a central component of Israel’s national security doctrine, based on Israel’s need, as a small country with limited resources, surrounded by hostile neighbors, of an alliance with a superpower that would provide it with economic aid, political support and weapons it needed for its defense. 

The United States supplied Israel with weapons during the October 1973 war and then played a central role in the efforts to bring the Arab-Israeli conflict into its end, for example in the signing of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt in March 1979 and in the 1990s, when it launched an Arab-Israeli peace process  that led to the signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993 between Israel and the Palestinians, and a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan in October 1994. 

The American-Israeli relations have also an economic dimension, since the United States gives Israel economic aid every year in the amount of about 2.5 to 3 billion dollars, and over the years has given it special grants and guarantees in the cumulative amount of tens of billions of dollars – for example after the signing of the peace agreements with Egypt; after the signing of the  Oslo Accords; and after the signing of nuclear deal with Iran in 2015. It should be noted that the United States is Israel’s largest trading partner (after the European Union), and the volume of Israeli export to the US is about a third of Israel’s total export, while the import from the United States is about 18% of all Israeli import.

It should also be noted that the rise of the high-tech industry that began in the late 1990s led to a dramatic increase in the number of Israeli companies (mostly high-tech companies) traded on the New York Stock Exchange to such an extent that they constitute the largest group of foreign stocks there.

Despite tensions that erupted in relations between the two states, the main interest of Israel’s foreign policy since 1967 has been to maintain close relations with the United States and establish bipartisan support for the special relationship between the two states.  Israel was assisted by the pro-Israeli lobby in the United States, AIPAC, which derives its strength from the commitment to Israel of the American Jewry, the second largest Jewish community in the world, which has significant weight and standing in American society and American politics.

Israel therefore attaches great importance to maintaining its special relationship with the Jewish community in the United States. However, during the last two decades, support for Israel grew among evangelical communities in the United States, although such support has provoked a backlash among liberal audiences in the American society.

Looking Ahead

The last decade was marked by several developments and processes that affected and probably will continue to affect the relationship between the two states:

On the one hand, the importance of Israel as an American asset in the Middle East increased significantly – Israel has become a regional power thanks to its economic and military strength. The contribution it provides to the United States, both in the intelligence and Cyber warfare and through the development of security and defense technologies, such as the Iron Dome and Arrow missile systems, strengthen and deepen the security ties between the two states and especially ties between the Israeli and the American military establishments. The operational and intelligence cooperation between the two countries has been proven invaluable in the struggle against terror and radicalism as well in confronting Iran’s ambitions in the region. 

On the other hand, the bond with Israel among parts of the American public and even the Jewish community has weakened – the shift to the right in Israel led to the abandoning of the of two states solution to the conflict with the Palestinians and to the efforts (at least by the Netanyahu government – 2009-2021) to preserve an Israeli presence in the West Bank, and to ensure that it would be possible in the future to annex it to Israel. 

All of these were perceived by the American administration as a development that could undermine regional stability, encourage violence and terror and thereby harm American interests in the Middle East and throughout the Muslim world. As someone who considers itself a close ally of Israel, the American administration also believes that such Israeli policy harms the long-term interests of Israel itself.

In American society, deep processes of a growing rift between liberals and conservatives, alongside the strengthening of the progressive camp within the Democratic Party, are evident. This camp tends to show suspicion and even animosity towards Israel, mainly against the background of its never ending conflict with the Palestinians. However, the shift to the right inside Israeli society and within the Israeli political system, as well as the close alliance forged between the right-wing circles in Israel and the Republican Party, especially during the Trump era, deepened the gap with Israel even among the “mainstream” Democrats. These processes do not spare the Jewish community in the United States either and certainly the young generation. The Jewish community is also affected by the strengthening of the ultra-Orthodox political power within the Israeli political system (the ultra-Orthodox community is hostile to the Reform and Conservative communities that make up the majority of American Jewry).

