The success story of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains a puzzle to many analysts. He has won more elections than any other politician in the history of the Turkish Republic. His party AKP has provided extensive social services and welfare programs to millions of Turks, while supporting pro-business policies. Moreover, the party has underscored the importance of conservative values, largely based on Islam, to gain a moral advantage over its competitors.  It is not a coincidence that Erdoğan has invoked God’s name more and more often.

Against this background, the Turkish president has promoted a new notion of nationalism that emphasizes Muslim identity as the defining element of Turkishness. The AKP claims to act as a force of democratization that represents most of the population against a tiny minority of non-genuine Turks. Thus, the party has mostly drawn support from devout Sunni Muslims who were largely marginalized by the Kemalist regime for decades. Not surprisingly, Turkish foreign policy has been influenced by Erdoğan’s Islamo-nationalism.

Under President Erdoğan, Turkey has pursued an assertive strategy towards its neighbours. The Turkish military has been involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq supposedly only to pursue Kurdish insurgents. While the Kurdish factor does weighs heavily in Ankara’s calculations in the region, there is an ideological element that cannot be easily dismissed. Both Syria and Iraq are now failed states which used to be part of the Ottoman Empire. Erdoğan has coined the term “borders of our heart” to challenge the sanctity of existing borders in the region.

Hence, Turkish incursions into Syria and Iraq are likely to continue.

Furthermore, the AKP has attempted to export its own model of governance to other Muslim-majority countries. In 2012, for example, Erdoğan visited post-Arab Spring Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia to promote the AKP model. Although his offer was perceived by many as interference in the domestic affairs of these countries, the Turkish leader has remained popular among the Arab public. He has developed a reputation of an honest and straight-forward politician who supports Muslim causes. The Turkish leadership has sought to normalize its relationship with the Sisi regime in Egypt. This effort will continue in the coming months. Yet, Ankara’s military intervention in Libya has produced uncertainty over Turkish intentions in North Africa. In late November 2019, the signing of the Turkish-Libya delimitation agreement infuriated Athens and Cairo which remain skeptical of Ankara’s presence in the war-torn country. 

Moreover, Erdoğan’s call for the revision of the Lausanne Treaty, which established Turkey’s borders with Greece, is not a coincidental development. Turkish officials have hinted at territorial claims against Greece, although the Eastern Aegean islands are populated exclusively by Greeks. And yet, this is only part of the Mavi Vatan (“Bluewater Homeland”) vision that Erdoğan and his lieutenants have openly endorsed in recent years. It was first declared by the Turkish leadership in 2019, claiming a sea area of 178,000 square miles for Turkey. Ankara has also sent drilling ships to the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone, infuriating Nicosia and the EU. In December 2019, the US Congress approved the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act to support energy cooperation among the US, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. The increased US involvement in the region has not been perceived by Ankara as a positive development. But Ankara has agreed to restore full diplomatic relations with Jerusalem, despite occasional rhetorical outbursts directed at Israeli leadership. Although the recent catastrophic earthquake in the Hatay province has led to a Greek-Turkish rapprochement, Ankara will not easily abandon its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean,

In any case, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has dramatically changed the security dynamics in the wider region. Not only has Ankara avoided imposing anti-Russian sanctions, but it has deepened its partnership with Moscow. Trade between the two countries doubled in the first nine months of 2022 compared to the previous year, reaching $47 billion. Furthermore, Russian tourists in Turkey have significantly boosted the Turkish tourism industry due to travel restrictions in the European Union. The Russian company Rosoboronexport has also been selling weapons systems to the Turkish armed forces, including the advanced S-400 antiballistic missile system. Russia is Turkey’s largest natural gas supplier, mainly through the submarine pipeline Blue Stream; Moscow also builds new nuclear power plants in the country.

Simultaneously, Turkey has supplied Ukrainian armed forces with combat Unmanned Arial Vehicles and has refused to recognize the annexation of Crimea and other Ukrainian provinces. Additionally, the Erdoğan regime has voiced concerns about the human rights of the Tatar Muslim minority in Russian-occupied Crimea. Perhaps most importantly, Turkey was pivotal in brokering a deal to allow grain exports from Ukrainian ports through a safe corridor in the Black Sea.

