US President Donald Trump is reportedly planning to withdraw American troops from Somalia where the US military is fighting al-Shabaab, the local affiliate of the al Qaeda terrorist group. The move will unwittingly lead the US to cede strategic ground in East Africa to its global rivals including China and Russia. And in also provides a strategic advantage to the terrorist group, analysts warn.

Why is Trump Pulling American Troops from Somalia?

In planning the withdraw, the 45th President of the world’s largest military has said he wants to get his country out of “ridiculous endless wars, many of them tribal, and bring our soldiers home.”

The Pentagon has about 6,000 troops in Africa, including about 1,400 in West Africa, primarily in Niger. There are some 4,400 boots are in East Africa, with Djibouti hosting the largest American permanent military base in Africa. Restive Somalia has between 650 to 800 American boots acting as advisors to African forces combating al-Shabab.

Analyst: US Withdrawal Will Help al-Shabaab

According to Tricia Bacon, a Somalia specialist at American University in Washington and a former State Department counterterrorism analyst, a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia will give al-Shabaab a decisive strategic advantage in the conflict in Somalia and increase the terrorist threat in East Africa, including to Americans and American targets.

The reported directive to get out of Somalia comes weeks ahead of the Nov. 3 election in the US and hard on the heels of a declaration Trump made on Twitter early this October declaring that all US forces would be out of Afghanistan by Christmas.

‘There’s no Strategy, There’s Just Electioneering’

“There’s no strategy, there’s just electioneering,” says Kori Schake, who directs foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

It turns out the Somalia exit strategy of seeking to extract the U.S. from foreign military entanglements is broadly drawn from one of Trump’s campaign issues as he seeks to win four more years in the White House. He has discussed the possible troop reduction in Somalia with his top advisers, including Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley, as Bloomberg reported on Oct. 13, citing unnamed administration sources.

“Al Shabaab will be quick to capitalize on a US withdrawal that will no doubt cause US regional partners to rush for the exits. A short-sighted political decision to pull out of Somalia now would harm America’s future security,” says Katherine Zimmerman of The American Enterprise Institute a public policy think tank based in Washington.

“Withdrawing from Somalia, will also harm US interests in the great-power competition. Counterterrorism partnerships also help keep key states aligned with the US, and by deserting these partners the US cedes regional presence and influence in the Horn of Africa. China, which opened its first international military base in Djibouti in 2017, will seize the opportunity to add to its gains along the region’s strategic global waterways,” writes Zimmerman.

Top Military Brass Seek Distance from President’s Troop Withdrawal Timetable

According to the Times, even senior military commanders have sought to distance themselves from their commander in chief’s troop withdrawal forecasts, which have caught them off guard. And critics say that in seeking to fulfill a campaign pledge to bring American troops home from “endless wars,” the president is exposing the country to even greater national security risks.

It turns out Defense Secretary Markj Esper has undertaken a review of each geographic combatant command, its missions and assignments, and will assess whether allies and partner nations can take on more responsibilities, says Jonathan Hoffman, the chief Pentagon spokesman, according to the Washington Post, newspaper this Jan 20.
Esper believes European allies can take on additional missions and allow the Pentagon to focus more elsewhere, the senior US official told the Washington Post.

Sec Def Esper: ‘US Africa Command Remains Committed to Working with Somali and International Partners’

The review began with the region under US Africa Command, which includes the entire continent except for Egypt, which falls under US Central Command.

“While I won’t speculate on future force posture, I will tell you that US Africa Command remains committed to working with Somali and international partners to enhance long-term regional stability by degrading violent extremist organization threats and organizations in Somalia,” AFRICOM spokesperson Kelly Cahalan said in a statement sent to Stars and Stripes.

The US deployment to Somalia which begun in 2017 consists of a Navy SEAL-led team, whose core task is to train and build Somalia its own elite light infantry force.

Code named Danab, which in the Somali dialect means lightning, the force is widely thought to be too small to carry out operations in a country with a coastline almost as long as the east coast of the US.

The plan, US defense officials say, is to eventually build Danab into a force of 3,000 soldiers capable of clearing militants from villages and towns across Somalia.

The Threat from Al-Shabaab

At first al-Shabaab built networks to generate funds and recruits, largely refraining from attacks. That changed in March 2007, after the deployment of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), a regional force sent to prop up the body then recognized as the Somali government. The group has repeatedly struck countries that had dispatched troops to AMISOM.

And seeking international recognition al-Shabaab formally pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda In 2012.

But long before that, they fought Western-backed governments in Mogadishu as the group sought to impose its extremist interpretation of Islam across Somalia. In defending the fragile government, the US has largely relied on proxy forces, including about 20,000 African Union peacekeepers from Uganda, Kenya and other East African nations.

The US military estimates that Al-Shabaab commands somewhere between 5,000 to 7,000 fighters and still controls about 20% of Somalia’s territory. While the group remains focused on recapturing power and enforcing its variant of Islamic law in Somalia, it has long operated elsewhere in East Africa as well.

Somalia, a country that occupies a key strategic location in the Horn of Africa, has faced civil war, droughts and an influx of Islamist extremists over the years.

The Danab Advisory Mission

While US military advisers have been in Somalia since at least 2013, the effort has gotten a major boost under the Trump Administration, which volunteered to undertake the Danab advisory mission in 2017 in addition to expanding drone strikes, and in December reopened the American diplomatic mission in Mogadishu for the first time since 1991.

Trump authorized the military to carry out precision strikes targeting al-Shabaab in March 2017. Prior to that the US military was authorized to conduct airstrikes only in defense of advisers on the ground. The administration regards the fight against the militant group al-Shabaab in Somalia as critical to protecting America’s primary strategic allies in the region such as Kenya and Ethiopia which have been hit by al-Shabaab-linked terror attacks in the recent years.

Most US troops in Somalia are Special Operations forces stationed at a small number of bases spread across the country. Their missions include training and advising Somali army and counterterrorism troops and conducting kill-or-capture raids of their own.

What Is the US Mission in Somalia?

At his confirmation hearing in August 2018, Washington’s current ambassador to Somalia,(CONFIRM) former acting assistant secretary of state for African affairs Donald Yamamoto, outlined four goals for US policy in the Horn of Africa, namely: Support for the building of democratic institutions and holding politicians accountable; building effective Somali security forces; implementation of stabilization and economic recovery programs; and delivering humanitarian assistance across the whole of Somalia.

These goals were broadly consistent with the Trump administration’s Africa strategy, publicly released in December 2018, which emphasized countering threats posed by “radical Islamic terrorism,” advancing US commercial interests on the continent, and using aid efficiently and effectively.

On April 13, 2019, the Trump Administration signed an executive order extending a presidential declaration of a national emergency concerning Somalia for another year, calling the Islamist insurgency plaguing that country an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the US.

At the time US defense officials said the mission in the country was likely to take years to complete, as CNN reported.

The commitment to the East African nation at the time came after the President had signaled a desire to reduce US troop levels across the globe and as the administration was in the process of withdrawing forces from Syria.

While officials say the effort is making progress, they tell CNN that the US training mission is likely to not be completed until 2026, showing the major mistake of Trump wishing to pull the troops out now.

“A US drawdown will cause other partners to withdraw, mirroring similarly reduced commitments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Al-Shabaab will overwhelm the remaining local security forces and possibly collapse the weak Somali government. A strengthened al-Shabaab imperils regional security. Al-Shabaab is already a well-established threat to Kenya, including the country’s tourism industry. Al-Shabaab has also signaled its intent to target Ethiopia, which may become vulnerable due to domestic turmoil,” CNN reported.

L'articolo Gross Misjudgment by President Trump as He Seeks Withdrawal of Troops from Somalia proviene da InsideOver.

Despite major foreign players in the telecommunications sector making large investments in Sub-Saharan Africa, this market populated by 1.1 billion inhabitants remains a minefield. As regulatory inconsistencies including political interference from government functionaries linger on as intractable bogeymen, creating a disincentive allure for probable investors.