It is worth noting that the older generation of American politicians who led the American political system in the 1980s and 1990s were influenced by the events of the Holocaust and felt committed to Israel as the state of the Jewish people. These politicians were also influenced by the cold war and tended to see Israel as a Western outpost surrounded by Arab countries, which were Soviet allies. However, the new generation of American politicians is freed from these historical memories and burdens, and therefore their commitment to Israel is not self-evident.

All of this has burst to the surface already during Barack Obama’s presidency (2008-2016). Obama repeatedly expressed his “unshakable” support for Israel, however, at the same time he also showed sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians and tried to promote the vision of “two states for two peoples” based on the 1967 lines. Obama was also determined to reach a nuclear deal with Iran that was perceived by Israel as dangerous. The tension between the two states reached its peak with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to the US Congress in May 2015 in which he challenged, with the support of Republican Party, the president’s policy. 

Relations between Israel and the Trump administration that replaced Obama (2016-2020) flourished, and there will be those who would argue that this happened due to Trump’s efforts to win the support of the Jewish vote in the Presidential elections. Trump was perceived as sympathetic to Israel, as evidenced by his recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (December 2017) and the transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem and the recognition of the Golan Heights as Israeli sovereign territory (on March 2019). In May 2018, the United States also announced its withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran and imposed additional sanctions on its economy. In January 2020 he presented the “deal of the century,” an American peace plan, favorable to Israel,  to bring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to an end.  Finally, the United States played an important role in obtaining the Abraham Accords, the peace agreements signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and later also Morocco and Sudan. This was part of an American effort to promote regional cooperation, and even to form a Middle Eastern NATO, to face common threats to these countries, mainly from Iran.

President Biden, who replaced President Trump, belongs to the older generation of American politicians whose commitment to Israel is deeply rooted. During the years of his tenure, the close relations between the two countries continued and even deepened. The war in Ukraine and the world need for energy resources, mainly gas, have also increased the importance of Israel in the eyes of the Americans. But it must be admitted that in Biden’s party – the Democratic Party – the voices that show suspicion and express criticism and even hostility towards Israel are growing stronger, especially in the progressive camp in the party. As mentioned, the intimate relations between former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump led to the erosion in the bipartisan support for Israel and created a rift between Israel, and at least Netanyahu’s government, and the Democrats. The establishment of a new government in Israel under Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, a “government of change”, somewhat improved the atmosphere, but the possible comeback of a right-wing government in Israel may change this trend back.

And finally, Israel’s importance in the Middle East had to do with the importance of the region in general in the American strategic view, due to its central location on the world map and the dependence of the US on its oil resources. However, in the last decade, the United States seeks to disengage from the region, as its importance in its eyes has decreased, as compared to other regions in the world. This might have repercussions on the importance of Israel in the eyes of the Americans. It seems thus that the Middle East was pushed aside by other regions, such as the Far East, where the United States maintains competition and even rivalry with China, or Eastern Europe (mainly following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine at the beginning of this year). Israel, which sought to walk between the drops and preserve its relations with China, an important economic partner of Israel, as well as with Russia, has often provoked Washington’s irritation for not standing by its side in the rivalry between the United States and these countries.

In conclusion, the relationship between Israel and the United States is deep and based on political and security interests. It still relies on broad support both among the American security and political establishment, and among large segments of the American society and public opinion.

Taking into account the interest that both countries have in preserving and promoting these relations and the benefit they see from these relations, it can be assumed that they will do all they can to preserve and even deepen these relations.

It should be noted that Israel’s great advantage in the eyes of the United States has always been that it does not need American soldiers to fight for it. And thus, the Americans were asked only to help Israel help itself rather than to send troops to help it on the battlefields, as they were required to do in South Vietnam, Korea, and later in Afghanistan and Iraq.