Turkey’s neutralist stance has deteriorated its relations with Washington which seeks to form a unified front against Moscow. The dire status of the Turkish economy may force Erdoğan to de-escalate tensions with Western countries. However, Ankara is highly unlikely to turn against Moscow as other NATO countries did. Despite Western hopes, there is a growing domestic support for a Eurasianist shift in the Turkish foreign policy. 

In the South Caucasus, Ankara has maintained its special relationship with Baku. In fall 2020, the success of the Azerbaijani blitzkrieg in Nagorno-Karabakh was partly credited to Turkish military support. The current normalisation of relations with Armenia will continue as long as Yerevan remains isolated and is under the threat of facing a greater political crisis. During his third term, the Erdoğan regime may show more interest in developing closer relations with the Turkic republics of Central Asia. 

Overall, Turkey has attempted to maintain an independent foreign policy by distancing itself from the West. While this has not been always possible, it is clear that the Turkish foreign policy is ideologically-driven and geopolitically ambitious. Ankara will maintain an active role in the Black Sea, the Middle East, North Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean for the next five years. Undoubtedly, Erdoğan’s Turkey aspires to become a regional power and its foreign policy will reflect this fact.

*Dr Emmanuel Karagiannis is a Reader in International Security at King’s College London’s Department of Defence Studies.  

L'articolo The foreign policy of Turkey after Erdogan’s re-election proviene da InsideOver.

After a year of war, it is possible to assess the Russian military strategy in Ukraine. The Kremlin initially applied the art of deception (maskirovka) at the strategic level, claiming that it was not going to attack Ukraine. For several months, Russian officials fiercely dismissed reports by Western intelligence agencies openly predicting an invasion. Operationally, the invasion began with an advance of motorized troops that attacked from three directions simultaneously: north, east and south. The Russian Air Force destroyed critical infrastructure (e.g., power stations) to plunge the country into chaos. In addition, the Black Sea fleet blockaded Ukrainian ports to stop any supplies from third countries. At the tactical level, Russian special forces attempted to create bridgeheads by seizing airports and carrying out acts of sabotage within cities. In effect, the Kremlin launched a blitzkrieg against Ukraine.

The strong resistance of the Ukrainians caught the Kremlin by surprise. Moscow underestimated the Ukrainian military doctrine, which calls for the mass mobilization of the population in the event of a foreign invasion. The Ukrainian leadership initially moved the war into and around populated areas, where the defender has the tactical advantage. Within the urban environment, small groups can easily set up ambushes and hit enemy targets with anti-tank missiles. In fact, urban warfare is the nightmare of all regular armies. The Ukrainian side was well aware that Moscow is still haunted by the “Grozny syndrome”. The first war in Chechnya (1994-1996) resulted in a humiliating defeat for the Russian army. Small groups of determined fighters destroyed entire columns of Russian tanks that had entered the centre and suburbs of the Chechen capital.

Yet, the Russian forces was expected to overwhelm the Ukrainian positions within less than a week. Putin’s battle-hardened army did enjoy numerical and technological superiority. Following the 2008 Georgian war, minister of defence Anatoly Serdyukov’s military reforms changed the force structure of the Russian army. The creation of the battalion tactical group (BTG) was intended to increase the firepower and speed of the Russian forces. Indeed, each BTG has a motorized infantry battalion together with tank and artillery elements; a total of 600-800 officers and men. However, the main disadvantage of BTGs is the relatively small number of light infantry troops (around 200 men) which makes BTG vulnerable to ambushes. During the first three months of the invasion, the Russian BTGs became an easy target for the Ukrainian fighters.