Telecom Expansion in Africa

Late this July Orange SA, France’s largest telecom operator with a footprint in 15 African countries launched mobile banking in Africa beginning in Côte d’Ivoire with plans to expand into Burkina Faso, Senegal and Mali. A month earlier the telco announced it was considering expansion opportunities in Nigeria and South Africa, the continent’s two biggest economies.

Meanwhile Africell Holding SAL, a Lebanese telecommunications company this March qualified to be licensed as the fourth telecommunications operator in Angola, another example proving how contagious the continent is for foreign telecom companies.

The Market is Not Stable

However peril lurks on the African horizon, making it more difficult for potential foreign firms interested in investing in one of the world’s fastest growing regions. Examples abound.

On June 18, 2018, Ethiopia, one of the remaining bastions in the world heading towards a command economy, unprecedentedly announced plans to off-load 30 to 40 percent stake in Ethio Telecom, a state-run monopolistic telco, to peer groups residing outside this federalist state. What is singularly enticing about the Ethiopian market is its subscriber base of 44 million people, making it the biggest single-country customer base of any operator in Africa.

By June 2020, Ethiopia — the continents’ fastest growing economy — had received 12 expressions of interest (EOI) from nine telecom and two non-telecom operators looking to secure a partial stake in Africa’s oldest telco.

Foreign firms involved included Etisalat from the Emirates, Orange S.A. from France, Saudi Telecom Company from Saudi Arabia and Vodafone Group plc. a British multinational, with the rest rooted in Africa. Then the unexpected happened mid this August.

The Ethiopian government suspended the entry of foreign telecom companies into the country, dampening the States privatization momentum spearheaded by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, a reformist Nobel prize laureate. Also it was not lost to global telecom watchers that the arbitrary nixing of the privatizing process, in big measure, encapsulates the capriciousness nature of the regulatory ecosystem in sub-Sahara Africa. This is a factor that understandably plays out as a major disincentive to generic foreign investors interested in dialing into Africa’s lucrative telco sector.

The Telkom Kenya Fiasco

Earlier in the neighboring state of Kenya — Sub-Saharan Africa’s third biggest economy — the local subsidiary of Bharti Airtel, an Indian global telecommunications firm, witnessed its merger plans with Telkom Kenya, a partly state-owned firm, collapse after the latter pulled of the plug sighting regulatory hurdles stretching back to February 2019.

Telkom Kenya CEO Mugo Kibati said his company was adopting an alternative strategic direction and would no longer be pursuing the proposed joint venture transaction.

“Considering the challenges experienced in getting all the approvals required to complete the transaction, the company has simultaneously been evaluating alternative strategic options to strengthen its position and offering within the market,” he said.

Regulatory Nightmare

Indeed, regulatory ambiguity is ubiquitous within Africa states, making it an unduly difficult market for foreign telco companies, long used to predictability. It’s a negative phenomenon that also denies the continent much needed revenue that ordinarily would accrue from licensing.

In addition, the standard technology transfer process that most African companies crave for routinely sputters away leaving consumers at the mercy of archaic technology. Furthermore, political interference, by African regimes in the running of telecom companies is also another dicey minefield that diminishes the appetite among foreign firms to invest in the sector.

For example, in November 2018, the Tanzanian government — which has a 40% stake in the local unit of Bharti Airtel called Airtel Tanzania — brazenly pooh-poohed IPO plans of the African unit saying it intended to enter into further negotiations with the parent company over the ownership structure.

To resolving the stand of, on January 2019, Bharti Airtel capitulated under pressure resolving to transfer a 9% stake in Airtel Tanzania to the Tanzanian government.

Further Telecom Troubles in Uganda

Also in neighboring Uganda, the government late the same year issued an order to telcos operating in the country, ordering them to list a minimum of 20% of their shares on the Ugandan Stock Exchange, ostensibly to promote local ownership of telecommunication companies.

It was noteworthy that all telcos operating in Uganda then and now were and are foreign-owned.

Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni argued the order would conserve Uganda’s foreign exchange since a portion of the firms’ dividends payout would be retained in the country.

But Wim Vanhelleputte, CEO of MTN Uganda — the local unit of South Africa’s MTN Group, which is the largest telecom company operating in Africa’s biggest coffee exporting nation — argued the government’s move, requiring foreign-owned telecom firms to list on the local stock exchange as a panacea to boost local ownership.

“Going onto the stock exchange is not necessarily a guarantee that you have localized the shareholders … the best way to localize is a private placement,” Vanhelleputte told Reuters, adding that instead of the listing requirement, the government should allow foreign firms to sell stakes to vetted local investors via private placements.

Turns out the rebut was a telling indication the move by the septuagenarian President did not sit well with telco investors for it understandably involved a great deal of coercion.

South Sudan’s Situation

A worse scenario meanwhile had taken place March 20, 2018, in South Sudan, the world’s youngest state, which saw the government of President Salva Kiir — a testy character — shutter the operations of Vivacell, owned by Lebanon’s Fattouch Investment Group, then the country’s largest telecom operator.

The official reason given for carrying out the extreme act was that the company hand’t complied with regulations, failing to pay over $60 million taxes since its inception in 2008.

But in his comments Pagan Amum — the former secretary general (SG) of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) — said that in fact the country’s ruling party Vivacell had already paid the prerequisite license fee.

“There is no way Vivacell can be required to pay for another license,” he told VOA.

Reportedly, as SG, Amum helped negotiate the original deal with Lebanon’s Fattouch Investment Group – Vivacell’s majority owner – giving the SPLM party a minority share in the telecom firm. Conveniently most of its shareholders were top government officials, creating an indelible perception the business was playing obeisance to the authorities there for survivals sake.

In business circles this is akin to playing the Russian roulette, particularly for professionally run outfits that abhor the slightest scent of corruption and skullduggery in a market.

Dogged by a lingering perception that in Africa the invisible hand in the telecom market is compromised by bad choices, the continent needs to redress the situation if positive momentum is to be regained.

L'articolo Africa’s Telecommunications Market a Minefield for Foreign Firms proviene da InsideOver.

Derek Chauvin, 44, a white police officer at the U.S Minneapolis Police Department has now been caught up in the labyrinthine issue of geopolitics involving Sub-Saharan Africa and the world’s largest economy at a time when China’s growing influence in the region is irking the Trump Administration.

The Floyd Murder’s Global Ripple Effect

Chauvin is presently facing up to 40 years in prison for murdering George Floyd, a 46-year-old unarmed and cuffed black man in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Chauvin, a 19-year veteran at the Police department now unwittingly finds himself thrust on the global stage epitomizing a negative racial caricature that pigeonholes the white race as being predators of people of color, particularly towards members of the black race.

With Sub-Saharan Africa being the second most populous continent on earth with an estimated population of 1.2 billion people and disproportionately black, this May 15 incident happening 14,108 km away rekindled a strong feeling, that the US under the leadership of Donald Trump has an uphill task navigating the issue of race relations globally.

Africa: Talking Truth to Power

Unlike in the past when the leadership of the African continent courted diplomacy and behind-the-scenes engagement as a strategy of resolving sticky issues revolving around the super power, this time round, the continent has embraced the unprecedented mode of talking truth to power, a probable indication of how low the fortunes of the US have sunk on the continent.

“The paternalistic attitude being displayed by President Donald Trump towards emerging nations has muddied the warm diplomatic relations that hitherto existed and Africa is following the cue by calling out an Administration that has intent of shunning the rest of the world as it perpetrates an inward looking foreign policy referred to as America First, which is unilaterally and isolationist in nature,” said Dr. Godfrey Muriuki, a Senior Lecturer at the University of Nairobi.

‘Africa Demands a Full Investigation into this Killing’

For now, within Africa, Chauvin’s sordid action is being interpreted as a manifestation of the endemic, entrenched and institutionalized racism, prevalent within US, that victimizes people of black color.

With the chairman of the African Union (AU) Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, condemning the murder saying, “The AU Commission firmly reaffirms and reiterates its rejection of the continuing discriminatory practices against Black citizens of the United States of America.”

While, Kwesi Quartey, a top AU official saying “This is one too many. We may be black, but we are people too. Africa demands a full investigation into this killing.”