However, an ill-considered Israeli conduct, in the case of a right-wing government coming to power in Israel – such as leaning too much on one side of the American political map or try to annex the West Bank to Israel, or even a deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian conflict, could put a strain on the relations between the two countries. These can meet the deep processes of slow but continuous erosion in the commitment to Israel that is already taking place within serval segments in the American public and thus damage the relations between the two countries.

And yet, as far as can be expected, the special relationship that Israel and the United States are establishing will continue for the foreseeable future as it is a vital interest for Israel and an major  interest for the United States, and both countries recognize this.

L'articolo The future of US-Israel Alliance proviene da InsideOver.

The corona pandemic did not pass over Israel, and like other countries of the world it was hit hard. 4,667,287 Israelis have been infected by the disease (out of a population of approximately 9.2 million) and the number of dead reached 11,710 (as of October 2022).

Along with health consequences, some of which are still unclear (after all, post-corona research is only in its beginnings), the pandemic also had far-reaching economic consequences, since during the first two years of the outbreak of the pandemic, the government in Israel adopted a strict policy of social distancing that included prolonged closures. This led to the paralysis of major sectors of the country’s economy and at the same time damaged the fabric of life, starting with the welfare system, education and higher education and ending with cultural life.

Israel was, however, in a good opening position compared to many other countries in the world, and this gave it an advantage in the fight against the disease. Its population and its government systems are practiced and have experience in dealing with emergency situations, although mostly security ones. In addition, the health system in Israel is considered an advanced system whose services are spread out and accessible to the entire population. All of this allowed Israel to become a pioneer in many aspects of dealing with the pandemic and, above all, performing mass tests to detect the disease, the ability to obtain a reliable and comprehensive picture of the state of morbidity and patients, and finally, a rapid mass vaccination operation of the entire population while monitoring of the results and effectiveness of the vaccinations. Israel was also a pioneer in formulating a policy of exiting the lockdowns in a way that allows the entire population to continue a normal life as much as possible. It is also worth adding that the fact that the population in Israel is relatively young eased the severity of the damage since the disease mainly affected older populations at risk.

However, Israel also had weak points, including the fact that political instability prevailed in it due to frequent election campaigns in those years, which often led to decisions that were based on political considerations rather than factual considerations. In addition, parts of Israeli society, such as the residents of the periphery, the ultra-Orthodox population and the Arab population tended to cooperate less than the general population with state institutions and follow its instructions, and their access to the health systems was also lower. This, alongside the fact that Israel controls the territories of the Palestinian Authority where millions of Palestinians live who are not its citizens but citizens of the Palestinian Authority, and therefore do not enjoy the same accessibility to health services.

After all this, it should be remembered that the disease was found to be deceptive, and thus for example the vaccines produced against it were found to be of limited validity since the body’s immunity weakens within a few months. In addition, new variants of the virus have been found to be resistant to the vaccine. Of course, all of this made it difficult to manage an orderly policy and to provide an intelligent long-term response to the pandemic.

But looking back, it can be stated that the Israeli system reacted quickly, functioned well within the limitations of the limited knowledge the world had about the pandemic, and gave a benevolent response to protect its population and this at the cost of only limited damage to the economy. And so, among the developing countries, Israel leads in all of the aforementioned growth rates recorded by the Israeli economy with the decline of the pandemic.

The outbreak of the Corona pandemic

At the end of December 2019, the corona virus that causes the disease COVID-19 began to spread in China, originating in the Wuhan province in the center of the country. In mid-February 2020, the virus began to spread rapidly throughout the world and soon, on 11 March 2020, it was defined by the World Health Organization as a global pandemic.

In Israel, the first patient was located on 27 February 2020, after he returned from a visit to Italy, and within a few days, the number of those infected by the virus began to climb to dozens and hundreds, and by the end of March 2020, there were already about 10,000 infected people. The first Israeli, an 88-year-old man, died of Corona on 20 March 2020.