Apparently, the Russian military were not prepared for such a large-scale invasion. Due to poor military planning, the Putin’s army has failed to conduct combined arms operations. This should have come as no surprise. In the 2008 war against Georgia, the involvement of the Russian army was limited in time and geography. Yet, its performance was assessed by analysts as rather poor.  Six years later, the annexation of Crimea took place with a hybrid and bloodless operation. In the Syrian civil war, the Kremlin has mainly used its air power, special forces, and mercenaries to support the Assad regime. In other words, it is the first time since the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan that the Russian military has been called upon to subdue a large country with a hostile population. It should be noted that there was an insurgency in western Ukraine after the end of the Second World War that lasted ten years.

During spring and summer 2022, the Russian military used indirect artillery fire and ballistic missiles to defeat the Ukrainians. This is not the first time in recent history that Moscow resorted to such tactics. During the Second Chechen war (2000-2002), the Kremlin bombed Grozny to the ground without any concern for the international law of armed conflicts. The Russian leadership chose the same siege warfare in certain parts of Ukraine.

Following a three-month siege, the Russian forces managed to capture the city of Mariupol in the Azov region. However, the invaders failed to capture Kyiv and Kharkiv, which are the two largest cities of Ukraine. According to Professor Louis DiMarco two factors could play a decisive role in attacking urban centres: the size of the population and the size of the area. The larger the population and the area, the more forces must be devoted to occupying a city. The American professor has challenged the 3:1 rule in favour of the attacker and advocated a 6:1 ratio for launching an attack in urban areas.

What has come, perhaps, as a surprise is the outsourcing of the Russian military operations to mercenaries. Since the summer of 2022, an unknown number of Russian and foreign mercenaries have joined the regular Russian army in fighting the Ukrainian army in Donbass. The partial “privatization” of the war is an innovation in itself. During the tsarist period, the army was under strict surveillance because officers were the only ones who could challenge the regime. In the Soviet era, the role of the political commissar was to enforce political control over the military through his presence at the strategic and operational levels. The use of private military companies, such as the infamous Wagner, runs counter to Russian military culture that prioritizes political control of the military. However, mass mobilization is neither desirable nor feasible in a middle-class country like Russia. The use of mercenaries allows Moscow to hide casualties from the Russian public opinion that does not massively support the war in Ukraine. The Wagner’s force functions as a small army capable of operational and tactical support when is needed.

The war has entered a new phase since September 2022. The Ukrainian counter-offensive succeeded in recapturing territories in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Yet, the Russian forces managed to stop the Ukrainian offensive before Christmas. Currently, there is a stalemate on the eastern front because of the trench warfare. The Kremlin has mobilised human and material resources for a new Spring offensive in Donbass. Europe and the United States must do whatever is necessary to stop it before it begins.

L'articolo The Russian Military Strategy in Ukraine: An Early Assessment proviene da InsideOver.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has revitalized the question of ethnicity in the former USSR.  The rhetoric and the actions of the Kremlin have indicated the adoption of a new doctrine, the Putin Doctrine, which requires the protection of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers. In effect, the Putin Doctrine is the Russian equivalent of the U.S. Monroe Doctrine; the former Soviet space is to become a Russian sphere of influence. Therefore, it is vital to understand how the Kremlin has explored inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine as a pretext to launch a full-scale attack.

Ukraine has been a multi-ethnic country, with Russians being the largest minority. Nevertheless, high rates of intermarriage, a common religion, and strong historical bonds have created a unique relationship between Ukrainians and Russians that probably has no parallel in modern European history. In fact, the break-up of the Soviet Union did not lead to a massive exodus of ethnic Russians from Ukraine like it happened with those living in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In contrast, most Russians even supported Ukrainian independence. Despite the occasional outbursts of Ukrainian nationalism, ethnic Russians have been well-integrated into the society. Moreover, Russian has been the second official language since it is widely spoken throughout the country.

Yet, Moscow has been able to mobilize many ethnic Russians against the Ukrainian authorities. Putin and his local allies have capitalized on eastern Ukraine’s grievances about the highly centralized nature of the state and the parliament’s hostile attitude toward the Russian language. During April and May 2014, many pro-Russian protests ended up in occupying public buildings in eastern Ukraine. It is open to speculation the role of Russian secret agents in these events, but it is clear that there was some coordination between secessionist leaders and the Kremlin. 