An emboldened, Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo also spoke up loudly on Twitter, writing that:
“Black people the world over are shocked and distraught by the killing … it cannot be right that in the 21st century the U.S., this great bastion of democracy, continues to grapple with the problem of systemic racism.”

“We stand with our kith and kin in America in these difficult times, and we hope that the unfortunate, tragic death of George Floyd will inspire a lasting change in how America confronts head on the problems of hate and racism,” Akuffo-Addo added.

South Africa Calls for ‘Amicable Solution’

South Africa’s ruling party the African National Congress (ANC), while deploring the rising racial discrimination in the US, is calling for “an amicable solution” to what is turning out to being a racial impasse with the ongoing protests and riots.

“It’s deplorable that almost 70 years since racial segregation was abolished in America, people of color are still routinely slaughtered for the color of their skin,” the party remarked in late May.

China vs. USA in Africa

Close watchers of the sub-Saharan Africa say the change of attitude towards the US is driven in big measure by the emergency of China as the biggest trading partner in the region. In 2009 China supplanted the US as Africa’s biggest trading partner. In 2019 China-Africa trade hit the $170 billion mark which was a big contrast compared to the US trade with sub-Saharan Africa for the same period which registered $39 billion.

And there is a reason for this seismic change of fortunes. China’s approach towards Africa has eternally been trade oriented. The region morphed to became one of the top destinations for Chinese investment after Beijing introduced the so-called “Go Out” policy in 1999 which, encourages private and state-owned business to seek economic opportunities abroad.

China has for example expanded African railways across the region from Kenya in East Africa to Nigeria in West Africa; currently its building a massive hydropower plant in Angola, in addition to building Africa’s longest railway connecting Ethiopia and Djibouti; it has also built the headquarters of the AU in Addis Ababa and the West African regional bloc ECOWAS in Abuja.

US Approach to Africa

In contrast, the US has instead viewed Africa as a battlefield where it can confront its enemies, whether its terrorists after 9/11 or the Soviets during the Cold War, or presently the Chinese brands ascendancy. Invariably, other States have taken a cue from China and as a result Sub Saharan Africa has copious suitors to choose from.

An exemplar is the Africa-India trade which grown 10-fold from US $5.3 billion in 2001 to $62 billion in 2018, — making India Africa’s fourth biggest trading partner, according to the UN Economic Commission for Africa.
Russia also is readying itself to have a piece of the action in Africa.

From October 23 to 24, 2019, the first Russia-Africa Summit was held on in Sochi, Russia, co-hosted by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took place. A total of 43 heads of state or government were in attendance. Putin emphasized “state sovereignty” and willingness of Russia to offer aid or trade deals “without political or other conditions”, saying tongue-in -cheek that “an array of Western countries are resorting to pressure, intimidation and blackmail of sovereign African governments,” adding Russia was well suited to help African states .

‘S**thole Countries’

Worsening relations between the US and Africa was a condescending statement made by President Trump in January 2019 during a meeting with lawmakers in the Oval Office to discuss the terms of a potential bipartisan deal to resolve the status of 800,000 young immigrants protected from deportation by the Obama administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, where he derogatorily refereed to Africa states as “s**thole countries,” indelibly cementing the perceived American view of Africa.

When immigration from African countries came up, Trump reportedly complained, “Why are we having all these people from shithole countries come here?” He then suggested bringing immigrants to the United States from Norway, a country that, many observers noted, is overwhelmingly white.

Awkwardly, Trump had announced an expanded travel ban in early February of that year, affecting nearly a quarter of Africa’s 1.2 billion people — including Nigeria, the continent’s biggest economy and its most populous nation. This helped create a lingering perception that people of Africa extraction were been singled out.

Pompeo’s Mission to Salvage Africa Ties

Seen as a last ditch effort aimed at mollifying Africa, the Trump Administration sent U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo later that same month as part of his first foray into sub-Saharan Africa ostensibly to convince its leaders to shun Chinese investments and, instead, look to Washington and American companies for collaboration.

He traveled to three countries, namely Senegal, Angola and Ethiopia where he ironically offered zero investments, initiatives or assistance, sending a mixed signal of the true intentions the US has with Africa.

Ever since January 20, 2017, when Trump became arguably the most powerful man on the planet, Africa has had no reason to count the US as a reliable partner and its diplomatic representative Pompeo and his predecessor Rex Tillerson have visited fewer than ten African countries — a decline from the nearly two dozen African states visited by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who served under President Obama for four years.

Indeed, the unraveling of the Floyd incident only strengthen the perception in the minds of Sub Saharan Africans that so long as Trump is the US President, the African race remains vulnerable and discriminated against. This is not a good omen for a country that seeks to re-gain its glory in a region with some of the world’s fastest-growing economies.

L'articolo Murder of Black Man in US Strains Fragile Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa proviene da InsideOver.

Africa’s Sub-Sahara region’s burgeoning debt is creating a wedge between the Bretton Woods Institutions and other lenders with China singled out for perpetrating a debt–trap that has soared by nearly 150% in the past 10 years, making the continent’s debt load unsustainable.

Soaring Sub-Saharan Debt is Becoming Unsustainable

Total external debt for sub-Saharan Africa jumped nearly 150% to $583 billion in 2018 from $236 billion 10 years earlier, according to World Bank data. Many now worry the debt load is becoming unsustainable as the average public debt increased from 2010-2018 by 40% to 59% of GDP.

In Zambia for example, government debt — including publicly-guaranteed obligations — is set to increase to 96% of GDP in 2020, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF is worried about rising debt in Africa, with about 40% of countries on the continent at distressed levels, Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva said in an interview with Bloomberg TV this past November.

“In some cases we are concerned, in others we see that investing is going to pay off over time,” she said, adding that “debt on its own is not bad, it is bad when it goes for the wrong things, and when it goes with a speed that the economy cannot handle … in cases where debt is dangerous — take Zambia — we do say, you need to really get a handle on your debt. In other cases, like Ethiopia, we say you do need to renegotiate some of your debt.”

Why is Sub-Saharan Debt Reaching Such Disastrous Levels?

Debt levels in the region have been rising as governments struggle to collect and grow revenue while increasing their budgets. South Africa’s ratio is projected to reach 81% of gross domestic product by 2028 and Kenya recently doubled its debt ceiling to match the size of the entire economy.

“We do advise Kenya to be somewhat more cautious in building debt, but we have seen good macroeconomic policies in Kenya,” Georgieva said. “Our program with the country, our engagement with the country, by and large, are just as positive.”

Presently, seven countries — Eritrea, Gambia, Mozambique, Congo Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, South Sudan and Zimbabwe — are in severe debt distress according to the IMF, while nine others including Ethiopia, Ghana and Cameroon are at high risk of debt distress.

It’s a problem across the low-income developing world but is particularly acute in the sub-Sahara region, where the fast-growing debt accumulation has outpaced other developing areas. The trend has been driven by a number of factors, including cheap money in more advanced economies so investors have been keen to seek yield in African countries promising up to 8% or 9% on Euro bonds, said the IMF managing director in a panel discussion at the World Bank in Washington, DC this mid Feb as reported by Quartz Africa.

Lack of Transparency, Bad Debt Management and Inability to Handle the Crisis

The IMF and World Bank are especially worried about the lack of transparency, weak debt management, and a lack of capacity in an increasing number of low-income countries.

“We are faced with a duality. Sophistication of lending instruments is going up. Multiplicity of sources is going up—and capacity to handle is falling behind,” says Georgieva.

Both the World Bank and IMF are jittery about the impact of China which, while still not the largest lender, has become a hugely influential source of capital in African countries that have few options due to their weak economic balance sheet. This is particularly true because China offers a convenient package of funding and execution through its state-owned enterprises for much-needed infrastructure projects across the continent. The problem, said World Bank president David Malpass, is the lack of transparency.

“One of the practical problems we’re dealing with right now is some of the new lenders, the non-Paris Club lenders—and so I guess when we say that, people should sometimes read China into that,” said Malpass. “They’ve escalated their lending, which is good in a way. We want more lending into developing countries. But…oftentimes their contracts have a nondisclosure clause that prohibits the World Bank or private sector from seeing what the terms of the contract are.”