Israel responded very quickly to the challenge, and certainly in comparison to many other countries, even though in the first stages of the outbreak of the pandemic, very little was known about it – how an how quickly does it spread? What are its dangers and how deadly is it, and finally, what is the right treatment for it. It should be noted that at this stage there was no vaccine for the pandemic or even a medicine that would relieve or even save the patients.

Israel and the corona – a good starting point 

Israel enjoyed a series of advantages that gave it a good starting point to deal with the dangers of the pandemic:

First, due to the political reality in the Middle East, Israel is actually a sort of isolated island cut off from its surroundings, with almost no entry or exit from the neighboring countries. This, in contrast to, for example, the European Union countries that cannot prevent transit between them and are limited in their ability to control entry or exit within their borders. This of course  facilitated the hermetic closing of the country to tourists, workers and immigrants who were perceived at the time as those who might bring new variants of the virus to Israel. It should be noted, however, that this was not a hermetically sealed and absolute closure of the borders, since Israel allowed holders of Israeli citizenship to return to it and in many cases, for example on humanitarian grounds, also to leave it and return to it later. This, of course, contributed to the spread of the virus and the arrival of new variants, Delta and Omicron, in the country.

Second, the governmental systems in Israel, with an emphasis on the health system, but more generally the population in the country, are used to a quick transition to an emergency situation, in view of the security challenges and even the military conflicts in which the country has repeatedly been subjected. For example, the IDF’s Home Front Command took responsibility for caring for vulnerable populations when lockdowns were imposed in the country and assisted the police in enforcing them. The army also took on the management of the effort to break the chains of infection by asking each infected man about the people with whom he came in contact. Military intelligence directed resources to collect information about the disease and to assist in the analysis of the data about its spread in Israel, and finally, the General Security Service was entrusted by a government decision to monitor isolated and infected people to make sure that they do not violate the isolation instructions they received.

Thirdly, Israel has an efficient public health system and according to many international rankings it is seen as one of the best in the world, in terms of its accessibility and the quality of service it provides to citizens. Next to an array of government hospitals in Israel there are several big health maintenance organizations with a spread of clinics all over the country. According to the law, every citizen must be registered in one of the health organizations. This reality makes it possible to receive reliable information in real time about the health status of all citizens and the spread of diseases and pandemics. This fact made it possible to quickly use the health system for the purpose of transmitting information to the population, in order to carry out tests on a mass scale to detect the virus or to control the state of the disease, and later also made it possible to have a vaccination operation that encompassed the entire population, and of course everyone who was interested in vaccination.

Fourth, Israel’s population is relatively young compared to the population in Western countries. In 2020, the rate of children up to the age of 14 in Israel was about 28%, and in contrast, the rate of people aged 65 and over was about 12% compared to double the rate in many European countries. Studies have revealed that the adult population in Israel is more active compared to other countries in the world, less isolated and cut off from family members, and therefore showed greater immunity to deal with the consequences of the pandemic.

Israel and the corona – the weak points

Alongside all this, it must be remembered that there were also shadows in Israel’s preparation for the fight against the pandemic.

Political instability – Israel fell into a prolonged political crisis at the end of 2018. In the reality of repeated election campaigns, Israel lacked a stable government and this had consequences for some of the decisions it made. Along with the many praises that Prime Minister,  Benjamin Netanyahu, received at the outbreak of the pandemic, for quickly diagnosing the danger and quickly mobilizing to fight it, it was argued against him that in many cases he worked to leverage the pandemic for the purpose of spreading fear among the population in order to mobilize support for him and that he avoided making decisions to impose policies of strict closure among the ultra-Orthodox population so as not to damage the support it gives him.

A health care system that has suffered continuous cuts over the years – in the transition that Israel has experienced in recent decades from a welfare state policy to a market economy has led to continuous damage to the public health and welfare systems. These affected the scope of the medical services and also their accessibility mainly in the peripheral areas. This undoubtedly created a burden on the health care system in the early stages of the pandemic, although there was no collapse and the hospitals were also able to cope with over a thousand seriously ill patients at the height of the disease.