Moscow has probably drawn valuable lessons from its experiences in Moldova and the South Caucasus during the 1990s. It was the time when the Russian army was covertly involved in ethnic conflicts supporting secessionist movements in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh and Transnistria. Ethnic mobilization often leads to confrontation with state authorities. If there is a military response, the civilian population will suffer enormously. The victims would be turned into heroes and the perpetrators would be accused of being inhuman. As a result, a cycle of violence is then unleashed that would fuel a campaign for secession and would eventually provoke a Russian intervention. This process can be summarized as follows: 

Ethnic mobilization state military response  violence against civilians

        glorification of victims and demonization of perpetrators more violence and campaign for secession Russian intervention

Eastern Ukraine clearly fits this model: it is an ethnically diverse region with a large Russian community that has been mobilized against state authorities. During 2014-2016, the Ukrainian government escalated the crisis by sending troops to defeat the separatist forces. Many locals rallied around the separatist leadership which blamed Kiev for the violence. As a result, the logic goes, Russia has a moral obligation to assist ethnic Russians and enforce peace. 

Simultaneously, the Kremlin has initiated a process of new identity formation among Russians living in Ukraine. Thus, Putin has frequently mentioned the term Novorossiya (New Russia) to describe the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine. It was first used during the tsarist rule to describe Russian-controlled territories of Ukraine that had been liberated from the Crimean Khanate at the end of the 18^th century. The renaming of Ukrainian territories indicates a long-term strategy to reinforce a sense of ethnic consciousness among the local population. It is not coincidence that the pro-Kremlin separatists have invented a flag and other state symbols for this new entity.

The Russian strategy of weaponizing ethnicity is deep-rooted, embedding a sense of injustice about the disintegration of the Soviet Union. While it is difficult to predict whether the Kremlin would intervene in another country, there is one former Soviet republic that already feels the heat of the war in Ukraine. Kazakhstan is the largest country of Central Asia, with a multi-ethnic population of 19 million and significant energy reserves. The Russian minority resides in the northern part of the country which shares a 7,644 km border with Russia. While its percentage has fallen since the early 1990s, the Russian minority still constitutes around 18 percent of the total population. Not surprisingly, Kazakhstan has increasingly attracted the attention of Moscow.

In early January 2022, following social unrest sparked by rising energy prices, a Russian-led peacekeeping force was deployed to stabilise Kazakhstan. Yet, President Tokayev has frequently mentioned the principle of territorial integrity in his speeches since the beginning of the Russian-Ukraine war. This is hardly a coincidence. For many years, the Russian far right has made territorial claims against his country. The Kremlin had never openly embraced such rhetoric because Kazakhstan was viewed as a loyal ally. However, last August, former president Dmitry Medvedev called Kazakhstan “an artificial country” and claimed that “Kazakhstani authorities implemented resettlement policies of various ethnic groups inside the republic, which can be qualified as the genocide of Russians”. While Medvedev later denied that he made the comments, part of the Russian political elite harbours some territorial claims against Kazakhstan. If the Putin doctrine is to be implemented again, Kazakhstan would probably be the next victim of Russian revisionism.

In conclusion, the invasion of Ukraine has produced fear and uncertainty among Russia’s neighbours. Putin’s weaponization of ethnicity could ultimately lead to more interventions. The United States has been viewed as a stakeholder in the former USSR because it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. While a U.S. military intervention in the region is highly unlikely, Washington could send a message of reassurance to former Soviet republics like Kazakhstan. The creation of a greater Russia, in which all ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking would live, cannot be written off as “a thing of the past”. Hence, the Biden administration needs to be more proactive and prepare for more crises like Ukraine. Ethnicity has become a factor of division and irredentism in the former USSR.

*Dr Emmanuel Karagiannis is a Reader in International Security at King’s College London

L'articolo Russia’s weaponization of ethnicity in Ukraine: Lesson Learned for Washington proviene da InsideOver.