Blaming the Asia Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the African Development Bank (AfDB), for “a tendency to lend too quickly and add to the debt problem of the countries,” Malpass added: “In the case of Africa, the African Development Bank is pushing large amounts of money into Nigeria, South Africa, and others without the strongest program to sustain it and push it forward.”
However Dr. Akinwumi Adesina, AfDB president says Malpass comments are “inaccurate and not fact-based.It impugns the integrity of the AfDB, undermines our governance systems, and incorrectly insinuates that we operate under different standards from the World Bank.”

The AfDB argues the World Bank has significantly larger operations on the continent of $20.2 billion in 2018 compared with the AfDB’s $10.1 billion.

China’s Aggressive Investment in Africa

China meanwhile is aggressively seeking investments and contracts around the world, and perhaps nowhere is this more visible than Africa, where Chinese companies have won contracts to build dams, roads, stadiums, airports and railways. In country after country, governments have borrowed heavily from China to pay for these projects.
China’s investments in Africa are central to President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) trillion-dollar program initiated in July 2019 to build infrastructure and extend Beijing’s influence around the globe, connecting at least 68 countries to Chinese trade routes. In 2019 it delivered a whopping $60 billion African aid package, further consolidating its robust economic influence.

According to the China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI), China is now the largest bilateral creditor in the region, accounting for 20% of Africa’s external public debt.

Typically, Chinese loans assume the form of cash for resources. In return for financing and building the infrastructure that poorer countries need, China demands favorable access to their natural assets, from mineral resources to ports. The recipient nations usually suffer from low credit ratings and have difficulty obtaining funding from the international financial market.

China, however, makes financing relatively easily available – albeit with certain conditions and less ‘paperwork’ than conventional sources. China’s ‘tied aid’ for infrastructure usually benefits Chinese companies, while its loans are in many cases backed by natural resources. Through this method China achieves the twin goals of economic penetration and strategic leverage.

America’s Response to China’s Growing African Presence

The Trump administration has accused China of engaging in predatory lending aimed at trapping countries in debt, acquiring strategic assets like ports and spreading corruption and authoritarian values.
US officials have condemned such moves, with former US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson accusing China of “predatory” lending behavior.

“The US pursues and develops sustainable growth that bolsters institutions, strengthens rule of law and builds the capacity of African countries to stand on their own two feet,” Tillerson said in a 2018 speech at George Mason University. “This stands in stark contrast to China’s approach, which encourages dependency using opaque contracts, predatory loan practices and corrupt deals that mire nations in debt and undercut their sovereignty.”

In Kenya, for example, reports indicate that its Government had used its prized port of Mombasa as collateral for a $3.2 billion loan, used to construct a 470-kilometer (292 miles) rail line between the seaside city and the capital Nairobi. In a leaked report linked to the auditor general’s office, Kenya was said to risk losing its port if it defaulted on the loan, with the Exim Bank of China taking over the port authority’s “escrow account” to regain revenues.
Djibouti, a strategically located state at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East has become a crucial hub in China’s BRI and has accumulated a public debt worth around 88 percent of the country’s overall $1.72 billion GDP, with China owning the lion’s share of it, according to a report published in March 2019 by the Center for Global Development. Some reports even indicate that Beijing now holds over 70 per cent of Djibouti’s GDP in debt.

Sadly, with all these China loans to this east Africa nation, there are real fears it might sign off its port to China after borrowing more money than it can pay back.

L'articolo Soaring Sub-Saharan Debt Drives Wedge Between World Bank and Lenders proviene da InsideOver.

U.S. sanctions that have strangulated Sudan’s economy for the past 23-years are likely to soon be lifted, after the impoverished northeastern African country grudgingly acceded to paying $30 million as compensation to 17 American sailors who died in 2000 when their ship, the USS Cole, was attacked by suicide bombers while refueling in the port of Aden in Yemen. The attack also wounded 39 sailors.
The bombing, attributed to the al Qaeda terrorist group foreshadowed the devastating September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, with a US court in 2014 concluding that Sudan had provided Qaeda with aid leading to the attack and awarding the families $35 million in compensation. Sudan finally paid the compensation on February 7.

Sudan’s Current Situation

Sudan’s announcement of a compensation deal comes as the African nation undergoes a fragile transition after the fall last year of president Omar al-Bashir, who ruled with an iron fist for nearly three decades. Sudan’s interim ruling council led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok is now seeking to shake off decades of diplomatic and economic isolation. Being removed from the American list of state sponsors of terrorism would be a significant step.

“It was the former regime that supported terrorism and the Sudanese people revolted against it. These sanctions have caused tremendous suffering to our people,” Hamdok — who was appointed prime minister in August — said during an address at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) this past September.
“Therefore we call on the United States to remove Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and to stop punishing the people of Sudan for crimes committed by the former regime,” he added.

‘It is Time to Remove Sudan from the List of State Supporters of Terrorism’

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has called for Sudan, which is Africa’s third biggest producer of gold to be removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism, as Khartoum slowly returns to the international fold.

“It is time to remove Sudan from the list of state supporters of terrorism, and to mobilize massive international support to enable Sudan to overcome its challenges,” the UN chief said Feb. 10 during an address at the annual African Union summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The US government added Sudan to its list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1993 over allegations that then-President Bashir’s government was supporting “terrorist” groups.

The designation made Sudan technically ineligible for debt relief and financing from the IMF and World Bank. Washington began a formal process to de-list Sudan in January 2017, but this was put on hold when Sudan’s mass protests erupted a year ago. The uprising toppled Bashir and eventually forced the military into a power-sharing agreement with civilians.

Pompeo: ‘Sudan is a Cooperative Partner of the United States on Counter-Terrorism’

According to the United States’ most recent Annual Terrorism Report — written while Bashir was still in office — Sudan is no longer a sponsor of international terrorism.

“Notwithstanding its history, countering terrorism is today a national security priority for Sudan, and Sudan is a cooperative partner of the United States on counter-terrorism, despite its continued presence on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List,” US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said recently that the Trump administration had considered lifting the terrorism designation for Sudan “for quite some time.”

“The Sudanese reminded me that they would love to get off that list and we always measure twice and cut once before we remove someone from a list like that,” Pompeo remarked.

The $300 Million 2012 Judgment Against Sudan

In 2012, a Washington judge ordered Sudan to pay more than $300 million to the victims’ families of the attack on the USS Cole. Other judges went on to order certain banks to make Sudanese assets available to start paying the sum.

However in March, 2019, the US Supreme Court overturned on procedural grounds a lower court’s ruling ordering Sudan to pay damages to the families of the victims.
Pompeo said that the USS Cole issue was one element in the terror designation but said that no decision has been made.

“We’ve been looking at whether to lift the designation of state-sponsored terror on Sudan for quite some time,” Pompeo told reporters as he flew to the Munich Security Conference this Feb. 13.

Sudan: Former Home of Osama bin Laden

In 1993, Washington listed Sudan on its terrorism blacklist for its alleged support of Islamist groups. Bin Laden used to reside in Sudan from 1992 to 1996. Sudan’s new authorities have made it a key priority to get the country removed from the blacklist.
Officials in Khartoum say the country’s economic revival has been stunted primarily due to its blacklisting, which deters global investors. In October of 2017, the US lifted its decades old trade embargo imposed on Sudan, but kept the country on the terrorism blacklist.

Sudanese officials and business people argue that the blacklisting has restrained international banking and transfer of funds, in turn severely impacting the country’s economy. Sudan’s chronic economic trouble — led by high inflation as well as shortages of fuel and foreign currency — was the main trigger for nationwide protests against now ousted leader Bashir. Bashir was removed by the army in a palace coup last April, but the country’s economic woes persist as the new authorities battle to rein in inflation and unemployment.

IMF Predictions on Sudanese Economic Prospects

The IMF predicts Sudanese economy will contract by 2.3% this year, with the country’s current external debt standing at about $60 billion, on which the debt payments are reportedly about $3 billion. Hamdok says the country urgently needs $8 billion to turn the economy around and an additional $2 billion to halt the falling Sudanese pound.