And finally, Israeli society is characterized by heterogeneity based on class, religion and ethnicity. There is a clear gap between the center – the Tel Aviv area – and the periphery in accessibility to health, welfare and education systems. Alongside this, in Israel there are two communities whose integration into the social fabric is partial. One is the ultra-orthodox population, which makes up about 13% of the total population. This population is often of low social status and its birth rates are high, i.e. this is the population living in a particularly high density and this of course had an effect on the spread of the pandemic. In addition, it is characterized by obedience to the rabbis and suspicion towards the state institutions. And so, the enforcement of a policy of closures and social disconnection on the ultra-Orthodox education systems and on religious ceremonies – prayers in synagogues, weddings and funerals, etc. – turned out to be only partial. On the other hand, the religious leadership mobilized to encourage vaccination against the virus, and this was an important contribution to high vaccination rates among this population.

It is also worth noting the Arab population, which makes up about 20% of the total population in Israel. This population also belongs to a low socioeconomic status and in addition lives mostly in villages and towns in the periphery. Of this, the Bedouin population in the south of the country, which makes up about a quarter of the Arab population, partly lives in nomadic settlements that are not connected to electricity and water infrastructure and do not enjoy full access to health services. This population shows great suspicion towards the state institutions. The result is difficulty in maintaining and enforcing a policy of closures and social distancing as well as difficulty in convincing this population to get vaccinated.

Alongside these, we must of course mention the Palestinian population living in the territories of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and under the rule of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. These are close to four million people and maybe more who are not citizens of Israel but are practically under its control as the occupying force in these areas. Israel did not see the Palestinian population as being under its responsibility but under the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas and therefore provided only indirect aid of testing and vaccination kits. It is worth noting that the Palestinian population comes into daily contact with the Israeli population – in the labor market, for example – and therefore the state of the disease among the Palestinian population had an inevitable impact on the state of the pandemic in Israel.

Israel is struggling with Corona

The corona pandemic was characterized by waves of infections that were characterized by the rapid spread of the disease to hundreds and thousands of infected people on a daily basis in the first waves and to over ten thousand infected people a day in the following waves. At the height of the disease in early 2022, when the Omicron virus became dominant, tens of thousands of people were infected every day, although most of them with mild symptoms.

As the familiarity with the disease became better, emphasis was placed on monitoring the number of seriously ill patients in need of treatment and even ventilation in the hospitals and not on the total number of patients, which as mentioned also included a young population, some of whom had no symptoms at all.

The initial response to the first wave – March – April 2020 – Israel responded quickly, and thus was among the first countries in the world, to response to the spread of the Corona disease. With the appearance of the disease in Israel, a policy of banning the entry and exit of non-citizens to Israel was announced, and later on the transfer of the educational systems to distance learning as well as work from home where this was possible. They also gave instructions to maintain social distancing and finally, within about a month, a total lockdown was announced in which the movement of citizens from their homes was restricted. Along with this, a policy of breaking the chains of infection was announced by questioning infected people about those they came in contact with, as well as a strict policy of isolation for infected people or those they came in contact with.

This policy indeed led to a dramatic decrease in morbidity rates and an exit from the lockdowns at the beginning of May 2020, but this was not done in a controlled manner and the result was renewed outbreaks of waves of infection (a second wave in May-July 2020, which culminated in a general closure of the entire country, and the third wave in December-January 2020).

It should be noted that Israel’s efforts to develop a vaccine for the virus on its own through the biological institute subordinate to the Israeli Defense Ministry did not go well as this required knowledge and ability that were beyond Israel’s ability. But an important Israeli contribution was an analysis of the available information found in the health systems in Israel about the trends and characteristics of the behavior of the virus that allowed Israeli scientists to make an important contribution in this field to scientific research in the world.