The Russian army has historically understood victory as the product of human spirit and psychology. Hence, material factors such as technology are not decisive for victory.  In a way, this reflects the influence of Carl von Clausewitz on the Russian military thinking. The Prussian theorist, who served in the Russian army for two years, stressed the importance of “moral forces” (e.g., motivation, patriotism, will) in the final outcome of the war.  Consequently, it has been argued that the “Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battlespace is the mind” (Berzins, 2014). 

 In his famous article “The Value of Science in Prediction”, published in the military journal Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er [Military-Industrial Courier] in 2013, the Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov described his understanding of modern warfare. In his words, “the focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures”. This analysis did not come from nowhere. In recent years, there is a lively debate within Russian military circles about new forms of warfare and how the armed forces can efficiently practice them. The article examines the strategy of dezinformatsiya (disinformation) which includes the diffusion of narratives.

The strategy of dezinformatsiya

The dissemination of false or inaccurate information (disinformation) is a major component of the Kremlin’s strategy in Ukraine. It was developed during the Soviet period as a technique to intentionally distort the truth for political gains. The Kremlin’s propaganda machine now includes state-run TV and radio stations, the satellite channel Russia Today, and electronic media outlets. The Russian media have adopted a narrative that can be summarized as follows: “there was a fascist coup d’état in Kiev and now Moscow is obliged to help Russian compatriots”. In effect, the Kremlin has capitalized on the memories of heroic resistance against the German army during Second World War and the sacrifices of Ukraine’s population. Russian TV channels have repeatedly shown images of Nazi salutes and young Ukrainian men wearing neo-Nazi armbands.

Ukraine has been a multi-ethnic country, with Russians being the largest minority. Nevertheless, high rates of intermarriage, a common religion, and strong historical bonds have created a unique relationship between Ukrainians and Russians that probably has no parallel in modern European history. In fact, the break-up of the Soviet Union did not lead to a massive exodus of ethnic Russians from Ukraine like it happened with those living in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In contrast, most Russians even supported Ukrainian independence. Despite the occasional outbursts of Ukrainian nationalism, ethnic Russians have been well-integrated into the society. 

Yet, Moscow has been able to mobilize ethnic Russians against the Ukrainian authorities. Putin and his local allies have capitalized on eastern Ukraine’s grievances relating to the highly centralized nature of the state, chronic corruption, and lack of transparency. Moscow has probably drawn valuable lessons from its experiences in Moldova and the South Caucasus during the 1990s. It was the time when the Russian army was covertly involved in ethnic conflicts supporting secessionist movements in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh and Transdninistria.

Thus, the Russian media have often reported real or fabricated atrocities against civilians in the Russian-speaking areas to incite fear and anger. Simultaneously, Russian journalists have flooded the Ukrainian airwaves with constant messages about the illegitimacy of the new Ukrainian authorities. The Kremlin’s propaganda is facilitated by restrictions on press freedom and intimidation against independent journalists in Russia.

The disinformation strategy aims at changing public perceptions and promoting certain foreign policy goals like keeping Ukraine away from the Western camp and bringing the country closer to Russia. In effect, the Russian strategy operates at macro, meso and micro levels. Consequently, the target audiences are the West, the Russian society, and the citizens of Ukraine. The quantity of Russian propaganda indicates a significant investment that has taken place over the past years to influence the information environment (Thornton, 2015).

As soon as the Russian army invaded Ukraine, it also launched an international campaign to influence the global public opinion. For this purpose, the Kremlin has utilized pro-Russian political networks and alliances. The Kremlin hopes to counter narratives about Russian aggression and portray the intervention as a humanitarian operation. There is a growing number of pro-Russian political forces in Europe defending Moscow’s actions in Ukraine. For instance, the French far-right political party Front National has been accused of supporting the Moscow’s policy in Ukraine because it has received loans from a Russian bank. In 2015, Marine Le Pen even called for recognition of Crimea as part of Russia. In Greece, the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn has proposed an alliance with Russia based on the common Orthodox faith. 

Additionally, Moscow has used non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to make its case internationally. The Institute of Democracy and Cooperation is a Paris-based Russian-funded think thank that has largely subscribed to the Kremlin’s narrative in Ukraine. There are pro-Kremlin NGOs like the World Without Nazism (Mir Bez Natsizma) that have accused the Ukrainian government of tolerating anti-Semitism and Nazism.