“Public external debt is around $51 billion,” said Stuart Culverhouse, head of sovereign & fixed income research at Exotix, citing 2016 IMF data. “(This) is 88 percent of GDP. The ratio is likely to be higher now because of a weaker currency.”
The IMF stated in its December 2017 report that Sudan was eligible for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) plan – an IMF and World Bank initiative launched in 1996 to help poor countries struggling with external debt obtain debt relief.

“Economic conditions in Sudan have been challenging since the secession of South Sudan in 2011 and the loss of the bulk of oil production and exports, which have compounded the difficult external environment,” the IMF report said.
Once a country has overhauled its debt burden with bilateral and multilateral lenders, it must come to an agreement with private sector lenders before being able to access international capital markets again.

Sudan’s Plan to Come Back From Financial Ruin

Last October Sudan agreed to a roadmap to “rehabilitate” the country with the Bretton Woods institutions including with the African Development Bank, Ibrahim Elbadawi its finance said.

The plan involved structural reforms and as part of the deal Sudan would not have to pay its lenders debt arrears. There could also be non-financial support.
Sudan’s inclusion on a list of countries deemed sponsors of terrorism by the United States makes it ineligible for debt relief and financing from lenders like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, cutting off a crucial source of finance.
According to Elbadwi negotiations with other creditors would begin in March.

“Based on that, Sudan’s debt relief program will start by the end of 2020,” he said, without giving further details.

Elbadawi says “friends of Sudan” will fund its 2020 budget, and said the ministry has submitted financing requests for 20 projects to donors, without identifying who those donors were.

A “friends of Sudan” meeting will be held in Khartoum in early December, he said. Another meeting for donors will be held in April. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have given Sudan $3 billion in aid, agreed soon after Bashir was ousted in April, throwing a lifeline to Sudan’s new military leaders at the time.

Sudan’s new transitional government, formed as part of a three-year deal agreed by military and civilian leaders in August, has been working to remove Sudan from the U.S. sponsors of terrorism list, to potentially open the door for foreign investment and it is clear that this could make a big difference in terms of sanction relief.

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An American-brokered deal is now set to end a nine-year-old stalemate involving three regional powers in Africa that has delayed construction of the continent’s biggest hydroelectric power plant and dam.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

Begun in 2011, the construction of the 6,000-megawatt Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in Ethiopia’s northern highland may eventually become a reality after Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan agreed to sign a preliminary agreement. The deal is set to be complete by end of February, paving the way for completion of the project after four days of talk in Washington late this January.

The US Treasury has been sponsoring the talks with the participation of the World Bank since last November after Egyptian President Abdelfattah al-Sisi sought intervention from his U.S counterpart Donald Trump, who has been a close ally.
Additionally, on two occasions this January officials from the three countries delayed signing of the deal, resolving the dispute.

‘Close To Obtaining Solutions To The Issues’

“Since the involvement of the observers, it is encouraging that we [Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt] seem to get close to obtaining solutions to the issues that used to take extended time,” Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was quoted saying by the Ethiopian News Agency (ENA) when he gave a speech at a hearing session within the Ethiopian parliament, this past February 3.

Ethiopia’s Minister of Water, Irrigation, and Energy Sileshi Bekele said Feb. 7 that Egypt and Ethiopia had “solved the main disputes,” related to the dam as a consequence of the US-led mediation, according to the Asharq al-Awsat, an Arabic international newspaper headquartered in London.

Dam Still Not A Done Deal

However, the nations still have to finalize several aspects of the dam, including its safety and provisions for the resolution of disputes, according to a statement released after the U.S.-brokered deal.

“Documents to be signed will be further deliberated by legal team supported by technical team. This will continue beginning February to complete comprehensive document within 30 days,” Bekele recently wrote on Twitter.

How The US Is Helping

After years of trilateral negotiations failed, the US hosted several rounds of talks in Washington with ministers from the three regional powers and the World Bank, eventually clearing the way for the final stages of the dam agreement.

The dam is being built near the Ethiopia-Sudan border along the Blue Nile tributary in Ethiopia’s northern highland region which accounts for 90% of Egypt’s main source of water for consumption, industry and farming. Egypt is concerned that filling the reservoir behind the dam could significantly reduce the amount flowing into its borders from the upper Nile basin.

Egypt’s Perspective

Even without taking the dam into account, Egypt—which is largely a desert—is significantly short of water. It imports about half its food products and recycles about 25 billion cubic meters of water annually. Cairo worries that the dam’s reservoir could lead to a reduction in the freshwater flow of the Nile into its territory. The Nile River flows through Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, but the largest share of the river runs through Egyptian territory.

Why Has The Dam Caused A Dispute?

The dam has been the source of a major dispute since it was announced. The main contention is the dam’s reservoir, which has a capacity of more than 74 billion cubic meters and will be flooded to form an artificial lake.

Cairo has consistently voiced its concerns that building the dam could harm its 55.5 billion cubic meters share as 80 percent of Egypt’s share comes from the Blue Nile.
Egypt seems reluctant to recognize any potential benefits, and openly dismissive of Ethiopia’s right to develop its own water resources. Research shows that the effects of filling the dam may initially dent Egypt’s water supply but that this trend will reverse once the dam is fully operational. Egypt can improve its irrigation practice and demand management to reduce the impact of reduced flow.

Another study suggests the dam will actually provide considerable long term benefits to both Egypt and Sudan by providing steady flow and reducing evaporation losses.

In the past, Ethiopia has said it wants to fill the reservoir as quickly as possible — ideally within the next seven years — to ensure the dam can operate at full capacity as soon as possible, an idea opposed by Egypt, fearing that if the dam is filled too fast, it could badly affect amount flowing into the country.

In turn, Egypt has accused Ethiopia of dismissing its concerns about water security, especially in the case of drought.

Experts: Cooperation On Dam Is Possible

International experts say it should be possible to reach an agreement on the joint management of the river system and that there are examples from other river basins such as the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan.

“Agreements for filling the GERD should consider the possibility of droughts occurring during the filling process, which may include arrangements on how the three countries might adapt under these conditions,” said Kevin Wheeler, of the Environmental Change Institute at Oxford University. “Considering shared drought management strategies over the long term—after the filling process is complete—is also very important.”

Egypt’s farmers are already facing dry fields because of water scarcity due to a combination of factors such as rapidly growing population, climate change and antiquated irrigation systems. The United Nations has predicted Egypt will face an “absolute water crisis” by 2025.

Also the Egyptian government had feared that Ethiopia’s dam will make the situation worse.

Egypt Wants To Project Power In The Region

However, some also believe Egypt’s protests are about asserting its power in the region.

“It’s not about technical [aspects], it’s not about harming the downstream countries,” Meressa Kassu, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, was quoted by Deutsche Welle (DW) saying this January.

“I think showing [their] power and hegemony in the region could be [Egypt’s aim],” he said. “In the Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, it is clear that any [upstream] countries will not significantly harm the downstream countries,” added Kassu.

Initially Addis Ababa was saying Egypt wantd to control Ethiopia’s water system and had rejected Cairo’s call for international mediation. With Ethiopia’s envoy to London, Fesseha Shawel Gebre saying: “Egypt wants to have veto power, telling Ethiopia what it can do.”

Ethiopian economic researcher Amen Abdela has also dismissed Egypt’s claims.
“The claims of the Egyptian government are not, by any means, supported by evidence,” he told DW.

The The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)

Diplomatic concerns include the fact that, for a long time, Egypt and Sudan have believed that they have more right to the waters of the Nile than other countries. Previous rounds of negotiations, of which there have been many, had failed to reach a comprise.

The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), an intergovernmental partnership of 10 Nile Basin countries set up in 1999 to foster cooperation among the 11 countries that share the river, has had its work hindered by Sudan and Egypt’s attitude, among other issues.
The biggest mega-structure on the Nile River is the Aswan High Dam built in Egypt which has stood for the last 60 years as a symbol of Egypt’s hegemony on the river, and provided Egypt with power, water security and a strategic geopolitical advantage.

GRED Could Make Ethiopia Africa’s Largest Power Exporter

When completed, the GRED will become the centerpiece in Ethiopia’s bid to become Africa’s biggest power exporter including challenging the status quo set by the Aswan High Dam. Both dams, then, will tower over different portions of the Nile River, starkly representing the dependence of the two nations on the river’s water.

In Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous nation, constant power shortages stifle economic growth. The hydropower plant is expected to bring the country’s electricity generation to more than triple its current capacity. Aside from a $1 billion loan from China for a transmission line—the government projects a $4.02 billion cost for the dam—with more than $1.3 billion already spent.

Invariably Ethiopia sees the dam as fundamental to its economic development. Because of this, the government wants the dam completed as soon as possible as it seeks to transform the country into an industrial nation and boost the economy.

“The government expects a return on this investment,” says economic researcher Abdela. “The issue that Ethiopia should complete the project [on time] is very important, otherwise prolonging the period of [construction] will further impact the economy.”

Ethiopia’s Current Power Grid Instability

Just half of Ethiopia’s population of 105 million is connected to the main grid. Even those with access to electricity, including those living in the capital Addis Ababa, have to contend with frequent blackouts.

The government also hopes to export surplus electricity generated by the dam to neighboring nations. During the January meeting the three countries reached an agreement on only three points of contention regarding the construction of the controversial dam.

Consensus Reached At January Meeting On GRED

During this January’s meeting a consensus was reached including a plan for filling the dam in stages, and on mechanisms for dealing with droughts, prolonged droughts, and years of water scarcity during the process of filling the dam, and during the dam operation.

The US drafted a document of agreement regarding the three above-mentioned points and was unilaterally signed by Egypt. Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry said that three primary elements, which are a large percentage of the final agreement, had been agreed upon paving way for the next round of talks.

“All remaining issues will be addressed during the next discussion. There is a need for political intervention on them, and there is recognition that within 30 days a comprehensive final decision will be reached,” Shoukry said in a televised address.
The joint statement, released after three days of meetings in Washington however failed to give details on how long it would take to fill the dam, saying only that it would start in the 2020 rainy season and occur in stages.

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Former Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi was the embodiment of the African strongman, whose 24 year reign exemplified the excess associated with autocracy. But when he eventually died this February 4 in a Nairobi hospital, the jury was magnanimous, crediting him with grudgingly leaving power and avoiding the scourge of civil strife associated with rogue regimes.

Moi’s Death And Legacy

Moi was 95 and his death was expected. In the past three months the country was aware the fallen leader was intermittently undergoing treatment in both local and international hospitals for ailments related to old age.

“We are aware that the best in medical science and clinical medicine was deployed to save Mzee’s (reverence title for an old man) life. But our creator had decided that his time had come,” said Raymond Moi, a son of Kenya’s second President, talking on behalf of the extended Moi clan.

Disproportionately, Kenya is a very youthful country with those aged between 18 and 35 making up 75% of the country’s estimated 49.7 million people, according to the World Bank. As a consequence, a majority of the population is clueless about the sort of leader Moi was. Furthermore, Kenya’s education curriculum⁠—which is supposed to act as a dependable repository of history⁠—has been adulterated irreparably to mask the excess visited upon the country by its leaders.

‘Young People Are Completely Ignorant Of That History’

“Young people are completely ignorant of that history. The egregious human rights of Moi’s time are completely sugar-coated,” says Wachira Waheire now a human rights activist, who suffered physical torture and incarceration from1986 to 1989. His crime was reading a treatise of Karl Marx while at university.

“I read Marx in college as part of my studies. They said that because I read him, I was part of [the anti-government group] Mwakenya,” Wachira explains.

Moi’s Checkered Legacy

Evidently, the wrath of Moi’s rule did not spare even those thought to be insulated due to their supposed camaraderie. A case in point was the 1990 murder of Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Ouko. A government inquiry into the death carried out in 2010 and presented to parliament five years after it was written, said the murder was carried out in one of Moi’s official residences.

For the most part, Moi⁠—who reportedly embraced Christianity in 1934 at age 10⁠— leaves behind a checkered legacy darkened by an overzealous kleptocracy that endemically defined his reign that oversaw the brazen emasculation of the rule of law, hollowing out of the national economy including ostracization by the international community for behaving badly.

A prime example is a 1988 constitutional amendment that junked the security of tenure for judges. As a result the judicial bench became an appendage of the executive, hamstringing the independence of the judiciary. Then, in June 1982, the National Assembly amended the constitution, making Kenya officially a one-party state. However, in December 1991, parliament repealed the one-party section of the constitution, allowing political pluralism after a 10 year hiatus.

With multiparty elections held in 1992 and 1997 witnessing cumulatively 2,000 people die and hundred others displaced from their homes as KANU unleashed a wave of unprecedented violence targeting perceived opponents. But the opposition was divided and disorganized, the balloting was marred by widespread violence, and Mr. Moi was re-elected both times

‘A Legacy Of … Nepotism, Corruption And An Economy On Its Knees’

As expected, both local and international media have pulled no punches providing their negative view of Moi. The local Star daily newspaper wrote that: “After a 24-year reign, Moi left a legacy of incurable ethnicity, nepotism, corruption and an economy on its knees.”

The New York Times, wrote: “Investigations after Mr. Moi stepped down found that his government had lined the pockets of his family and its allies with as much as $ 4 billion. The biggest fraud in Kenya’s history, the Goldenberg affair, in which the central bank paid incentives to a company for exporting gold, diamonds and jewelry that did not exist, cost taxpayers billions and sent Kenya’s economy into a tailspin in the early 1990s.”

It has since been publicly revealed the Goldenberg scam cost the country an estimated $800 million USD and to date nobody has been called to account for the monies, leave alone persecuted, underlining the larceny and thieving culture inherent in Kenya’s Second Administration.

Githongo: Moi Was Corrupt Beyond Belief

John Githongo, CEO of Inuka Kenya, a local anti-corruption organization says, “During his tenure as president from 1978 until 2002, Moi engineered one of the most sophisticated and ruthless political patronage machines on the continent—patronage that was fed by graft. A 2007 Wikileaks expose showed that more than $2 billion of government money was looted under Moi’s rule.”

How Did Moi Gain Power?

Upon the death in office of Jomo Kenyatta, a daunting oligarch and the country’s founding father in 1978, Moi⁠—then a self-effacing vice president who had held the perch for 12 years⁠—was elevated through popular acclamation, becoming President the same year. After that he went ahead, to win five successive elections held in 1979, 1983 and 1988, when he repeatedly led his Kenya African National Union (KANU) party, a monolithic colossus to victory.

Moi Consolidates His Power

In order to consolidate his hold on power after a 1982 failed coup attempt by lower cadres of the Kenya Air Force soldiers Moi led a groveling parliament to abolishing political pluralism that same year, leaving KANU as the country’s sole political party. Diplomats said he was transformed from a cautious, insecure leader into a tough autocrat following the attempted coup.

“I’d like ministers, assistant ministers and others to sing like a parrot after me. During Kenyatta’s time, I sang only “Kenyatta” until it came a time when people said ‘He has nothing expect singing Kenyatta ‘.I did not have ideas of my own. Who was I to have ideas of my own? I was in Kenyatta’s shoes, and therefore I had to sing, whatever Kenyatta wanted.

“Do you think Kenyatta would have retained me had I sung a different song? So you play my tune. Where I put a full stop, you also put a full stop. That is how we can progress. When time comes for you to be big, you play your tune and the masses will sing after you. That will enable us to progress,” said Moi in November 1984, giving the clearest indication that he would not brook dissenting views.

Supporters, meanwhile, have praised Moi for keeping Kenya stable when neighbors crumbled into civil war, and for peacefully leaving power in 2002 after 24 years as head of state⁠—a rare occurrence in Africa at that time.

“I forgive those who have hurled insults at me,” Moi said in his last national day speech in 2002. “If I have said anything that has hurt your heart, forgive me.”

L'articolo Strongman Of Kenya Politics Dies, Leaving A Murky Legacy proviene da InsideOver.

Ethiopia, Africa’s oldest independent nation will this August 16 hold competitive national elections for the first time in 30 years. But the country’s fragmented opposition is casting aspersions on the putative exercise leading close Addis Ababa watchers to question whether this former Marxist leaning nation is ready to embrace plural democracy.