Vaccination of the population – With the development of vaccines for Corona by a series of pharmaceutical companies and receiving emergency approval for its distribution at the end of 2020, Israel quickly prepared to vaccinate the entire population starting in December 2020.

Quick action by the Israeli government while taking advantage of the country’s advantages and strengths – the fact that it is a relatively small population that has access to health services, made it possible to present a quick and reliable picture of the results of the vaccination. This fact made it possible to turn Israel into an attractive experimental laboratory for the companies developing the vaccines, and because of this Pfizer, for example, was willing to give Israel priority in the supply of vaccines, which made it possible to vaccinate the population with a full vaccine (two vaccines as required according to Pfizer’s medical specifications).

The rapid vaccination operation, within the framework of which about 60% of the country’s population were vaccinated within six months (and with the exception of their young people, no vaccination has yet been offered, this was even a much higher rate), made it possible to formulate a policy that allows the recovered and the vaccinated to fully return to their daily routine – on the basis of presenting a certificate of recovery from the disease or vaccination. And so, Israel also became a pioneer in returning to normality in the shadow of the disease for this population of those who are recovering and vaccinated. The data provided by Israel unequivocally proved the effectiveness of the vaccines, their contribution to improving the body’s ability to defend itself in case of illness, but also the decrease over time in the effectiveness of the vaccine.

As mentioned, the corona was proven to be a deceptive disease because it soon became clear that the vaccine weakened after a few months and apart from that, new alpha, delta and Omicron variants were discovered that the vaccines turned out to be less effective against and that thus even infected or vaccinated people were infected once again.

Indeed, in June 2021, although about half of the country’s population was already vaccinated, there was a renewed increase in cases of infection, most of which originated from Israelis who returned from other countries and were infected with the delta strain of the virus that became dominant in the world and in Israel. And so, the fourth wave of the corona pandemic began in Israel, yet it was a virus whose impact on patients was easier. In July 2021 Israel was the first country in the world to vaccinate its citizens with a third vaccine (booster vaccine).

“Living alongside the pandemic” – but this time the government decided on a policy change under the title of “living alongside the pandemic”. The leading principle of the strategy states that contagion must be suppressed with minimal damage to the economy. Thus, the examination of the severity of the pandemic will not be done according to the number of patients but according to the burden on the health systems and the number of seriously ill patients and even those on ventilators.

And yet, at the beginning of September 2021, Israel was the country with the highest number of verified people in the world in relation to the size of the population. But on the other hand, life continued as usual and economic life began to recover.

A fifth wave began at the end of 2021 – in the months of November – December with the appearance of the Omicron strain. Although the government imposed a ban on entry and exit to Israel and encouraged work from home in the private sector, it avoided imposing a lockdown. In addition, it decided in January 2022 to give a fourth vaccine to the entire population. The sixth wave – in June 2022, morbidity began to increase again, mainly due to the spread of the 5.BA variant, but this did not receive any attention, as it turned out that, as a rule, its damage is mild in those who are vaccinated. In September 2022, Israel began to vaccinate the population with a vaccine against the Omicron.

In all of the above regarding the vaccination of the population of Israel against Corona, as of October 2022, 6,718,301 received at least one dose, of which 1,643,280 received two doses, 3,661,649 received 3 vaccine doses, and 849,358 received 4 vaccine doses (out of a total population of 9.2 m.)

It is worth noting that many avoided receiving the vaccines both because the delta and omicron strains turned out to be easier and because Israel’s population is mostly young anyway and the vaccines for children under 16 were developed and put into use after the pandemic had already passed its peak and therefore the rate of vaccination among the young population was relatively low.

It should also be noted that the response of the population knew ups and downs, in the beginning mobilization was evident, but as time passed, fatigue was evident and also the feeling that the pandemic is not so terrible since it affects adults. This had the effect of decreasing vaccination rates. It should also be noted that the effect of the vaccine opponents was marginal.