Conclusion

Although it is obvious that the Russian leadership does not recognize the territorial integrity of Ukraine anymore, Moscow does not seek a total occupation of Ukraine. It rather strives for a ‘Finlandlization’ of the neighboring country. That means Ukraine could not join organizations like NATO and the European Union, which are largely viewed by the Russian political elite as geopolitical competitors.  Russia’s strategy against Ukraine cannot easily be repeated in other parts of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine is clearly a unique case due to the large territorially-concentrated ethnic Russian population. More importantly, Moscow’s strategy has been based on a calculated risk assumption that other great powers would not come to Kiev’s aid.

*Dr Emmanuel Karagiannis is a Reader in International Security at King’s College London’s Department of Defence Studies.  

L'articolo Russian invasion of Ukraine: The Strategy of Dezinformatsiya proviene da InsideOver.

The Horn of Africa region has been the scene of one of the longest insurgencies in the world. Although Somalia is at the epicentre of the crisis, Islamist militants have managed to spread their activities throughout the region. Despite numerous efforts to eliminate al-Shabaab, the group has remained active and dangerous.

The rise and endurance of al-Shabaab

The Islamist insurgency in Somalia dates back to the early 2000s when the Islamic Courts Union (al-Ittihad Mahakem al-Islamiya – hereafter ICU) was established in order to create an Islamic state. Although the ICU had managed to occupy most of south and central Somalia by the summer of 2006, the group was eventually defeated by the Ethiopian-backed Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The Mujahideen Youth Movement (Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen – hereafter Al-Shabaab) was formed sometime in 2006 by members of the ICU who vowed to continue the war against TFG and its Ethiopian allies.

The al-Shabaab is not a typical non-state armed group. Although it has lost territory over the years, the group has functioned as a proto-state in parts of the country still under its control. The implementation of a harsh version of Sharia has reduced violence and has increased sympathies among many Somalis who are tired of lawlessness and insecurity. Αl-Shabaab has even developed its own environmental policy. In July 2018, for example, the group declared a ban on single-use plastic bags because they are “a serious threat to both humans and livestock” and banned the logging of rare trees.

The endurance of al-Shabaab is phenomenal. The group still has thousands of experienced fighters across several provinces. Roland Marchal argues that the impressive survival of al-Shabaab is the result of widespread mistrust towards conventional clan-based politics among Somali youth, who seek a new ideological alternative. Al-Shabaab has presented itself as a vanguard movement fighting a war against literally everyone, namely corrupt locals (warlords), aggressive neighbours (Ethiopia, Kenya), and imperialist powers (the U.S. and Europe). This may be why the al-Shabaab insurgency has even attracted Muslims from abroad.

The role of the Somali diaspora

Al-Shabaab has recruited both diaspora Somalis and converts. In October 2008, Shirwa Ahmed, a Somali American from Minneapolis, became the first American suicide bomber to blow himself up outside a government compound in northern Somalia. In September 2010, a Somali American from Seattle launched a suicide attack against an African Union base in Mogadishu, killing 21 peacekeepers. According to an investigative report produced by the U.S. Congress’ Committee on Homeland Security, at least 40 or more American Muslims have joined al-Shabaab and 15 of them have been killed fighting in Somalia. In December 2012, Craig Baxam, a former US soldier converted to Islam, was arrested in Kenya while trying to travel to Somalia. He was self-radicalised through the Internet and decided to join al-Shabaab to defend territories controlled by the Islamists. Besides being foot soldiers, American Muslims have also risen to leadership positions. The American convert Omar Shafik Hammami (also known as Abu Mansuur alAmriki) was a senior member of al-Shabaab who published online his autobiography, The Story of an American Jihadi, describing his own radicalisation trajectory. To sum up, al-Shabaab has developed a sophisticated recruitment strategy to attract disenfranchised youth from Somalia and the diaspora alike.