And further emboldening an impression the polls may flounder is the existence of an inextricable and pervasive ethno-nationalist fervor that eternally threatens to unravel the relative peace being experienced within this East Africa nation.

Beginning in 1991 – when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a left-wing ethnic federalist political coalition, took over the reins of leadership after mounting a 17-year guerrilla warfare ending 17 years of totalitarian rule- Ethiopia has held regular parliamentary elections but, with one exception, none were competitive.

On December 2019, the EPRDF, once Africa’s largest, and arguably most powerful, political party and richest, thanks to its business interests, was dissolved, courtesy of a brazen initiative led by the country’s new prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, 43, – heralding, according to its supporters, an entirely new mode of politics.

Prime Minister Abiy – who, in April 2018, became the first Oromo to hold the post – has introduced a number of reforms since assuming office, as well as overseen the release of jailed dissidents, the unblocking of websites and moves to liberalize the economy.

The Oromo are the country’s largest ethnic group, accounting for 34.5% of Ethiopia’s 105 million strong population in a state that has 80 disparate ethnic groups.

In its stead, the Prosperity Party (PP) emerged, doing away with a four-party ethnic coalition structure that drew in the Tigrayan Peoples’ Liberation Front, the Amhara National Democratic Movement (later Amhara Democratic Party), the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (later Oromo Democratic Party), and the Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement.

To its supporters, the PP offers an escape from the divisive and increasingly deadly ethnic politics which characterized three decades of EPRDF rule. To its critics, it is the thin end of the wedge towards abandonment of the 1995 constitution and the principle of ethnic self-rule – ethnic federalism – which it enshrines. And there are fears that it could also tear an already desperately polarized country even further apart.

Already, the country’s Minister of Defence Lemma Megerssa, a close ally of the Prime Minister, has gone public to oppose the folding up of EPRDF.

Megerssa, a former president of the Oromia regional state – Abiy’s home region – told the VOA Afaan Oromo service last week that he opposed the new party and that the ruling party in Oromia – the Oromo Democratic Party, ODP, had issues to resolve before entering such an arrangement.

Ethiopia is a federation subdivided into 10 ethno-linguistically based regional states. Apparently, the ninth regional state, Tigray, was not present when the EPRDF was done away with because it was opposed to the merger and subsequent dissolution of the EPRDF, calling it an illegality.

Also, violence in the regions has forced 2.4 million people out of their homes, according to the United Nations, and delayed both a national census and local elections. Opposition politicians have repeatedly warned that election delays could fuel unrest and dent the democratic credentials of Abiy.

William Davison, Ethiopia analyst at the International Crisis Group think-tank, said the opposition could pose a real challenge to the ruling party.

“An overall majority for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s party is by no means guaranteed, especially if the opposition is allowed to freely campaign,” Davison said.

Security and seasonal considerations came up as major concerns expressed by leaders of political parties vying for seats in the coming elections.

“Ethiopia as a nation is not ready to hold general parliamentary elections,” said outspoken opposition politician Lidetu Ayalew of the Ethiopian Democratic Party.

Further, a splinter faction of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) called Shane is reportedly waging war in a southwestern area of Kelem Wollega in the Oromia region.

“The current security situation in Ethiopia does not allow for the conduct of a credible election,” Lidetu said.
One opposition political party said Aug. 16 was unsuitable because it is a fasting day for the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and falls during the rainy season.

“There are concerns that need to be resolved and addressed specifically on the schedule,” Desalegn Chane, president of the opposition National Movement of Amhara, told Reuters.

While the OLF leader Dawud Ibsa -whose party was previously considered a terrorist movement by the Ethiopian government until July 2018 when the ban was lifted together with two other groups, as part of the Prime Minister’s efforts to bring various opposition groups back into Ethiopian politics, has opposed the electoral date.

“August is a rainy season when rivers will bulge, making it difficult for people of the countryside to move about,” he said, preferring the elections be held in or before June – prior to the onset of the main rainy season.

According to the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), 50 million Ethiopians are expected to cast their votes with 80 political parties expected to tussle over the coveted prize. The NEBE chairperson Birtukan Mideksa said her organization is seeking $129 million from government for purposes of running the polls.

Jawar Mohammed, an influential political activist widely thought to be harboring ambitions of challenging Abiy, suspects the ruling party sought the August 16 date so as to leverage on incumbency with the intentions of “locking out” opposition parties especially from reaching rural areas.

In one of his tweets he wrote: “August is a No Go for election. By the way many suspect planning to hold the election in August is meant to favor the ruling party that controls state’s transportation resources and hinder poorly resourced opposition from accessing rural areas.And ironically as early as 6 months ago, ruling party leaders were saying election will be held in August. Coincidence?”

Jawar, who played a central role in having Abiy elected as Prime Minister, has since joined the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) based in the Oromia Regional State, Ethiopia’s largest and most populous one.

It is also the home region of Prime Minister Abiy and Jawar who incidentally broke ranks with the former after the PM told parliament that media-owning personalities who were fomenting unrest with their outlets.

Jawar said the claims were an attack on him understandably because he is the owner of Oromia Media Network, an influential ethnic television station based in Minnesota, US.

Last year, Jawar’s claims of a security breach on his person stirred widespread protests across the region with young people denouncing Abiy and pledging support for Jawar.

While the NEBE has downplayed the concerns raised by the opposition saying it was going to liaise with federal and regional governments to deploy logistics, the world will be watching how Sub-Saharan Africa’s fastest growing economy the election date conundrum.

L'articolo Great Challenge for Ethiopia’s Fledgling Democracy. proviene da InsideOver.

It’s unlikely warring parties in South Sudan will beat a February 22 deadline by when the formation of a transitional government of national unity is expected after the country’s main opposition group said it would not participate in the exercise unless the UN deployed its forces.

Speaking in Juba, the capital, mid-January, Angelina Teny, head of the influential defense committee within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), said a compromise to have the UN deploy its forces in the world’s youngest state was a pre-condition for the party to participate in forming a government.

“The SPLM-IO has said we will form the government on February 22 and we did put forward the proposal to enable the formation of that government,” Teny told reporters in Juba, adding that “on the critical issues of security, we came up with a compromise. We need to sit down and look at the deployment of troops in some areas until such a time that we can deliver the unified forces for the delivery of the security services.”

“This is a very big compromise for us. For us, we see it like risk-taking because already, we see that the government has shown reluctance in the implementation of security arrangements and unification of forces,” said Teny who is also the wife of Dr Reik Machar, the de facto leader of the SPLM-IO and a former Vice-President of the country.

The party led by Machar, a former first Vice President, is demanding to have 4,000 troops deployed to “sensitive areas” of the country ostensibly as a surety against the routine implosion of civil war.

Already 7,000 non-combat UN troops under the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) are in South Sudan, but are only stationed in Juba.

However, the current peace deal signed on September 12, 2018, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, known as the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) does not contain a clause incorporating a protection force, a phenomenon that may make the proposal of the opposition untenable.

An earlier agreement signed in August 2015, but which floundered, had provisions for regional countries to deploy 4,000 troops which were to be known as the Regional Protection Forces or RPF.

Turns out, South Sudan is the world’s newest country, gaining independence in 2011 after a decades-long civil war. Yet the euphoria of that moment was short-lived, ending in December 2013 when an internal political dispute between South Sudanese President Kiir and his then vice president Machar exploded into a lengthy ethnic conflict.

The spark for the 2013 conflict lay in Machar’s alleged plans to challenge Salva Kiir as leader of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Kiir subsequently sacked Machar and his supporters from the cabinet.

According to Ashley Quarcoo, an international development practitioner and visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a foreign-policy think tank based in the US, the scourge of negative ethnicity weighs’ heavily on the on-going internecine bloodletting.

“Longstanding ethnic divisions within South Sudan’s security forces led to the easy fragmentation of the military on each side of this political dispute. Those from the Dinka ethnic group supported Kiir, and those from the Nuer ethnic group joined Machar. The conflict spread quickly, and ethnically motivated violence between the Dinka and the Nuer engulfed large parts of the country” she says.

Coincidentally, the Dinka people form with 35.8% of the country’s 8 million population form the largest ethnic bloc in South Sudan while the Nuer are the second largest group representing 15.6% in a country with approximately 60 disparate tribal groups.