Israel’s economy and the corona virus

The pandemic also had economic consequences, since in order to slow down the rate of its spread, a policy of social distancing and closures was decided which resulted in the paralysis of economic life. The government in Israel  initiated a wide range of aid programs for those affected by the economic damage of the corona virus.

At the peak of the corona virus, the level of unemployment that was on the eve of the outbreak of the crisis increased from 3-4% to about 10%, but in practice about a quarter of employees were forced to go on temporary leave or were affected by the scope of the job and salary. But the recovery was quick. The extent of unemployment decreased starting at the beginning of 2022 to about 3%, even less than its pre-covid rate of 2.2%, the GDP per capita decreased by 3.9%, recorded a rapid recovery compared to all the developed countries of the world and recorded an increase of 8% in 2021 and a rate of approximately 7% in 2022.

In conclusion, during the waves of the Corona pandemic, 11,710 Israelis died and about four and a half million were infected. It goes without saying that research into the long-term damage of the disease, post-Corona, is still in its infancy and it is therefore premature to assess the long-term consequences of this number of patients on society and the country.

However, this is a relatively low number of casualties compared to countries like the USA where over a million people died (out of a population of about 330 million) Italy where over 177 thousand people died out of a population of about sixty million or Germany where about 150 thousand people died out of a population of 83 million.

In general, it can be stated that society and the government systems in Israel were able to successfully deal with the pandemic and its consequences, to respond as quickly and effectively as possible, in view of the limits of knowledge about the disease, and to reduce as much as possible its effects.

The robustness of the state’s systems, their points of strength and their experience helped the Israeli leadership make effective decisions. The rapid economic recovery from the pandemic and the return to normality are proof of this

Israel – as a society and as a country – was therefore able to successfully meet the challenge of the corona virus.

L'articolo Israel and the fight against Covid-19: a model for the world? proviene da InsideOver.

Lebanon has become a failed state in recent years. It is in a continuous political paralysis that prevents the formation of a functioning government and this reality has contributed to the deterioration of the country into a severe economic crisis the likes of which Lebanon has not known since the end of the bloody civil war at the end of the last century.

A Failed State

As a failed state, Lebanon lacks weight and importance because even decision making as for its own future is not in its hands. In fact, it has become another arena of conflict, one of many, between rival regional forces, whether a conflict between Iran, which supports the Hezbollah organization, and Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries, which provide support to the members of the Sunni community in the country, or whether an Israeli-Iranian conflict in which the Hezbollah organization serves as a representative and protector Tehran’s interests on the shores of the Mediterranean.

Israel is aware of the weakness of the Lebanese state and does not see it as an entity capable of independent decision-making. In this context, it should be remembered that in recent decades, Israel’s regional policy has been based on four foundations:

The first, the preservation of regional stability, peace and calm, and certainly in the area around Israel and ensuring peace along its borders.

The second, an attempt to promote a peace process towards the Arab world based on normalized relations between Israel and the Arabs.

The third, an attempt to keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at a standstill, in terms of maintaining the status quo while managing the conflict and not necessarily an effort to resolve it. Preserving the status quo means preventing a deterioration into violence and escalation, but at the same time also avoiding progress towards a solution that involves territorial concessions on the part of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

And finally the fourth, an attempt to curb Iran’s attempts to achieve regional hegemony in the Middle East and more importantly, an attempt to curb the Iranian race to nuclear power.

With such evidence, the importance of the countries of the first circle surrounding Israel, led by Egypt and Jordan, to maintain peace and calm is clear, as is the importance of the Gulf countries, such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which are a cornerstone in Israel’s efforts to strengthen the strategic cooperation between the countries of the region against Iran.