The spillover effect

Since 2010, al-Shabaab has launched many attacks outside Somalia. The 2013 attack against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi attracted world media attention due to the presence of many Western civilians. In April 2015, a group of al-Shabaab fighters stormed the Garissa University campus in northeastern Kenya killing dozens of students. In early January of this year, al-Shabaab militants attacked communities in Kenya’s coastal Lamu region that borders Somalia. The group has extended its operations in the neighbouring country for two reasons.

First, the group does not see itself exclusively as a local group. Instead, it has developed a regional identity seeking to penetrate Muslim communities in Kenya. This is an ideological commitment that runs very deep. Al-Shabaab is the strongest jihadi-Salafi organisation in the region, but it has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has constructed a new transnational identity to promote its utopian vision of an Islamist takeover of the world. This new post-territorial identity aimed at creating a Homus Islamicus who would live and die by the Quran and the Kalashnikov. This new man would have allegiance to the umma and not his country of origin. Likewise, al-Shabaab has gone through a process of ideological transformation adopting a new modus operandi: the pursuit of a regional war

Second, the expansion of al-Shabaab’s reach can be viewed as a strategy of offensive defence against the United States and Kenya. In early January 2020, for example, a group of al-Shabaab assailants attacked a U.S base in eastern Kenya killing three Americans. It was obviously a response to the U.S. involvement in counterterrorism operations which have eliminated many senior al-Shabaab operatives. At the same time, Kenya is more than just a host to the U.S. Special Forces. Indeed, Kenyan troops have fought against al-Shabaab since October 2011. The Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) was launched by the Kenya Defence Forces to eliminate al-Shabaab from the border areas. The Kenyan forces later joined the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON) to stabilise the country. Since then, Nairobi has played an increasingly important role in overt and convert counterterrorism efforts in neighbouring Somalia.

The future of al-Shabaab

The group has suffered from several setbacks over years. Indeed, it has not been immune to internal disputes and external pressures. For example, ISIS criticised al-Shabaab for its allegiance to al-Qaeda and attempted to penetrate the organisation. Yet, the group has been able to maintain its autonomy, albeit as the al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate.

There are two factors that can have significant impact on al-Shabaab’s endurance and capacity to carry out attacks. First, the availability or lack of human resources can directly affect the group’s ability to execute operations. Second, ample access to diverse sources of funding can help al-Shabaab to sustain its presence in southern Somalia and possibly northern Kenya; without significant financial resources al-Shabaab would not be able to win many battles.

And, yet, al-Shabaab can survive if counterterrorism efforts start appearing more like foreign interventions. Islamist militancy is a symptom of a failed society that still shares a sense of common identity and national pride.

*Dr Emmanuel Karagiannis is a Reader in International Security at King’s College London’s Department of Defence Studies.

L'articolo Horn of Africa: The endless insurgency of al-Shabaab proviene da InsideOver.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a region plagued by conflict and instability. The Syrian civil war has turned into a regional crisis, drawing other neighbouring counties into it. Post-Mubarak Egypt has sought a new role as a leading Arab country. Israel has been involved in a shadow war with Iran and its Shia allies. Simultaneously, Turkey is becoming increasingly assertive in pressing its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. The United States, Russia, and France have shown strong interest to engage in the regional security architecture. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has not diminished Greece’s diplomatic capability to cope with new complex security environments. In fact, Athens has developed a new foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean that deserves some attention.

The new geopolitics of energy

Following the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, the need to reduce dependence on Russian gas exports has forced European governments to consider the Eastern Mediterranean as a potential source of energy. Israeli, Egyptian, and Cypriot gas exports could contribute to the diversification of supply. The Eastern Mediterranean has an estimated 122 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered, but technically recoverable, natural gas. Greece’s geographic location makes it a natural bridge between the energy-rich Eastern Mediterranean and the energy-consuming Western Europe.

Hence, Athens has negotiated with Nicosia and Jerusalem the construction of the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline, which would connect Israeli and Cypriot gas fields to Europe via Crete and mainland Greece. In January 2020, the three countries signed an agreement, although the final route is still under consideration. However, the EastMed pipeline project is feasible only with U.S. political and financial backing. The passing of the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 by the U.S. Congress sends that message.