In August 2015, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a trade bloc made up of eight countries in the volatile region, brokered the first peace effort, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan. But the deal immediately ran into obstacles from both sides, particularly after Kiir issued a unilateral decree, increasing the number of states from ten, as laid out in the peace agreement, to 28 and then 32.

Understandingly the opposition faction led by Machar objected to Kiir’s decision to increase the number of states, saying it violated the peace agreement. On January 31, 2016, IGAD issued a communiqué calling on the parties to the peace agreement to suspend implementation of the 28 states system and formed an inclusive commission to review it.

South Sudanese civil society groups also raised objections in a joint letter, noting the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan had referred to 10 states and did not authorize the president to create new states or dissolve existing ones.

While the international community also criticized the President’s decision, though the response was both mild and delayed. In January 2016, the Troika drawing in, the US, the UK, and Norway released a joint statement expressing concern about delays in forming the Transitional Government of National Unity and observing that the 28 states decision had “created an obstacle to consensus.

A report by the country’s Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC), a 14-member body created under the R-ARCSS, showed few Sudanese favored the stance taken by the government, for the increase of number of states is widely seen as subtle strategy of Balkanizing the state in favor of the Dinka.

Another sticking point involves the merger of the militarizes into one national army.

Intermittent peace deals have routinely collapsed due to hardline stances taken by the warring parties, an estimated 400,000 people have been killed and over four million displaced from their homes, according to the UN in the past seven years.

Ahead of the February 22 deadline, Teny also has rebuked the mediators under the umbrella of IGAD for suggesting discussions on the number of states be continued well into the transitional government, for at least 90 days more.

“To us, they are automatically proposing an extension of the pre-transitional period. We felt that we want to make that clear so that we are not misunderstood,” she said, referring to the proposal announced mid this January after attending the IGAD-led consultative forum in Juba.

“The legislative assembly cannot be formed without having the issue of the number of states.” SPLM-IO has instead proposed for a committee made of representatives from African countries in the Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC), known as the C5 and members of the three main donors countries known as the Troika -Norway, UK and US- to deliberate on the issues within two weeks.

One of the key issues is how main installations like the airport, roads, delivery of humanitarian assistance and safeguarding of attacks on civilians and officials will be assured during the transitional period. SPLM-IO presumes soldiers from all sides will be in non-combat positions as they train for a merger into a professional army.

Whether the warring parties will reach a compromise before February 22 remains a major conundrum.

L'articolo Sticking Points May Delay Formation of Unity Government in South Sudan proviene da InsideOver.

Twenty-one Kenyans have been killed by the Al-Shabaab terrorist group since December last year, a telling indication that the Somali-based criminally inclined group has rebooted its murderous streak, leading the Administration of President Uhuru Kenyatta to change track in countering the insurgents.

This January 17, the Kenyan President announced security officers will begin mounting sting operations to flush out Al Shabaab operatives in the North Eastern and Southern regions of Kenya which have witnessed a spike in terrorist attacks since December.

“We will respond robustly by mounting the operation against the operatives and sleeper cells especially in the North Eastern and Coastal regions. I also expect the officers to use proactive measures in dealing with the attackers,” said Kenyatta during a meeting with security bosses in Mombasa, the capital of the country’s southern region.

The president said key financiers would be called out and would be listed nationally and internationally in a bid to cripple their operations. “Illegal deals fund Al Shabaab. I also expect more on dealing with the sponsors and the recruiters,” he added while singling out trade in contraband as a direct contributor to the Somalia-based terror group.

He also directed the administration officers including regional and county commissioners to engage politicians and religious leaders within communities to ensure that terrorists do not get space to make inroads with locals.

“Government administrators and police are to engage local politicians, religious and opinion leaders within vulnerable communities as a proactive strategy to deny terrorism entry points into radicalization, especially of our youth.”

Arguably, Kenya is frequently attacked by Al-Shabaab militants because it hosts several UN agencies and is a regional economic powerhouse that once attacked draws international media attention, experts say.
“Kenya has many foreign diplomatic missions and is the wealthiest in the region, so an attack creates global attention,” Yusuf Serunkuma, a research fellow at Uganda-based Makerere University says.

He said Kenya has many media houses with foreign journalists located in its capital Nairobi, so an attack on the country receives wide media coverage, which Al-Shabaab exploits to spread its propaganda. “Frequent attacks on Kenya also confirm that al-Shabaab still can strike beyond its borders in Somalia,” he says.

The Somali-based Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group has previously stated that it attacks Kenya in retaliation for its contribution to peacekeeping in Somalia. Kenya initially sent its troops to Somalia in October 2011 after Al-Shabaab terrorists reportedly abducted aid workers in the country. But it later decided to contribute troops to the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to help bring peace to its northern neighbour.

Other regional experts say the frequent attacks on Kenya are aimed at shaping public opinion in the country so that citizens pressure their government to withdraw troops from Somalia.

Andrews Atta-Asamoah, a security expert on the Horn of Africa, believes that withdrawing Kenyan troops from Somalia will not stop Al-Shabaab from continuously attacking its neighbour.

“Kenya is a major tourist destination and an attack on the country affects different nationalities that frequent is what Al-Shabaab wants,” he says. He also believes that high unemployment among Kenyan youths makes them vulnerable to extremist groups.

“The presence of sleeper cells and sympathizers of Al-Shabaab among radicalized Kenyans also makes it easier for the group to launch attacks in Kenya,’’ he says.

The recent increase in attacks by Al-Shabaab in northern Kenya has raised concern that the Somali terror group may be weakened but is not yet defeated and is still working hard to raise its profile in global jihadi circles.

Many analysts say different factions within the group have different objectives, though Al-Shabab as a whole continues to pursue its broad aim of establishing an Islamic state in Somalia. A major cleavage among the group’s leaders divides those known as nationalists, who largely seek to oust the central government, from militants with transnational aims.

Ms. Bronwyn Bruton, an expert on Al-Shabaab at the Atlantic Council, an NGO based in the US that galvanizes US global leadership and engagement in partnership with allies and partners, says hard-liners within the group have gained prominence in recent years.

“People who are still calling themselves Al-Shabaab are more and more committed to the idea of sharia law,” she says “The unifying idea of Al-Shabaab is opposition to the Western-backed government.”

In areas it controls, Al-Shabaab enforces its own harsh interpretation of sharia, prohibiting various types of entertainment, such as movies and music; the sale of khat, a narcotic plant that is often chewed; smoking; and the shaving of beards. Stoning’s and amputations have been meted out to suspected adulterers and thieves. The group bans cooperation with humanitarian agencies, blocking aid deliveries as famine loomed in 2017. This forced some eight hundred thousand to flee their homes, according to the United Nations.

Counterterrorism experts say Al-Shabaab has benefited from several sources of income over the years, including other terrorist groups; piracy; kidnapping; and extortion of local businesses, farmers, and aid groups, among others. The Eritrean government has in the past been accused of financing the group but it denied these claims.

Presently Al-Shabaab has built up an extensive racketeering operation, with checkpoint taxation on illicitly traded charcoal bringing in upward of US $7.5 million annually despite a UN ban on Somali charcoal exports in place since 2012.

In recent years, Al-Shabaab has increased its reliance on smuggling contraband sugar across the border into Kenya, bringing in millions of dollars annually. Kenyan forces have been accused of involvement in the scheme since 2015.

The UN Security Council authorized the African Union to lead a peacekeeping force in Somalia, which is known by its acronym, AMISOM, in early 2007. Its primary mandate was to protect the country’s transitional government, which was set up in 2004 but had just returned to power in Mogadishu.

Neighbouring Uganda was the first nation to send forces into Somalia under AMISOM, and it maintains the largest contingent in the regional force, at more than six thousand troops. Other military forces come from Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. In total, AMISOM comprises around twenty thousand troops.

It remains to be seen whether the current strategy by the Kenyan government will cripple the operations of Al-Shabaab within East Africa’s largest economy.

L'articolo Kenyan Government to Use Sting Operations to counter Al-Shabaab Terrorist Group proviene da InsideOver.