Against this background, it will be understood why Israel’s focus is not on harnessing Lebanon so that it contributes to the advancement of Israel’s interests, but rather on denying the ability of Lebanon, and especially the Hezbollah organization, which is a significant and decisive player within the Lebanese system to harm These Israeli interests.

And so, if in the fifties and sixties of the last century Israel saw Lebanon, which was then under Maronite hegemony, as a possible ally for making peace; in the 1970s, after the PLO established a presence on Lebanese soil and even turned this country into a base for military activities against Israel, the latter focused its efforts on neutralizing the threat posed by the PLO from the territory of Lebanon. Today, Hezbollah is setting the tone in the country, and certainly in matters of calm or confrontation. This, due to the military power he built for himself with the help of Iran. For example, he has close to 150,000 surface-to-surface missiles, several hundred of which are long-range precision missiles that cover the entire territory of Israel. He also maintains considerable political influence in the country and, with allies from the Shia community – such as Amal movement – and others, has the right to veto the decisions made by state institutions.

The Hezbollah Influence

In Israel there is a debate about whether there is sense and logic in separating the Lebanese state – the Lebanese army, the government and the political system in the country – and the Hezbollah organization. Such a distinction is a cornerstone of the American policy towards Lebanon which holds that strengthening the Lebanese state will one day enable it to deal with Hezbollah.

But Israel maintains that Hezbollah is the decider in any case, even if it is attentive to the opinion of the Shiite and Lebanese public, and certainly do not want to bring a war on them. These are indeed a restraining factor in the organization’s decision-making, but on the other hand it does not listen to the Lebanese army or its government, and acts according to its interests and those of its ally Iran.

Therefore, Israel perceives the Lebanese state as a weak and even hollow entity, irrelevant to questions of peace and war. Instead, Israel focuses on establishing a deterrent capability against Hezbollah, with the help of which it hopes to ensure peace along the border between the two countries.

Alongside this, over the past decade, Israel has been conducting a secret campaign (a campaign between the wars) against Hezbollah, designed to harm its arming efforts – hitting Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah while they are in Syrian territory, as well as an effort to stop the missile precision project (turning missiles in Hezbollah’s hands into missiles capable of striking Precise).

It is clear to Israel that Hezbollah does not necessarily stand on its own, since it proves itself to be a link in the axis of resistance, or in the words of Israel and the US, the axis of evil, which is led by Iran and in which Syria and the Hamas organization are also members. Therefore, Israel takes into account that a confrontation with it may have an impact on what is happening in Syria and in Iraq and against Iran and vice versa.

In conclusion, the Israeli view of Lebanon is narrow – through the prism of the threat of missiles and terror posed by Hezbollah, and in any case, through the prism of the desire to neutralize this threat. However, Israel is attentive to what is happening in Lebanon and takes into account that the Lebanese public, certainly the Shiites, as well as the institutions of the Lebanese state can help restrain Hezbollah. The fact that Hezbollah is becoming more and more identified with the state, due to the ability to influence what is happening in it – politically and not just militarily – makes it more and more attentive to the moods in the country.

All this was reflected in the comprehensive negotiations conducted by the two countries with American mediation on the question of marking the maritime boundary line between the two states. An agreement on this question may allow Lebanon to extract gas from the gas fields off its shores and thus help it get out of its economic predicament. But due to the political paralysis that prevails in Lebanon, it is difficult to reach to the agreement, and Hezbollah is taking advantage of the impasse to unleash far-reaching threats of war, if an agreement is not reached according to the equation – that if Lebanon does not utilize its resources, Israel will not be able to utilize its own resources either.

Yes, in Israel’s view, Hezbollah is Lebanon, and it therefore is focusing its attention on it. Thus, the only relevant question that preoccupies it vis-a-vis Lebanon is how it is possible to maintain peace along the border, to curtail the capabilities of the Hezbollah organization, and to prevent Iran from strengthening its influence there.

L'articolo Lebanon in Israel’s Middle East Strategy proviene da InsideOver.