As a result, Turkey feels even more left out and isolated. Therefore, Ankara needs allies to support its position. In November 2019, the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord of Libya signed a maritime agreement with Turkey in exchange of military support. The agreement has established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between the two countries by ignoring Greek islands, including Crete which is the fourth largest island in the Mediterranean. The legality of the agreement is disputed by the Libyan opposition but complicates the situation. Against this background, Athens was forced to reach out to Cairo. In August 2020, the two countries signed an agreement for a partial demarcation of maritime boundaries between Crete and the northern coast of Egypt.

But this is not all. The Cypriot government’s determination to exploit its offshore gas deposits has provoked a military reaction from Erdogan’s regime. Turkish drilling ships have repeatedly entered the Cypriot EEZ, accompanied by warships, to conduct various activities; yet, Nicosia has already licensed parts of its EEZ to foreign energy companies. Due to ethnic ties, Athens has supported the Republic of Cyprus in its confrontation with Ankara.

Energy geopolitics also play a role in Greece’s ambitious plans for renewable energy. In October 2021, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Egyptian Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi signed an agreement to build an undersea electricity interconnector via the new Greek-Egyptian EEZ. This project aims at bridging Europe and Africa by building a submarine power cable of total capacity 2000MW in either direction. In combination with the other interconnections that are developed in the region, including interconnections with Italy and Bulgaria, the interconnector with Egypt could transform Greece into an energy hub of cheap, environmentally-friendly energy.

Building realpolitik alliances

The partnership with Israel is the cornerstone of the Greek foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterraean. The deterioration of the Turkish-Israeli relations after the Gaza flotilla incident in May 2010 paved the way for a new era in Greek-Israeli relations. On the initiative of Netaniahu government, the two countries signed agreements in the field of security, energy, trade, and tourism. Jerusalem has shared Greek concerns about Turkish assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara has not only supported the Palestinians, but it has also offered moral support to Hamas. Not surprisingly, the air forces of Israel and Greece have conducted several joint exercises in recent years. Additionally, Athens plans to purchase advanced Israeli systems for its army, navy, and air force.

Moreover, Athens has built a new relationship with pro-Western Gulf countries. In late November 2020, Greece and the UAE signed a defence pact which includes a provision for mutual defence if one country’s territorial integrity is threatened by a third party. Three months earlier, Emirati F-16 jets were deployed at the Souda Air Base in Crete for training with the Hellenic Air Force. Abu Dhabi opposes Ankara’s attempt to dominate the Muslim world and supports the anti-Turkish opposition in Libya.

The UAE is not the only Gulf country that has developed military cooperation with Greece. In September 2021, Athens decided to deploy Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia for the protection of critical energy infrastructure. Some months earlier, Saudi F-15 jets flew to Greece to participate in joint military exercises. Like the UAE, Saudi Arabia has also opposed Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East.

At the same time, Athens has attempted to balance Turkey by forming an alliance with Paris, which views Erdogan’s Turkey as a geopolitical competitor. In late September 2021, Greece and France signed an agreement which includes a clause on mutual defence assistance. Consequently, the Hellenic Navy will soon purchase advanced French frigates to conduct operations far away from Greece’s shores.

An evolving scenario

Energy development and transportation in the Eastern Mediterranean is a game-changing factor. The Greek pivot to the Eastern Mediterranean serves as a test of capabilities and intents. Athens has formulated a new foreign policy by collaborating with key neighbouring countries, such as Israel and Egypt. Both Jerusalem and Cairo have shared Greek concerns about Turkish assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, the Athens has reached out to pro-Western Gulf countries that have their own problems with Turkey’s leadership and aspire to play a region in regional affairs. The French-Greek military agreement also confirms the growing commitment of Paris to regional security. This all amounts to a concerted, deliberate diplomatic effort to increase Greek presence in the volatile region of the Eastern Mediterranean.

L'articolo Greek foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Energy and Realpolitik proviene da InsideOver.